



The Anthropology of Parliaments offers a fresh, comparative approach to analysing
parliaments and democratic politics, drawing together rare ethnographic work by
anthropologists and politics scholars from around the world.
Crewe’s insights deepen our understanding of the complexity of political institu-
tions. She reveals how elected politicians navigate relationships by forging alliances and
thwarting opponents; how parliamentary buildings are constructed as sites of work,
debate and the nation in miniature; and how politicians and officials engage with
hierarchies, continuity and change. This book also proposes how to study parliaments
through an anthropological lens while in conversation with other disciplines. The dive
into ethnographies from across Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, the Middle East
and the Pacific Region demolishes hackneyed geo-political categories and culminates
in a new comparative theory about the contradictions in everyday political work.
This important book will be of interest to anyone studying parliaments but
especially those in the disciplines of anthropology and sociology; politics, legal and
development studies; and international relations.
Emma Crewe is Professor of Social Anthropology at SOAS, University of
London, UK.
‘With characteristic wit and imagination, Emma Crewe casts her anthropological eye
across the spectrum of parliamentary politics. This book is the product of those
enquiries – it is sparklingly fresh, insightful, and as ever with this author, more inter-
ested in illumination than condemnation.’
Jonathan Spencer, University of Edinburgh, UK.
‘This is a pioneering anthropological exploration of parliaments from the UK to East
Africa and South Asia, through a rigorous, imaginative and productive crossing of dis-
ciplinary boundaries. Emma Crewe’s study of the sociality of parliaments – elections,
representation and scrutiny – is complemented by a fascinating account of the culture
of parliaments – their rhythms, riffs and rituals – both drawing on a formidable volume
of primary research, from the constituency level to every imaginable aspect of parlia-
mentary practice.’
Niraja Gopal Jayal, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India.
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In the state opening of the 1908 Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul, seen on the
cover of this book, the representatives are uniformly male, formal, and clothed in
black. Globally our political institutions remain blighted by male dominance. But if
you consider the various constituencies these politicians represent, you might also
see this as a vast and diverse empire on show. In contrast to European colonial
nations, it is claimed that all Ottoman subjects were citizens with the same political
rights and were represented in the Parliament (Türesay 2013). These Ottoman
Members of Parliament discussed Westminster in a debate during the following
year, and were disinclined to emulate it:
ABDÜLAZIZ MECDI EFENDI (KARESI): Do the parliamentary system and equality
reign supreme in England?
KOZMIDI EFENDI (ISTANBUL): I’m not referring to England here. I am an Ottoman,
was born an Ottoman, and was brought up an Ottoman. Anything else simply
doesn’t concern me.
ABDÜLAZIZ MECDI EFENDI (KARESI): The parliamentary system in England is 225
years old. And there’s not a single Indian member of Parliament.
KOZMIDI EFENDI (ISTANBUL): You don’t seem to understand England very well.
India is a colony.
(ibid)
A few years earlier the Westminster Parliament had had a solitary Indian MP,
Dadabhai Naoroji, the Honourable Member for Finsbury Central. Born into a
poor Parsi family in Bombay, he was a fierce critic of British colonialism and its
economic rapacity. With justice: he concluded that a quarter of India’s revenues
were being appropriated by the UK. A founder member of the Indian National
Congress in 1885, he decided ‘it is in Parliament (London) that our chief battle has
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to be fought’. Incredibly, he won his seat in 1892, effectively one man representing
the interests of the whole Indian subcontinent in the UK Parliament: 287 million
people. Towards the end of his term he asked in the House of Commons:
suppose this House was cleared of Englishmen and filled with foreigners, or
perhaps shut up altogether, all power and plans in their hands, eating and
carrying away much of the wealth of this country year after year, in short
Britain reduced to the present condition and system of government of India,
would the Britons submit to it a single day if they could help it?1
If you look at who sits in parliaments, much is revealed about a nation. And yet, although
social anthropologists have been studying politicians and other leaders, since around the
time Dadbhai Naoroji won his seat, they have rarely ventured into parliaments. The
study of politicians requires an understanding of the highly skilled work involved in
doing politics. It is an arena of power, a jostling for public recognition and an encounter
with difference. It involves struggling with friends and foes to realise aspirations, share
resources, discipline people or thwart opponents’ goals. It happens informally in families,
communities, organisations, in the street, and formally within institutions across and
between nations. Of those institutions, it is parliaments – politicians’ workplaces – that
tend to be the most ritualised, exposed and complex political spaces within a governance
world, although courts are serious competitors. It is a place where hierarchies, power,
conflict, rituals, rules, are always found alongside loyalty and disobedience.
Although it is work, politics is also entangled with people’s social, cultural and
emotional life so it can be intoxicating, addictive, unsettling or, at times, deadly
dull. These entanglements make it difficult to write about. If you focus on only
individuals doing politics (politicians, for example) and the institutions that allow
them to organise themselves (political parties or parliaments) and the outputs
they produce (acts, budgets, regulations, policies, reports) but fail to look at
processes – the relationships, communication and emotions that keep their
show on the road – then you can only ever achieve an impoverished analysis. To
understand parliaments, you have to look at the complex range of connections,
networks and exclusions they form across nations.
My purpose in this book is to summarise what anthropologists have written
about parliaments so far and provoke questions for future research, both for those
already studying parliaments as well as those who might be tempted, enticing new
anthropologists (and ethnographically inclined scholars from other disciplines) into
these absorbing fieldwork sites, to continue with what previous anthropologists
have already shown: that anthropology can be useful to the study of parliaments. I
make no claim to be comprehensive, holistic or systematic about explaining par-
liaments in this book and my own fieldwork site of Westminster gets more of my
attention than others. I can do no more than offer some anthropological brush-
strokes about what parliaments are, what people say about them and do in them,
continually asking who, what, where, when, how and why, always worrying about
what I/we don’t know. I hope this approach to the study of parliament offers a
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tapestry – a weaving of ideas about past, present and future, both broad patterns
and depth through detail, narratives with plots and characters, and both context-
specific and generalisable theories. I aim to offer insight into both parliaments and
anthropology at the same time.
A map of this book
This book is primarily written for researchers and students, especially those who
already study parliaments or might do so in the future. If interested in researching
parliaments ethnographically, then this is the book for you. You are most likely
to be an anthropologist, as I am, or from a discipline that already dominates the
study of parliament (history, political science, gender studies, public administra-
tion and legal studies). But you may be trained in a discipline that has mostly
stayed away but would enrich our understanding (psychology, organisational
studies, theatre studies, linguistics …). I have distilled what has been written so far
about parliaments through an anthropological lens so that you have an intro-
duction to these exotic and unfamiliar institutions. For these disciplines, I’m
explaining my version of anthropology and aiming to offer novel insights into
institutions that you may not have considered from an entangled socio-political
and cultural angle. It may interest teachers and students of politics and maybe a
few with a keen interest in following politicians as an utterly compelling intel-
lectual spectator sport.
To watch your own democracy, or better still to participate in it, requires
knowledge of the arena at the centre and anthropology sheds light on parliaments
through a particular and illuminating filter. Take the Westminster Parliament, as I
have done in this book a great deal (because it is the one I know best): anthro-
pology has helped me to wrestle with a series of questions and puzzles about
gender, whipping, emotion, ritual, conflict and political work left unsolved by
political science.
To find your way around this book, it might help if I explain its narrative
structure. Each chapter can be read on its own, offering a way to inquire into a
specific theme, while overall I am making an argument about how to study poli-
tical organisations through an anthropological lens. I will explain this general
argument first before I introduce you to each chapter. After a brief introduction to
parliaments, anthropology and how I came to be doing anthropological research on
parliaments, I present this book in three parts. The first is about how politics is
entangled in sociality, the second grapples with culture and the third is about
power and knowledge. The first part relies on a partly conventional way of
understanding politicians’ work as processes of campaigning, representation and
scrutiny of government, in the hope that this way of conceiving of it will be
recognisable to everyone. But I question the idea of MPs’ work as divisible into
roles. Typologies classifying MPs into these ‘roles’ miss the entanglements between
them, the difference between claims they make and what happens in practice, and
diversity among MPs. My conclusion on summarising these strands of politicians’
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work is to note the overlaps, contradictions, conflicting pressures and endless sha-
peshifting they have to do to adjust to multitudes of audiences.
So, Part I leaves me with this empirical question: if the work of MPs creates this
confusing mess of pressures and expectations, which they have no choice but to
respond to in democracies, then what are the continuities and breaks across the
various encounters and sites? In Part II I offer a systematic way to study how MPs
work by looking at the performance of rhythms through time and space, the riffs
of meaning and how riffs and rhythms are organised by and through rituals, both in
parliament and outside. This could be a way of considering the differences between
MPs but also the patterns of interaction through speeches, debates, documents,
meetings, conferences, ‘surgeries’, digital channels and so on. To understand both
the individuals and groups, we need to research the relationships between them
and consider what formal structures influence these (e.g., political parties) as well as
informal sedimented hierarchies (e.g., gendered inequality in conversation with
class, age, race …). Part II still fails to resolve this further problem: how do we
develop a sense of proportion to make sense of all this interaction? What is sig-
nificant and what is trivial and who decides?
In Part III I write about significance. Much that I have written about politicians’
work in Parts I and II is true of people working in any organisation and certainly
those aspiring to do public good. We are all shapeshifters if we go out into the
world of work. In Part III I turn to what is specific to politicians and other leaders.
Whether navigating friendship and enmity, or engaging in continual power strug-
gles, politicians are doing what we all do but in magnified ways. It is this magni-
fication that makes them unique, or at least unusual. Politicians are more exposed,
have more capacity for impact and are connected to huge numbers, so their
entangled political work is like the work done by the rest of us but with the dial
turned up. I end up explaining how I have come to these conclusions, building on
the research of other anthropologists. Researchers and politicians can learn from
each other’s craft: to do good research you have to be politically savvy; to be an
effective politician you’d be wise to learn – that is, do research in the broadest
sense of the word – with intensity. The starting point for both, if wise, is to
acknowledge their ignorance and assume a position of uncertainty.
My argument about the nature of politicians’ work as entangled, shapeshifting
and magnified is built up chapter by chapter. In Chapter 2 I begin by summarising
the anthropological work on elections. When you stand for election you don’t
know whether you or your party will be in government, so you have to make
hypothetical promises. It is anxiety making, intoxicating and highly addictive for
those standing. Voters don’t necessarily need to agree wholeheartedly with their
representative; they vote for a candidate or party that is intelligible, recognisable
and (in some cases and in some ways) trustworthy. The loyalty crafted in relation-
ships in the run up to these events often proves important in doing politics once
they are in parliament.
I discuss another even more complicated kind of voting within parliaments.
When verbal battles over policy, law and government are fought by political
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parties, their members have to decide whether or not to support their own side,
which they usually do. But rebellions mean that the government party, which
nearly always has a majority, can’t always assume victory, with a few exceptions,
for example, in Bangladesh where it is illegal to vote against your party. In the UK
rebellions against your own party have been increasing for over half a century
(Cowley 2005), revealing much about political but also cultural change both inside
and outside parliament. A recurrent theme of this is the connection between par-
liament and the rest of society; it is a microcosm of wider society – because within
it are representatives of (nearly) all people in a nation – so unsurprisingly politics in
parliament reveals change that is happening elsewhere because it unfolds within
MPs’ domains in amplified forms.
In Chapter 3 I write about another area of political work that has exercised
scholars for as long as they have studied democracy: representation. Rather than
taking the representation by elected politicians as a literal process of championing
the interests of the electorate, I write about different understandings of this
claim – for example, by politicians, feminists and constituents in different coun-
tries. We can’t fathom this process until we take a far closer look at what inter-
actions and results this claim produces in different places. Scrutiny is the focus of
Chapter 4. For democracy to work, law-making, policy development and
administration of the state have to be scrutinised by politicians, the media, civil
society, academics, even the Twitterati. While legal scholars look at what hap-
pens to swathes of documents to assess the quality of this scrutiny, I followed 250
words as they travelled through parliament and were pored over, debated and
revised. The role of civil society is easily overlooked in these processes because its
appearance in the legal and parliamentary texts is more marginal than it is in the
reality of face-to-face and mediated encounters. ‘Evidence’ is idealised, and seen
as especially pure and efficacious if scientific or legal, whereas I argue it is its
entanglement with politics that creates and sustains democratic processes. To
deny the politics in evidence is anti-democratic.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 bring culture into the entanglements. Under the influence
of Lefebvre and Mead, I am pulling at my own long-standing bias towards mind
and history to write about bodies and geography in the rhythms of parliamentary
work in Chapter 5. How do MPs navigate time and space – as individuals and
groups – and what are the patterns of continuity as opposed to the breakdowns in
these rhythms? More familiar to the study of parliaments, in Chapter 6 I consider
the riffs of meaning to make sense of the content of political ideas and how they
influence what MPs think, say and do. I take up Barth’s distinction between dif-
ferent types of knowledge – ideas about the world or ideology, communication
(such as political rhetoric), and transmission through social relations (2002). I relate
an example of advocacy to explore the social relations involved, a story about how
a network in rural England influenced a district council to turn down a planning
application. Through rhythms and riffs, it becomes possible to see one way of sys-
tematically studying how political work happens between politicians and those
they interact with.
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Since politicians are connected to every person in a nation (at least symbolically), if
you amass information about their political rhythms and riffs – including who they help
and who they neglect – then how can you judge what to focus on? How do you know
what is politically significant? In Chapter 7 I address this question by arguing that rituals
and symbols reveal the struggles for status and power, the contests over meaning, and the
intensity of the stake in decision-making. Observing the formality of rituals, and the
emotional reaction to symbolism, tells you when something important is going on.
My final question for Part III is this: what matters to people and how do you
tell? Politics happens when emotion becomes magnified within social relationships,
especially at moments of negotiation, and although we are all involved in politics,
for politicians the intensity tends to be greater. Politicians do politics with the dial
turned up. Why is this? Because you can’t do politics without developing conflicts
and alliances – walking between friends and foes – which inevitably leads people
into power struggles. Power is negotiated with the influence of ghosts from the
past, and aspirations about the future, so it is always relational in both a social sense
but also a temporal one. The more politicians turn up the social dial of democratic
engagement – listening to constituents, lobbyists, journalists, each other – the more
they have to deal with contradictions, exposure and risk. This sounds beneficial but
then leads to a turning up of the second dial too – one of political and emotional
intensity. To nurture our democracies in ways appropriate to our own nation, we
need to pay more attention to these democratic dials.
I will return to how I came to these conclusions in the final chapter. I make this
claim about anthropology: our approach has rigour and can discover parts of par-
liament that other disciplines can’t reach. We can be politically savvy enough to do
research in ways that uncover the hidden transcripts, meanings and possibilities for
change. Our research methodology means we learn with people rather than merely
turning them into objects of study. I end trying to point to what we don’t know
about parliaments and suggest that when beginning new inquiries it is always useful
to approach the desire for knowledge with uncertainty.
Welcome to the wonderful and terrifying world of parliaments.
Parliaments and legislatures
Why should scholars mind about parliaments? Rai and Spray point to an answer
with both local (Indian) and global significance at this particular point in history:
should we care about this institution? … it is flawed and at times weak and
even corrupt – the vernacularization of its politics is often represented as its
decline. Women remain marginalized within its portals. At the same time,
however, it is an institution that makes claims for India’s democracy, which is
increasingly valuable in a context of the dangers of increasing populism, of
executive predominance, and of narrow nationalism even as neoliberal India
faces challenges of increasing inequality.
(2019: 331)
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Parliaments are the embodiment and expression of democratic politics in con-
centrated form (it is hoped): an idea, a process, a place, a building, a time and a
symbol. They are an idea-in-action in the sense that they are the ‘what, where and
when’ – the parliamentary laws and motions, in the house of parliament, during
parliamentary terms and sessions – and so constitute the means for elected politi-
cians to do the work of representation. The nation is usually but not always divi-
ded into constituencies, so parliaments are the meeting of those travelling from all
over the country to talk (parler in French), scrutinise governments and make laws.
Some of the business of political decision-making takes place in parliament. Solemn
decisions are made in them about the laws and administration of a country or
about going to war; the more serious the decision is viewed by those who control
the rules, and the more it might be difficult to reach agreement, the more it tends
to be ritualised. These rituals that allow laws to be made and motions passed
depend on both formal and informal rules and conventions and hierarchical rela-
tionships between those who police and either obey or disobey them.
Parliament is a place designated for the work of politics, located in the political
centre (or capital) of the nation, region or locality. It is also the name for a building
of state in most countries. These buildings can be forbidding, inspiring discomfort
and awe, but in different ways. In the case of Westminster – towards which I am
biased not because I think it is the most important but merely because I have
FIGURE 1.1 An anthropologist lifting the lid on the UK Parliament.
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studied it for over 20 years – it is a gothic-style royal palace with 1000s of corri-
dors, rooms and staircases, no one knows quite how many, that most find either
entrancing or disturbing. The Palace of Westminster is one of the world’s iconic
buildings; it is also collapsing, with faulty electric wiring and pieces of masonry falling
from the ceilings. If you are a visitor, you are confined to a few public areas – the
important ones being the chambers, the committee rooms and the central lobby.
Westminster’s central lobby is where you can send a message to your MP as a con-
stituent and ask to have a word with her, and although they are unlikely to be available
to see you then and there, you do have the right to ask. In practice people rarely do.
How do other parliaments draw the public in or shut them out? The Lutyens
buildings of state in New Delhi, India conjure grandeur but also a colonial past,
while the modernist Bangladeshi Parliament designed by Louis Kahn looks like a
fortress with its huge walls, few windows and brutalist architecture. Some newer
parliaments are designed to encourage public participation. The Deputy Presiding
Officer of the Scottish Parliament marked their 5 millionth visitor in 2019 by
saying: ‘The Scottish Parliament has always prided itself on being an open and
accessible place, where the public should be welcomed and feel at ease.’2 Parlia-
mentary buildings, and their public’s reaction to them, reveal how a nation wishes
to present itself. But different groups within any population respond differently to
each parliamentary space. The national Parliament in Myanmar has a 20-lane
boulevard approaching it, large enough to land a plane, and a clear military pre-
sence. On 4 March 2020 I visited Naypyidaw with a colleague from SOAS, Bethel
Worku-Dix, and while I felt intimidated – remembering other militarised zones in
Sri Lanka and Israel/West Bank – Bethel saw it as showing-off, sending a message
of strength to the outside world, including us. Our three Myanmar colleagues,
scholars from different Burmese and non-Burmese parts of the country, replied
when asked for their reaction (‘how do you feel being here?’):
‘Very good, it shows what we can do as a country.’
‘Magnificent but lonely.’
‘It’s practical – it avoids traffic – but it is excluding, it is about showing a
strong state. We should have a university here beside this road.’
I don’t have the space to explain these reactions as they arise out of complex,
diverse individual histories but I mention it because I want to emphasise that par-
liaments evoke multiple responses not only as a group of politicians, but as build-
ings, spaces and ideas.
A parliament is also a period of time between one general election and the next – so
you might refer to the 2010–15 parliament – during which parliamentarians meet to
make laws, pass motions and hold the government to account. This period obviously
varies depending on how often elections are held and the duration of terms in that
place. Within a parliament you have sessions (signified by the opening and proroguing
of parliament) and sittings (daily meetings that often start and end with processions)
(see Chapter 5 for more on the rhythms of work in parliaments).
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Parliaments often operate as both an insular bubble, creating a small town-like
political workplace for politicians, journalists, lobbyists and staff where you can also
drink, eat and get your hair done, but also a forum at the centre of a web con-
nected to others across the country and the world. To describe all the connections
comprehensively would be impossible. To research parliament, you have to study
it locally, nationally and globally – to have the world in view – with a sense of
culture, theatre, geography, history and the imagined future. The continual dyna-
mism means that the study of any parliament never stops: as soon as you have
finished writing about a specific parliament, at least some of your observations are
out of date and you have to prepare to start all over again. As the pace of change
accelerates, in part as a consequence of the digital revolution, some statements
about politics are out of date almost as soon as you have committed them to paper
or the web. But other observations endure in their relevance, so like any inquiry
about people the researcher needs to consider both the stable and unstable, the
continuities and the dynamism, the patterns at different times, places and scales.
Parliaments and legislatures are different: although both pass laws, in a UK-style
parliamentary government the executive is constitutionally accountable to parlia-
ment whereas in a US-style presidential system there is a separation of powers
between executive and legislature (Laver 2008). In presidential systems, such as the
US and Brazil, the upper and lower houses or chambers are jointly called Congress.
In other places parliaments are unicameral rather than bicameral – having only one
house. Accountability or separation are the ideal but they only work effectively in
democracies with a functioning opposition. (Some of what I write may apply to
regional level assemblies within countries but anthropologists have given them less
attention.) In this book I use ‘parliaments’ (with a capital when it is a specific par-
liament) as the umbrella word because I find it more beautiful than the technically
correct ‘legislatures’. (This is not a trivial matter – beautiful words help with intel-
ligibility and writers, even academics, have a duty to avoid alienating the reader
where possible.) Parliaments are any national, regional or local body in which
elected politicians sit and within which people are represented, laws are made and/
or governments are held to account.
What is anthropology?
Anthropology is a discipline that studies with people and teaches about them and
their social worlds. Ingold describes anthropology as a form of philosophy but with
the people still in and even central to the inquiry (Ingold 2014). Ethnography is a
way we approach learning with people and documenting what we find while the
main method for doing this is participant-observation. Ingold explains distinctions
in a helpful way:
Anthropology is studying with and learning from; it is carried forward in a
process of life, and effects transformations within that process. Ethnography
is the study of and learning about, its enduring products are recollective
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accounts which serve a documentary purpose … participant observation is a
way of knowing from the inside … There is no contradiction, then, between
participation and observation; rather, the one depends on the other.
(2013: 3–5)
Anthropologists tend to begin an inquiry by following, watching and talking to the
inhabitants of the world in their sights. But that is only the beginning because we
aspire to be thoughtful about how we produce knowledge out of our relationships
with those we hope to understand. Ingold explains that anthropologists don’t study
people – they aren’t objects of study – but they learn with people, it is a participatory
form of research:
Anthropologists follow their noses, sniffing out promising sources and lines of
inquiry. They are like hunters on the trail. To hunt, you have to dream the
animal; get under its skin to perceive as it does; know it from the inside out.
(2018: 118)
To do anthropological research well, you have to have an open mind and to
approach conversations, observation and encounters with a willingness to learn. If it
is a world you have never been to before, you have to learn to become an insi-
der – a strangely infantilising experience. If you are learning about what you
assume to be your own culture, the process begins with unlearning – making
yourself a stranger even to yourself. Learning is impossible without the possibility
that it may change you so anthropology entails transformation and relies on reso-
nance. As Rosa writes about interaction in general, ‘Encountering the foreign
commences a dialogic process of (always only ever partial) adaptive transformation
that constitutes resonant experience’ (2019: 185) (see Chapter 3 for more on
resonance).
During fieldwork anthropologists are often drawn to narratives that explain
puzzles, disconnections and the messiness of everyday realities so that ethnography
is not just data collection and interpretation, it involves writing about people evo-
catively and with imagination. The people are the focus because anthropology
tends to be empirical, starting with guesses about what is going on, proceeding to
people’s everyday experiences, meaning-making and relationships, and building up
more certain theory from the bottom upwards. It is partly our interest in episte-
mology that makes anthropology philosophical, but it is also the nature of the
questions we ask, whether about politicians or anybody else. How do people create
and contest meaning in their lives? What are they doing when they do their kind
of work? What motivates people to act in the way they do? What is the source of
their morality or immorality? And what is the relationship between individual
freedom and social constraint? In asking and answering such questions, seeing and
then describing is never just about the activities seen on and from the surface. At
the same time, good interpretation doesn’t take you away from empirical descrip-
tion, just to advertise the cleverness of the author, but revels in it: ‘cultural analysis
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is (or should be) guessing at meanings, assessing the guesses, and drawing conclu-
sions from the better guesses, not discovering the Continent of Meaning and
mapping out its bodiless landscape’ (Geertz 1973: 20).
Geertz advises that this means that anthropologists will neither abstract away
from everyday reality nor necessarily reach a perfect consensus, for example about
what is really going on in parliaments, but will aspire towards refined debate and
better precision with which to vex each other. Anthropologists studying parliament
(or any mini-world for that matter) investigate the everyday concerns of people –
the mundane and dramatic, the logical and puzzling, the soothing and jarring – but
keep in view the complexity created by pluralism, connections and change. Whe-
ther anthropology confronts these as a science, social science or an art is a matter of
dispute, depending partly on how you view science. In the US the idea of science
tends to be far broader than its European conception. US anthropologist Geertz
described the ‘interpretation’ piece of any inquiry as relying on the ‘power of the
scientific imagination to bring us in touch with the lives of strangers’ (ibid: 16).
Clearly, he does not mean to imply that he relies on quantitative measurement,
valid sampling or replicability of results – or equivalent associations with positivist
scientific method. But rather he is claiming science as a systematic inquiry with a
focus and depth. The problem with this broad conception is that it creates a great
deal of work, in the sense of communicating to win the support of other scholars.
Since many scientists (including social scientists) will complain that anthropological
inquiry is not proper science, then the terminological decision will lose us allies. Is
it worth investing time and pages making the case that science encompasses
anthropology or is it more profitable to describe anthropology as a humanities
discipline, and demonstrate how it establishes rigour more like other humanities,
such as history, literary studies or philosophy? In the end I find myself more com-
fortable in Ingold’s humanities camp because I find the investigation into philoso-
phical rigour, with its inevitable focus on processes, more interesting than a battle
over defining the rules and boundaries of science.
If we portray anthropology as a humanities discipline, and we want to be taken
seriously by other disciplines studying politics, then we need to explain how we
conceive of rigour. Since anthropology used to position itself as a science, has
mostly been defined as a social science, but is (in my view) more like a humanity,
anthropologists are right to obsess about rigour – both methodological and theo-
retical. At least three elements in anthropological inquiries are critical to rigour:
reflexivity, interdisciplinarity and plurality, and it will become plain how these are
as much about theory as method, as I muse on their place in anthropological
research. (In the final chapter I will return to the processes involved in doing eth-
nography as anthropologists.)
Reflexivity
This entails thinking about how we think and respond to each other – what we
know or claim as knowledge and how this changes during an inquiry as researchers
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encounter others. What anthropologists find most significant during an inquiry
may be taken for granted by the people they study, the ‘silent traditions’ that seem
so natural that they are scarcely noticed by those recreating them (Bourdieu 1977:
167). This is a good example of how method and theory are entangled. Bourdieu
explains how culture is partly about people navigating rules and making implicit
assumptions about what is true, morally proper or politically desirable, without
noticing that they are doing this. Insiders often can’t see their own traditions. As
outsiders, or detached insiders, anthropologists can usefully see what tends to be
invisible to those too involved to perceive their own cultural practices. However,
doing anthropology means shifting from the position of outsider to insider
(although you can never be just one or the other), and back to detachment again,
so as research progresses your relationship with your informants transforms. Rigour
depends on the anthropologist investigating their own silent traditions, and what
happens when these traditions meet other values, bodies of knowledge and
assumptions, and then converse, clash, merge, alter or remain stuck. An anthro-
pologist’s own dispositions, and relationships with informants, influences what she/
he finds when studying others, so it is important that the specificity of these pro-
cesses become part of the inquiry. If you agree with Bourdieu’s theory of culture
and knowledge – that much of it is silent or at least quiet – then you need
reflexivity in your method.
Consider this example of encountering difference with some colleagues in
Ethiopia. During a methodological experiment in 2014 four of us interviewed
Ethiopian women MPs to test out whether our own identities influenced the
research. We went into the interview: me (a middle-aged white British woman), a
younger white British man, a middle-aged Ethiopian man and a younger Ethiopian
woman researcher. By prior agreement, towards the end of the interview the two
men left the room to see if this influenced how the women MPs spoke to us. This
is what happened:
While all the researchers were present, the MPs were determined to stress the
strength of their party and government and their successful efforts at promot-
ing gender equality. The impression given was that women politicians were
tough, dynamic and invulnerable. When the two male researchers left, the
conversation changed abruptly. The women MPs became far more candid
about the hostility of some male MPs, quoted as typically saying: ‘Why do you
always cry?’ and ‘The constitution already reflects the interests of all. Women’s
issues are already discussed so do not always talk about women’. One of them
tellingly said when asked what it was like being a woman MP: ‘When a
woman gets up to speak in the parliament she is always fearful, thinking “can I
do this?” whereas a man never worries’. Whether this was true or not – per-
haps men are just as nervous but refrain from saying so – it was clear that this
would not have been said in front of the men, and especially the senior
national scholar leading our research in that country who had taught several of
them at university. This encounter made it clear to us that women MPs in this
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country struggle with confidence but are under pressure to appear invulnerable
in the presence of figures of authority or those they are competing against.
Such a pattern may be generalisable as there is plenty of evidence to suggest
similar dynamics elsewhere.
(Crewe 2018: 23)
Although I have presented this example as gendered, the context being that I wished
to convince colleagues that it was important to have women involved in any
research team, other identities also shaped the interaction. Ethiopia was never colo-
nised, but the country is locked into aid relations with Europe (including the UK) so
this was a postcolonial encounter nonetheless. When talking to me, the Ethiopian
MPs only opened up after I stressed that we (the two Brits) were not there to imply
that they should copy Westminster; the UK House of Commons can be a place of
misogyny, with women silenced and derided by colleagues or the media, I told
them. At the same time, racialised identity wasn’t necessarily the most important
feature in the encounter between the MPs and my two male colleagues; it was the
Ethiopian man’s former status as lecturer at the university, and former teacher to
several of the MPs, that was intimidating and constraining, probably more so than
my British male colleague’s whiteness. So, gender, race, age and a past teaching
relationship all played their part in highly specific ways (no doubt along with other
aspects that I did not notice). Different forms of difference have various and often
unpredictable effects; patterns can be hypothesised but to ascertain what they are in
particular situations with rigour, empirical investigation in context can’t be evaded.
Too often researchers claiming to be reflexive used to treat it as a rather superficial
listing of identity characteristics (I include myself, writing in my methodology sections:
‘as a white middle-class women from London my bias is …’) rather than grappling
with the meeting of cultures and individual histories as an endlessly complex process of
morality, assumption and communication. But fortunately contemporary anthro-
pologists rarely resort to such simplicities. We have moved a long way since the days of
postmodern identity determinism – a period when anthropologists seemed to imply
that your specific identity inevitably led to particular kinds of blindness or perception.
Tilche and Simpson make an important point when they write about returning to
Pocock’s fieldwork site in Gujarat, India; they remind us that ethnography does not
lead to a product that fixes our knowledge of ‘the other’ as truth for all time, but also it
is far more than merely an idiosyncratic view. It is a process of education: ‘Anthro-
pology is not only a personal account of the world but also a kind of apprenticeship
that can itself (and beyond the self) be transmitted as a knowledge in and of the world’
(2017: 704). Tilche did not portray Pocock’s fieldwork site as an entirely different
place six decades after he lived there; in fact her findings strongly resembled Pocock’s
in form and content despite expecting the opposite. Despite the changes in researcher
and site, the continuities were more interesting than the divergences. An approach to
reflexivity that investigates how relationships generate knowledge in specific ways
paves the path for a subtler approach to accounting for our participation in research as
open-minded researchers.
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Interdisciplinarity
Bourdieu wrote that the separation between sociology and history is disastrous;
great historians are also great sociologists and vice versa (Bourdieu and Wacquant
1992: 90). But anthropology goes further, it takes on whatever discipline dom-
inates the field under investigation: if looking at development, anthropologists
argue with economists; when writing about organisations you react to management
literature; when researching parliaments a scholar can’t avoid reading history, poli-
tical science, legal studies and public administration. But parliaments are at the
centre of more than politics, law and administration because politics is entangled
with everything it touches and it touches everything. You can’t study parliament
without a sense of architecture to fathom the building; geography to consider how
people navigate space and place; history to see what unfolds over time including
movements in power, relationships or values; linguistics for perusing speechifying
and written texts; legal studies if tracking law-making; psychology to uncover the
pressures people face and how they respond to them and so on.
So what is our focus as anthropologists? Anthropology is often, and more than
most other disciplines, looking at connections and entanglements rather than
separations created by classification, whether typologies, lists or ranking of cate-
gories. So, in the social life of a community, organisation or theme we might
consider the kinship between people, the circulation of money, hierarchies or the
importance of music, and how these are related, depending on what bubbles up in
observing and interacting with people. We once referred to anthropology as a
holistic study. But in practice it is impossible to study a whole society, culture,
group or organisation across time and place with attention to all the individuals and
groups within it and how they are moving and changing. We now aspire towards a
holistic sensibility, meaning we are open-minded to the possibility of anything being
both important and connected to anything else and to the influence of the dis-
positions we arrive with, our own history, our identity, our previous research on
the topic and our theoretical inclinations. To achieve this sensibility, and stand on
the shoulders of others scholars wherever they come from, we have to be
interdisciplinary.
Plurality: who to listen to?
Anthropological researchers are continually worrying about inclusion and exclu-
sion, who they are (and are not) observing and talking to when doing their
research. Aside from the ethical imperative of being inclusive, in the sense of lis-
tening to the inevitably diverse views of any group, research will suffer if the views
reflected are excessively partial. Who you talk to, and to what depth, will influence
how far, and with what degree of certainty, you can generalise your insights to
whole groups or populations.
I began to learn about plurality, exclusion and excessive partiality in India. In
1983, when I was 21 years old, I arrived in a hill village in the foothills of the
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Himalayas to look at the rules governing relationships between castes to see if they
were changing (for my MA dissertation). I set about talking to my neighbours. I
discovered that the order of caste ranking depended on who you spoke to, with
both Brahman and Rajput families in this particular Himachal Pradesh village
claiming the top spot in the hierarchy. The rules stipulated that to avoid pollution
you shouldn’t eat with, marry or even touch a Dalit person’s shadow. This pre-
sented a problem for Brahmans. They could avoid Dalits most of the time but their
seat in the State Assembly in Shimla was reserved for a Dalit politician, so interac-
tion with him/her was unavoidable. When I asked about this they told me that the
caste rules only applied to ‘the village’. But the new government buildings just
beyond what they told me was the periphery of the village were, therefore, outside
the rules. By investigating where this boundary was in the past, I began to realise
that they had redefined the geographical periphery of the village so that meetings
could be held in new government buildings with Dalits without fear of pollution. I
suggested in my dissertation that this creativity with the rules was a way of pre-
serving the status quo and maintaining caste hierarchy.
Influenced by structuralists, like Rodney Needham and Louis Dumont, and the
post-structuralist Bourdieu, who were all interested in how ideology, rules and
practices of social institutions create continuity, I wrote about how ideology tends
to be taken for granted, which explains why structures persist. I outlined the cul-
tural rules – divided into prescriptive rules (which are difficult to break and often
explicit) and preferential rules (which are implicit, more like patterns or norms that
people can’t or don’t necessarily articulate) – and the practices (which are what
actually happens between people, as much shaped by ideology as they are by rules).
It was a classically tidy post-structuralist account. Contradictions often get thrown
up in everyday relationships – such as the caste rules versus the anti-caste dis-
crimination law – so people have to find a way of resolving these, in this case by
redefining the village limits, so went my explanation. I now look back and I see
one terrible flaw in this research: I did not speak properly to Dalits. They did not
speak English and my landlord and interpreter was a Brahman so he wouldn’t go
inside their houses because ‘they were dirty’. As we stood awkwardly at their front
doors with me asking them questions through the translator, he sometimes
answered on their behalf and they couldn’t speak freely. If I had found a way of
talking to them alone, then the processes of exclusion and bonded labour that I
only glimpsed could have been a serious part of my study, essential if I was serious
about writing about inter-caste relations. When writing this up, I shouldn’t have
implied that I was writing about all inter-caste relations when I was only conveying
the perspective of Brahmans with depth. Not only did I exclude half the village,
but excluded the half that are endlessly excluded by the other half. Intimidated by
my Brahman hosts no doubt, but I should have been at the least more modest in
my implied claims about representing the whole village in my account of caste.
So, if we need to be aware of who we are excluding in our anthropological
representations of the realities of others, then who should we listen to when
studying parliaments? Since the whole population of any democracy is connected
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to parliaments via their elected representatives, researchers have to make selective
judgements about who to include (and therefore exclude) from their research. This
judgement will be informed by research goals and themes, opportunities for access
and our own politics.
I hope I have said enough to introduce the preoccupations of anthropologists
when they embark on ethnographic research. I will return to method and theory
in the final chapter because it will make more sense after I have explained my
insights and those of other anthropologists. Before I discuss these findings, I will
explain why I leapt sideways in 1997 from working as an NGO activist into
studying Westminster.
My own entry into parliaments
After a decade of frustrating work as an NGO activist and consultant in interna-
tional development, in 1997 (aged 35) I noticed that the new Labour government
intended to reform the House of Lords. The prospect of entering such an exotic
fieldwork site, and watching the eviction of hereditary peers, was irresistible. I
spent my teenaged years arguing with my father about whether the House of
Lords, or at least the peerage, should be abolished. The more practical reason for
avoiding foreign travel was that I had a two-year-old daughter and did not want to
miss out on her childhood. Through a family contact, I managed to get an
appointment with the Clerk of the Parliaments, Michael Davies (later Sir): the
clerk in charge of running the House of Lords.
At noon I shuffled shyly into his wood-panelled room and accepted a glass of
white wine. ‘Where shall we sit?’ he asked. I chose the high-backed red leather
chairs near the window overlooking Parliament Square – it gave me the feeling of
possible escape from what was mounting terror. Would I mess up this one chance
of talking my way into this alarmingly grand and awe-inspiring place? Hoping he
couldn’t see my hands shake, I explained my idea for studying the House of Lords;
I had some vague notion that I’d research culture and power but did not confess
that I expected misogyny, racism and other heinous forms of prejudice. He told me
later that he wasn’t entirely sure what anthropology was, presumably not the study
of evolution, ants or chimpanzees, he thought, but then what? Still, he seemed
pleased that an academic proposed to study his neglected house of parliament.
As I was leaving he asked if I knew any peers as he planned to put my proposal
to the ‘usual channels’. I had no idea what that meant and must have looked
puzzled, so he reeled off the names of the party leaders (Lords Richard, Cranborne,
Rodgers of Quarry Bank) and Crossbench (non-party) Convenor (Lord
Weatherill).
‘Yes, Cranborne is a friend of my grandmother’s,’ I exclaimed. I rushed home
and phoned my grandmother, ‘Gran, did you have an affair with Cranborne?’
‘No, but I did have a fling with Cranbrook. Is that any good?’
‘No, no, no – no good at all,’ I thought. In a terrible panic, I phoned my father.
‘Dad, I need to find someone who knows Cranborne.’
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‘Sure, Robert Cranborne is a cousin of your uncle’s third wife.’
I wrote to Michael explaining that I was mistaken – Cranborne was a distant
cousin via an aunt not a friend of my grandmother’s. (I tell this story with a sense
of embarrassment but it still makes me laugh and I’m trying to be honest about
how I began with both ambivalence but also a significant advantage in the difficult
game of getting access to elites.)
After a few days, a Conservative peer (an academic) telephoned me at home. He
said that my research proposal had come before him as a member of a House of
Lords committee and that they were considering whether to give me access. He
snapped a question at me with considerable irritation: ‘What is ethnography?’ I
blurted out something like the study of the culture of a self-identified bounded
community, which seemed to take the wind out of his sails of annoyance. He
explained that he was perplexed by the way that the Clerk of the Parliaments had
put it because after ethnography he had written: ‘the scientific study of the races
of man’. He asked me why I thought he had done that. I suggested that he had
probably looked it up in the dictionary or was being humorous. The peer replied
that the Lord Chancellor had tried being humorous (about decoration)3 and that
backfired. By this time, I was alarmed – tempted to beg for forgiveness for being
so presumptuous – but he suddenly said that I had greatly reassured him as I
obviously did not adopt an old-fashioned view of ethnography, and put the
phone down.
Michael Davies asked two other sets of people for approval in addition to that
committee. He asked the two other most senior clerks, the Lords still being man-
aged at that time by an oligarchy of three clerks. One expressed reservations,
arguing that they should reject the proposal, but Michael over-ruled him. Then
finally he went to the usual channels – the three party leaders and the Convenor of
the Crossbenchers – to ask them to give permission for my research. They con-
sented but soon afterwards Lord Richard (Leader of the House) changed his mind
(or never thought it was a good idea but did not want to say in front of the others)
and told Michael to stop the project. Michael told him it was too late, I had
already started. He issued me a pass (bright yellow with a red stripe, to indicate that
I was a temporary member of staff in the House of Lords) and I started tiptoeing
around the corridors.
I borrowed some posh frocks from my mother, as trousers were deemed too
casual for women in those days, and summoned the ghost of a well-mannered and
well-spoken persona from my past. Every morning that I visited the Lords I went
to Michael’s outer office, hung up my coat and gossiped with his personal assis-
tants, giving me a sense of belonging from which I derived the courage to gradu-
ally treat the House of Lords as familiar. Writing about it some years later involved
a huge effort of mental detachment, to try and see it through the eyes of a visitor
once again:
To enter the House of Lords is to be translated from the gritty urban pave-
ment to a serene and comfortable palace, where there is time for laughter,
Introducing parliaments and anthropology 17
letters are often handwritten and a drink at eleven o’clock in the morning does
not necessarily mean tea.
(Crewe 2005: 1)
That book was tortuous to write. I had my second baby in the middle (2001) so
my brain became foggy and my body reluctant to leave home. As the first
anthropologist in the UK Parliament I did not want to mess it up for others to
follow by alienating my informants to the point of hostility. But most of all,
because I had far too much data. For four years (1998–2002),4 but most intensively
during the first year, I visited the Lords somewhere between once and four times a
week. I carried out formal unstructured interviews (for 30 minutes to 4 hours) with
119 peers (I interviewed more later), 63 House of Lords staff, and 26 others
(advisers, former staff, secretaries, police officers, postal workers, academics, peers’
spouses/relatives, journalists, Commons’ staff, civil society organisation staff and
visitors). But that constituted only a small fraction of the conversations I had –
snatching political gossip with peers in the lobby before they went into the
chamber, and in the office within which crossbenchers kindly gave me a desk,
talking to clerks and other staff over lunch in the Lords cafe or bar, and joking
during every visit with the doorkeepers.
The doorkeepers alarmed me initially, then all retired armed services men of a
certain age, with their unparalleled standard of British banter. I couldn’t do it at
first. Their teasing, sharp observation and word plays were too quick for me. But I
learned over time the skill of doorkeeper banter – not to take offence at teasing
(‘Emma, you can’t wear brown shoes in town’) and to tease back but not in front
of peers; to judge how and when to rib peers or flip back into respect if not
reverence; and not to banter with the one doorkeeper who always frowned at me.
I became addicted and never visited the House of Lords without lurking in Lords’
lobby with these avuncular figures. Alongside the banter, they were an incredible
source of gossip about everything from the timings of votes to who was quarrelling
with who and what was likely to happen next. When I tracked the legislation to
exclude the hereditary peers I watched every public debate and even assisted the
clerks in running the election to choose those that stayed behind. I accompanied
the Staff Adviser, Derek Dunn, when he interviewed staff as part of his continual
process of reviews. I became obsessed by the place and by parliament. In the words
of the Principal Doorkeeper, Mick Skelton, I became part of the fixtures and
fittings.
Some peers treated me with suspicion, either because anthropology was mys-
terious or, in one case, because it wasn’t. One crossbencher (peers with no party
political affiliation) who had studied anthropology several decades earlier ques-
tioned my right to portray them. A good question but not one to be paralysed by,
I decided; my answer was to promise to work as hard as possible to come up with a
persuasive portrayal. Some male peers flirted, many women communicated
materteral solidarity; most revelled in telling me their life stories, a few were
uncomfortable being questioned. What I shared in common with all those
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prepared to talk to me was a relish in political talk. Whether hearing their tales of
triumph or failure, gossiping about backroom deals or discussing how parliament
works, it was a conversational pleasure almost without exception. Only the most
narcissistic peers, only interested in themselves and their own greatness, failed to be
delighted to talk to an obsessed outsider.
It was during this study that I came to realise how thoroughly obscured the full
story about our Parliament is from public view. When my book on the Lords was
published those working there were surprised by some of the insights: they discovered
about some habits, perspectives and events for the first time. This was partly because
although it is like a village in its intimacy and small population, relative to the Com-
mons in any case, nonetheless there are groups across the House that rarely meet. If
you encounter relative strangers, or even people you work with regularly, you can’t
normally ask them, ‘Why did you do that? What are your feelings about x? Tell me
your whole life story’, whereas an anthropologist can get away with a position of
ignorance and absurd curiosity. Everyone understood that my topic was so broad, that
I might ask about anything, even if they were initially surprised to be interviewed by
an anthropologist, as former Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe clearly was:
Five or six years ago I was astonished to find myself being interviewed in the
House of Lords’ Royal Gallery by an engaging young woman anthropologist.
Surely, I thought, there must be more rewarding places for her to work –
amongst Samoan tribesmen or Kalahari nomads, for example. I could not have
been more wrong. For Emma Crewe has now produced a uniquely percep-
tive, thought-provoking (and often entertaining) study of the most under-
valued component of Britain’s unwritten constitution. All the more so,
because she has been gathering her (often fly-on-the-wall) evidence from a
vibrant variety of sources – from displaced dukes to all-observant doorkeepers.
(2006)
The Lords of Parliament: Manners, Rituals and Politics (2005) was a rather conven-
tional post-structuralist account of culture, elegantly written (because it was edited
by my husband Nicholas Vester and he is a better wordsmith than I am) but
slightly old-fashioned in its presentation of information. I was trained to write
more in an ethnography than you need for your argument, in case other anthro-
pologists may find it useful for developing alternative arguments, but I should have
made the significance of my findings more explicit.
As an aside on post-structuralism, since completing a book with Elizabeth Har-
rison (1998), strongly under the influence of Bourdieu and feminism, I had been
wrestling with the structure versus agency debate. In our final chapter of Whose
Development? we explained that the development ‘industry’ is not a cohesive
machine but a complex mess in which constraining ideologies or rules and indivi-
dual agency are in a dialectic relationship. But what was this Hegelian ‘dialectical
relationship’ exactly? Were all, some or a few people alternatively constrained and
then free to create some room for manoeuvre? I returned to it but was unable to
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resolve this in the book about the Lords. The biggest missed opportunity was in
my discussion of rituals. Following the line taken by philosopher Stephen Lukes, I
argued that rituals and symbols mobilise consent in the House of Lords. Their titles
act as symbolic capital that can be converted into power elsewhere and their ethos
of equal independent-minded influence reduces their incentive to challenge exist-
ing power hierarchies. So far so good, but I failed to write adequately about indi-
vidual history and agency. Very occasionally individuals can have some success at
revising policy or law in the House of Lords, in fact more easily than in the
Commons, so backbenchers have the feeling that they are transcending their indi-
vidual powerlessness, even becoming influential in the vital process of revising law.
But it depends which political party they belong to, whether they are government,
opposition or crossbench, and how many allies they have elsewhere. But then I
stop. I do not explain how individuals navigate the Lords as individuals rather than
as members of various groups and never directly grapple with the paradox of
politicians’ experience being both individual and socially constrained at the same
time. I finally hint at this when writing about the House of Commons (2015a),
and expand on this in Chapter 8 of this book, but I am getting ahead of myself.
In 2010 I turned my attention to the House of Commons.5 This time I made an
appointment with Malcolm Jack (later Sir), the Clerk and CEO of the House of
Commons. I knew him slightly because I had invited him to a conference in
Hamburg, jointly organised with Marion G. Müller (with whom I later edited the
conference proceedings, Crewe and Müller 2006). For several decades Malcolm
had advised politicians as a clerk and, luckily for me, he had reached the top of the
hierarchy just as I was ready to study the Commons. His advice to me about doing
research on politics reflects his immediate grasp of how the anthropological method
is a social and political process: ‘Don’t get too close to anyone – if you do you will
alienate others’ and, ‘If a group of MPs came into this room and we sat at that
table, they would all notice where they were sitting in relation to each other, you
and me.’ He counselled me to be attentive to these status struggles. MPs are in
competition; status preoccupies most people but MPs have the dial turned up
higher than others. There is much at stake for them, and closeness is also marked
by party allegiance, so I took care to avoid revealing any views that might place me
close to any one of the political parties or factions. Malcolm issued a grey pass with
a green stripe – indicating a member of staff of the House of Commons – and sent
an email to all staff encouraging them to co-operate if I asked to talk to them. I
launched into research with another piece of advice by a former MP and Gov-
ernment Chief Whip (then in the Lords but since died) ringing in my ears:
If I learnt one thing when I was Chief Whip in the Commons about politicians,
and that is a politician has, by and large, an infinite capacity to absorb flattery …
They can be persuaded of virtually anything if it’s skilful enough. If they see it and
think you’re just flattering then, then it’s no good at all. But if you can actually
find the key to making them feel really loved and good, they’ll do it.
(Crewe 2015a: 3)
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My Commons inquiry was influenced by a sense of puzzlement on reading scho-
larly literature on MPs’ work. The cataloguing of politicians’ work into separate
roles by political scientists and sociologists created tidy abstractions that did not
seem to reflect the messy patterns of their working lives (Searing 1985, 1994, Rush
and Giddings 2011). Systems of classification are useful if you want to measure
variables and create models with the aspiration of prediction. But this was not my
agenda. I wanted to observe, interrogate and draw conclusions about the political
significance of what MPs actually do when they are doing politics in the various
sites they navigate. My project remains one of finding meaning, rather than mea-
suring or predicting, not only in relation to the Commons but also by drawing on
the work of anthropologists in other parliaments.
My methods in the two Houses can be charted in a superficial way as seen in
Figure 1.2.
I have already made it plain that feminist post-structuralism was my position
during the Lords research, interlaced with an interest in history (influenced by
Jonathan Spencer, Pierre Bourdieu and Maurice Bloch). Clearly whatever you find
FIGURE 1.2 My research in the UK Parliament 1998–2020.
Interaction
 Over 356 formal interviews (incl 59
MPs, 30 former MPs, 98 peers, 35
parliamentary clerks, 80 parliamentary
staff, 24 MPs’ staff, 11 journalists, etc.)
 Group discussions with clerks, staff &
constituency MP/staff
 Informal conversations/gossip +
1000s in Westminster and constituencies
 Shadowing staff, peers and MPs
 Attending meetings and policy
forums, workshops and conferences to
advise or participate
Mini-histories
 House of Lords Bill 1999
 Selection of a parliamentary candidate
2013 (with candidate)
 Eastleigh by-election 2013
 Children’s and Families Bill
2012–14
 History of expenses scandal
2016–19 (with Andrew Walker)
 MPs in constituencies 2018 (with
Nicholas Sarra)
 Chairs of select committees 2019 (with
Nicholas Sarra)
Literature review & outputs
 Review of biographies, diaries &
parliamentary studies literature
 Five books (including two
ethnographies)
 15 chapters and journal articles
 Radio programmes, podcasts and talks




 Chamber & Select Committees meetings
(F2F and Parliament TV)
 Staff meetings, staff/MP meetings
 APPGs & other meetings
 Media (press, radio, TV, web,
twitter)
 Nine constituencies: interviews,
surgeries & meetings
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in parliament has its tentacles in the past. I had some vague sense that I needed to
make better decisions than I had previously about which tentacles to look at and
how to discern what shape they were and what processes they were creating.
My thinking shifted between studying the Lords and Commons in various ways.
As a decade passed between the two studies, my experience of fathoming organi-
sations took a double leap. First, I managed an NGO and was mentored by two
unusual management specialists (2005–11). Richard Livesey-Haworth, my first
Chair of Trustees, taught me much about political ethics and the tactics of man-
agement. The first time I asked him whether he thought we needed to take an
issue to the board he replied, ‘probably but the timing depends on whether you
want to ask for approval or forgiveness’. I learned from him that to be politically
savvy in an organisation, every day continual research is needed to work out
motivations, power struggles and incentives. Second, the next Chair, Chris
Mowles, invited me to join the faculty teaching management at the University of
Hertfordshire, supervising students to get their professional doctorates by research.
This faculty group shares an interest in specific interdisciplinary strands of theory:
process sociology or anthropology (e.g., Norbert Elias and Bourdieu); American
pragmatism (especially George Herbert Mead and John Dewey), to understand
how individuals gesture and respond to each other through improvised practice
rather than rule-bound ‘systems’; complexity science to help explain the uneven-
ness of history and unpredictability of the future; and finally, group analytical
theory (e.g., Foulkes 1948). This teaching has had a significant influence on how I
undertake research (as I explain in Chapter 9).
The final source of influence in my study of parliaments has been to return to
Eastern Africa and South and South-East Asia to work on comparative studies of
parliaments. In 2014 Ruth Fox (Director, Hansard Society) and I secured funding
to enable scholars from anthropology, policy studies and public administration to
look at their parliaments in Bangladesh and Ethiopia.6 We all agreed that a healthy
democracy needs researchers to take a close look at the claims, relationships and
performances of politicians. The Hansard Society scrutinises not only parliament as
an institution but how it is seen by the public and it occurred to us that this project
could bring together the interests of parliamentary studies (usually considering the
institution) with those of development studies (looking at citizens, civil society and
the private sector). Along the way, as Ruth and I co-ordinated this project, we
learned about the conflicting demands for rigour created by the different disciplines
that study parliaments.
We then scaled it up with a larger programme in 2017 and gave 46 grants to
scholars in Myanmar and Ethiopia to study the relationship between parliaments
and people. Under the auspices of the Global Research Network on Parliaments
and People, we went further in making the argument that all healthy democracies
need scholars, breaking down boundaries between disciplines, researchers/artists/
activists and scholarship/advocacy.7 These entanglements have demonstrated the
incredible potential and value of national researchers to conduct the highest quality
research on parliaments if given the opportunity to design and direct it themselves.
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Amongst them are anthropologists, and other ethnographers, who deserve more
opportunities to reshape the study of parliaments in their respective countries.
These scholars are finding that making institutions more inclusive is not only about
changing them on the inside; it is about improving the relationship between politi-
cians and people in society, including in NGOs, creative industries, constituencies, in
the private sector and so on. Investing in individuals and research organisations to
produce knowledge about parliaments and scrutinise politics is vital for deepening
democracy.
I will draw heavily on my own research in Westminster in this book – because I
know it best and I have touched on so many themes in my research on UK poli-
tics – but also on the anthropology of parliaments located elsewhere. I will refer to
anthropologists, and other anthropologically inclined ethnographers, who have
written about parliaments, councils or politicians in Argentina, Bali, Bangladesh,
Botswana, Brazil, Canada, France, Ethiopia, Europe, Fiji, Germany, India, Indo-
nesia, Israel, Madagascar, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Pacific
Islands, Portugal, New Zealand, Russia, Scandinavia, Senegal, South Africa, Tan-
zania, Trinidad, Turkey, Uganda, the UK, the US and Wales. By referring to
ethnographic insights from parliamentary democracies from across Europe, the
Americas, Asia, the Pacific Region, the Middle East and Africa, the well-worn
geo-political categories of parliamentary studies are transgressed. Any theory about
parliamentary democracies needs to take account of both global patterns and local
specificity. Anthropology is uniquely placed to respond to this need.
Notes
1 Dadabhai Naoroji, HC Debates, 12 February 1895, col. 571.
2 https://www.parliament.scot/newsandmediacentre/112636.aspx, accessed 5 January 2020.
3 Lord Chancellor, Derry Irvine, had his official residence in the Palace of Westminster
redecorated at a cost of £650k. When he joked that it wouldn’t collapse, like products
from the DIY store B&Q, it did not go down well. The huge cost was partly the result of
asking the authorities to aim for an historically authentic standard, for example, in hand-
painted Pugin design wallpaper.
4 This was funded by an Economic and Social Research Council Grant (R000237788)
under the title, ‘An Ethnography of Culture and Power in the House of Lords’.
5 From 2011 to 2013 this was funded by a Leverhulme Trust Research Fellowship entitled
‘Navigating Multiple Roles’.
6 The programme was ‘Parliamentary effectiveness: public engagement for poverty reduc-
tion in Bangladesh and Ethiopia’ funded by an Economic and Social Research Council
Grant (ES/L005409/1).
7 This programme, ‘Deepening Democracy’, was funded by the Arts and Humanities
Research Council (AH/R005435/1), and its findings can be found on www.grnpp.org,
accessed 22 June 2020.
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PART I
The sociality of parliaments
The study of parliament has traditionally been cautious, conservative and judge-
mental. It has been dominated by historians surveying politicians’ biographies and
attempts at reform; political scientists evaluating parliaments’ performance or pre-
dicting outcomes; and legal scholars assessing constitutional problems, legislation or
scrutiny and who influences these. This is all useful but leaves much unsaid. Some
scholarship on parliaments suffers from a surfeit of judgement and dearth of theory;
by rushing to judge, it is as if it has warped our capacity to understand. In Lords of
Parliament (Crewe 2005), my final chapter was weakened when I succumbed to the
temptation to make recommendations for reform (not all of which emanated from
my findings) rather than theorising in sufficient depth about what I had found.
Writing is a process of learning through mis-steps/takes like most endeavours so I
resist the assumption that all research has to judge; in this book policy recom-
mendations are scarcely made as the emphasis is on trying to understand.
In the literature on parliaments, most scholars tend to portray them either as an
abstraction (institution, system, culture) or a collection of individuals. To investigate
MPs’ behaviour, most scholars rely on explaining and predicting the aggregated inter-
ests of individuals. Various versions of rational choice theory remain popular (especially
in the US, e.g., see nearly all of the contributions in The Oxford Handbook of Legislative
Studies, Martin, Saalfeld and Strøm 2014). This approach allows comparison between
‘well-structured’ parliamentary systems with empirically testable assertions, so goes the
argument (Saalfeld 1995). The following basic assumptions influence rational choice
theory: individuals are the basic unit of society; their goals reflect their self-interest (not
just income but other stable preferences); and given options, they will go for the one
with the highest expected net utility (ibid: 35). But few rely entirely on rational choice
theory any more. It is sometimes combined with institutionalist theory, whereby
individuals are constrained by the rules or norms of groups or organisations (e.g.,
political parties or parliaments) (ibid: 41). The only other alternative is (allegedly) ad
hoc romantic ideas and interpretations of parliaments, say, about the theatrical nature
of debate, which get in the way of finding fault and optimising performance. Martin,
Saalfeld and Strøm critique ‘micro-political’ or in-depth studies of parliaments for their
lack of potential for generalising and making causal links, claiming that it is US political
science that offers the most useful research innovations (2014: 9–11). Their assertion
misunderstands the basis of rigour for anthropological (and other forms of qualitative)
research. This book is in part a response to this claim; I’m offering a counter-claim,
aiming to demonstrate that anthropology has the potential to generalise persuasively,
albeit in a different way.
In the last few years political scientists in Europe have begun to argue for
innovations in methodology by adopting ethnography (Bevir and Rhodes 2010).
The political scientists Marc Geddes and R.A.W. Rhodes (2018) have written
about an interpretive approach to the study of legislatures influenced by their own
experimentation with ethnographic methods, by my work in parliament (Crewe
2005, 2015a, 2015b), and by ethnographically inclined politics scholars Shirin Rai
and Rachel Johnson (2014) and Cristina Leston-Bandeira (2016). Recognising that
their colleagues are poised to burst out of rational choice theory and new institu-
tionalism (or combinations of the two), Geddes and Rhodes invite scholars of
parliament to turn their attention to beliefs, practices and traditions. Inspired by
Geertz, they already understand that ethnography can be rigorous. As Geertz
explains, the rigour of thick ethnographic descriptions of culture are based on
interpretation whereby ‘the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental sci-
ence in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning’ (1973: 5). This
book is also a response to the invitation of those political scientists – as well as
ethnographers in other disciplines including anthropology – because we are agreed
that there is more to discover about the nature of sociality in parliaments. Teasing
out our divergent understandings of sociality could be generative as well, however,
but that may need to wait for another book.
My starting point is that politics is always both individual and social. What do I
mean by ‘social’? If you treat the social and the individual as if they are opposites,
then you tend to find yourself conceiving of the social as an entity, a structure
(rather than a process), as anthropologists used to as a reaction to individualistic
functionalism. In the days when structural functionalism dominated anthropology,
the political ‘system’ served a social function. Take the work of the British
anthropologist Edmund Leach. In the 1960s anthropology tidied up reality with
abstractions, in part to establish a reputation for theorising and to go beyond
merely describing endless specific cases as if classifying butterflies. Leach also wrote
about political continuity and change – his analysis of ‘systems’ in highland Burma
offered conceptual stability: ‘while conceptual models of society are necessarily
models of equilibrium systems, real societies can never be in equilibrium’ (1954: 4)
and ‘it is necessary to represent the system as if it were stable and coherent’ (ibid:
63). In reality political units in the Kachin Hills are inherently unstable, he
acknowledged, and history shows that the size of political units continually shifts,
often with violence, while the Kachin political system oscillates between feudal and
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egalitarian tendencies (ibid: 6). However, his conceptual equilibrium is artificial; it
removes history from the theory and consigns it to the mere messiness of real life.
He also divorces culture from the way people organise themselves socially, dis-
missing culture merely as the way people ‘dress’ a social situation (ibid: 16–17).
Taking his area of the Kachin Hills, he finds that the cultural diversity doesn’t fit
with the political diversity so assumes they are unrelated, leaving his theory
underestimating the significance of culture.
So if we give up on the search for either a social system or the social function of
politics, then what kind of ‘sociality’ are we looking for? Rather than jump to an
abstraction, let’s consider empirically which social actors and what social processes
we find in parliaments. The central actors are Members of Parliaments (MPs). In
any parliamentary democracy they navigate complex, dynamic socio-political
worlds in ways that have to accommodate dynamism – with every day developing
with some familiarity but also variation. As individuals the specificity of their poli-
tical and social performances arise in part out of their diverse identities because they
are social beings as well. Identity is continually formed, and then cuts across the
various social groups created by MPs based on gender, age, place of birth, residence
and origin, language, nationality, ethnicity, profession (past or sometimes present),
education, class, race, sexuality, relationships status, dependents and so on (Bellier
2002, Wodak 2003). When the MP representing the Kunama, a small group living
in the far north of Ethiopia, is in his own village in the constituency he ‘dresses up’
completely differently to when in Mekelle or the capital Addis Ababa, explains
Ethiopian anthropologist Mitiku Gabrehiwot (pers. comms). ‘Dressing’ entails
putting on clothes that symbolise belonging to that group but is a metaphor for a
wider social process of fitting into the cultural norms. Dressing is both social and
political.
This may sound obvious but since people (journalists, the public, even civil ser-
vants) make crass generalisations about MPs all being the same, it is worth pointing
out that even if they seem similar (and they are in some of the pressures they face),
in many important senses they are not. To give an example from the administra-
tion of Parliament, in a bid to ensure fairness even the officials in the Westminster
Parliament once provided induction and training to MPs based on assumptions of
equality (in the sense of sameness) rather than diversity. When I was asked to give
advice about how to improve induction (first informally and then to a select
committee), I pointed to how the differences between MPs create entirely different
imperatives and preferences for training so it was vital to inquire into the differ-
ences. After a series of conversations with the now Clerk/CEO of the House, John
Benger (who was head of Service Delivery at the time), we co-designed a new way
of doing evaluation. The House of Commons stopped the annual survey (carried
out by an external marketing organisation), which provided little more than a
ranking and occasional comments about malfunctioning toilets, as an example. I
suggested that they use their own staff, rather than consultants, to interview MPs
and MPs’ staff, not only in Westminster but also in constituencies, to find out
about existing services but also elicit ideas for new ones. I recommended that it
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would be hard for the most junior staff to conduct interviews, and that the most
senior officials would intimidate MPs, so middle ranking officials would be the
most appropriate interviewers. I briefed the interviewers about how to handle the
delicate process of talking to MPs, they were trained by the Social Research
Association in interviewing techniques, and they set off in pairs, armed with a
checklist of questions. As a result, officials discovered precisely how different MPs
found the various services provided by parliament, but also realised that there were
gaps.1 Constituency staff felt isolated and one of the many innovations that came
out of the project was an expansion in services provided for them. But as impor-
tantly, officials understood far more about the diverse needs of MPs. Since 2012
the approach to induction, training and evaluating services has reflected this
diversity, with a new ‘buddy’ system for new MPs arriving in Parliament for the
first time meaning that each MP is linked to an official who can respond to their
individualised requests for assistance and advice. When given training, you also
have to take account of the socio-political relationships between MPs – they are
more likely to join courses with their trusted friends and allies and with those from
the same political party. MPs navigate the world through relationships, just like any
other social beings, so it is only by looking at how they relate to others that we can
begin to understand who they are and what they do. The sociality of MPs has to
be understood even when administering parliaments.
Within democracies three social processes of interaction are central to MPs’
work and, therefore, how their worlds are configured:
 Winning votes, support and money
 Representing people
 Scrutinising the state
In each case it will become clear that these entail more than narrow political
work in the sense of achieving goals. Each involves forming alliances, antagonistic
factions and cross-cutting cleavages with social connections and disconnections, and
various cultural meanings emerging out of them, which go far beyond political
aspirations. When people vote in India, they are not merely choosing an option
that promotes their self or group interest – they know that in most of India’s vast
constituencies they will not have any effect on the result as an individual. It is social
(as well as cultural and symbolic) considerations that come into play, taking part in
an event that connects them to the rest of the nation (Banerjee 2014). When
politicians promise to represent a constituency in the US, it is a sense of trust and
belonging that matters to those who lend their support rather than evidence that
the representative is promoting voters’ goals (Fenno 1978). When civil society
organisations try to influence law-making, Mosse concludes that disputes ‘are about
how “the social” is made available for public debate and especially for the law’
(2020: 26). It is important to his argument that he tells us enough about the social
worlds (in this case created by caste in both India and the UK) so that we can
appreciate that law is always entangled in conflicting social relations. I elaborate on
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these three processes in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 to explore what anthropologists mean
by sociality in politics.
In Part I I am writing about the nature of everyday political work and what is
involved when politicians are electioneering, representing, governing and scruti-
nising. According to one Conservative MP, ‘It feels like Genghis Khan attaching
four horses to your limbs and you are pulled in four directions’ (see Figure I.1).
And yet when contradictory demands are thrown up by these different kinds of
work, with their various audiences and pressures, most politicians find ways of
dealing with this without breaking down. The resulting inter-subjective cultures of




bers-and-Members-staff-interview-project-doc.pdf, accessed 13 October 2020.
FIGURE I.1 The contradictions of political work.
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2
THE ALCHEMY OF VOTING
Elections are ‘a happy synthesis of liberation and revenge, secured in the ideal case
without either bloodshed or massive public disorder; all the conveniences of revo-
lution, without any of the inconveniences.’
(John Dunn as quoted by Banerjee 2014: 173)
To understand parliaments, you have to think about how parliamentarians got into
the position of winning and taking their seats. Democracy means that the people,
rather than Monarchs, choose their representatives and in most places this is orga-
nised by political parties trying to get their members elected. The rituals that
create, renew or break the relationship between party, elected MP and represented
citizens (and others) involve people casting their vote for the preferred candidate(s).
Voters and preferences change, so their views have to be regularly retested through
a process that will be trusted. As Spencer writes, ‘the mysterious link between
representative and represented is established and renewed in ritual form: through
elections’ (2007: 76). It is not the only way that people get into parliaments. Some
houses contain appointed members (e.g., the Canadian Senate), and two also have
members who inherit their right to a seat (the upper houses in Lesotho and the
UK). But in by far the majority of democracies politicians have to win their seats
through selection by their party and then in a public election, unless they are
indirectly elected (e.g., in the Netherlands Senate, which means the individual can-
didates are selected by parties after the public vote). In most cases elected politicians
have a specific locality as a ‘constituency’, but again there are exceptions: some
seats reserved for women in the Bangladesh parliament have the whole country as
their constituency. Fiji has no constituencies at all. Some countries have several mem-
bers representing the same constituency. Weirdly, hereditary peers in the UK are elec-
ted (but only by other hereditary peers), but have no constituency outside parliament.
Once they have taken their seats in parliament, MPs need to make decisions about
DOI: 10.4324/9781003084488-2
law, policy and administration and in the face of inevitable differences of view,
again they need a process that ensures the losers accept the result and the agree-
ment sticks. Just like elections, voting in ‘divisions’ by parliamentarians is also
ritualised and carefully surveilled so that no cheating is possible.
Political scientists focus on what influences people’s votes or choices, or pre-
dicting and analysing results, but there is also much to be said about what voting
means and does to relationships between people. It is not just the result that mat-
ters, it is that the expression of the will of the people is treated as sacred that is
worthy of inquiry. What kind of magical process takes place between casting a vote
as individuals and the momentous decision made by collectives that follows? What
is it in the rhythm of the process of voting that makes it either so dramatic or so
mundane?
Elections: socially, historically and technologically embedded
Citizens tend to assume that the most important vote in a democracy is cast by
voters for a politician or party to represent you. However, you could argue that
the candidate that political parties select in the first place is as influential on the
process of securing a seat in parliament. As in any ritual, transformations happen
in voting that are supposed to ensure that the ‘will of the people’ (or of the
political party) are expressed in ways that are seen as legitimate. So, in an election
a voter travels to a designated place, is identified, enters a private space within the
room and puts a tick or cross on a piece of paper which is then turned into a
‘vote’ once it is counted. Ekaterina Melnikova points out that this voting process
shares in common with other rituals that,
the prescribed parameters of time and place provide an understanding of the
event as an event in result of which a certain activity is recoded and acquires a
new meaning. What unites the actors is their participation in the very act of
miraculous transformation; what divides them is their understanding of what is
turned into what.
(2013: 133)
Voters in St Petersburg, Russia in March 2012, and especially older pensioners, got
dressed up, bought pies or buns (which are often sold in the foyer of the polling
station) and took photos of the event. Those who are unable to vote often invite
members of the polling station election commission to drink tea and eat sweets.
Elections have an element of festival and celebration about them. But they are also
solemn events with strict rules that aim to ensure that the results are seen as legit-
imate. For example, the polling stations must fulfil certain criteria so that voting
can be observed in general by the electoral commission but secret in the sense that
individuals’ choices among the electorate are not seen. The mix of tea, cake, music
but also observers and police ensure that, as Melnikova puts it, ‘the disciplinary
space is combined with the celebratory one’ (ibid: 142–3). If the polling station is
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where the voter meets the state, then the meaning of discipline will be different in
Russia from other places due to its totalitarian associations.
Kimberly Coles has pioneered looking at the technology of elections from an
anthropological viewpoint. She points to the social underlying democracy and as
far as elections are concerned, argues that the social can be gleaned by studying the
technical aspects (2004: 552–4). This technology is not merely instrumental, it is
part of the social practices and artefacts that are essential to the process of doing
democracy, a vital way of bolstering societal solidarity and translating the choices of
people into political authority. Seeing elections as rituals is only part of the story.
Democracy has to be continually remade by practices and actions of both humans
and non-human objects: electoral rules, polling stations, officials, ballots and so on.
In contrast to Melnikova, Coles argues that elections are more like a socially con-
structed scientific laboratory than a religious event. I don’t see why they can’t be
both, in which case the task becomes one of explaining the nature of the entan-
glement – which is more important, for whom, when and why. It is revealing to
make visible the technicalities to see how authority is established and remade in
social terms.
The interweaving of the social, technical, cultural and political in voting is one
of the many entanglements I will consider in this book. This question is, as always,
not whether they are entangled, but whether one becomes more prominent and
why or how they are part of one and the same process. Like all good anthro-
pology, the devil (or the virtue) is in investigating the detailed practice. This
entanglement is only clarified if you look with a forensic intensity at the practices
involved in voting, whether dealing with errors in recording the number of ballots
or arguing over how ballots should be transported. These practices mean hiding the
uncertainty, ambiguity and error in any election so that the result can be trusted
and deemed legitimate (ibid: 574). For example, a mistake Coles made on the
‘daily accounting form worksheet’ was obscured by a work around (redoing the
form); so, creativity within the technology of elections reveals how social action
can be part of making politics work.
Mukulika Banerjee has written about the political, sacred and technical aspects of
voting, wrestling with the following puzzle: given that for many in India their vote
will make no difference to the result, and the state neglects the majority whoever
wins, why do they bother to vote? She finds multiple reasons and differences on
the basis of class but shared incentives between them as well. The most neglected
social group vote to gain a sense of empowerment and out of fear that they might
lose their entitlements; those better connected to the state vote to maintain ties of
patronage; while the elite vote out of a sense of civic duty and/or to protect their
position (2014: 168). At the same time all Indian voters ‘understand that unless
they come together and participate in elections, the whole edifice of political
democracy will collapse’ (ibid: 169). Those are the political reasons. But elections
are socially significant too. They are carnivalesque; festive occasions where people
get dressed up in new or best colourful clothes, embroidered chadars and flowers in
their hair, as if getting ready to do puja at the temple. The special biscuits laid out
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on best china (ibid: 139, 124) remind us of the Russian pies and buns that Melni-
kova told us about. Elections are rituals when normal rules get turned upside down
and the social order is reversed – creating some of what Turner called ‘commu-
nitas’ – as powerful people beg for votes in stark contrast to everyday hierarchies
when poor people beg them for goods or help (ibid: 172). The usual hierarchies of
caste and class are inverted during voting while the result is to transform a candi-
date into someone god-like. And elections provide a rare opportunity for people to
participate in politics as individual citizens, when their citizenship is, therefore,
remade, and so voting acts as one of the processes that mediate between citizens
and the state (ibid: 182). In the moment of voting, divisions based on gender, caste
or class can be transcended.
Banerjee offers a story, related by Mekhala Krishnamurty, one of the researchers
in her project, to encapsulate what voting means in India. An elderly woman in
Madhya Pradesh was distraught when she lost her voting card, and when
researchers tried to console her by saying it was only one vote she replied:
You see me? My work is to sweep up all the grain that falls from the sacks and
the weighing scales on the floor. At the end of the day, I sell what I have
collected and I am allowed to keep half the money. That is my income. So
you see, I understand the value of each grain of wheat. On the floor they look
insignificant, just one isolated grain of wheat, but each grain that is added to
the heap determines what I earn. My vote is like those grains of wheat.
(ibid: 2)
Writing anything about such a vast continent is always incredibly ambitious. It is
not surprising then to find exceptions to these tendencies. Jelle Wouters reports
that voting in Nagaland in India’s remote Northeast offers a rather different picture
(2015). Representative democracy and party politics were seen as an interference to
communal harmony in Nagaland, the ‘Naga way of life’, so that two Chief Min-
isters went as far as to suggest abolishing elections (Wouters 2018: 214). People’s
experience in the run up to election is that the competition between candidates
causes rivalry and division. ‘Our memories are long. If a fellow villager contests and
we do not wish to support him, he and his relatives, even his entire clan, take it as
betrayal and grudges grow’, one elderly resident told Wouters (ibid: 199). So, in
2013 they had a consultative meeting in his village and decided on a commitment
to one ‘village consensus-candidate’, a common practice in Nagaland. When the
two candidates defied this order the elders of the village rushed around reassuring
everyone that the election would soon be over and normal neighbourly relations
would return. Historically authority in village republics was based on wisdom
accumulated over a lifetime, so age had prestige and power, especially for men, and
the naivety of youth was kept in check (ibid: 122–3). Naga intellectuals complain
about competitive elections and people’s practices embody a critique by adapting
electoral practice not to reject democracy but to create their own way of doing it.
Just as we know from anthropologists that people develop their own vernacular
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ideas about what ‘development’ consists of (e.g. Pigg on Nepal 1992), they also tell
us about how old and new forms of vernacular democracy emerge. The new forms
emerge out of history with politics and culture entangled. A former politician in
Nagaland provides an illustration of this, explaining how his candidacy was hin-
dered by the conduct of past relatives:
They were well-built, strong, and excelled in village wrestling. Those days,
‘might’ often meant ‘right’ and they became somewhat domineering in their
behavior and got themselves landed into disputes. Much has changed since,
but the villagers remembered this. Many therefore felt reluctant to cast their
vote for me. I was held accountable for deeds done long before I was even
born.
(Wouters 2015: 131)
The significance of all this is that we need to investigate historical and localised
interaction (the vernacular) in any part of the world to see how democracy plays
out. We can’t assume consistency can be found within the sometimes culturally
arbitrary borders of nations – so it is safer to make an assumption of diversity rather
than homogeneity within and between countries until proved otherwise.
Vernacular election games in the UK
You can’t understand democracy without looking at elections and you can’t fathom
the importance of elections for politicians unless you look at how they perform them
socially, politically and emotionally. The performance of politics involves putting on a
show (Goffman 1959), both as individuals and in groups, because getting things done
in democratic politics means endlessly winning support from allies (whether temporary
or permanent) and outsmarting your opponents (Crewe and Sarra 2021). The putting
on of a show is also a ‘show’ of affect or a performance of emotion. Paradoxically, the
‘show’ has to be perceived as authentic in order to appear plausible but this authenti-
city is also performative. The inevitable competition and enmity involved in demo-
cratic politics creates a magnification of normal human experience, making it a rich
and complex domain for the study of power, identity and emotions.
It was only by participating myself that I appreciated the drama and addictive
quality of selections and elections. An opportunity arose when a friend and col-
league, who I will call Roxanne, decided to stand to be selected as a Labour can-
didate for the election due in 2015 and submitted an application in her
neighbouring constituency within a large English city. Armed with the list of
Labour members in the area, we went canvassing (Crewe 2015a: 21). In this
affluent city area, members probed to find out where she placed herself. ‘I’m on
the left of the party with Old Labour, I agreed with our current MP – so where do
you stand?’ asked one, to which she replied, ‘Oh yes, I am Old Labour in the sense
that I am very strong on civil liberties and a great defender of the NHS …’ At one
house we met the local ward Chair. Roxanne did not know anyone in this ward,
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so she did not recognise him or know who he was. He looked at her with undis-
guised disdain; ‘Who are you exactly?’ he asked. She was committing the greatest
sin in UK politics – she was a total stranger locally to the party even though she
lived only a few miles away.
I advised Roxanne to stress her local connections in her publicity. Unlike most
job applications, which focus on individual skills and experience, I stressed that she
needed to convey her commitment to the local party and its demands. She wrote
this:
Putting people at the heart of politics again
Fighting for Labour, Fighting for x
Dear Labour Party Member
Weren’t you relieved when x challenged the legacy of Thatcherism and
reminded us of how she undermined education, health and support for those
in need, setting the context for a get-rich-quick culture where the individual
was more important than society?
I have lived locally for over 17 years and I am passionate about representing x,
speaking out on issues that matter to you and putting people at the heart of
politics. This desire is driven by an increasing sense of frustration with the
Coalition and their policies, which lack insight, compassion and care and give
relentless support for private contracts. My career so far has taught me how to
give voice to the most vulnerable, especially on issues linked to health, envir-
onment and human rights …
As the candidate for x, I would relish working with the local party to win the
seat and campaign nationally for both local people and concerns that are close
to their and my heart.
Others advised her that a photograph and strong design were essential. Nothing
was untrue in her leaflet but she left out various aspects of both past and present –
that she once worked for a former Conservative Cabinet Minister, finds a sense of
humour essential to everything she does, and runs a foundation for an oil company.
She was all set except that the three front-runners, as written up by the local
newspaper, all had extensive party political experience and large numbers of
‘endorsements’ by senior party leaders, MPs, peers and party supporters. They were
local Labour councillors with decades of experience of campaigning and winning
elections. We thought about canvassing more regularly but what with holding
down a job, and the pressures of normal life, Roxanne did not have time in the
brief gap between application and the next stage – the shortlisting.
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One chilly Sunday afternoon we joined members of the local party in a church hall
for the shortlisting ordeal. Roxanne and I split up to work the room, but I had realised
by now that she was competing against three candidates who started fighting for this
many years earlier and who were, therefore, far ahead in the race. The Chair of the
Constituency Party called the meeting to order once over 100 people had arrived and
the ten candidates were on stage ready to speak to the assembled crowd. The Chair
asked the first to start and each was given strictly three minutes only. Candidate 1 had
only managed a few sentences when a member interrupted on a point of order, com-
plaining that the speakers should proceed alphabetically. The Chair explained with
considerable tetchiness that lots had been drawn and members should not interfere with
the process. By the time the first candidate fired herself up again, the mood was charged
with a suspicious current. Each spoke nervously about why they were standing, what
they could offer and why they would make a good candidate; my heart was beating fast
with nerves on their behalf. The old hands stressed that they would win at the General
Election and work with the local party; those new to politics treated it like a normal job
application and talked about their motivation, experience and talent. The woman next
to me complained that one of the novices talked too much about themselves; the
performance of selflessness was obligatory from her viewpoint.
The candidates then moved from table to table being questioned by party
members for 5–10 minutes each. On my table they asked the candidates questions
about their politics, gauging where they stood on the symbolically important issues:
‘What would you do about the privatisation of the health service?’ ‘How would
you pay for the reversal of cuts?’ ‘What would you do about free schools?’ To the
latter one of the front-runners replied: ‘I don’t like free schools and I wouldn’t
have supported them but now that we have them, I don’t think there is any point
getting rid of them.’ A member shot back with a look of fury: ‘So you would just
let them be?’ When the table decided the process was at an end, the candidate
turned to me panic-stricken to explain her position on education in more detail, as
if I would in turn explain it to others when I had a chance. It helped me realise
how nerve-wracking it was to be judged on your views, and your performance in
conveying them, at the same time. (It was this candidate who argued that free
schools should stay who finally became an MP.)
A few days later the party members met and selected their shortlist. All three of
those chosen were the same front-runners who were identified by the local newspaper
some weeks before. They shared in common: snazzy personal websites, endorsements
by senior party figures, a track record as local councillors, and experience of elections.
One was a journalist, stood for the Westminster Parliament in 2010 and had the
backing of many party figures (including a shadow frontbench spokesperson); one had
worked for Labour MPs for her whole short career and had a string of endorsements
(including one from a former party leader); and the third was special adviser to a senior
MP with 20 years of campaigning for the Labour Party. The proportion of MPs per-
ceived to be young generalist professional politicians, rather than older specialists who
turn to politics as a second or third career, had been increasing (Crewe 2015a: 28); so
this result was completely unsurprising.
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Roxanne was told that she hadn’t made it. She realised that to have any hope of
being a parliamentary candidate she needed to be a councillor first, so she applied
to stand for local government. The assessment panel turned her down for lack of
experience of campaigning and knowledge of government (see Figure 2.1 for the
reasons).
Eligibility for public office from the perspective of officials in that Labour Party
constituency means connections of a certain kind: to get onto the shortlist you
need to be part of the local and national party network. If you study any local
party list of activities it is clear that this means, at the least, an exhaustingly time-
consuming commitment over many years of canvassing on doorsteps, stalls and
marketplaces – challenging for anyone with dependents and/or an existing
demanding career. For the local party members it means being known, in rela-
tionships with other members, but also sharing their loyalties – in this case to
unions and the welfare state in opposition to the private sector – as signalled by
shared rhetoric.
What conclusions can we draw from this narrative? Patronage from well-known
figures in the party helps you get into the UK Parliament and you are unlikely to
win unless you have contributed enough labour (in the sense of political work) to
the party through meetings, canvassing and leafleting, for other candidates as well
as for yourself. The performance of selflessness and commitment to the common cause
were both essential. In Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, MPs and
activists have talked about how connections in the party and the patronage of big
players in the party helps.1 Those big players want to build up their support base; the
presence of indebted, bright young new MPs can be extremely useful when pursuing
their own ambitions to get a ministerial position. This is especially true if you are a
woman or part of a minority, because you tend to start with an in-built dis-
advantage, so mechanisms of inclusion have to be seen alongside exclusionary
processes. As one former Lib Dem MP put it: ‘Usually the problem for women
getting into Parliament is not the electorate but the selectorate’, that is, not the voters
but party members.2 Gendered inequalities show up in various competitive political
processes and selections are no exception. Betty Boothroyd was told in West Bromwich:
Area of concern Brief comments
Campaigning We thought you have the potential to be
an excellent candidate in the future given
your extensive public sector experience.
However, we would like you to get
involved in the voluntary and campaign-
ing aspects of the local Labour Party
before standing for public office. We
would also like you to research and learn
more about local government structure.
Knowledge of local government
FIGURE 2.1 Assessment of a local government candidate.
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‘Well I don’t think I’m going to vote for you because you’re unmarried, you don’t
know anything about life, you don’t have any children or know what it is to make ends
meet on a low income. You don’t know how to run a house. I’m certainly not going to
vote for you’ (McDougall 1998: 30). It is as if women are not trusted if they don’t have
children but if they have them (or other dependents), then the pressure on their time is
(and is seen as) problematic.
Even today women are still asked as candidates how they will cope with
managing two homes if they have children, or what their husbands will think
about them running off to Westminster. A woman candidate in 2010 was not
unusual in being told: ‘I think you are evil. Your children will suffer.’3 Selec-
torates have created barriers for women across the world historically, with some
notable exceptions in recent years created by quotas (Kenny 2013) or party
policy (e.g., in Ethiopia, Ayenew et al. 2019). But hostile policies and attitudes
are not the only reasons that women hesitate to stand. In the UK it is clearly
extremely difficult to work as an MP, running two homes and workplaces if
your constituency is outside London, and especially if you have children or
other dependents unless you have an additional income or a spouse or relative
who takes care of the family. Some do the sums and conclude it is not finan-
cially possible because childcare costs are extremely high if you need care at
any time of day or night at short notice. Partly because it is less likely for
women that their co-partner will be willing or able to step in, the consequence
was in 2013 that only 55% of women MPs had children, while 72% of men
MPs were parents (Campbell and Childs 2015: 489).
To return to the question of patronage in selections, I have mentioned that in the
UK having well-known senior politicians as ‘patrons’ helps a candidate’s campaign to
get selected within the party. This favours those who are already well-connected.
Publicising a close relationship with a party VIP means that the candidate improves
their chances, while the patron anticipates the benefit of new MPs who are likely to
support their causes. However, patronage is usually associated with financial benefit
and in some places this is clearly a part of the reciprocal support. Bueno de Mesquita
et al. claim that selectorates, that is, the group that chooses a country’s political lea-
dership, have to be ‘bought’, whether by private goods like favourable contracts or
by public policies that they agree with (1999: 149). But the potential for paying out
private goods to win over potential supporters in the UK is far lower than other
places, the US for instance (Bull and Newell 2003), and even rarer in countries with
high political competition and media scrutiny such as Sweden (Svaleryd and Vlachos
2009). To understand how patronage works in contemporary Bangladeshi politics
you have to look at the history of the two main political parties and how they
operate in what has become a weak state but a strong society (Lewis 2011: 103). The
patron–client relations are organised around the Awami League versus the Bangla-
desh National Party who took turns to form governments until 2014 (when the
latter boycotted the election), using their power to build up state structures with
their supporters (Lewis 2011, Ahmed 2020). But the details of everyday patronage
between politicians, and between them and their potential supporters, from the
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beginning to the end of people’s careers, remains partly in the shadows (Piliavsky
2014: 14). The anthropological work in Piliavsky’s edited volume reveals that it is
important not only to understand the political economy of these relationships but
also how they are infused with morality. As Piliavsky concludes, wherever and
whenever you study, ‘Political giving is never only a matter of redistributing
resources, it is necessarily a rhetorical act that conveys largesse as a politician’s virtue’
(ibid: 19), which is partly why patronage is so often expressed in the language of
kinship.
It is when candidates move from selection to election that processes get seriously
showy. Once selected by your party, or deciding to stand as an independent,
elections require relentless intelligence-gathering and making socio-political con-
nections, especially during by-elections. I witnessed this at a by-election in East-
leigh in 2013. For three weeks the nation’s eyes turned to this Hampshire town in
the South of England to watch the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives battle it
out on the doorsteps. Labour aimed to come in as a respectable third. Only two
years from a General Election, a poor performance would reflect badly on the
leaders. They only remain at the top of their parties as long as their colleagues view
them as an electoral asset so David Cameron (then Prime Minister and leader of
the Conservatives), Ed Miliband (Leader of the Opposition and of the Labour
Party) and Nick Clegg (Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the Liberal Demo-
crats) poured staggering amounts of their time, and demanded it from their MPs
and even ministers, into the campaigns in Eastleigh.
I began my campaigning with the Lib Dems (Crewe 2015a: 30). I walked into
their headquarters in a Business Park as one of a constant trickle of volunteers.
They sent out calls for volunteers by emails, blogs and twitter and 100s were
arriving daily from as far as Aberdeen, 400 on one day. A friendly activist imme-
diately slapped a white sticker onto my lapel – I had to choose ‘Driver’, ‘Clerical’,
‘Canvasser’ or ‘Deliverer’ – alongside another orange one saying: ‘I like Mike’ (the
name of the candidate). On the first floor I found virtually the whole party’s media
machine shipped from London to Eastleigh, working the phones, producing
materials, connecting with journalists, party people and activists in a factory-like
election production process. The excitement of it still crackles in my memory.
The point of sending canvassers out to knock on doors is not to convert the
voters – most activists don’t have the skills to do that – but to find out voters’
intentions and priorities and then convert the waverers into supporters with
leaflets. This is true of all the political parties but especially Lib Dems, who have
to fight harder to win elections. They couldn’t rely on traditional banks of sup-
port; they needed to use clever political tactics. Canvassing has become a form of
intelligence-gathering through conversations, analysed alongside opinion poll and
survey data, and the LD operation is highly sophisticated. Some of this intelli-
gence was done by phone and some by visiting people’s homes in Eastleigh. On
the day I went, volunteers were tutored at lightning speed by a US election
strategist, who explained that they had slightly different questions on the door-
steps each day:
The alchemy of voting 39
(1) Do you plan to vote LD? If no, forget the other two – they don’t need
literature. If yes, then ask the next two; (2) Do you have a postal vote? Have
you sent it? (3) Are you willing to help? If they say no to (1) then you record
their intentions – not only which party they might vote for but what mix of
affiliation they may tend towards, so LD leaning Tory is a yellow Tory, for
example.
Once we returned our forms, the Clerical workers would put them in the database,
allowing them to produce lists to be handed to the Deliverers so they knew which
letterboxes needed leaflets. The media team had already produced specific leaflets,
different versions for different communities and for voters with different intentions.
In addition to leafleting, every five seconds a Lib Dem activist phoned an elector.
The scale and efficiency was matched by the grit. One of the LD councillors was in
hospital for an operation to remove a cyst on Tuesday and was back out canvassing
by Wednesday, not wanting to let down his colleagues.
A vital aspect of an election campaign is to perform to the media. One evening I
was at the HQ, chatting to MPs and activists in a festival mood, waiting for Mike
Thornton (the candidate) to arrive with the Leader, then Deputy Prime Minister
Nick Clegg. A young woman stood on a platform of boxes and began to whip up
an atmosphere with accomplishments punctuated by cheers. ‘We are up to 1000
calls in 90 mins, 320 volunteers through the door today, 1500 for the week, dis-
tributed 70,000 leaflets, 5,000 phone calls, and knocked on 10,000 doors.’ She
thanked and thanked and thanked colleagues for their hard work and success. The
core campaigners were working from 8 am to midnight every day but somehow at
the required moment they drummed up a buzz of anticipatory camera-ready
excitement. And then suddenly Nick and Mike appeared to give rousing speeches
about more achievements, surrounded by euphoric organisers in a tight gaggle,
vital for galvanising their support but also for giving the impression on Sky News
that the campaign had momentum and huge numbers of people at the core. Such a
mood is normally confined to party conferences or General Elections, so it seemed
to me at this point that a by-election is an unusual opportunity to create some
precious communitas among the troops. I can still easily conjure the memory of
jangling emotional excitement, both embodied as an individual and shared with a
small crowd.
I also canvassed with the Conservatives beginning at their club, an impressive
mansion with cornices and plush carpets, thronging with MPs on the day I visited.
I met up with Sir George Young MP, the then Government Chief Whip, who
was one of the few MPs I stalked regularly (with his consent). We were given our
forms, leaflets and a map and set off with a woman MP. George and the other MP
handed me the canvassing printouts and we whizzed from door to door at a
cracking pace, far faster than the LD canvassers. The printouts had names and
addresses but less information than the Liberals about voter intentions in this con-
stituency. If he had an opening, George’s patter was: ‘I hope you will consider
voting for the Conservative candidate. Maria Hutchings is a local girl, I have
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known her for 4–5 years and she will be a marvellous MP.’ Then, like many MPs,
he would glance at the house and garden and work out what they might be
interested in: children’s toys, he would talk about education; posh cars he would
talk about the fuel price freeze; an affluent house he might talk about tax. All Tory
MPs were asked to do three stints but some were skiing or shooting, so one
Conservative MP told me, and they were short-staffed. With a shortage of money
and volunteers, winning elections has become hard graft. We bumped into a
Secretary of State so I asked him why so many MPs and even cabinet ministers
were knocking on doors. He said that the local party needs the resources and it is
important that the voters don’t think you are taking them for granted. I wondered
whether their presence was also partly to win support from colleagues in the party.
Whether seen by fellow activists, or photographed by the media, perhaps when
MPs, ministers and even the PM are seen backing the party this egalitarian business
of electioneering is a rare opportunity to engender a shared party spirit and loyalty.
Finally, with strictly equal enthusiasm I campaigned with Labour. As is often the
case with by-elections, the shortlist was drawn up by Labour National Executive
Committee rather than the local party. They knew that they were going to lose so
they picked a candidate who would at least get them some good press attention,
the writer John O’Farrell. He braced himself for the strangeness of being a candi-
date: ‘you can’t just be your normal everyday self in democratic politics. You have
to put on clothes you wouldn’t normally wear – metaphorically and literally’
(2014). He did not lose his sense of humour, tweeting mid campaign that when a
voter told him: ‘I’ll vote for you if you pay for a boob job,’ he replied: ‘Not sure if
that is an actual spending commitment, we’ll look at economy in 2015.’4
Canvassing with Labour was relaxed. I travelled down on the train with my own
MP, Andy Slaughter, who had tolerated me as an occasional shadow, and a col-
league of his, a woman MP. I asked them why MPs canvassed so much at by-
elections. They said it was partly tradition, shortage of activists in Eastleigh, and
whips asserting their authority for the sake of it. At the Labour HQ, a small
Victorian red brick house with worn carpets and peeling paint, I was greeted by
elderly men with Yorkshire accents and young women with brightly dyed hair.
As we tramped the streets of Eastleigh – getting lost, cold and with sore feet – the
Labour MPs gossiped about their time in government, past whips and leaders.
Canvassing is an opportunity for consolidating party loyalty through rallies,
walking the streets together but also swopping stories about shared political
experiences, people repeatedly told me. The prospects for winning affected the
parties but the cultural and aesthetic differences between them were obvious too.
In the Conservative club I was offered a glass of wine or beer, with the Lib Dems
I drank water, while the Labour activists handed me tea. This matters because
such habits play a part in creating a sense of belonging or alienation for those
participating.
On the day of the election I canvassed one last time with the Lib Dem Simon
Hughes MP. He took me ‘knocking people up’ and gave me a crash course on
election day canvassing. I was the Driver. When you knock on doors, you must
The alchemy of voting 41
take care not to wake babies or, in rural areas, chickens. You should not talk too
much and take care with direct questions: ‘Do you have children?’ would be
tactless to a childless couple desperate for offspring; ‘How do your parents find the
health services?’ would upset those whose parents were dead. (You should use an
indirect approach by asking about local schools or the generation above.) But the
performative aspect of talking to people when they open their doors is not only in
using your imagination to discern difference and taking care with emotional sen-
sitivities. What is harder to explain is the effect Simon Hughes had on the intensity
of the engagement: his unusually potent charisma gave him an ability to create
intimacy with strangers in moments. In contrast to other canvassers, who appeared
to have minimal impact on those opening the door to them – or even faced
complaints about the quantity of campaign literature and had doors slammed in
their face – Hughes connected with total strangers within 5–10 seconds. He fixed
them with an intense gaze and the hint of a smile and said in an intimate, confiding
way, ‘I will be the last person to pester you tonight’, and they would almost
instantly tell him what they were thinking about the election, how they voted and
why. One man voted for the Conservatives so he gently teased him and slapped
him on the side of the arm quite hard. But he did not seem to mind; he looked
tinkled pink. At one door he met a Labour voter:
‘I’m a Labour girl, have been all my life. Normally I vote LD tactically but this
time I couldn’t bring myself to. Because of the coalition.’
‘Do you mind me asking how you did vote?’ Simon added.
‘You won’t believe me.’
‘Try me.’
‘Peace party.’
‘Ohhhhh. You obviously know that is a vote for the Tory party.’
‘I know, I know … I agonised.’
‘At the next election will you consider voting for Mike?’
‘Yes, to be honest if you had been here 30 minutes ago I might have voted
for him. I will.’
This may have been partly his celebrity but even those who hadn’t heard of him
seemed entranced, acting as if they had known him for years rather than moments.
Talking to people on election day itself is also about finding out who has voted.
When the potential voter answers whether or not they have already voted it is
essential to send the information back to HQ so that they can be taken off the lists
and won’t be pestered again. In Eastleigh the LD did four sweeps on election day
of the whole constituency, each time minus people who had voted as they were
struck off the printouts. Meantime activists from around the country were phoning
LD voters to encourage them to go to the polling booths. At ten minutes to 10
pm, the close of the vote, party members (including extremely senior ones) were
still phoning like crazy. In the final minutes they ‘knocked up’ residents within five
minutes’ walk of polling booths and checked that they had voted.
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At the Count, in a soulless Leisure Centre, people sat at lines of trestle tables
counting votes. Each party’s election agents doubled up as scrutineers, checking no
mistakes were being made, but also counting how many votes their party had
received in a sample. The LDs crunched the sample vote in a laptop and came up
with the result well before it was officially announced. The technology of counting
the vote was obscured by the ritualised performance of celebration. Once again,
the political parties and the cameras colluded to make sure that the performance
was festive; everyone knew what had to be done. The TV needed some drama, so
the political parties arranged some. First came a small gaggle of Liberal Democrats
waving orange ‘I like Mike’ banners, cheering as loudly as their exhausted beings
could muster, and crowding around the candidate as tightly as possible. The cam-
eras descended on them, urgent and close up, giving the impression of a massive
and spontaneous crowd. The spectators looked on with wry amusement at this tiny
huddle of showy supporters in a large mostly empty gym, providing some enter-
tainment for the cameras, starved as they were of action and relying mostly on talk-
ing heads in studios with nothing new to say. The others followed with their own
band of supporters at five-minute intervals. Diane James for the UK Independence
Party came next with supporters in purple, looking equally buoyant and noisy. A gap
and then John O’Farrell breezed in with an air of weary sophistication and his
Labour crew in dark long coats and red badges looking like a unionised mafia.
Finally, Maria Hutchings, the Conservative candidate, appeared dressed in dark navy
blue, surrounded by anxiety as their impending defeat was becoming clear.
Canvassing for elections entails a heady mix of order and disorder – the
mechanical work of intelligence-gathering and counting, on the one hand, and
theatrical performance to engage people’s attention (in conversation or through
cameras and mediators) or outwit your opponents, on the other. Bad press for a
good MP can ruin a good party campaign so the devil of negative campaigning
tempts some. One Labour Party activist told me that in one general election he
couldn’t resist pointing out to a journalist that if he took a photo of a candidate in
his Speedo swimming trunks from a particular angle then it would read, ‘peedo’.
The swimmer lost at the election. One of the most famous mudslinging campaigns
took place in Bermondsey in 1983. A Lib Dem leaflet described the election as a
straight choice (misreported as ‘the straight choice’).5 Lib Dem canvassers walked
around with badges saying: ‘I’ve been kissed by x’ (that is, the gay Labour candi-
date) badges and an anonymous leaflet asked: ‘Which Queen Will You Vote For?’,
even supplying Mr x’s phone number and address. Candidates will go to incredible
lengths to get into parliament: trying again and again despite failing to win a seat,
giving up their jobs, enduring vicious attacks from opponents (prospective politi-
cians and countless others), attacking or even lying about opponents in their turn,
and spending huge amounts of money. In a survey carried out by journalist Isabel
Hardman she found that MPs spend an average of over £11k of their own money
on electioneering to get into the Westminster Parliament (i.e., 12.5% of their
annual salary if they become MPs) and 11 spent over £100k (2018: 19). Less is
spent that it was on leaflets and more on digital advertising, but it is still expensive.
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Elections draw people in not just because they are the most participatory way to
choose our representatives – conferring greater democratic legitimacy than any
other method – but the solidarity and competitiveness are intoxicating. Democratic
politics is like sport with ideas, UK politicians are keen on pointing out, as party
members are drawn together by values in common but also a sense of social
belonging. Former MP Natascha Engel describes this when worrying about whe-
ther MPs meeting on Zoom (during Covid-19) may erode team spirit:
Breaking the whip feels like a terrible act of betrayal, and in our Parliament,
the disloyalty is physical. The hours building up to it, friends coming and sit-
ting next to you in the chamber to try and dissuade you, the moment the
division bell rings, standing up and walking into the other lobby – the one
filled with MPs not from your party – how hard that is in person and how
easy it would be online. Some might think that is a good thing, that MPs need
to be more independent-minded. They certainly would be in a virtual parlia-
ment. But we would lose the reason why those party ties matter. For one
thing, most people vote for a political party at elections rather than for the
local candidate. Almost no MP would get to parliament without the party
ticket on which they stood. It is what makes politics a team sport, and like any
competitive game, it is always better live, cheering and groaning close-up with
your tribe, because at heart, politics (like sport) is about actual people and their
lives – a reality that is easily lost in the tiny heads and tinny voices of the vir-
tual world.6
Whether politicians or ordinary party members, people often talk about joining
and staying in or leaving parties because they share a moral and aesthetic sensibility.
However, since parties change abruptly with new leaders, their support base of
party members and voters shifts as well. Gone are the days when people have
reliable allegiances to parties – they consume politics, and swop loyalties in the flash
of an eye, rather than belong to one political ‘tribe’ (as they refer to them) for
decades or even life. Loyalty is still a powerful inspiring and constraining influence
on political relations, bonding some and excluding others, but these ties loosen
more easily than they used to.
Quiet rebellions: voting shifts as an indicator of social change
In the UK the Monarch used to take the advice of his nobles until burgesses began
to be elected and sent to ‘Parliaments’ from the thirteenth century (Crewe 2015a).
Until the nineteenth century landowners or other wealthy individuals controlled
over half of the seats, meaning candidates needed their favour to stand a chance.
When power is concentrated in so few, with no opening to change the rules, it is
common to find that elites resort to corruption. In this case it wasn’t just that the
controlling landowners bribed or blackmailed the voters to back his (or very
occasionally her) candidate but also that the boundaries of constituencies ossified
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despite sizeable population shifts. Even though Manchester and Birmingham had
huge populations by the nineteenth century, they sent no MPs to Westminster;
Old Sarum in Wiltshire and Gatton in Surrey had only seven voters but two seats
each. With the redrawing of boundaries and the secret ballot in the great reform
acts of the nineteenth century, corruption was stamped out of UK elections,
although only men were allowed to vote until 1928.
This brief snapshot of UK electoral history, and the equivalent from other
Western democracies, is partly to blame for common universalising assumptions
about how democratising is twinned with lower levels of corruption. But history is
not that simple. Sylvia Tidey tells a tale about two mayors in Indonesia that disabuses
us of such evolutionist tropes (2018). The post-Suharto drive to democratise entailed
the stamping out of clientelism and corruption on the grounds that this is the only
route to democracy. But voters had other ideas. Although an anti-corruption mayor
was voted in during a 2007 election, five years later he was replaced with a known
‘corruptor’ (ibid: 125). Tidey points out that while voters might tolerate some kinds
of stealing, they will not put up with a candidate who ignores the ‘small people’. So,
it is the betrayal of promises, and failure to recognise the intelligence of the voters,
that provokes them to have a change of heart.
Aaron Ansell also found that people in Northeast Brazil were voting on the basis
of anticipating loyalty versus betrayal, rather than assessing whether a politician
would represent their interests or rise above a narrow liberal conception of
corruption:
A good politician is one ‘for all seasons’ (de todos os tempos) and one who
‘always walks around here’ (sempre anda por aqui). A bad politician is one
who ‘only wants your vote’ and ‘only gives you value (valor) during the
political period.’ While politicians may boast of the enduring loyalties they
have earned from village families who vote for them in sequential elections,
they know that they need to do their part to secure these loyalties against the
shifting sands of familial and neighborhood obligations (e.g., work partner-
ships, love affairs, and land disputes) that alter people’s thinking about whom
to vote for during the next election. Each subsequent ‘proposal’ visit implicitly
affirms that a voter who was once captured in their numerical individuality has
returned to live as a socially embedded person whose particularity awaits
rediscovery.
(2018: S133)
So, voting reveals much about the relationships that people have within their
communities and how politicians’ connections with the community are viewed, at
least in some constituencies. In larger cities, and places with huge constituencies,
this may be less relevant. But it is certainly resonant of the UK where politicians in
all constituencies, even in London, are expected to sustain their relationships with
constituents by being present in the community and serving those who ask for
help. They are far more likely to be trusted to maintain this connection if they are
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local. Campbell and Cowley’s research indicates that while voters will not be
strongly influenced by the gender, age or class of the candidate, they are far more
likely to vote for someone who is seen as part of the community – preferably a
resident in the constituency (2014).
Aside from the distinction between being an outsider or a local, politicians are
seen as ‘all the same’ in the sense that they are lying, power-hungry and venal. The
only route for them, as Robert Halfon MP suggests, is to recognise that:
the pure science of political campaigning will only have a limited degree of
success – unless it is buttressed by a deep understanding of the most important
ingredient – the building up of human relationships … Human relationships,
and a level of emotional intelligence, are a prerequisite to ensuring that voters
don’t see you as just another politician.
(quoted by Crewe 2015a: 40)
But you need both. The UK’s Conservative MP Nicola Blackwood won a seat
from the Liberal Democrats by finding out the intentions and concerns of 10,000s
of voters and sending out a million pieces of literature. Here are the ingredients of
modern electioneering: nurturing relationships, gathering intelligence, making
promises that respond to demands in your constituency and sustaining your con-
nection between elections. Indeed, in the UK elections reveal a shift from
patronage through a Burkean form of trustee representation towards the current
more intimate connection whereby the politician is a delegate for his/her con-
stituency. In the last few decades this has intensified with politicians being even
more exposed by the 24-hour digital revolution, transforming the way that politics
is performed, observed and participated in so that MPs have no rest from the
endless pressure to please their supporters and potential voters.
The importance of dynamism in relationships doesn’t stop with the seeking of votes
to get into parliament but extends to a different form of voting once MPs take their
seats: whipping to get party members to support ‘divisions’ (i.e., votes) as ‘business’
(usually law-making) goes through parliament. Both voting in elections and in divi-
sions involves a process of alchemy. In both cases individuals express their view by
casting their vote – in elections by a cross on a piece of paper and in divisions by
electronic voting or (in the UK) by walking into one of the lobbies beside the debat-
ing chamber indicating yes or no. These many subjective viewpoints expressed
through votes get counted up to produce a result that is seen as objective – yes versus
no – turning the base elements of many subjectivities into the democratic gold of a
decision that is beyond question. As if by magic, the argument stops, violence is pre-
vented and a decision is created by the alchemy of voting. It is no surprise then that
when the preparation for the voting changes, for example with new forms of massa-
ging of the individual subjectivities, then the result is affected.
Once MPs have been voted in, voting for or against motions is a key part of
their work. The pervasive scholarly view of whips – those politicians disciplining
their members into obedience so that they vote with their party – is that they
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forcefully bully or bribe their members and politicians comply out of self-interest
(Kam 2014). Many political scientists, and even people working in parliament,
contrast the iron-like grip of UK House of Commons’ whips with a feeble whip-
ping operation in the House of Lords (Crewe 2015b: 7). All peers have a seat for
life, and most have reached the pinnacle of their profession so lack career ambition,
which means there are few threats or bribes at the whips’ disposal in the House of
Lords. So why then do the gentler whips in the House of Lords achieve relatively
high levels of obedience while their Commons’ equivalents deal with increasingly
rebellious MPs who have so much more to gain and lose? Philip Cowley’s work
on divisions reveals that MPs have been more rebellious each parliament since the
1950s (2005). The Public Whip website produces figures by counting the number
of times that peers and MPs vote against the majority of their party. The average
for rebellion is tiny.7 Although double the number of more-than-average rebels
can be found proportionately in the Lords, this raises a perplexing question: why
do peers (like MPs) vote with their party the vast majority of the time even when
they disagree with their leaders and whips?
To answer this puzzle you have to look at the social, cultural and political dif-
ferences between the two Houses and how these are shifting. Then it becomes
clear that obedience to the party’s instructions in the House of Lords is only partly
achieved by the whips. Three subtler social processes are at play. First, the experi-
ence of being a peer is socially all-encompassing. Elevation to the peerage, stimu-
lating conversation, the charm and comforts of the gilded end of the Palace, £323
a day for attendance (in 2020)8 and, above all, a sense of moral and political pur-
pose make them humble to a collective of which they are equal members and share
in its symbolic property. The deference to the will of their own House of Lords,
and ultimately to the other House, is taught to peers within the rituals of law-
making and scrutiny. They regulate their own proceedings with long-established
peers encouraging restraint and punishing breaches with surprising ferocity (‘self-
regulation’ in the words of peers); it is literally peer pressure. The seduction and
deference only work effectively thanks to a third process: belonging. Belonging to
political parties for life is mostly a dying pattern in the UK, but belonging has as much
potency for politicians in the Lords as in the Commons, despite an ethos of ‘inde-
pendent-mindedness’ among peers. A sense of belonging is unsurprising for former
MPs, of which there are many in the Lords, especially as the MPs appointed as peers
by party leaders tend to be especially loyal to party. But party loyalty stirs first-time
politicians too. The late Earl Russell explained what loyalty meant to him: ‘My loyalty
to my party is one of the strongest emotions that I possess … I had been here 10 years
before I voted against the party Whip.’9 To vote against the whip in either House can
feel like a betrayal of colleagues you have taken sides with for years. Or, as one woman
peer put it, when I asked about where her loyalty is directed: ‘It is not to Britain, not
the abstract idea of the Labour party, or to beneficiaries, it is to party members – party
people. It would be very difficult to be disloyal to party people. I can’t bring myself to
go into the division lobby with the enemy.’10 The key sanction for peers voting
against party – shame – is extremely effective.
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Commons whips have more weapons than Lords whips. For the 140 MPs on
the government ‘payroll vote’ in 2017, that is, with a paid or unpaid job in gov-
ernment, or on the Opposition frontbenches (with a position as whip or ‘shadow’
to a minister) you have no choice, you have to vote with your party or you will
lose your job. For the rest – the backbenchers – your obedience will be rewarded
with one of the following: support if you get into trouble (which MPs seem to
manage rather often), ‘slips’ (permission to be absent for an important event like a
football game or play at your children’s school), a good office, an overseas trip or,
most importantly, promotion to the frontbench. When government backbenchers’
support wobbles, the whips arrange a meeting with the relevant minister and that
often brings them around. Persistent offenders are threatened with denial of sup-
port at the next election, but since many local party associations can have a grip on
this decision-making in the UK, this warning on its own can often ring hollow.
Withdrawal of the whip, effectively expelling them from the party, is a serious
threat, however. It was used only sparingly until recently, because it can dent party
loyalty among those close to those punished. But the UK’s PM Boris Johnson
showed his desperation towards rebels in his own party by evicting twenty-one
from his party in September 2019 with the consequence that many lost their seats
in the General Election a few months later.
What does this intolerant post-rebellion approach reveal? Johnson’s punitive act
may have been merely a blip in a pattern in the Commons whereby increasingly
whips rely on pressure exerted between MPs rather than the authority of the party
leader. Most loyal party members in the Commons, like the Lords, deem defiance
of the whip to be arrogant individualism or even morally suspect. They rely on this
moral pressure because although whipping still constrains MPs, for a host of social,
cultural and political reasons whips (and the party leaders they serve) have been
losing authority. As MPs spend more and more time in constituencies, visiting at
least once a fortnight in contrast to the annual trip that they tended to make a
century ago, they listen to local party members and constituents more often than
they used to, especially if in a marginal seat. In the UK local parties in con-
stituencies often take less notice of the central party managers and so do their MPs.
For many years defiance went almost unpunished and especially during the Labour
Blair/Brown governments (1997–2010) when they had large majorities and could
afford more rebellion than usual. The Labour Party’s leader from 2015 to 2020,
Jeremy Corbyn, was the second most rebellious MP during Labour’s Blair/Brown
governments; his Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell defied the whip more often
than any other Labour MP.
Since 2010 whips have had even fewer bribes or threats at their disposal. They
no longer choose select committee members or chairs since the whole House elects
them,11 thanks to reforms brought in post the UK expenses scandal in 2009 to
restore the reputation of Parliament and increase the power of the backbenchers.
Stories about physical violence meted out on wayward backbenchers are also losing
their intended deterrent effect; it is no longer socially acceptable to squeeze some-
one’s balls (for those who have them) or shout verbal abuse to enforce their
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obedience; and backbenchers relish going straight to the newspapers or Twitter
with tales of abuse by whips. Even deference itself is going out of fashion so the
whips have less authority.
Whips rely on party loyalty but it is fracturing in the Commons. Belonging to
political parties is sustained by social relationships between members, which con-
tinue in the intimacy of the village-like House of Lords, but not in the cityscape of
the House of Commons. MPs spend less time with each other than they used to.
They all have offices with two or three members of staff, sometimes in distant
outbuildings, and they work fewer evenings in Westminster since the hours were
shifted to earlier in the day. In general people support each other in politics
because they like and trust them, not only because they agree with them. With
hierarchies in decline and the loosening of social bonds, parties can no longer rely
on loyal voting either outside or inside parliament. So whether researching people
voting for politicians, or politicians voting with or against their parties, the rela-
tionships created before or after the vote are as interesting as the vote itself.
Fetishising the vote
We need to understand elections to make sense of parliaments, so I have written
about what they mean to people in Russia, Brazil, India and the UK and how
changes in voting reflect wider social and cultural change. Voting is so central to
our idea of democracy that the latter could not exist without the former. You
cannot be for or against elections; they just exist like trees or mosquitoes, argues
Russian anthropologist Melnikova (2013). But I would go further: critical judge-
ment is also necessary – not in the sense of questioning whether to be for or against
voting, but to consider whether we have lost our sense of proportion about what
voting can and can’t do.
Voting is seen as an expression of the will of the people; the secret ballot is seen
as emancipatory and connotative of a universal philosophy of individual choice,
freedom and self-expression (Wouters 2018: 115–16). At times democracy is even
equated with voting, as if elections fuel, drive or even constitute democratisation.
As evidence of this, US overseas aid has become conditional on the establishment
of ‘democratic institutions’. Comaroff and Comaroff point out that this usually
means regular multiparty elections with democracy being reduced from ‘the sub-
stantative to the procedural, from social movement to electoral process’ (1997:
125–6). Democratising, which usually focuses on elections and the rule of law,
became the panacea for Africa’s development ills at the end of the Cold War
(Hagman and Reyntjens 2016). By equating elections with democracy donors gloss
over gaps. They are inconsistent in their insistence on elections in practice, for
example, when they prioritise electoral technical assistance for those countries that
they deem to be ‘weak’ states. Donor darlings like Uganda, Rwanda and Ghana
receive far less interference in the running of their politics on the one hand
(Pommerolle 2016: 119, 127–8); in the Cameroon, on the other hand, various
bilateral and multilateral donor workers got involved in ‘electoral assistance’ to
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maintain stability in the country. Since free and fair elections were seen as a
symptom of success, and were vital for sustaining their aid budgets, foreign devel-
opment workers repeatedly validated successive elections even though they were
unable to offer proof. Their impact on Cameroonian politics was, Pommerolle
argues, mainly to confuse matters.
I would argue that our pseudo-magical trust in the results of elections as the
driver of democracy, and our fetishising of voting, can also lead to neglect of the
other processes that are necessary to make democratic politics work. Just as tech-
nology is seen as the driver of development, fetishised to such an extent that people
scarcely notice the harm it causes (Crewe and Harrison 1998), so too elections are
seen as so sacred that we don’t notice when they cause chaos, still less acknowledge
their limitations. The architect of the Indian constitution, Ambedkhar, warned that
democracy has to be cultivated – it can’t work unless we transcend divisions, such
as those created by class and caste (as cited by Banerjee 2014: 181, 171).
A painful example of fetishising the process of voting and the failure to over-
come divisions (both new and old) was on display after the UK Brexit Refer-
endum of 2016. The Conservative Party in the UK was plagued by division over
our membership of the European Community and then Union since we joined in
1973. A large minority of Conservative MPs and members campaigned against the
EU ever since and they persuaded the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, to
hold a referendum to decide whether we should leave or remain as a member. To
his shock, the leavers won the vote on 23 June 2016 and he resigned. For years
afterwards the UK was paralysed by this vote. Our inexperience at holding and
responding to referenda was partly to blame: it was advisory in law, so we did not
have a threshold which would often be the case for a constitutional decision if
binding, and the politicians failed to underline this before and after the vote. The
government was entirely unprepared for the possibility that the ‘leave campaign’
might win and triggered Article 50 prematurely, the mechanism for leaving,
without knowing on what terms we might exit. A mixture of indecision about
those terms among Brexiteers, and an aspiration to thwart Brexit altogether among
Remainers both inside and outside Parliament, made resolution impossible for
years. The normal factions created by the main parties fragmented and new alli-
ances formed, across Parliament and with those outside, to create paralysis. The
referendum may have been merely a starting point from which debate and discus-
sion might have found a way to leave the EU based on some kind of consensus or
at least agreement. But politicians relied too much on the ritual of a vote, treating
the result of the referendum as sacred and turning to elections twice (in 2017 and
2019) to find a way through the impasse, before finally leaving the EU in January
2020.
We take democracy so much for granted we have forgotten how it came about.
As Graeber points out, ‘We create things, and then, because we don’t understand
how we did it, we end up treating our own creations as if they had power over us.
We fall down and worship that which we ourselves have made … A fetish is a god
under process of construction’ (2005: 411, 427). Athens gave democracy its name
50 The sociality of parliaments
with a system in which citizens governed themselves, but it took the French Revo-
lution 2000 years later to turn it into an aspiration for transforming society into equal
citizens (Dunn 2005: 16–17). John Dunn’s story of democracy and how it became
about choosing your leaders rather than self-rule, helps us understand the present.
Today, the word democracy has become ‘saturated with emotion, irradiated by
passion, tugged to and fro and ever more overwhelmed by accumulated confusion.
To rescue it as an aid to understanding politics, we need to think our way past a mass
of history and block our ears to many pressing importunities’ (ibid: 39).
How did this happen? Greek philosophers were fiercely critical of Athenian
government by the multitude, and democracy was still a pariah word at the
beginning of the eighteenth century, but by the time Tocqueville wrote Democracy
in America, the idea had taken on an utopian character (ibid: 71–4). What is sig-
nificant about the shaping of early democracies in North America and France is not
just the integration of all citizens into the system but, in contrast to Athens, the fact
that their participation was severely restricted to irregular elections. Voting their
leaders and representatives into parliaments or legislatures – through the institution
of representative democracy – was as much a way of excluding citizens from the
exercise of power through government, as it was about including them. As Dunn
puts it, the political leaders of capitalism’s amazing advance embraced the idea of
democracy, with elections at the core, as a highly effective way to appropriate and
tap into a deep reservoir of political power (ibid: 134). You can recognize citizens
as equals in theory but fail to treat them as such in the everyday practice of gov-
ernment, allowing obscene inequalities, injustices and harm to minorities to persist.
To make sure citizens comply with the limits to their power, it is no surprise then
that elections need to be highly ritualised, fetishised and made sacred (see Chapter
7 for a discussion of political ritual). It is not only authoritarian political worlds that
need ritual to sustain them.
We are so dazzled by the idea of Western democracy being inclusive, and the
other political systems being elitist, that we fail to see the opposite operating at the
same time. The postcolonial meeting of different political aspirations in different
nations around the world reveals much about the limitations of democracy.
Comaroff and Comaroff point to the contemporary history of Botswana to illus-
trate how it can be entirely rational to take a critical position on the risks of
democracy if reduced to mere election and no more (1997). Rather than assuming
that politicians should be elected on the basis of their promises, people view a
political party as credible if it has established its track record for engaging in
recognisable forms of participatory democracy. So while electoral processes did not
mimic earlier forms of political processes, they were embedded in long-standing
expectations about how leaders should perform. When some even argued for a
one-party system in Botswana, it wasn’t a harking back to a traditional way of
doing politics, but it was a critique of the superficiality of reducing democracy to
one choice every five years.
The argument that democracy takes different forms with vernacular meanings in
different places, depending on its history and culture, should not be taken too far
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or over-simplified. Jonathan Spencer, in his seminal work Anthropology, Politics and
the State, cautions against the search for democracy Lankan-style for two reasons
(2007: 93–95). He finds similarities in the way people engage in democratic politics
across South Asia (high levels of participation with low expectations of politicians),
but also threads that run through all processes of representative democracy wher-
ever they are found in the world. One of these is the carnivalesque mood of
elections, fuelled by a sense of possibility for a better future, and another is the
threat of violence. So, we need to keep both the vernacular and the global in our
mind’s eye.
To come down to earth, and listen to the implied critiques from elsewhere (like
India, Botswana and Cameroon, as explained above), we need to work hard at
other aspects of democracy rather than merely revere its defining sacred process:
the vote. It is voting that allows democracy to distinguish itself from other forms of
political leadership, but it is processes other than voting that will enable people to
make democratic politics work well or badly. Other democratic processes have
been analysed in different ways by philosophers since ancient times. In re-imagin-
ing democracy we need to avoid universal recipes and allow for the emergence of
vernacular and shared forms. There is no shortage of ideas, both local and global.
For Arendt, politics is about debating diverse opinions created by the plurality of
humans in public spaces, so she has plenty to say about how democracy needs to
engage with the diversity of human experience in the public realm:
The more people’s standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pon-
dering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think
if I were in their place, the stronger will be the capacity for representative
thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion.
(1977: 241)
Writing after the tyranny of Nazism, Arendt counsels that participating in the
public realm is a moral responsibility, necessary because important differences will
always be found between people in any group, however homogeneous they may
appear. She has influenced Hermut Rosa, who wrote about the plurality of voices
in his book Resonance: ‘Modern democracy is rather fundamentally based on the
idea that its form of politics gives every individual voice and allows that voice to be heard,
such that the politically shaped world thus becomes an expression of this produc-
tive polyphony’ (2019: 217). Unlike Habermas, who implies that consensus can be
reached, Rosa is interested in how we find resonance across separation, difference
and alienation. So he goes deeper into the question: how can democracy accom-
modate plurality without foreclosing rule by the people? I will return to this in the
next chapter, when considering how elected politicians make the claim to repre-
sent hugely diverse constituencies containing 1000s or even 100,000s of people.
To return to the issue of how democracy needs to develop, we need to expand
our understanding of leadership. While politicians can be brilliant at some aspects
of politics – adapting to different audiences, finding compromises and agreeing
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laws, as examples – their record at administration and government tends to be far
weaker. Dunn warns that modern political theory focuses too much on intention and
gives inadequate weight to practical skill. Part of the practical skill is about deliberating
on the plurality of interests affected by policy, law and administration directly or in its
shadow. Since what is good for some will be bad for others, reading the runes – ima-
gining the future on the basis of the present – is fraught with danger for politicians.
Their decisions will always be distasteful to some and in this sense we might even be
grateful to politicians for courting inevitable unpopularity.
The very purpose of political society itself is precisely to stand in – by clear
and predictable legal and judicial arrangements, backed by effective powers of
enforcement – for the erratic and dangerous conditions generated by the col-
lision of institutionally unrestrained human partiality.
(Dunn 2000: 84)
President Trump’s neglect of administration, failure to accept the results of the
November 2020 election, and encouragement of supporters to sabotage the orderly
transfer of power in January 2021, all illustrate Dunn’s warnings with poignancy.
According to one of his aides, when he became President in 2016 Trump found it
difficult to adjust to the business of discussing policy options. He often interrupted
meetings to ask the aide to bring the election maps depicting his victory to explain
how he won, state by state.12 During his term it was as if he never stopped cam-
paigning, endlessly making claims about America’s greatness and his own, seeing
the two as intimately connected. His unrestrained partiality – including a sympathy
for white supremacy – and emotional and intellectual inability to accept defeat,
were his downfall as a politician.
In Chapter 4 I will look at the scrutiny of government – by parliament but also
by media, civil society and academics – and suggest that this is an especially
important role for researchers, including anthropologists. But next I’ll turn to the
claim to represent the people.
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3
REPRESENTING
This is a wonderful place, filled overwhelmingly by people who are motivated by their
notion of the national interest, by their perception of the public good and by their duty –
not as delegates, but as representatives – to do what they believe is right for our country.
(John Bercow speaking in the UK House of Commons, 9 September 2019)1
What is political representation?
When the Speaker of the UK House of Commons announced his resignation in
2019 he referred to MPs as representatives and not delegates of the public – elected
representatives who should use their own judgement in deciding what is best for
the country. He was referring to what has become a sacred text for the trustee
approach to representation, the words of former English MP Edmund Burke:
It ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest
union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication
with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their
opinion, high respect; their business, unremitting attention. It is his duty to
sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs; and above all, ever,
and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own.
But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he
ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he
does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution.
They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable.
Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he
betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
(1854: 446–8)
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Burke famously listened to his constituents and then ignored them, for example in
his support for free trade with Ireland. When politicians in the UK wish to argue
that it is legitimate to depart from their constituents’ demands or preferences, then
they reach for Burke with predictable regularity. But this is beginning to sound out
of step with contemporary popular riffs on representation in democracy – the now
more familiar claim that MPs will represent the wishes, views or interests, as a
delegate of a community or collectively as a parliament of the nation. It is a regular
refrain to hear demands from constituents that politicians should present their
views, sound like them in attitude and respond to their demands, not to do the
best for them in their own individual judgement.
A representative being a delegate of a group was articulated by one of the architects
of the US constitution, James Madison, in the eighteenth century, although its his-
torical roots have been traced back to the Magna Carta (Rehfeld 2009: 217). It
remains unsettled in democracies as to whether we want our representations to aspire
towards trusteeship or delegation. But it may also be the wrong question. Rehfeld
points out that this binary choice obscures three processes that will affect the repre-
sented and representer relationship: the law-maker’s aims, the source of his/her jud-
gement, and the degree to which he/she is responsive (ibid: 215). I might add that the
trustee versus delegate binary ignores the complexity of representatives working
within political parties and factions, or trading votes and doing deals across parties, to
promote their causes. It also ignores places where MPs don’t represent constituencies
but the country as a whole, such as Portugal (Leston-Bandeira 2004). And the binary
of trustee versus delegate fails to consider other alternatives beyond needs, demands
and interests, to ask what representer and represented might mean to each other in
symbolic, psychological and emotional senses.
The first political scientist to address this question in both depth and breadth as
an ethnographer was Richard Fenno. He writes of US representatives that trust is
the magic ingredient. ‘If people like you and trust you as an individual, they will
vote for you’, members told him (Fenno 1978: 56). So, conversations between
politicians and their constituents are not only (or at least as much) about policy or
political ideology but about whether the representative can be trusted. It takes time
to win the moral approval contained within trust and it means getting close to
people or giving the illusion of closeness. One US representative told Fenno that
no one will vote against you if you are on a first names basis and if you chew their
tobacco, then they will even fight for you. Another representative put it: ‘the best
way to win a vote is to shake hands with someone. You don’t win votes by the
1000s with a speech. Very rarely will anyone ask you about how you stand on
anything’ (ibid: 64, 85).
Communication involves a subtler process whereby US politicians spend time in
their districts to measure and enhance their voting leeway. Representatives know
that they will be required sometimes to vote against the wishes of their con-
stituents. To do this without losing too many votes they have to be trusted; the
more a politician is trusted, therefore, the more leeway he or she has (ibid: 140–
51). Again, this quality of trust is not abstract but an embodied experience of
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emotion requiring mutual affirmations of identity. So, it is not policy agreement
that voters demand, according to US Members of Congress, it is a feeling of
belonging to one another. They continually talk about the shared streets, the char-
acters and the churches, stressing their commonality, understanding and affectual
resonance. They vary their presentation to different groups within the constituency.
When voters do see the Member as the same as them, perhaps if their identity
overlaps, then he or she becomes a symbolic representative; for example: ‘Almost
anything I do makes them feel proud. They know I’m a black man standing up for
the black man’ (ibid: 120). To what extent representatives are able to create this
sense of shared space and resonance with different groups on digital media is worth
studying, especially since digital communication is increasingly consuming so much
of politicians’ time and, in the face hate speech and abuse, emotional labour.
Political scientists have even undertaken participant-observation as politicians
themselves (e.g., Price 1992 and Lee 2006). Mordecai Lee, who has been a
member of both the Wisconsin State Assembly and Senate, wrote about how both
constituency casework and legislating for special interest groups are viewed with
relish by most legislators as ways to secure both appreciation and support in the
next election (ibid: 373). However, there is, of course, the risk that it will alienate
other special interest groups but the anticipated damage is less than failing to look
responsive. Katherine Cramer, another US political scientist, offers another rare
example of ethnographic research into democracy, again about Wisconsin (2016). She
spent years conversing with groups of citizens in the rural areas of this swing state,
interpreting their attitudes towards politics and politicians. She found that rural con-
sciousness is partly constituted by a resentment towards city-dwellers. They feel
ignored and neglected in ways that do not translate into automatic support for either
Republicans or Democrats. They distrust all politicians: ‘support for small government
can come from something more visceral, though certainly not less serious, than poli-
tical principles: our sense of who is on the side of good and who is on the bad’ (ibid:
211). But such complex ethnographic research, based on many years of observation or
even participation, remains rare in recent political science literature.
More conventional political scientists face a pressure to create universalising
causal links and classifications to explain what goes on (e.g., in parliament or con-
stituencies) and quantitative methods are seen as the gold standard. As Cramer
explains, positivist approaches have their limits:
The positivist model set-up assumes that values on one explanatory (or ‘inde-
pendent’) variable move independently of the other variables. Or, if claiming
an interaction between explanatory variables, it assumes that people with par-
ticular combinations of these characteristics exhibit a significantly different
level of the variable we are trying to explain (the ‘dependent’ variable).
However, the object of my study, or my dependent variable, to put it in
positivist terms, is not a position on an attitude scale but, instead, the per-
spectives that people use to arrive at that position.
(ibid: 22)
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While Cramer’s focus is on the entanglement of attitudes and identities, ethno-
graphy in the hands of anthropologists is often even more ambitious – probing into
social relations, rituals and so on. The result is not only that positivist approaches
struggle to inquire into such complex entanglements but there is a widespread
misunderstanding of the epistemologies underlying anthropological (and philoso-
phical, sociological and historical) theories/methods that depend on, as examples,
logic, narrative, interpretation and abduction (which I return to in the last chapter).
When more conventional political scientists address the question – What does
representation entail? – they tend to generate useful data, but have more to say on
outcomes than processes and relationships. They sometimes look at the coexistence
of (a) constituents’ preferences and (b) how politicians vote, and then deduce a link
between these based on a rational calculation of interests (Best and Vogel 2014). In
this case they deduce that the coexistence of these two factors must mean that the
elected representative has calculated that it is in his/her interests to please their
potential electors by following what they want. The data can get complex in its
detail when other variables get pulled into the mix. When considering how this is
affected by electoral systems, apparently they found that proportional representa-
tion (PR) causes greater congruence with all voters while majoritarian systems do
this with party voters (ibid: 71). Brack et al. agree that it is extremely rare for
political scientists to find out what MPs actually do in their constituencies and why,
offering a rare example of research into this from France, Belgium and Germany
(2016). However, when they hypothesise that MPs’ activities are influenced by
institutional constraints, normative ideas of representation, perceptions of citizens’
expectations, environmental considerations and the context of ‘culture’, this begs
further questions. The two main variables – institutional and individual – are
explained with further long lists: institutional characteristics include the electoral
system; culture might involve the state, conflict or image; and the individual level
brings in perceptions or the impact of electoral rules on MPs’ incentives. Repre-
sentation is about rules and activities in this perspective, which can be quite easily
listed, but we never discover how these endless variables influence each other in
the everyday relationships and practices of real people working together. Much
political science research about representation – especially on preferences (of voters)
and behaviour (of politicians) – tends to be abstracted from everyday experience,
relationships and contradictions. It is difficult to probe the plurality of meaning or
intention in quantitative surveys (we can’t easily ask ‘why?’), to inquire into the
impact that the researchers (and their assumptions) have on the process, or to code
the most revealing responses. The normative work of trying to classify and improve
representation, before we have really understood it, can distract scholars from get-
ting under its skin and from working out its history, meaning and plurality.
It is worth remembering that the idea of representation in Europe was paterna-
listic until the Enlightenment – that is, it was assumed that elites would take
account of the interests of all, as far as morally required. But this changed in the
UK in the seventeenth century, as recorded during the 1647 Putney Debates. It
was revolutionary when Thomas Rainsborough argued:
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For really I think that the poorest hee that is in England hath a life to live, as
the greatest hee; and therefore truly, Sr, I think itt clear, that every Man that is
to live under a Government ought first by his own Consent to put himself
under that Government; and I do think that the poorest man in England is not
at all bound in a strict sense to that Government that he hath not had a voice
to put Himself under.2
The idea that everyone needs their own voice took hold but it was 100s of years
before the radicals’ demand for universal male suffrage was met and it was only in
1928 that all adults got the vote in the UK, including women. To understand
representation in the UK then, you have to know how we got from Rainsborough
to where we are now. A UK history of representation is beyond the scope of this
book, still less a global history of developments in different nations, but one aspect
of this idea of ‘voice’ deserves particular attention in part because it has dominated
global debates on representation by parliamentarians for the last few decades:
women’s political representation. The Sustainable Development Goals commit
governments to gender equality and the empowerment of women, and one of the
key indicators is the number of seats held in parliaments by women (indicator
5.5.1). Only 32% of parliamentarians globally are women, only three countries
have parliaments with over 50% female – Rwanda, Cuba and Bolivia – and three
have no women at all.3 Feminist theories about representation help us understand
why progress has been so slow in promoting not only gender equality but also
representative democracy more generally.
Feminist theories of under-representation
Central to feminism is the question of alignment or divergence between the interests
of those representing and being represented. In recognition of women’s political sub-
ordination to men, and lack of access to education, from the middle of the nineteenth
century early feminists in the English-speaking world (notably Mary Wollstonecraft)
pointed out that their interests were negated, marginalised or neglected entirely. In the
UK, inspired by Wollstonecraft, the first wave of feminists argued for political repre-
sentation. The impact of their fight for votes for women, and the on-going campaign
for equal representation within political institutions (and the equivalent struggles else-
where), was to transform parliaments. (Both the UK and the US were slower than the
first country to give women the vote – New Zealand in 1893.) On the other side of
the relationship – the representers rather than the represented – feminists assume that
the differences between women and men mean that the latter will tend to (or even
will always, according to some) overlook the interests of the former so self-repre-
sentation is the most effective way to work towards equality. It is now widely accepted
that women should have equal representation in political institutions for that reason or
because it is their human right.
Shirin Rai, one of the world’s leading scholars on gendered representation,
explains the twists and turns with a unique grasp of its historical and geo-political
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complexity. She is a politics scholar whose interdisciplinary approach breaks
through various boundaries by combining humanities and social science (2000).
Despite democracy being such a powerful motif, its message of political parity is
not translated into practice because liberal democracy has privileged a ‘public man’
as the default political actor and excluded women from becoming fully engaged
citizens (ibid: 2–3). The work of feminist activists and scholars has been to shift the
focus from individual rights towards identity-based politics. Hanna Pitkin’s Concept
of Representation (1967) was influential in helping people rethink what this rela-
tional, rather than merely individually based, representation work might entail. She
argued against choosing between a trustee and delegate model of representation,
proposing that the representative should be accountable but able to take autono-
mous decisions on behalf of the group. Her classification of four meanings of
representation – formalistic (the institutional arrangements), descriptive (shared
identity or interests), substantive (taking actions that are in the interests of the
group), and symbolic (the meaning evoked) – reveals where our attention is still
drawn in terms of intention several decades later. Most of the scholarship and
political work on representation continues to focus on formalistic and descriptive,
rather than substantive and symbolic. However, Pitkin’s classification tells us little
about what actually goes on between people who are representing and being
represented.
Jane Mansbridge offers a more empirically based four-fold categorisation of
forms of representation that is based on empirical findings: promissory (whereby
representatives are evaluated for their promises), anticipatory (taking actions that
seek rewards in the next election), gyroscopic (looking within to decide what is in
constituents’ interests), and surrogacy (representing those outside their con-
stituencies/districts) (2003). This is a helpful advance on Pitkin’s work as it injects a
sense of time into the relationship, not just past time but future time, that is, peo-
ple’s anticipation of the future. But it still leaves us with old and difficult questions
about evaluating ‘interests’: who should decide what is in the interests of some or
all women? If you ask women we will always disagree between ourselves (like any
group) and we don’t always have the full picture of possibilities or, as Appadurai
puts it in another context, ‘the capacity to aspire’ for our rights or resource enti-
tlements (2004). Maxine Molyneux’s distinction between strategic versus practical
interests addresses this difficulty. She offers an attempt to acknowledge that it is the
most subordinated who can be the least ambitious for change because they have
the poorest access to the resources required to make demands. Women’s practical
interests address their immediate needs (e.g., for access to services or childcare) and
this is what resource-poor women will often focus on. Strategic interests challenge
women’s subordination by addressing those conditions that reproduce it (e.g., fairer
pay, better political representation or stopping gender-based violence) (1985), and
that can only be achieved in collectives. But can we generalise across cultures about
the conditions that reproduce gendered inequality?
Since the 1980s white feminists have been criticised by ‘Third World’, black4
and LGBT+ feminists for simplistic generalisations, portraying women as
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homogeneous, denying their diversity (based on age, class, sexuality, nationality,
ethnicity …) and privileging the views and experiences of white, heterosexual,
middle class women. Western feminists often assumed that the ‘victimhood’ of
women around the world mirrored the European experience of patriarchy. Chan-
dra Talpade Mohanty was one of the first to point out that the portrayal of Third
World women as passive victims was a symptom of widespread postcolonial
racism – some women are far more powerful than others (1986, 2003). Child rights
activists point out that feminist generalisations are often adult-focused (Crewe
2010). Demands for the representation of women leaves out the pervasive abuse
and exclusion of girls, despite the commitments that states have made via the
Convention on the Rights of the Child that all children will be consulted about
laws and policies that affect them.
The Eurocentric ‘globalised’ generalisations about women that we find in some
Western white feminism spill into some donors’ initiatives to increase women’s
representation in parliaments. Women lack voice, access to resources and contacts,
so since the 1990s many donors and UN bodies have invested huge amounts of
energy into increasing the parliamentary representation of women so they could
argue for equality. Better representation in parliaments is perhaps less contentious
than addressing women’s unpaid work as carers and their unequal pay, which are
far higher priorities for many women but require complex social and political
change (Sawar 2000). Nonetheless, feminist-inspired representation does entail
complexity too. Anthropologists have pointed out that women’s interests, and
therefore the representation of them, are inevitably different according to context
and can confound both expectations and assumptions. In Botswana’s stable and
multiparty democracy you might expect women’s representation to rise but actu-
ally it has been falling (Bauer and Burnet 2013). In Rwanda quotas have achieved
one of the world’s majority female parliaments, but limited progress has been made
by government towards a feminist agenda, partly because the space for the
women’s movement in civil society has shrunk (ibid). Ugandan feminist and lawyer
Sylvia Tamale’s innovative work with women politicians also probes connections
between their experience inside the Ugandan Parliament and how it is connected
with broader social relations, embedded as it is in a long and specific history of
patriarchy (1999). Cultural socialisation orientating girls and boys towards different
ambitions – ideas about ‘feminine’ mothering in the domestic arena versus ‘mas-
culine’ aggression in the public realm – influences their experiences when they
become MPs. The male dominated government can never quite shrug off gen-
dered assumptions and interests when confronted with feminist action so women
MPs face a backlash from men and are often blocked in their efforts. There is
general agreement that to make progress, and resist the temptation to get involved
in patronage politics themselves, women MPs need to work with those beyond the
state in civil society.
Much feminist work in the last 20 years has argued for going beyond numbers.
Another feminist who has reshaped debates on representation in profound ways is
Anne Phillips in her Politics of Presence (1995). She makes the argument for the
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presence of diversity in political institutions to ensure diversity of skills in the name
of justice, to guarantee a range of interests and to deepen participation. But she also
points out that numbers are not enough. The next challenge is for representatives
to be more accountable. Anthropologists, and other ethnographers, who have lis-
tened to politicians talk about this have explained how this is even more fraught
for women than men. Ethnographically inclined political scientist Jack Corbett
writes about women’s experience of representation in a way that echoes across
contexts: politicians in the 15 countries of the Pacific Islands reflect that once
elected, your constituents own you and for women it is a form of dual ownership.
They represent their constituents and all women at the same time because their
total number in all Pacific Island parliaments is extremely low (2015: 72–73). Even
in 2020 women are proportionately only 7% and three of the four countries in the
world with no women politicians at all are in the Pacific.5
I too found that accountability was especially complex for those who are under-
represented or from minorities. While white men feel more easily entitled to be
our representatives, women and, especially those who are black, Asian or minority
ethnic (BAME), can be treated in subtle ways as if they are ‘space invaders’ in
Parliament, as Nirmal Puwar puts it (2004). When Dadabhai Naoroji, a Parsi from
Bombay, stood for Parliament in 1886 and was defeated, Lord Salisbury later
commented that England was not ready to elect a ‘Blackman’. Naoroji became the
first Asian MP to sit in the UK House of Commons, winning a seat by only five
votes in 1892, hoping to represent the interests of the whole Indian subcontinent.
Three more Indians sat as MPs up to 1929 but then no one of Asian origin sat in
the Commons until 1987. Dawn Butler, a black woman and MP for Brent Cen-
tral, was told by a white MP: ‘This lift really isn’t for cleaners’, while in 2019
Abena Oppong-Asare MP was handed a bag to look after as if she was staff by
another MP (Whale 2020). Black MPs are especially abused and stretched in dif-
ferent directions; they are mistaken for each other, treated as an homogeneous
group, and expected to represent endless other groups. Diane Abbot, a long-
standing black MP, received almost half of the abusive tweets sent to female MPs
in the year before the 2017 election. Chi Onwurah, MP for Newcastle upon Tyne
Central, told the journalist Sebastian Whale: ‘I get racist trolling whenever I open
my mouth to say something vaguely controversial … I get tweets from Nigeria
telling me to stand up for Nigerians. All BAME MPs end up being seen as repre-
senting or not representing different groups’ (ibid).
In Westminster one British Asian MP (let’s call him Deepak) was particularly
articulate about how his identity affected his work of accountability (Crewe 2015a:
96). His 30-year involvement in his constituency, and in its Borough council,
meant that it feels as if everyone knows Deepak. It has given him a good knowl-
edge not only of the sizes of the different communities in his constituency – white,
Indian, Pakistani, Tamil, Afghan, Somali, Eastern European and so on – but what
they mind about. Although some Asians trust Deepak, others disapprove of him
because he speaks out against caste and domestic violence, infuriating traditionalists
who think he has been too influenced by ‘Western thinking’, as they put it. From
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when he wakes till the moment he sleeps, he is on call – just as his father was (as a
former politician in an Asian country). Deepak has three offices, including one at
home staffed by relatives, and each accumulates invitations, requests and obliga-
tions. If the invite offers an opportunity to speak and exchange views, he will not
refuse. He goes to a disproportionately high number of Asian functions, perhaps
three or four weddings each weekend, because if he turns them down, they will
not forgive him, whereas a white person will assume the MP is just too busy and
will not take it personally. He wasn’t complaining, just explaining to me what it is
like to do representative politics British-Asian style.
When you consider such everyday tales of accountability, they show up the
failings of classificatory schema, or at least relying on them too heavily. Schema
miss a sense of proportion and what it is like to be on the extremes of a pattern.
We also fail to get an explanation of the ways in which different uses or forms of
representation are entangled – contradict, reinforce, undermine, get magnified and
so forth. The most influential scholar to challenge such rigid schema is the philo-
sopher Judith Butler, famous since her book Gender Trouble (1990) was published,
with her theory of performativity. She subverts the systems thinking approach, and
other rigid typologies that are blinkered to process, by looking at how gender and
sex are not given by nature or created by an abstract thing called culture but per-
formed through processes of people interacting. Performance entails endless jud-
gement and if you transgress expectations or assumptions as you recreate your
gender, then you can face moral censure or punishment. Those expectations about
how women should relate to women, women to men and men to men, are cul-
turally or locally specific so gender doesn’t create stable identities, but a repetition
of acts, which over time leads to sedimentation of ideas about what is, as examples,
an impressive male parliamentarian or a good mother. We all perform gender but
the content of the performance emerges out of specific cultures (and sub-cultures),
endlessly changing with the movement of time and place and negotiation of
power.
Butler’s perfomativity has been taken up in depth within parliamentary studies
by Shirin Rai and Carole Spray in their book Performing Representation. Although
they suggest a schema – a framework for researching the performance of politics –
they use it to open up the debate by probing assumptions, spaces and patterns
rather than closing it down with definitions (2019: 21). This important merger of
ethnography with political theory explores how the claim of representation plays
out in practice in the Indian parliament – offering a radically different way of
understanding representation in contrast with many scholars in political science.
Michael Saward’s idea of representation as a ‘claim’ is one of their starting points
and it is worth explaining this first (2007). Representation is not a one-way formal
mechanism provided simply by an institution or a person; it is process created by a
claim, a two-way relationship between representer and represented within which
the represented choose their politician in an election and the representer portrays
the represented in particular ways. It is something that happens within relationships
that continually change. The claims made by politicians – about themselves or their
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constituency – tend to be more compelling when they resonate with current cul-
tural understandings. While the conventional question is whether MPs are
responsive to those they represent, as if their interests can be known, political
theorist Saward stresses a different aspect of the relationship: does the MP manage
to silence or evoke the represented? Re-presentation of other people is not usefully
seen as a mechanical articulation of the interests of a group but as a changeable
relationship between a constituency and the person symbolically creating it, within
which claims are made, contested, accepted (including partially) or thrown out and
remade. So, it is not only anthropologists who understand that representation is a
process rather than an event or activity.
As Rai and Spray point out, what is badly needed, but remains rare, is research
about what this claim means in practice as politicians perform representation in the
sense of re-making identities and relationships (2019). While contemporary fem-
inists of parliament coalesce around institutionalism, over-focusing on rules and
norms in my view, in contrast this tour de force by Rai and Spray reaches into
architecture, embodiment, anthropology, theatre, materiality and symbolism to
analyse the performativity of politics not only through speech but also non-speech
acts. Methodologically, it is innovative because they make eclectic use of statistics,
narratives, interviews and observation, and then inquire into these with careful
attention to the rhetoric, discourse, rules or practices generated by these different
techniques of inquiry. They don’t take what people say as literal statements of
truth; statements are the starting point for interrogating plural claims and experi-
ences. Empirically they provide us with a treasure trove of material about who
women MPs are, what they do, how they relate to others and what this all means
for representation. Theoretically, it matters because their interdisciplinary-informed
explanations offer both complexity and a challenge to received wisdom on politi-
cians’ work of representation.
What are the implications? First, they are writing a whole monograph about a
nation in that area of the world (the ‘Global South’) that is normally confined to a
footnote or, at best, a few chapters on the ‘rest of the world’ in parliamentary
studies (e.g., Martin et al. 2014), as if only countries in the ‘Global North’ are in
the centre of the globe and can be compared when writing about legislatures.
Second, they elucidate findings with subtlety by treating what informants say as
only the beginning of the inquiry. To take the issue of representation they point
out that asking whether women represent other women is problematic because it
essentialises the category, glosses over women’s different ideological positions on
feminism, and underplays how institutions (including parliaments and political
parties) and hostile men constrain women’s ability to pursue feminist (or woman-
friendly) agendas (Rai and Spray 2019: 336–8). They make this argument in rela-
tion to India (and potentially in principle therefore beyond) by substantiating it
with rich and varied data. Gender can only be fathomed in conversation with other
inequalities in any political institution, and in India specifically you have to also
consider class, age, caste and religion at the least. Most women MPs are largely
middle-class professionals, middle/upper caste and mostly Hindu (ibid: 125) and
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when Aparupa Poddar was elected from a constituency reserved for lower castes,
her win was contested by the losing candidate on the grounds that she had married
a Muslim man so had lost her Dalit status (ibid: 143). When her claim was chal-
lenged in this highly competitive environment, a mix of her gender, caste and
religious identity were used against her.
Women’s experience of being politicians is influenced by being surveilled and
judged more than men for how they dress, speak, tweet or seek support. For
women politicians both the content and impact of judgement is magnified, even if
the substance of these evaluations will vary across place on the basis of diverse
cultural norms and taboos. So, we need more research about how representation is
gendered in different places. We should not assume that progress is being made;
women’s position can also go backwards. Despite the promising signs of better
representation of women in Myanmar, after the supposed end of military rule a
decade ago (Minoletti 2019), gendered, ethnic and religious forms of margin-
alisation and dispossession have become entrenched and even more severe for some
(Maber and Aung 2019: 407). Meanwhile the party in government, the National
League for Democracy (until the military coup in February 2021) discouraged its
own MPs from engaging with its own civil society, distrusting NGOs and over-
rating their own capacity to reflect plural interests and knowledge of the popula-
tion without consultation. Civil society space for action contracted after Aung Sang
Suu Kyi became State Counsellor, with the exception of the ultra-national Bud-
dhist movement Ma Ba Tha (which has huge assets, 270 offices and over 150,000
members across the country), with punishing effects on women’s groups and fem-
inist causes. So, we also need to know more about how gendered representation is
entangled with religion, ethnicity, race, class, sexuality and other differences within
past and imagined relationships between politicians and different groups of people.
The anthropology of representing and ignoring
The claim to represent is easily made; to accomplish it literally for all electors in a
specific moment is impossible. My own district councillor told me after a year of
representing our ward: ‘I can’t please everyone. I try to provide a sense of com-
munity leadership: I’m a conduit between our locality and the local authority. But
some will always disagree with what I do.’6 Elected politicians are usually con-
nected to localities by the aspiration to represent residents of their constituency,
and through those constituencies they collectively connect to the whole nation.
The number of residents can be substantial. The MP for Malkajgiri in India was
elected by over 3 million voters in 2019. One of the MPs elected in São Paulo,
Brazil received 1.8 million votes in 2018. The largest electorate in a UK con-
stituency was in the Isle of Wight at almost 110,000 in 2017. The numbers of non-
voters, who also expect to be represented, pushes up the numbers even higher: the
total population of the Isle of Wight was over 140,000 only one year later.7 The
largest constituency geographically in the world is Kalgoorlie in Western Australia:
890,000 square miles in total and from north to south it covers the distance
Representing 65
between London and Moscow. Apparently on average humans tend to maintain
close ties to around 150 people at any one time, but one UK MP estimated that
most politicians regularly interact with about 2,000 constituents (Dunbar 1996: 69).
An anthropologist is bound to ask, given these substantial numbers, what does this
process of representation mean in practice within different places and from different
viewpoints?
Politicians’ relationships with citizens were a focus of attention for Marc Abélès,
the first anthropologist to study European parliaments. Politicians stress their local
roots in France: a politician is above all the representative of a territory with all its
traditions, even a living symbol of a locality; ‘it is more or less obligatory to occupy
local and national office simultaneously’ (Abélès 1991: 268). So, relationships in
politics are not merely about interests, kin connections or viewpoints; politicians
have to tap into people’s imagination. Politicians who ignore the sacred – the
ritual, symbolism and drama of politics – and merely try and impress voters with
their views, will find it harder to secure support. Representation is not just putting
up a mirror – politicians need to do more than listen and repeat what people say,
or appear like those they represent. Even the leader of the nation has to evoke her
or his locality. In his article about President Mitterand’s visit to the department he
represented for 30 years, Abélès relates how he continually reminded people of his
local connections (with the past, with people) and their shared belonging: ‘we
comprise some sort of community’ (1988: 394–5). When he bestowed investitures
on local government dignities, or inaugurated a railway station, there was a quasi-
religious aspect to it. Like many rituals, this ‘constructs a historical form of legiti-
macy, an image of the elected person which is reflected, in inevitably distorted
form, in the mirrors of the mass media’ (ibid: 398).
The work of representation is so much more than a ‘role’ carried out by an
individual as if following prescribed duties set out in a Job Description. Several
anthropologists have taken a closer look at politicians’ relationships with con-
stituents and other citizens, depicting this work as more performative than pre-
scribed. One pattern across these relationships is a combination of promising,
shifting to adapt to different audiences and privileging certain groups, but the
intensity of these processes varies dramatically. Since 2014 I have been supporting
anthropologists in Bangladesh, Myanmar and Ethiopia to research the relationships
between parliamentarians and individuals, groups and organisations in society. In
Bangladesh politicians’ interactions are weekly, in Ethiopia some MPs only visit
twice a year and in Myanmar it varies from one extreme to the other depending
on the MP.
Let’s take the case of Bangladesh. In my work on the Commons I challenged
pervasive assumptions about how acting as a representative is about the fulfilment
of a role by looking at how these interactive processes play out in different con-
stituencies within contrasting areas (Crewe 2014b) and encouraged my colleagues
in Bangladesh to do the same.8 What is meant by ‘roles’ in parliament? This rela-
tionship between representative and represented is often analysed as one of MPs’
functional roles. Searing classifies UK MPs’ representation work as ‘Welfare
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Officers’, or ‘Local Promoters’ (1985), while Norton’s taxomony offers seven types:
safety value, information provider, local dignitary, advocate, local benefactor,
powerful friend and promoter of constituency interests (1994).9 But conceiving this
work in terms of ‘roles’ glosses over critical ingredients – identities, relationships,
power and emotions. As Goffman pointed out in his study of how individuals
present themselves in social encounters, the idea of roles can miss the point that
people are responding to different audiences through performance and power
struggles (1959).
Taking up my point that representation has to be performed in contradictory
ways within relationships with diverse groups of constituents as a form of impro-
vised shape-shifting, Ahmed looks at how MPs are involved in this endless self-
adjustment in Bangladesh to build up their reputation and win support with very
different groups of people (2019). They do so selectively, influenced by operating
within a profoundly conflictual and distrustful contemporary Bangladeshi political
world. When Ahmed finds that a particular MP colludes with a group of his own
constituents to humiliate a religious minority teacher, an act that amounts to a
violent abuse of power, any potential idealisation of him representing his whole
constituency breaks down. Young people across the country showed solidarity for
the teacher on social media, clearly expressing their sympathy and even symboli-
cally identifying with him by repeating the act of humiliation and posting it on
Facebook and Twitter. This MP, who is dispensing patronage and favours to some
constituents and abusing others who are rescued symbolically by total strangers, is
engaged in a process of ‘representation’ for which the label ‘role’ (as a way of
describing work) seems inadequate. In this example the politics and emotions are
amplified and abusive, but it is indicative of the general pattern of relational work
in representing any group of people. Other examples could be subtler and benign.
Representation is a complex, messy and dynamic process of relating, which can
only be explained by richly describing the history, politics and social world of the
specific place and seeing how it is different from other worlds.
I found a similar pattern to Bangladesh in Myanmar when I visited one con-
stituency in Mon State in 2019 with their MP who was born and bred in that
area.10 I could not find a constituent who did not know the MP (or at least of
him) reasonably well. The constituents I spoke to uniformly described him as reli-
ably present: ‘he is one of us’, ‘he delivers’, ‘he’s here, can give the time.’ They
told me he represents them abroad, mediates in disputes, organises nationalist cel-
ebrations, makes development happen (e.g., got funding from government to
develop their infrastructure), and is always at the end of the phone – answering 5–
20 calls a day and replying on Messenger, Facebook and WhatsApp. He confirmed
he visits his constituency (also his home) every day after 4 pm; ‘they are my
friends, I am very close to them, they call me brother.’ Contrast this with
research in the same country but in Chin State (by the Chinbridge Research
Institute) where researchers found that 74% of those in a large survey did not
know the name of their MP.11 This is more like Ethiopia, where according to
Ayenew et al. 93% of MPs only visit their constituents twice a year, only 7%
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visit more than twice and they almost never get involved in individual cases
(2019: 33). It is also telling that over three-quarters of the Ethiopian MPs
interviewed reported that it was the local party secretary who organised the
schedule and only 2.3% said that they had spontaneous meetings with con-
stituents (ibid: 38). The party discourages too much interaction by the MP, as
it might generate local demands that interfere with the government’s national
plans. So, these meetings are formal, theatrical occasions where speeches are
given and the politician speaks about the achievements of government. The
result is, unsurprisingly, that citizens in most parts of Ethiopia complain that
they never see the ‘face’ of their MP.
It is clear that variations can be found both between and within countries.
Consider the different findings of anthropologists working in West versus North
India. Ruud’s research on how people view politicians in West Bengal, India
reveals that people see them as unprincipled and corrupt. As the business of politics
itself is so dirty, by getting involved ‘anyone was bound to be tarnished by
unsavoury decisions, shady actions and odorous alliances’ (2001: 117). But Miche-
lutti found in North India that Yadav leaders see themselves as a martial race, with
an historical link to Krishna fighting for social justice, born to be politicians acting
for their caste when necessary in muscular ways (2008: 178–83). People locally
have a far more favourable view of these representatives and even support these
(allegedly) ‘criminal’ politicians because they defend the poor.
One way to research representation is to look at the social distance between
represented and representer and how the former judge the latter. It is rarer for
anthropologists themselves to assess the impact of MPs on constituents, but there is
some research of this kind. A Swiss anthropologist, Kathrin Wesendorf, compiled
work by lawyers, historians and anthropologists to look at how indigenous peoples
relate to parliaments in the Arctic region and found neglect (2005). In this region
participation in democracy has not halted their dispossession or marginalisation and
they face opposition from politicians and the public when discussing their collec-
tive rights, including to land (ibid: 12–13). The generalisable message is that par-
liaments are failing to represent indigenous peoples, even if indigenous peoples are
developing different strategies for strengthening their political clout in either
existing or alternative parliaments (ibid: 20–1).
Meanwhile in other places citizens expect their MP to rectify problems and find that
some do deliver in strange and diverse ways. In the words of a Marshallese politician:
Your constituents don’t expect you to only be their senator in the parliament.
They also expect you to be a counsellor in a marriage fight, a psychologist in a
suicide attempt, to bankroll a first birthday party or a wedding or a funeral.
(Corbett 2015: 75)
In the UK I have begun to inquire into what MPs do to, with and for those they
represent by visiting 9/650 constituencies and listening MPs’ reflections – thinking
about not only how they view each other and how often they meet, but what they
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mean to each other. Since the answer is different for each MP, and the sample is
small, this research is at an early stage. Nonetheless, patterns are emerging.
In UK constituencies: the collective MP
MPs try to represent constituency interests during the various processes entailed in
making law. For example, Stephen Lloyd MP explains that he voted against his
own party’s introduction of tuition fees because ‘for me, the promises I made to
my constituents will always come first.’12 But interwoven with the representation
of their constituents, the MP is in the business of self-presentation so this also
shapes their interaction with their constituency. MPs represent themselves and
others at the same time; attention to self and other are thoroughly entangled. The
political performance of representation by MPs takes place in many sites – in Par-
liament’s debating chambers, committee rooms or meeting rooms, television stu-
dios, Twitter, local party offices, and in offices, streets and meeting venues within
constituencies. UK MPs are well-known for name checking their constituents in
Westminster (Crewe 2015a: 84–6). The then Minister Eric Pickles MP mimicked
other MPs by saying that Stockport was close to his heart, a gem and a magnificent
town, Formby a wonderful place to invest, and Rochdale was the apple of his eye,
all within the space of an hour.13 Even the lesser-known parliamentary rituals
provide opportunities for constituency name checking: ‘Points of Order’, when an
MP can ask the Speaker to take action regarding rules being broken, have been
harnessed to the constituency cause occasionally. As the then Speaker Bercow
pointed out, they can act like a press release: ‘It is part of the choreography of
Parliament that this is tolerated to some extent.’14
At the same time these days no MP ignores her/his image or appearance. Photos and
reports on how MPs have raised constituency issues bloom all over MPs’ websites, their
campaign literature, in the local press and on Twitter. As soon as MPs ask a question in
Parliament’s debating chamber, they rush back to their office and instruct their staff to
put out a press release or call the local paper. Paul Flynn advises other MPs:
Be ubiquitous and ever present in the constituency. The drip feed of blog,
tweets, early morning radio interviews that are repeated throughout the day,
widely advertised surgeries, and attendance in the Chamber in a camera-
exposed position, all propagate the message ‘Busy MP’.
(2012: 142)
If you follow MPs around to meetings in public places – churches, community
centres, universities, business parks, housing associations – you will see that they
take photographs and email them to their staff or put them on Twitter themselves
(Crewe 2015a: 99).
MPs are encouraged to look busy by media and civil society organisations ped-
dling various superficial ways of measuring of success. For example, during the
general election of 2019 change.org published ‘the People-Power Index’ ranking
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MPs according to whether they are ‘good’ at their job. They had three indicators:
(1) MPs’ availability (judged by their online presence, whether they hold surgeries
and whether they are ‘distracted’ by an additional job outside parliament), (2)
voting record in parliament and raising issues in parliament ‘from the constituency’,
(3) how much the MP listens to their constituents. However, the problems with
their methodology were multiple. Where they couldn’t speak to MPs’ staff about
frequency of advice surgeries, even if they have a caseworker or legitimate absen-
ces, they put a default ‘no’. So, MPs were penalised if their staff decided that
answering the survey was not the best use of their time. They rated those poorly
who do not have a constituency office, but MPs can save money if their staff are all
in Westminster; this doesn’t stop them spending half their week in their con-
stituency, which may be in London. Second jobs that are a ‘public service’ were
scored differently from other jobs, but who defines what is in the interests of the
public? Strangest of all, listening to the public was measured by how often MPs
mention petitions or constituents sign change.org petitions.15 Despite these flaws,
local newspapers all over the country reported on their MP’s ranking – this was
easy, timely and cheap copy, requiring journalists merely to consult a website. The
presentation of results as if they were rigorously gathered glosses over contested
assumptions about what representation means.
MPs’ interaction within their constituencies has intensified hugely with rising
expectations and cuts to public services. Constituency work doubled between the
1970s and the end of the 1990s and over half of MPs claimed that they spent more
than 40% of their time in their constituency by 2012 (Judge and Partos 2018: 268).
As its significance grows, it is worth scrutinising this work. Pundits, political sci-
entists and MPs themselves tend to view their close and frequent interaction with
constituents as either: (a) work that should be done by local councillors and a waste
of resources merely invested to please the public and get the MP re-elected, or (b)
useful political work that deepens the MPs’ knowledge of their locality and the
impact of politicians’ decisions. However, some completely ignore this aspect of
representation work and some journalists even complain when Parliament closes
and MPs go ‘on holiday’, ignoring the fact that they spend most of the time in
their constituencies when not in Westminster. Isabel Hardman is a rare exception
as a journalist who has not only asked MPs about their constituency work, but
even shadowed them into chilly church halls, community centres and library
basements as well as bread throwing rituals and, most significantly, their ‘surgeries’
(2018: 62–79). She found that MPs often solve problems for individuals facing
disasters and raises two important questions. Since the problems constituents face
are often created by MPs – poor legislation, for example – and they are rarely
qualified to deal with people’s crises, is this the best use of their time? This seems to
me an interesting question for MPs to debate with their constituents. In the
meantime, I have been trying to understand more about what happens in these
surgeries.
Surgeries have scarcely been studied by scholars and yet MPs or their staff spend
a huge amount of their time in constituency ‘surgery meetings’, mostly either
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listening to lobbyists or individuals expressing political views or to constituents
asking for help. The latter involves invisible and neglected encounters with those
constituents who present with urgent problems. Between 2011 and 2013 I observed
surgery meetings in six constituencies and found almost half were ‘urgent’, meaning
that either the constituent or an immediate family member was: (a) destitute, (b)
about to lose their income, house or right to stay in the UK, (c) dealing with a
serious mental illness (Crewe 2015a: 92). Cases were almost never about only one
issue; they were complex, with many strands of difficulty, which constituents
pointed out were never adequately dealt with by one local service. The MP or
caseworker listening to him/her was invariably respectful and polite. Of course, the
MPs who allowed me to visit may have been more serious about these processes
and my presence could have affected this courtesy. But during and after these
meetings with constituents, many of whom had visited the office multiple times,
they often mentioned the way they were treated with respect in the MP’s office
without any prompting. In contrast to local government officials or staff in com-
panies dealing with their challenges, constituents talked about having their dignity
restored when the MP or staff member – someone important – was taking them
seriously and appearing sympathetic. They felt recognised in their struggle. One
said about a DWP worker, they ‘were rude and never apologised. They don’t
have any standard of courtesy. I have never had a pleasant reply. We pay our
taxes. Why can’t they be more receptive?’ (Crewe 2015a: 94). Even when the MP
or their caseworkers were doubtful that much could be done, the constituents
usually went away full of praise and gratitude. Although much of the rest of their
work impels MPs to speak at people, to be (or at least appear) thick-skinned, and
to feel oblivious to the feelings of their opponents, in the privacy of surgeries MPs
who do this work – which is the majority of them – become patient but also
surprisingly good listeners.
MPs and their staff develop an in-depth knowledge of the characters, agencies,
rules, resources and latest changes in social security; compiling a socio-political, insti-
tutional and economic ethnography of the local state. Research is an integral part of
the work of MPs and their staff. They aim to treat all constituents, irrespective of
whether they are supporters or even voters, as equally deserving of attention and
usually take care to avoid assessing the merits of the case explicitly in their conversation
with the constituent. Refusing to take any action at all is extremely rare. But when
writing on behalf of a constituent an experienced MP will give hints about the severity
of the case, putting ‘we ask that this be looked at in a timely manner’ (meaning don’t
rush) all the way to ‘this is extremely urgent’, as appropriate. Constituents get a copy of
these letters but since they can’t compare with the letters sent on behalf of others, they
can’t easily interpret the meaning of these hints. MPs would destroy the goodwill of
government and voluntary agency contacts if they gave the impression that fast and
time-consuming responses had to be made equally in all cases. So they signal the level
of urgency without making it explicit to the constituent.
This mediation by MPs (and staff) between constituents and the state inevitably
privileges some above others – and there is no avoidance of this – so representation
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is uneven however much politicians strive to act otherwise (Crewe and Sarra
2021). But when seen within wider processes in society – whereby people with a
substantial income pay for lawyers, accountants or doctors, and it is those more
dependent on the state who go to their MP as a last resort – representation by
MPs, it could be argued, colludes with rather than addresses these inequalities.
Unevenness and inequality are found between constituencies too. More established
MPs have a huge ‘bible’ of useful services, contacts and resources while newer ones
may not (especially if they have taken over from an MP in a different political
party). The political position of the MP’s party will make a difference. An MP
whose party is in government can’t blame their own ministers for their con-
stituents’ problems and, if their party controls the council, then they have to
defend their record locally too. On the other hand, if their party governs either
locally or nationally then you have the advantage of better access to decision-
makers who can make something happen more easily.
MPs’ own identities influence whom they listen to most closely but also how
people react to them. British women MPs seem more comfortable than male
counterparts with ‘glorified social work’, as some observers call the process of lis-
tening and then responding to constituents’ reports of suffering (Crewe 2015a: 88).
I did not find a simple pattern. The MP who looked most at ease was a man who
had been an MP for decades, so he was the most experienced among my small
sample, but I found no women looking uncomfortable while several men did.
Several male MPs in my wider sample delegate all (rather than most) casework to
staff but I only discovered one woman in the House of Commons who did this. In
a familiar gendered pattern of women’s work receiving less public recognition and
value, this invisible political work enhances an MP’s reputation locally but counts
for nothing in the eyes of the whips when trying to get promotion onto the
frontbench.
So, interaction between MPs and their constituents reveals the wider social and
political patterns in society. When the Covid-19 pandemic hit, MPs’ staff had to
work from home – like everyone else – navigating the difficulties of caring for
small children or lack of work space while communicating with constituents via
email, phone or online video. They dealt with a flood of requests in the first few
weeks, according to one staff member five times more than normal. Initially they
did not know the answers to completely new questions – about lockdown, people
stuck abroad or government assistance – so they had to learn fast about a new
pandemic-struck world, one created in a matter of weeks.16
If we go back into the past, we find more normal gradual change: during the
2010–15 coalition (the time of my first bout of fieldwork in the Commons) we
were beginning to witness the direct impact of austerity and cuts in public spend-
ing. This showed up in the meetings between MPs and constituents with huge
numbers of questions about benefits and housing in particular. During more recent
fieldwork with Chris Law (MP) and his staff in Dundee West over a few days in
late 2018, by collaborating with Nicholas Sarra (a psychotherapist and group ana-
lyst), we were able to make sense of the psycho-social interaction within
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constituency offices in more depth. The over-riding impression was that the work
of the constituency office is always suffused with affect and emotion (Crewe and
Sarra 2021). Constituents present their cases with the hope that the staff will
identify with their concerns and difficulties. To ‘identify with’ is to feel a sense of
alliance with and to find one’s own experience in the experience of another, as if I
am like you and you are like me. These ongoing processes of identification in the
MPs’ office appeared to us as psychologically demanding on constituency staff,
required as they are to engage with disturbances and challenges in the community.
For example, we heard a rough estimate that 50% of presentations to the con-
stituency offices were mental health related. (The week we visited the caseworkers
reported that they were dealing with 125 live constituency cases.) This work is not
just about dealing with the turbulence of others, but navigating the emotions
summoned up for the MPs’ constituency staff too. So, the ‘mood’ in the office
corresponds with the ‘mood’ presented. The office can feel sad, angry, anxious,
grateful, happy or disturbed according to who walks through the door or what
comes through the screen or phone. In effect this means that wider individual,
family and sociological disturbances, embodied in the constituents and their indi-
vidual histories and concerns, express themselves through the conduit of the con-
stituency offices. Political representation is a politics of affect.
All staff working in this Dundee West constituency office recognised the con-
struction of a collective MP through their own collaboration in representing the
latter (ibid). The endless demands by letter, email, tweets and people walking in
through the door need a response as if it were the MP himself responding. The
MP will come to represent a community symbolically as they come to stand in the
public’s eye for something larger than their own individual self even if that indi-
viduality may well express both party and personal political ideology and its
branding. She or he can’t do this alone. As the social psychologist G.H. Mead
wrote:
Consider a politician or a statesman putting through some project in which he
has the attitude of the community in himself. He knows how the community
reacts to this proposal. He reacts to this expression of the community in his
own experience – he feels with it. He has a set of organized attitudes which
are those of the community. His own contribution, the ‘I’ in this case, is a
project or reorganization, a project which he brings forward to the community
as it is reflected in himself. He himself changes, of course, in so far as he brings
this project forward and makes it a political issue. There has now arisen a new
social situation as a result of the project which he is presenting. The whole
procedure takes place in his own experience as well as in the general experi-
ence of the community.
(1934: 187)
The MPs’ office is constituted as if it were a mini-community within the larger
constituency. An ongoing process of imaginary anticipations and identifications
Representing 73
takes place and is embodied affectually, in which the constituency staff are able to
form a collective: ‘We’ and ‘I’ become fused both through the persona of the MP and
the personae of their staff. Each member of staff may respond slightly differently – after
all, they each have their history, professional experience and performative style – but
they are part of the collective ‘We’ (represented in this case by Chris Law MP) at the
same time. How does this relate to representation? The MP evokes the social object of
representation and by extension his staff do the same by their active work in performing
the collective ‘We’. Representation is linked with identification, the latter of which is
partly an emotional process involving as it does an acute sensitivity to issues of belong-
ing or the processes of inclusion and exclusion which concern their constituents. The
more an MP can extend this sense of ‘We’ identification, the more successful they will
be at creating the idea of a community which they symbolise and represent.
The reward is not merely better prospects at the next election. MPs tend to be
loathed as a collective in the UK, but in their constituencies they are still VIPs,
often even loved. UK MP Paul Flynn’s constituents knew everything about him,
he told me, and they think, ‘He is a mad bastard, but he is our mad bastard.’17 They
are certainly local heroes, but whether their social work is glorified or respected is a
matter of political judgement. It is a judgement that needs to be made by each
individual and group within any constituency, not merely by looking at superficial
measures of participation, but by finding out what MPs actually do in their
encounters and holding them to account for that work.
Resonance and alienation
It is obvious that representation is about more than numbers. Demands for pro-
portional representation of different groups in society is complicated by the multi-
ple identities of representatives and those they represent. I have already mentioned
that one British Asian MP was particularly articulate about how his identity affec-
ted his work: although some Asians trusted him, others disapproved of him because
he spoke out against caste and domestic violence, infuriating traditionalists who
thought he had been too influenced by Western thinking. Former MP Dame
Anne Begg, who uses a wheelchair, did not want to be pigeonholed as a disability
activist so rather than working on disability as a separate issue isolated from context,
she considered the interests of disabled people in the course of all her work as an
MP. As former Chair of the Work and Pensions Select Committee, she thought
about how disability related to pay, pensions, benefits or whatever came up.18 The
question of whether or not people are best represented by those with a shared
identity becomes problematic when you consider that there can only be over-
lapping identities, rarely identically aligned ones. Furthermore, plenty of women
felt ignored by Margaret Thatcher; plenty of black people were disappointed that
Barack Obama did not do more for their rights. Identity is always co-created in
relationships, dynamic and, therefore, provisional. While a parliamentary chamber
should be representative of the wider population, because they are then more
likely to consider a range of interests and the electorate will have more faith in
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them, an overlapping identity between specific MPs and constituents is no guar-
antee of truer representation.
The relationship between representative and represented is too complex to be
captured with mechanical metaphors; they tend to ignore the emotional, hidden,
symbolic and sacred. As Graeber points out:
any system in which one member of a group can claim to represent the group
as a whole necessarily entails setting that member off in a way resembling the
Durkheimian notion of the sacred, as set apart from the stuffs and substances of
the material world, even, to a certain degree, abstracted from it.
(2005: 421)
Flynn described the relationship between MP and constituent as:
that of a priest and parishioners, solicitor and clients, shepherd and flock, shop
steward and workers and friend of many friends. The MP should be the living
embodiment of the constituency, tirelessly promoting and defending the ter-
ritory with the ferocity of a mother protecting her offspring.
(2012: 138)
We have seen that MPs extol the virtues of their constituency – its beauty, variety or
warmth – and develop an affinity with the place they represent. MPs can champion
their locality, at least in general terms, without incurring anyone’s displeasure, so this
process has a performative quality achieved through their interactions with their con-
stituents. This fosters the sense of an expanded ‘We’ identity of which he or she is the
embodied representative. Without our elected representative, we would not exist as a
constituency – a political entity reaching up to the nation. So, the representative cre-
ates us as a group and we create her/him as a symbol of that collective. This means far
more than the representation of our interests or views as an aggregate of individuals
with preferences, as it involves the shared belonging to a locality within which the
representative champions our area as a space and an environment as well as the diverse
organisations, families and individuals within it (Crewe 2014b).
Political science rarely acknowledges the importance of symbols and yet culture
and politics rely on them existentially. MPs are not just women or men of actions,
ideas and policies, they are symbols with the power to evoke. This power of evo-
cation is essentially the capacity to evoke an emotional and cognitive response and
in particular, a response which affirms a mutual or collective identity. These iden-
tificatory processes are experienced as feelings of belonging and ‘we-ness’. To
identify with an MP’s gestures is to affirm their authority to represent. Being seen
as ‘local’ is the most important identity marker when people elect their MP in the
UK (the evidence is summarised by Judge and Partos 2018: 207). All MPs sym-
bolise the link between local and national government, and even political locality
and nation, succinctly conveyed to me when one MP presided over the celebra-
tions for the Queen’s birthday in England in 2012 (Crewe 2015a: 104–5). This event
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involved residents in a constituency assembling to watch a parade by cadets (the mili-
tary), vicars speaking about the importance of community (the church) and the MP
(Parliament) concluding the speeches by encouraging us to drink a toast to the Mon-
arch. The MP symbolised the embodied link between community, Parliament and the
Monarch reigning over the nation, an example of how identities are constructed
through performance and ritual at a local level (see Chapter 7).
But any community involves both fission and fusion – the fission is created by
differences, factions and conflicts, the fusion by commonalities, alliance-building
and other forms of co-operation. Dewey grappled with the problem of fission and
fusion in the process of political representation long ago. How can representatives
mirror the interests of a huge group as individuals? Since he was interested in par-
ticipation – or ‘self-organisation’ of citizens – the trustee model of representation
puts them in too passive a situation and the delegate still makes them spectators, he
argues.19 To be more deeply democratic, representation would have to involve the
representative being willing to be changed by the process of seeing the world from
the viewpoints of those they are representing. Viewpoints, or preferences, would
have to be understood as neither just individually held, nor culturally determined
for whole groups, but emergent through processes of interaction. If representatives
are serious about acknowledging pluralism, and being open to change, then this is
hugely demanding, as the sociologist Hartmut Rosa explains:
democratic will formation and decision-making are inherently time-consuming,
as – in the language of resonance theory – they are based not on a logic of attu-
nement through the mere casting of votes, but rather on a responsive process of
deliberative, argumentative encounter. The more pluralistic a society becomes –
i.e. the more circuitous its chains of interactions and the more complex the issues
it must negotiate – the more time-consuming this process becomes.
(2019: 223)
In this negotiation, effective representatives will be continually attuned to the
possibility of resonance or alienation. Resonance is a metaphor for how people
relate to other humans and the world around them; a process that happens
between minds, bodies and the environment. Rosa’s most concise explanation in
his epic tome is as follows:
It describes a specific relationship between two vibratory bodies whereby the
vibration of one body prompts the other to itself vibrate in turn. If you strike one
tuning fork in close proximity to another, the second will begin to vibrate at its
own frequency. We can speak here of resonance, however, only when the two
bodies in question are not so interconnected that the movement of one necessa-
rily elicits a mechanical or linear reaction from the other (e.g. because the two
tuning forks are glued or clamped together). Resonance is produced only when
the vibration of one body stimulates the other to produce its own frequency.
(ibid: 165)
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This might be useful for helping us move beyond a numerical or mechanical view
of representation that portrays the relationship as either the aggregation of indivi-
dual interests or the mirroring of collective interests. Representing others is both an
individual and social process of relating, requiring a resonance of more than mate-
rial interests or social identity or emotional states, but all of these at the same time.
The subject and the world need to be consistent enough to be able to speak in
their own voice, but open enough to have influence on each other (ibid: 174).
So political representation is partly material, but it is also affectual. Affect is the
physiological resonance between interdependent bodies and the meanings we
ascribe to these patterns of physiological resonances are communicated through the
vehicle of emotion. Emotion communicates the qualities inherent in the processes
of identity formation ubiquitous in political work:
Our view is that emotion and its performance are fundamental to political life
and that we miss something important if we fail to recognise this and the
connection with how identities are constructed through political processes.
The presence of emotion is not only discernible in exceptional circumstances
or when ‘feelings run high’ but an omnipresent quality in all human relating
and thus through all political work. Therefore, we argue that it is erroneous to
separate rational from emotional process and more helpful and pragmatic to
view them as mutually constitutive and arising at the same time in political life.
(Crewe and Sarra 2021)
How are the social, emotional, cultural and material entangled in the work of
representation? The first point to make is that they are not evenly so because
people’s material circumstances are so unequal. At the same time, as Mosse puts it,
all economic relations are social relations but not all social relations can be reduced
to economics, so people living with poverty are every bit as emotional and
engaged in culture as richer people (2010: 2). To be poor is not to lack social
contacts or networks but to engage with them in adverse ways because you owe
your patron money, or are exploited by richer landowners, or are a woman who
can only be ‘married off’ with a dowry. Poverty is both an individual and a social
experience, a form of structural violence embedded in culture; ignore any of these
elements and it is all too easy to perpetuate the status quo.
If you look at poverty as social relationships that could be changed, then you
have to wonder, why does anyone tolerate such suffering in their communities? To
relate this to this chapter’s theme of representation, why don’t politicians do more
to challenge poverty or climate breakdown? As Appadurai suggests (2004), people’s
ideas about the future, and whether or not their priority is poverty eradication, are
embedded in culture not just material circumstances. He challenges the idea that
economists are the ones we need to help plan the future while anthropologists
study culture, which is associated with the past. Anthropologists are interested in
culture, and culture is about the future and present as much as about the past. He
points out that economy and culture are not opposed in people’s lives; economies
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themselves are embedded in cultural and, I would add, emotional processes. Thus,
both your economic experiences of life, and the meaning and emotion you attach
to them and to your future, are culturally produced and nurtured.
Has our disposition towards the suffering of others changed with Covid-19?
What are the prospects of returning our attention to what Robbins calls the good –
value, imagination, well-being, empathy – which might make it easier for politi-
cians to be influenced by what people are already doing to make a better world for
themselves and their neighbours (2013: 450)? Politicians have seemed indifferent
(or ineffectual) in challenging poverty – no doubt in part a product of their social
and geographical distance from the poor: a form of alienation – and this translates
to what Keith Hart calls inhuman principles:
Compassion and similar human qualities are unlikely to be influential in
economic life when power seems to be concentrated in remote, faceless
centres. The normal response to problems is to let ‘them’ (the powers that
be, les responsiables) get on with it. When confronted with the consequences
of their own actions, people shrug their shoulders: it is nothing really to do
with us.
(2002: 33)
To move beyond this alienated stance, perhaps what is needed is an emotional
transformation; it may be that the trauma of the Coronavirus pandemic could
inspire such a change. We have had agricultural, industrial and digital revolutions,
perhaps it is time for an emotional revolution based on resonance and empathy? Is
Extinction Rebellion, the movement based on the idea of action for future gen-
erations, and the state response to Covid-19, the sign of things to come? Might it
even be possible to envisage a world where civil society, governments and parlia-
ments address emergencies in critical collaboration?
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SCRUTINY OF THE STATE
Scrutiny of the state, in the sense of critical examination and questioning, is seen as
vital to a healthy democracy, but what exactly is being scrutinised? The state is one
of those words with many meanings. Going back to the idea of the ‘estates of the
realm’ (noble, common, clerical), it is also often used interchangeably with the
nation, but while a nation has geographical and political boundaries, the state is
both an idea and a network of governing organisations with no clear lines between
it and society. Whether defined as the political means or ends, and separable from
the private sector, civil society or family (e.g., Lazarus-Black 2001) or not, and
whether you wish to see its reach extended or contracted, all depends on your
political viewpoint. Within a state you find various political institutions: govern-
ment, the judiciary, parliament, local authorities … that fit together in different
ways depending on the country and its history, geography and culture. A govern-
ment is a group of people who rule a politically defined area, but while some
entities are clearly governmental others are hybrids (e.g., ‘quangos’ which are
usually funded but not run by government). Some national or regional govern-
ments are part of wider structures – the United States of America, the European
Union or the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia – meaning that you can
only understand how they work by looking at the larger unit. In parliamentary
systems (such as the UK) the ministers of government are chosen from among the
MPs, so parliament contains both the legislature and the executive. In a presidential
system (such as the US) the executive is separate from the legislature. In the former
the civil service tend to be permanent and apolitical, in the latter they tend to be
political appointees. Some parliaments have one house (unicameral), while others
have two (bicameral) – a lower (usually primary) and upper (usually secondary).
My point here for the anthropology of parliaments, seen within the context of
states, is that we begin with an unsettled sense of what states are and what they do.
If drawing the boundaries around the state is complex, then we can logically
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assume that scrutiny of the state is probably difficult as well. The most promising
anthropological theory of the state in recent years was proposed by Jonathan
Spencer (2007). His starting point is that states are much more than an apparatus or
process of disciplinary power. On Foucault-inspired anthropological work on the
state he writes, it can be ‘a very predictable world, a feel-good dystopia, where
external power meets local cultural resistance, and the last surviving remnant of
Foucault’s bracing capacity to shock is drowned in a sea of sentimentality’ (ibid:
111). He takes us into new directions by pointing to neglected avenues in political
study – to history, emotion, performance and ritual – offering an approach that gets
us beyond merely deconstructing rigid typologies and lists towards exploring the
movement of and within entanglements, a task that is always incomplete. People’s
tendency to use the idea of the state to dream about happier futures, and their
collusion with state authorities in the meantime, tells us something about our
deeply unsettled ambivalence towards the state. To inquire into how people move
between collusion, blaming and dreaming tells us much about their relationship
not only with the state but with politics more generally as well.
In the last 20 years anthropologists have been rising to this challenge – writing
about state violence (e.g., Das and Poole 2004), corruption (Blundo et al. 2006),
and the everyday practices of state bureaucracies. For work on bureaucracy in
Africa see Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2014), for the UK we have Koch
(2018), for France see Fassin (2015), and for a special issue in the Political and Legal
Anthropology Review on bureaucracy, see Bernstein and Mertz (2011). But there is a
marked dearth of research on important processes within the political world: scru-
tiny by and of parliaments. The Handbook of Political Anthropology has a chapter on
the state but none on parliament and only a few mentions in passing (Wydra and
Thomassen 2018). Greenhouse’s entry, ‘Political Anthropology’, in The International
Encyclopedia of Anthropology alludes to existing anthropological work on the impact
of the state – privatisation, outsourcing, austerity – and the response of political
movements, encouraging us to study how states, law and regulation are both
coercive but also culturally reproduced subjectively for citizens (2018). But again,
parliaments/legislatures are absent as objects of study.
While anthropologists ignore parliaments, political scientists tend to ignore cul-
ture in favour of science. Political scientists, and their sub-branches, tend to be
tempted to create taxonomies and typologies of states and parliaments, or activities
that take place within them – identifying their common ancestor or features and
trying to group them into separable categories as if they are like plants. As Paley
points out, they do the same with democracy: advanced liberal, parliamentary, elec-
toral and socialist (2002: 471). This scientific-like classification can generate insight but
it can also obscure more than it sheds light, making the world appear more well-
ordered and stable than it is. It can even have troubling effects. The ‘Westminster’
model of government describes most political systems around the world, according to
many political scientists, even half a century after the end of British imperial power.
Apparently, the Westminster model offers efficiency, ambiguity and flexibility but
weak accountability (e.g., Kumarasingham 2013: 580–1). In the use of this model
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in other parts of the world, the absence of some elements of the model and/or
the gradually evolving unwritten rules you find in Westminster, have made it
easy for the executive to evade some aspects of (including informal) forms of
accountability. Efforts to correct this have been made, for example, New Zealand
aspired to have a better version of the Westminster model, but the executive
wielded even more power over the state than in the UK so they introduced PR
in the 1990s (ibid: 584).
To return to typologies, in other postcolonial nations, the export of the West-
minster model is seen to have failed and the apparent backwardness of those places
is explicitly or implicitly blamed. In a search for features to blame: their ‘dictators’
are unconstrained, politicians lack incentives or a system has been inadequately
influenced by the West. These apparently explain why some countries drift
towards authoritarianism rather than democratisation (e.g., Schuler and Malesky
2014). Such an approach entails finding features shared between commonly label-
led systems, creating a typology and calling it a theory, without looking at the
assumptions lurking beneath the claims. This is problematic if you accept the
anthropological premise of taking specific national and local histories seriously and
rejecting an a priori assumption of Western superiority. Some politics scholars
agree. Barry Munslow, who has researched and lived in Africa and clearly under-
stands the history of the places he writes about, offers a convincing account about
the perceived failure of the Westminster model in postcolonial settings:
The first is that the models and institutional framework established by a
particular country in Europe is the product of its own history. They cannot
easily be transposed to a society whose social, economic and political tradi-
tion has been extremely different. Parliaments would have to face different
problems. Regional rather than national splits are still represented in Niger-
ian politics, for example. The intensity of the conflict was such in this
country in the mid-1960s that civil war broke out between the Ibos of the
east and the rest in the Biafran war. The Westminster model was the creation
of Britain’s own history, with its unwritten constitution based on long tra-
dition and precedent. It emerged after its own bitter civil war and the long
struggle for popular emancipation which only in recent times fully enfran-
chised the adult population. The legislature is far from being the sole source
of power; there are firmly established interest groups like the Trades Union
Congress and the Confederation of British Industry, powerful economic
institutions like the banks, newspaper chains and well-established health and
educational systems. Power is diffused within the society. The newly inde-
pendent states of Africa lack these established patterns of power and the
borrowed institutions exist in an altogether different environment. Much
stress has been laid on the ‘preparation’ for independence which colonial
rulers are supposed to have carried out, but on closer inspection this appears
to have been a hollow claim.
(1983: 223–4)
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Even though he challenged the ethno centricism of mainstream political science in its
depiction of ‘failing’ states over 35 years ago, and others with deep knowledge of
places have echoed this since, the importance of history is often still ignored in the
taxonomy of states. Russell and Serban have recommended that the term ‘Westmin-
ster model’ should be dropped as the contradictions within it, even if only aiming for
family resemblances, muddle the aim of comparison (2020). Some even argue that
Westminster itself doesn’t conform that well to its own ‘model’ (ibid: 12).
The political failure of states is given labels – failed, failing, emerging, weak,
fragile, authoritarian – to indicate that those places are in need of assistance from
the West (including from Westminster or Washington). Even though this tax-
onomy has its scholarly critics in political science (e.g., Nay 2013), this classification
has created an economic incentive for aid agencies to collude with the hierarchical
ranking of states so it has become entrenched. Since the account of failure and
prescribed solutions are both flawed, it is unsurprising that governance assistance (or
more specifically ‘parliamentary strengthening’) usually fails too in the sense of
achieving little change.1 But for the moment my main point is to question the
utility of the commonplace classifying of parliaments in both academia and inter-
national aid discourse. If you do follow anthropologists by going beyond taxonomy
to history, processes, relationships and effects in countries around the world, then a
far deeper understanding of scrutiny becomes possible. By presenting some of the
threads of anthropological inquiry on the state in more detail in the next section I
hope to show you what I mean.
Anthropologists on the shape of the state
Anthropologists point to the blurring and entanglement between the state and
other parts of society, as well as other states (see Mitchell 2006: 170). The state is
not the discrete system sometimes portrayed by political scientists or policy / public
administration scholars: it is entangled, dynamic and unpredictable. Whether in
relation to service delivery, human rights regimes or collaboration on security,
states are conceived of as single entities in well-ordered typologies but in practice
operate in concert with other entities and each other. As examples, states privatise
and outsource service delivery to the private and voluntary sector from their own
nation and others; while government departments are clearly part of the state, there
are ‘quangos’ that are hybrids; people cross from one state to another and live in
several, so responsibility for their welfare and tax is complex; transnational and
multi-lateral organisations (such as the UN), networks and movements operate
across national boundaries; and so on. If globalisation challenges two ideas under-
lying the idea of the national state – territoriality and sovereignty – then for Sharma
and Gupta the question is, ‘How can an anthropological approach further our
understandings of the state as a multilayered, contradictory, translocal ensemble of
institutions, practices, and people in a globalized context?’ (2006: 6).
To understand the relationship between state and society, we have to look at what
Sharma and Gupta call the cultural moorings of the state. Since anthropologists are
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interested in the everyday practices of both making culture and statecraft, this means
turning our attention to people’s ideas and action rather than abstraction away from
practice. So, anthropology invites us to get beyond definitions and taxonomies,
because they rarely generate understanding of practice (in Bourdieu’s sense, 1977), to
ask what the state actually does, or, to be more precise, what do people who are seen
as part of the state do and with who else? What cuts across from one state to another?
And what is created or destroyed through these processes? What changes over time
and why?
The banal practices of bureaucracies – mapping, collecting taxes, filling out
forms, receiving complaints – can be highly significant when you look at them
closely. For example, Sharma and Gupta noticed that they have the effect of
reproducing the primacy of the state and its superiority over other institutions
(2006: 11–13). ‘Proper procedure’ is part of the performativity that confers legiti-
macy on the authorities and claimants, while subversion and rule-breaking expose
the inter-bureaucratic conflicts. The activities of the state are geared to creating the
impression of predictability and order but in reality its work is always messy, even
when it achieves tasks:
By lending to the state a veneer of consistency, systematicity, centralized
control, and wholeness, and by thus eliding the messiness, contradictions, and
tensions that states congeal, statist representations play a crucial role in
entrenching the borders and vertical authority of the state and in shaping
resistance to the state.
(ibid: 19)
The anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes about the tension between
simultaneous state encroachment and decline. Millions of daily encounters between
individuals or groups and the state reveal how it regulates, denies access or rewards
but also how social movements and transnational companies bypass state power
(2003). He, in turn, was influenced by one of the best-known scholars of the state,
James Scott, an anthropologist and political scientist, who interrogates processes of
state control. Scott outlines four processes that lead the state towards harm. Unlike
typologies that merely classify, these point to patterns about the workings of the
state in action over time that have explanatory power. First, modern statecraft
involves processes of classification, mapping and simplifying complex human and
environmental phenomena into categories that make it easier to organise. ‘These
state simplifications, like all state simplifications, are always far more static and
schematic than the actual social phenomena they presume to typify. The farmer
rarely experiences an average crop, an average rainfall, or an average price for his
crops’ (1998: 46). Second, the ideology of high modernism – the belief in scientific
and technological progress to create order – means that making the organisation of
people look ordered is symbolic of being advanced. These two tend to be char-
acteristic of most states. Their capacity for lethal harm increases with the two final
processes: third, using the ‘full weight of its coercive power’ and fourth,
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obliterating the possibility of resistance by opposition, within the state or in civil
society (ibid: 4–5).
Scott did not dream up these processes and then apply them to examples. He
explains that his inquiry began with a question about why the state is seen as the
enemy by people on the move (pastoralists, travellers, refugees etc.) and morphed
into a wider question about state power. He developed his ideas in response to
thinking about real life encounters between people and the state; for example, he
retells the history of ujamaa, a campaign to permanently settle the population of
Tanzania in the 1970s (ibid: 223–61). Five million Tanzanians were relocated. The
aim was to make it easier for the state to deliver services, such as education and
water, but it was also about making it easier to enforce state policies (e.g., com-
munal farming). Although clearly not found on the plans, Scott argues that a third
less tangible dimension was at play – the aesthetics of modernity. The aspiration
was to transform people’s disorderly traditional living arrangements into efficient,
orderly, intelligible modern ones. The scheme failed – economically, socially and
environmentally – due to the ‘destructive conservatism of the people’, according to
a Tanzanian civil servant (ibid: 241). Scott’s version, after considering how it
looked from the viewpoint of various people, was that a mix of ill-informed poli-
ticians and planners (influenced by colonial and aid ‘experts’), canny elites deter-
mined to secure a bigger share of the benefits, and resistant peasants contributed to
the disaster. The peasants’ resistance was highly rational. The politicians and plan-
ners ignored the peasants’ complex, delicate adaptations to make the most of their
environments, misunderstanding their rational caution for traditionalism; in fact,
their foot-dragging and flight made the scheme less destructive, not more so (ibid:
246–7).
This combination of politicians’/planners’ ignorance, elite capture and the
rational resistance of peasants is a familiar story in the anthropology of aid and
development, not only in the processes controlled by states but also by interna-
tional donor agencies (we summarised this literature in Crewe and Axelby 2013).
So, governing as a process – or even Foucault’s broader governmentality – it not
just in the hands of states; it takes place across sectors and within and across borders,
locally, regionally and globally. The ‘aid industry’ is a clear example of government
across borders, administered in the name of ‘development’, about which anthro-
pologists have much to say. In many parts of the world aid-receiving governments
are entangled with the aid industry to such an extent that it is difficult to separate
them conceptually as sovereign states. Aid-giving nations continue to have
incredible influence on aid-receiving ones, and compete against each other for
influence, either directly or via multi-lateral agencies (such as the Bretton Woods
institutions and the World Trade Organization), and through aid, foreign policy,
trade or security. International aid receives even less formal scrutiny than national
development, even though aid agencies often behave as if they are governing, so
both national and international scholars of aid and development play a key role in
scrutinising. If you were to take this view of scrutiny (or lack of it) seriously then
aid-giving countries might consider two policy shifts. First, they might invite
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national scholars and experts to give evidence more systematically to the body that
the aid-giving government is ultimately responsible to (e.g., in the UK it is the
International Development Select Committee [IDSC]). Second, they should
involve them in developing strategies for governance programmes including for
parliamentary strengthening. (I have found the UK IDSC and government officials
sympathetic to these ideas in theory but they continue to rely heavily on UK
academics to make the connections.)
Can we apply this kind of anthropological approach to researching the state, and
more specifically, to the study of parliaments? In the next section I offer two nar-
ratives on evidence and conflict in processes of scrutiny, before seeing whether this
might advance our inquiry into the anthropology of the state, as well as the rela-
tionship between knowledge and politics more broadly.
Reading the runes: making law in the UK
Legal scholars and political scientists frequently observe that the Westminster Par-
liament is moribund, burdened by arcane rituals and responsible for a leeching of
power from legislature to executive. Anthony King and Ivor Crewe offer an
example of such despair about the Westminster Parliament in The Blunders of Our
Governments, ‘the parliament of the United Kingdom is, much of the time, either
peripheral or totally irrelevant. It might as well not exist’ (2013: 361). I have no
interest in quarrelling with their list of government failures, except to warn by that
by focusing on domestic topics they gloss over some of the most critiqued areas of
UK government policy in recent years: the invasion of Iraq and Brexit. However,
my problem with this book is that their critique of Parliament’s role in the failures
is too unspecific and ignores valuable but less visible aspects of scrutiny. The par-
liamentary scholars who have forensically studied what Parliament actually does to
legislation – such as Russell and Glover (2017) who tracked twelve bills over
2005–12 – conclude that government backbenchers, the opposition and civil
society have significant influence on the process of making laws. So, what is this
influence and why does it get overlooked by some, including King and Crewe?
The making of law (or policy) begins with a political claim – usually to promote
national (or sometimes local or global) interests in the future. Inevitably what really
goes on in law-making as it is implemented either complies or departs from this (or
both) to different extents depending on the example and your own politics (e.g.,
what you thought of the law in the first place). Governments privilege the interests
of one group above another but often try to conceal how these choices involve
taking sides. There are also more specific claims that gain credibility and respect-
ability in a particular time or place. For example, the prevailing rhetoric in con-
temporary law-making in the UK (and elsewhere but in this narrative I’m focusing
on the UK) asserts that any new Act will modernise the country and reshape the
future based on evidence. My narrative challenges this rhetoric, showing how
evidence is always entangled with politics and arguing that the future can’t be
predicted. It is in the hands of many groups and organisations, so in practice
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governments are reading the runes and anticipating the future rather than reshaping
the nation in a predictable way. It is a case study, or to be more accurate a mini-
historical ethnography, about law-making in Westminster.
For almost two years part-time (2012–14) I followed one 250-word clause about
parenting as it made its journey through the two UK Houses of Parliament while
being transformed from text (a ‘bill’) into law (an ‘act’). If you merely glanced at
the texts produced by government and parliament,2 you might think this mini-
history concerns MPs on a committee championing the interests of families in
tandem with one venerable Baroness Butler-Sloss, a giant of family legal matters as
the former President of the UK family court, rising above politics to improve draft
legislation on the basis of evidence. So, text-based research might validate the
politicians’ claims that decent non-political law, and especially good law about
children, is driven by evidence. But a more rigorous inquiry over a long time and
across space into the less visible sites reveals that the story is messier and more
political: a huge cast of individuals and groups, including some influential ones in
civil society, arguing over evidence and, therefore, entangled with politics in ways
that show scrutiny of law-making is about far more than one committee and one
person holding law-makers to account (Crewe 2017).
The clause I followed was a response to the transformation of family life in the
UK during the previous 50 years, which has witnessed the greater involvement of
fathers in parenting, as reflected in custody arrangements for children on divorce or
separation. In response to fathers’ rights groups, such as Fathers4Justice and Families
Need Fathers, constituents and even male backbench MPs, the government deci-
ded to direct judges to encourage ‘shared parenting’ when parents or carers bring
their disputes about custody to courts. However, feminists, family lawyers and child
rights’ groups were worried by this because ‘evidence’ from Australia indicated that
such legislation had inflamed conflict between parents and failed to protect children
from domestic violence. The scene was set for a struggle over the wording of this
clause to promote what was conceived of as a contest between fathers’ and chil-
dren’s interests. (Feminists decided to frame their views in terms of child protection
for political reasons, calculating that championing children would always trump a
campaign in favour of adults.)
During the course of scrutiny, the government made three significant changes to
this 250-word clause:
1. comments from citizens on proposals for legislation. The government absorbed
concerns about the risk of abuse to children in their wording of the first draft
of the clause by changing the wording from, ‘children should see both their
parents if safe’, to ‘children should see their partners unless there is a risk of
harm’ (see 3a of the clause, Figure 4.1). So, children’s rights advocates made a
small victory as a result of comments by the public.
2. the recommendations of a Select Committee. The Justice Select Committee
undertook pre-legislative scrutiny on this clause. Select Committees make a
tactical claim to be evidence-based and above party (or ‘tribal’) politics, so
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they tend towards assumptions that (a) unanimous reports will have more
influence and (b) consistency with past reports protects their credibility. In
that respect they become like mini-political parties. Since the Justice Select
Committee’s earlier inquiry on this issue was clearly child-centred, they
recommended a change in the title of the clause from ‘shared parenting’ to
‘Welfare of the child: parental involvement’. They wanted to emphasise that
the courts should put the welfare of children above the rights of parents. The
government accepted this; another triumph for children’s rights.
3. 2B was added by the House of Lords. From the documents it looks as if this
amendment was crafted by Baroness Butler-Sloss, revising law on the basis of
evidence accumulated during decades of experience. However, this amend-
ment was originally drafted by a paralegal called Hazel Kent (with help from
her colleagues Kirsten Anderson and Professor Carolyn Hamilton), all based in
a children’s charity (Coram Legal Centre) in Bloomsbury (Crewe 2015a:
199ft27). Hazel was part of a coalition of children’s charities, academics, lawyers
and social workers; I attended the coalition’s meetings for almost two years.
They put this amendment to the Labour Party and their Shadow Minister
moved it during the public bill committee when the clause went through the
Commons. Of course, it was rejected because the government almost never
accepts opposition amendments in the House of Commons unless forced to –
to do so would be a loss of face. The coalition then met with child rights
FIGURE 4.1 Final version of section 11 in the Act.
* The changes mentioned in the text are underlined.
Welfare of the child: parental involvement
(1) Section 1 of the Children Act 1989 (welfare of the child) is amended as follows:
(2) After subsection (2) insert –
‘(2A) A court, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (4)(a) or (7), is as respects
each parent within subsection (6)(a) to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that
involvement of that parent in the life of the child concerned will further the child’s
welfare.’
‘(2B) In subsection (2A) “involvement” means involvement of some kind, either direct
or indirect, but not any particular division of a child’s time.’
(3) After subsection (5) insert:
‘(6) In subsection (2A) “parent” means parent of the child concerned; and, for the
purposes of that subsection, a parent of the child concerned –
(a) is within this paragraph if that parent can be involved in the child’s life in a way
that does not put the child at risk of suffering harm; and
(b) is to be treated as being within paragraph (a) unless there is some evidence before
the court in the particular proceedings to suggest that involvement of that parent in the
child’s life would put the child at risk of suffering harm whatever the form of the
involvement.
The circumstances referred to are that the court is considering whether to make an
order under section 4(1)(c) or (2A) or 4ZA(1)(c) or (5) (parental responsibility of parent
other than mother).’
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campaigners in the House of Lords from all parties, with me observing
discreetly from a corner, and they agreed that an amendment should be
moved by Baroness Butler-Sloss because she had the best chance of win-
ning it. As a crossbench (i.e., non party) peer and former judge, she could
appear as if she was above politics. Sure enough, she won and she then
made an agreement with the government to ensure that they wouldn’t
reverse it in the Commons.
On a quick appraisal of Bill documents, the Clause 11 changes could have
looked like the influence of one committee and one crossbench peer, but were
really a process of far greater complexity involving significant numbers of people,
conflicts of interests, contested evidence and networks of both competing factions
and alliances communicating through phone, meetings, documents and emails. In
short, messy politics. The Children and Families Minister, Edward Timpson MP,
told me that ‘it is as much about tapping into the human element as it is about
getting into the nitty gritty. It is a very human process, it’s about relationships, not
just texts.’3
I tell this story elsewhere, so will not repeat the detail, but will restate what this
political scrutiny did and did not involve. It was not above politics; it was not a
cool, detached look at the facts as if free from the contamination of what is seen as
the polluting processes of political conflict. Law about children in particular is often
talked about by politicians and officials, and written about by legal scholars, as
ideally free of politics. The legal scholars Maclean and Kurcezewski claim the more
political the process of law-making, and the more controversial the content of the
bill, the lower quality the result (2011). But this clause was unusually carefully
scrutinised because it was political (and at times party political) so in this case
scrutiny was more detailed and keenly fought over precisely because it was inten-
sely political and controversial (Crewe 2017). Politics, far from being a nasty form
of pollution as often portrayed, usually requires adversaries and conflict in order to
work effectively. Chantal Mouffe points out that, ‘a well-functioning democracy
calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions’, clarifying that this needs
to take place both in Parliament and outside (2000: 104). It will inevitably entail
the exclusion of some people – the challenge is that political processes need to be
designed, and people need to respond to this design, in ways that make it possible
for that exclusion to happen with justice and without violence.
Illusions that this parental involvement law might be (or even could be) simply
‘evidence-based’, does not stand up to examination either. The idea of ‘evidence-
based policy’ can give an impression that expert opinion or research consists of
incontrovertible facts that can be turned into solutions irrespective of politics. My
colleague Chris Mowles, influenced by American pragmatism, argues that evidence
is always contestable and so likely to produce a paradox: ‘the more evidence is
collected, the more contestation, so rather than creating greater certainty, the
search for evidence may only create greater uncertainty and ambiguity, i.e., mul-
tiple meanings with no necessary connection between them’ (2015: 10–12). So,
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the more evidence we have, the more we know about conflicting interests, then
the more complex the decision. This was clearly the case with the ‘shared parent-
ing’ clause.
Whether this clause was catching up with cultural change, or attempting to
provoke it, the politicians were listening to a mixture of fathers and those repre-
senting children. They scarcely consulted those most affected – children them-
selves – although others had and they reported to politicians that children’s
demands were clear. They want to be involved with both parents if they get along,
but not if they have a poor relationship with them (Mooney et al. 2009: 16).
Researchers working with children conclude about their welfare on separation that
they are better off if parental conflict is low, they have a good relationship with at
least one parent, their main parent is not suffering from mental health problems
and their family is financially secure (ibid: 10–13). The logic of taking children’s
perspectives seriously might be a huge investment in family therapy and eradicating
child poverty, but in the context of austerity, this was hardly suggested within
Parliament; the opposition knew it was impossible in that historical moment.
The contestability of evidence is far more complex than the articulation of
interests in straight lines. Different groups of people in society produce truth and
knowledge, and therefore what they see as ‘evidence’, in different ways so people
argue about what is reliable as much as they disagree with the substance. Political
work involves undermining your opponents’ arguments; in the face of hierarchies
of knowledge, and what is seen as expert versus personal opinion, this contest is
unevenly fought. The French anthropologist Bruno Latour compares how lawyers
and scientists produce knowledge or what they both call ‘evidence’ when asserting
knowledge as truth (2010: 229–43). When lawyers establish truth or falsity in a
court they use documents, images and speeches to make claims about a specific
context even though the events were in the past and the subject can’t necessarily
be seen. Scientists establish truth completely differently. They aim to create uni-
versal generalisations by interviewing, observing or experimenting on subjects and
then deducing predictable laws that do not depend critically on context. Form
matters in the law – how you present evidence – whereas content matters in sci-
ence – how you collect your data. So, assertions about scientific versus legal objec-
tivity are based on different epistemologies, rituals and audiences. Politicians make
use of both legal and scientific knowledge in speeches, debates and documents, to
rationalise their arguments in seemingly dispassionate ways. But they also believe
that their colleagues are not usually swayed by the knowledge produced by scientists
or lawyers, despite the credibility and prestige it confers on the person using it, so
then they resort to other rhetorical or political devices to persuade their own audi-
ences. They rely on close allies for support, reassure everyone that this is ‘modern’
and well-intentioned, appeal to the emotions of waverers by telling heart-rending
stories, and make deals with potential opponents (‘if you support this, I’ll back you
on that other matter’), to win others over to their causes. Obviously law-making is
political: those who pretend it is not, just because the people involved don’t fall
into the usual party political-based groups when creating alliances and divisions, court
90 The sociality of parliaments
the danger of a specific form of manipulation. A stance of anti-politics allows law-
makers, and other politicians, to find excuses for evading accountability.
This narrative about parenting was about how evidence was handled in the
context of conflict, how it constrains and enables politicians in scrutinising gov-
ernment as backbenchers and while on select committees. In my second narrative
about scrutiny I consider the shadowing of parliament by the media, and how and
why scrutiny can tip over into attack, before deriving general observations from
these two cases of scrutiny.
Crocodiles and snakes
In the 1960s Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and his colleague Selwyn Lloyd
walked off a plane after an overseas trip. A BBC journalist greeted them with:
‘Prime Minister, have you got anything to say to the BBC?’ Macmillan replied:
‘No, I don’t think so. Selwyn, have you got anything to say to the BBC?’ ‘No, I
don’t think so,’ Selwyn replied.4 For the PM to have nothing to say to the BBC
today would be unthinkable, political suicide. Although some say Bernard Ingham
was the first Press Secretary and spin-doctor, Margaret Thatcher was the last PM
who did not obsess about media reaction, according to former Cabinet Secretary
Robin Butler.5 She listened to the Today programme while having her hair done
but did not pay too much attention and used to say she planned to lead not follow.
Since around that time, the relationship between politicians and journalists has
descended further into a polarised combination of collusion and hostility and it is
not always clear to outsiders which is at play and to what degree. The aspirations
for accountability and scrutiny persist in theory, but traditional investigative jour-
nalism by newspapers is in a decline while political spin for TV and online audi-
ences has been professionalised. As Matt Chorley of the Times ‘Red Box’
summarises:
Every time a paper closes, lazy MPs, corrupt councillors, dodgy police chiefs,
rip off businesses, and anyone in the dock can relax a little. This isn’t just
nostalgia. The great and the good didn’t stop behaving badly because we all
got Snapchat and iPlayer.
(as quoted by O’Toole and Roxan 2019: 194)
And we are still living in the new world of political communication partly reshaped
by Tony Blair’s press secretary, Alastair Campbell, who took spinning to a new
dimension, managing 1000s of stories every day.6 He was in turn responding to the
digital revolution, which brought with it 24 hour news and social media. As a
consequence, you have a revolution in politicians’ relationships with MPs, jour-
nalists and various forms of mediated communication (Crewe 2015a: 167–78).
The press has traditionally or ideally had a vital role in holding politicians to
account. A healthy democracy needs an energetic, free and courageous press. But
the relationship between politicians, and celebrities more broadly, and the media
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has taken a darker turn partly for economic reasons. Newspapers have been
shrinking for two decades: in the US print circulation has almost halved and,
according to Pew Research, the number of journalists employed by newspapers has
decreased by 39%, 126 newspapers have closed between 2006 and 2016, and
20,000 journalism jobs have been lost (O’Toole and Roxan 2019: 195). The
Canadian government has even commissioned a report asking what will happen to
democracy in a post-newspaper world (McLennan and Miles 2018). As online
media has exploded in use, print is dying; compare Sheffield’s main daily news-
paper’s readership of 16,000 print copies and 130,000 unique web users (O’Toole
and Roxan 2019: 143). According to the Media Reform Coalition, this has left
more than two-thirds of local authority districts with no local daily (ibid: 89).
Larger publishers have been taking over, and merging or closing down less profit-
able local papers, with the five largest publishers owning just over 77% of all local
newspapers by 2017 (ibid: 88). Editorial budgets of local newspapers have nose-
dived; Chris Walker (Senior Managing Editor for Reach, formerly Trinity Mirror)
reports that his budget halved in the last ten years to 2017 (ibid: 140). Local jour-
nalists find it more difficult to talk to local government officers, press offices can be
more obstructive and they have to use Freedom of Information requests more
often. Another weakening of local accountability has taken place within local
councils; their attempts at communication with citizens faced serious hostility with
the new coalition government of 2010–15. The first Communities and Local
Government Minister, Eric Pickles, was determined to stop local councils spending
so much on what he called ‘propaganda’ (ibid: 184). Cuts to local government
budgets since 2010 have led to a reduction in broader consultations with citizens –
as they focus on more specific issues (ibid: 58–64) – and as much as 50% cuts in
spending on communications (ibid: 39). Taken alongside the drastic fall in local
newspapers, it could be argued that scrutiny of local democracy is in trouble.
The warning signs were obvious during one of the last important pieces of
investigative journalism in the UK in recent times led by campaigning journalists
and The Telegraph – the expenses scandal of 2009. That this was followed by a
tawdry explosion of inaccurate articles in a host of other newspapers is an indicator
of a weaker print media. It is a story worth telling as it reveals much about cultural
change in Parliament, and UK society more widely, but also a shift in how we
understand scrutiny and accountability. Between 2017 and 2018 I pieced together
the story of the expenses scandal with the official then in charge of resources (and
therefore MPs’ expenses), Andrew Walker. We trawled through 1000s of docu-
ments and interviewed the key protagonists and what we discovered surprised us
both.
Even Andrew, who lived through the whole sorry saga, hadn’t realised how it
looked from the viewpoint of the different people involved – MPs, officials, those
brought in to clean up the mess and so forth. The public assumed that:
greedy MPs dipped deep into public funds to pay for a lavish lifestyle and that
officials in the House of Commons colluded to assist by maintaining a corrupt
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system. They bought duck houses to decorate their ponds, cleaned their moats
and improved their homes with flat screen TVs because they were greedy; so
goes the crude version. While the rest of the population suffered pay freezes,
MPs enjoyed increased benefits. Even the most thoughtful accounts blame
either the greed of individuals or the flaws of a system. MPs’ explanations are
often one-track minded in their telling as well. Many of them felt wrongfully
accused of embezzlement when the vast majority were following the rules and
fraud was only proved in a handful of cases. Few asked why it occurred and
how its repetition could be prevented. This is bad history partly because the
cartoon version begins too late and reduces what was a complex scandal into
one inaccurate riff. To understand the expenses scandal we have to go way
back in time.
(Crewe and Walker 2019: 3)
In our complex history of the expenses scandal various declines have to be appre-
ciated. I have mentioned the newspaper industry already, but mix that in with a
combination of the financial crash of 2008 (so that people’s declining incomes
meant that any hint of corruption was especially resented) and (more positively), an
acceleration of the erosion of deference towards figures of authority (including
MPs) since the 1950s. MPs’ salaries lost value relative to other public sector pay
awards, so their party leaders agreed that expenses and pensions would act as a form
of compensation.
In the uneven way that history tends to unfold – with the ‘butterfly effect’ evi-
dent at critical moments – several seemingly small (or tangential) events grow into
huge ones over time. When Andrew Walker shifted from the Inland Revenue to
Parliament and decided to tighten up the regime, he found an ally in Liberal
Democrat MP Archie Kirkwood. Archie, a member of the House of Commons
Commission, came up with the idea of insisting on receipts for MPs’ expenditure
in a bid to improve accountability. Without those well-intentioned receipts, the
scandal would not have happened. The introduction of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, a piece of legislation that required public bodies to provide information
on request if it was reasonable, was also an essential ingredient. This attempt to
enhance government’s transparency had all kinds of unintended consequences.
One of them was to allow a campaigner and journalist, Heather Brooke, to ask
awkward questions about how much MPs were spending on their second home
allowances. Finally, the House of Commons was forced by the courts to make this
information public, and was preparing redacted copies without personal data about
MPs when a leak handed over millions of pieces of information to The Telegraph.
As newspapers published the information about MPs, the public were horrified
by both extraordinary claims for moat cleaning and ordinary expenditure on items
like bath plugs and toilet paper. Ever since then the media obsession with expenses
has continued. The new Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, and some
MPs themselves, publish all claims on the internet, which provides ammo for the
local press to write scurrilous reports and make fun of MPs in a formulaic fashion
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(Crewe and Walker 2019: 164). So, journalists persist in a form of auditing of MPs
that once had a purpose, but is long past serving a useful function. Taking a closer
look more often at the additional sources of income of some MPs, including their
involvement in and relationship with lobbying companies, or the kind of cronyism
and clientelism reported by Peter Geoghegan during Covid-19 (2020), would be
more revealing but would require more serious and costly investigation. Expenses
now provide cheap weapons for media attack. The immediate result was that while
30% of people in a survey were dissatisfied with MPs in 2001, after the expenses
scandal it was 71%.7
Alongside media attacks we find collusion. Alliance-building between journalists
and politicians starts with lunch and is sustained by regular contact, whether phone,
WhatsApp or whatever other means necessary. As one MP explained to the Spec-
tator journalist Isabel Hardman:
hacks will want to have lunch with you to build a good relationship before
you enter a ministry. If you’re good company over lunch, they will warm to
you and write you up as “effective”, even if this only means ‘effective at gos-
siping and eating pudding’.
(2018: 123)
If you fail to be noisy to the media about your achievements as a minister, then
you can get into serious trouble:
impressing the right journalists with good chat (and, as already mentioned,
good pudding-eating skills) means that you are able to create a reputation for
being an effective minister, one that is sustained largely by writers who haven’t
got a clue whether any of your policies are actually working.
(ibid: 131)
If you go quiet then the Prime Minister might suspect you of plotting or being
lazy, a Special Adviser (SpAd) told her.
Jack Straw, former Cabinet Minister, pointed out to the Leveson Inquiry that
politicians always want to get close to the press because the media is the prism
through which the public see them (Crewe 2015a: 169). When in opposition MPs’
communication with journalists is designed to attack the government but of course
this changes once the MP gets into government. Then he or she relies more
heavily on special advisers to brief journalists privately but they no longer find the
media as co-operative once they become a minister or even a government back-
bencher. After all the job of the press is to hold the powerful to account and that
often means government (or occasionally Parliament), rather than the opposition,
which is relatively powerless. Whether journalists do that effectively or not is hotly
contested. In the UK 2019 general election high profile journalists were criticised
by the Twitterati for reporting what ‘senior sources close to x’ claimed as if it was
more than spin, thereby abandoning their scrutiny function.
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The media play a ferocious role making kings and queens out of politicians,
although they can be created without their help, so some MPs are bitter when they
don’t get enough attention. A group of backbenchers complained to Hardman that
journalists were ignoring them (2018: 123). But seeking attention is risky. In 2007
Rebekah Brooks, then editor of The Sun, called John Reid when he was thinking
about running in the leadership contest and suggested he should think again. He
went ahead anyway and they ran an eight-week campaign to trash him, saying he
had no brain (Pascoe-Watson 2007). So the journalism that makes and breaks
politicians is not only scrutiny – it is MPs and journalists colluding with or against
each other to do politics, making friends and breaking foes, to gain support for
their own ideas, groups and leadership. Anonymous briefings from colleagues, or
increasingly their special advisers, are difficult to rebut. Apparently former SpAd
Damian McBride was annoyed by Labour MP Ivan Lewis having ideas about tax
policy. When he refused to be bullied, Damian then planted a story in the News of
the World about how he pestered a young civil servant (Crewe 2015a: 171).
‘Plebgate’ was another example of politics by and through the media: journalists,
the police and probably politicians (either opposition or rivals in his own party)
colluded to bring down a minister. In September 2012 the newly created Chief
Whip, Andrew Mitchell, was trying to leave Downing Street with his bicycle and
asked a policeman to open the main gate. The officer told him to use the pedes-
trian gate. Mr Mitchell says he muttered: ‘I thought you guys were supposed to
fucking help us’, while the policeman logged that he called him a pleb and threa-
tened that there would be consequences.8 Gossip circulated shortly afterwards that
someone in the Labour Party tipped off the Police Federation that Andrew
Mitchell MP was not that popular so they might be able to oust the new Chief
Whip. The Police Federation may have relished the opportunity for revenge at a
government that was cutting police pay at the time. The police officer’s version
was leaked to The Sun and another policeman pretended to be a witness, sending
in a false email to corroborate the story.9 Five weeks after the incident, when it was
clear that the various forces ranged against him were not going to back down,
Mitchell resigned. In December 2012 a Channel 4 Dispatches investigation reported
that the police had fabricated evidence, with the collusion of various journalists,
but by that time it was too late for Mitchell to reclaim his Cabinet post. Once
again Andrew Mitchell’s story is about collusion between journalists and his poli-
tical opponents hell-bent on his scalp (Crewe 2015a: 171–2).
This relationship is important because politicians’ reputations are critical to their
success in the game of politics. Honour is so central to politics in Brazil, it is even
recognised in the legal framework under the ‘right of personality’ (Teixeira 2004:
33). If your honour is violated – for example, by a journalist – you are entitled to
compensation. It raises questions for any democracy: when does valuable critique
transgress into a violation of rights? What should be done when both happen
simultaneously? If honour is translated into money, through compensation, asks
Carla Costa Teixeira (ibid: 38), then doesn’t honour merely become ‘a misplaced
shadow of the world of egalitarian individualism’?
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It is as if journalists mimic the politicians, taking sides and elevating the reputa-
tion of their own side by bringing down the villains in the other gang. Politicians
are bound to do this; it is inherent to the way representative democratic politics
works. There is fierce competition between them, which has the benefit of galva-
nising action. But when journalists join this antagonism and compete against each
other, to reach more readers and pursue their own political causes, then they can
lose their effectiveness as critics. The scrutiny by citizens of politicians on social
media might surely face the same risk. Abusive tweets on Twitter during the 2019
election reached 138k as opposed to 31k in 2017 and increasing numbers of poli-
ticians have attributed their decision to stand down to abuse on social media.10 Is
media scrutiny tipping over into the undermining of politics? This is surely a vital
question for future research.
The relationship between the state and the media of course varies hugely around
the world. In Ethiopia, to give just one example, the media environment consists
of a mix of private and state-owned enterprises, but the latter dominate and are
tightly controlled by government legislation and warnings (Skjerdal 2011). Self-
censorship is common as a result. In 2008 the government produced a ‘develop-
ment journalism’ policy document reviving the idea (that prevails in other parts of
the region too) that journalists should contribute to development. They were even
expected to work towards Ethiopia’s national goal to rise to a middle-income
country within 20–30 years (ibid: 65–6). Private media were accused in the policy
of being driven by a mix of profit motive and hatred, and were instructed to focus
on positive success stories in the future. Until recently, most Ethiopian journalists
complied, hardly ever reporting on government in critical or oppositional ways,
with the rare exceptions dismissed by the government as hostile and ‘political’ or
even imprisoned as a threat to security.
The relationship between government and media has shifted again with the
advent of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018. Government capture of media
communication once inadvertently limited hate speech within Ethiopia (Workneh
2020). But the Ahmed-led reforms – release of prisoners, repeal of restrictive law,
the return of exiled politicians and activists and the creation of a new national
Prosperity Party – have created new unintended tensions. The government has
been struggling to control ethnic-based hate discourses, violence and displacement,
passing a Proclamation to combat hate speech in February 2020. Communications
scholar Téwodros Workneh explores the arguments for and against new legislative
frameworks to control this rampant expression of hate in Ethiopia, listening to a
range of people talking about the tensions between peaceful co-existence versus
freedom of expression (2020). Although Ethiopia’s history of state–media relations
has its own unique history, with its long tradition of incarcerating journalists, and it
will need to work out specific solutions to reduce hate speech in its own way,
Workneh’s warnings have global significance. Legislation against the incitement to
violence is open to abuse and on its own can’t curb hate speech – ‘it is one player
in a cast of several actors’ (ibid: 136–7); social media companies are a key one. But he
also presents ideas for a longer-term strategy for reforming education in formal and
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informal settings involving government, civil society, religious organisations and
media outlets, and even the hate-speaking offenders – who have responsibilities and
should be part of the solution. It is this kind of nuanced and critical scrutiny of the
relationship between the state and its critics seen from many perspectives that offers
theoretical but also practical insights of great value.
Critique as scrutiny
If you contrast the performances involved in law-making versus court proceedings,
much is revealed about how they are accomplished and scrutinised. Ilana Gershon
has compared the anthropology of courts and legislatures in the Anglo-American
system, pointing to their different constraints: legislators by their claim to represent
others; judges by the pressure to perform objectivity in the cause of justice (2011:
157). Courts use analogies to set precedents while legislatures focus on equiv-
alences, that is, imagining the qualities of people who might face a problem.
People can embody culture in both settings but in courts people become a vehicle
for understanding different cultures, while in legislatures law-makers speak for
people belonging to various cultural groups. As law moves from legislatures to
courts, one of the many shifts that take place is that explicit compromises move to
the background, thereby hindering their transformative potential (ibid: 169). To
make her case Gershon refers to Lazarus-Black’s work on legislative debates in
Trinidad over the Domestic Violence Act 1991. She raises questions about how to
define family and whether to challenge beliefs about masculinity in contrast to how
cases were handled in court, where the law’s transformative potential was closed
down.
Lazarus-Black’s research has in common with my parenting case study an argu-
ment about how the impact of law has to be researched in society (homes, offices,
streets …) not only in parliamentary chambers and the courts, where their claims
about impact are partial and conflictual respectively. It was in the ‘shadow of the
law’, in these cases of violence and parenting, that the relationship between the
state and family were at stake. In the case of domestic violence, the issue was
transformed from a private to a public one and the Trinidadian state gained the
power to interfere, but while criminalising violence changed people’s attitude to
what was seen as ‘disciplining’ women, it provided little relief to the majority of
women facing abuse (Lazarus-Black 2001: 400–1). In relation to parenting by
separated carers in the UK, custody was already a matter for the state and so in the
public domain when parents were in conflict. The bid to give the courts more
power to promote fathers’ rights failed and children’s welfare remained ‘para-
mount’ in the courts. The most thorough assessment, by Felicity Kaganas, a law
professor, concludes that this clause failed too: fathers’ rights group remain angry
that the courts are biased against men; the higher courts ignore it; and in the lower
courts (and informal dispute resolution processes) women are under more pressure
to accept more contact with fathers against their wishes. She concludes that this has
probably put a greater number of women and children at risk of violence in society
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(2018). In both cases, despite the best intentions and high quality scrutiny of law-
makers, including by the civil society organisations engaging with them, the law
failed to protect women and children as much as intended. The reason for this in
both cases was not too little evidence and too much politics, but not enough
transformative politics to challenge inequalities based on age and gender.
Another narrative of inequality surviving the failed efforts of law-makers was
recently told by the anthropologist David Mosse. Caste discrimination gets less
attention than other forms of inequality despite affecting 100s of millions, including
the South Asian diaspora in the UK. In 2013 the UK government put in law the
requirement to add caste to pro-equality legislation. Following a backlash from
‘Hindu organisations’, who labelled this move postcolonial racism and even a ‘hate
crime against Hindus’, the government abandoned its plans in 2018 by repealing
the established duty (2020: 11–13). Hindu organisations claimed that caste dis-
crimination was reinvented as a creation of colonial missionaries, in contrast to the
benign equitable form of it in Hindu scriptures. The objectors diverted attention
from the experience of Dalits. It was only by excluding Dalits, and their arguments
about the prejudice they face, that Hindu organisations managed to present their
case as anti-racist. Ironically it was the practice of excluding on the basis of caste,
and protecting upper-caste community spaces in everyday lives, that was being
defended through the cancelling of the UK’s commitment. Although scrutiny and
public participation sound politically good, it is clear from Mosse’s research, and
the other narratives in this chapter, that it is far from inevitable that it results in less
inequality. Scrutiny and advocacy spaces are often dominated by the more pow-
erful groups in society. So, scrutiny is a vital part of democracy but, like voting and
representation, should be nurtured and inclusive rather than idealised, as if assumed
to work by magic rather than hard work.
The UK select committees and US congressional committees respectively inspire
awe (mostly) while the free presses in these two democracies were once the envy
of the world. But alongside these impressive looking structures, troubling patterns
are emerging. Scrutiny of government by politicians and journalists appears to be
waning in the wake of other more emotionally and politically potent processes of
exposure, blame and conflict. When storms flooded and bashed the UK in early
2014, Ed Miliband blamed the government, Secretary of State Eric Pickles MP
blamed the Environment Agency, Lord Smith (Chair of the EA) blamed the
Treasury and those affected blamed anyone in authority. As the journalist Simon
Jenkins observes:
We now have a new form of accountability, to an ‘inquiriat’, a cackle of
inquisitors and lawyers jumping to the bidding of public opinion, flapping
round every executive’s head and piling accusation on every error. This can
only lead to ever more defensive behaviour in every sphere of public life. It is
the paranoia of the modern state. Every document is ‘open’, every conversa-
tion ‘on the record’ and your friend today is tomorrow the witness against
you.11
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Haridimos Tsoukas makes a related argument by pointing to the alarming side of
transparency (another idealised democratic goal), predicting that the obsessive pro-
duction and collection of information could reduce people to bald facts, numbers
and images, making it even easier to monitor them. When the context and
meaning of information has become distorted, the less we understand its com-
plexity and the more distrust it generates; it may well ‘constitute a new tyranny’ (as
quoted by Crewe and Walker 2019: 200).
Both transparency and scrutiny have to be understood within the context of the
ubiquity of audit as a new form of accountability that has spread across the globe,
as various anthropologists have explained (e.g., Strathern 2000, Shore and Wright
2015). The all-encompassing regime of audit is influenced by New Public Man-
agement, which has permeated all sectors (Gulrajani 2011). One aspect of this is
that ‘performance’ (in the sense of effectiveness here) is measured by narrow
metrics, often of a financial kind, and there is a presumption of predictability and
control whereby organisations (including governments) are only deemed effective
if they anticipate the future. Many of the managerial tools adopted for planning
and measuring success were originally developed in project management disciplines
of bridge building in a military context (Mowles 2010). Mostly they are assumed
necessary for incentivising and monitoring organisational performance, with sur-
prisingly few politicians asking what harm (and occasionally benefit) they cause.
Claims about following scientific evidence can be a political strategy of evasion. We
observed an example of this during the Coronavirus crisis. PM Boris Johnson made
sure he was flanked by scientists when he announced to the country the strict measures
to tackle the spread of the Covid-19 virus. He stressed that he was ‘following the sci-
ence’, as if it was singular and as if that absolved him of excessive scrutiny, despite the
usual entanglement of evidence with politics (Grey and MacAskill 2020). To give just
a few examples, when scientists did their initial modelling of the likely spread of the
virus they assumed that the UK public wouldn’t tolerate a curfew so did not even
include that scenario. They made political assumptions that affected their production
of evidence that the politicians failed to question. On the side of the politicians, the
government flipped from a strategy of testing and tracing to lockdown when it
became obvious – guided by scientific advice – that the spread couldn’t be contained.
But they could have done both. They also missed eight conference calls or meetings
about the Coronavirus between EU heads of state or health ministers and missed a
deadline to take part in a common purchase scheme for ventilators, which were later
in short supply. Whether for political reasons (the UK was exiting the EU), or a mere
administrative error (as Johnson’s spokesman claimed), it is clear that the response to
Covid-19 was about making political judgements. ‘Following the science’ is useful as
rhetoric, but should not be taken literally.
When Trump was asked questions by journalists about whether the US gov-
ernment was acting fast enough to respond to Covid-19, in his replies he insulted
the journalists, telling them they were ‘bad people’ for sounding negative. In the
middle of the crisis he withdrew funding to the World Health Organisation
because they criticised his response to the virus. By April 2020 it was widely
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reported that the US states were competing rather than co-operating to deal with
the huge surge in virus cases. When criticised for speculating spontaneously that sci-
entists might test whether people should inject disinfectant, he later pretended he was
just being sarcastic. In the country with the second highest number of cases, Brazil,
President Bolsonaro claimed that Covid-19 had been exaggerated by journalists and
he undermined his own state governments and Health Ministry’s efforts to control the
pandemic by encouraging people to ignore regulations.12 Trump and Bolsonaro could
have saved lives if they took some notice of journalists’ questions, but they increasingly
reframed scrutiny as anti-patriotic, fantasy and ‘fake news’.
Critical scrutiny of the state by journalists, academics and other politicians is vital
for holding officials and ministers accountable for their actions. It is part of the duty
of elected representatives to engage with this – marshalling evidence to answer
questions – in ways that deal with the inherent contradiction in democratic
accountability. Elected politicians in government are expected to be honest and
transparent, including about their mistakes, but to appear competent at all times so
that they don’t lose support for their party. When backbench politicians are the
scrutineers in the chamber or committees, they are told by their whips to back up
the party line and by their constituents to demand more for their locality. Scrutiny
is yet another highly contradictory form of political work.
Scrutiny as part of shapeshifting work
Political scientists tend to divide political work into idealised roles and categories. The
impression given is that MPs are doing representation or scrutiny or policy or party
work or government and that they vary in how they prioritise these, which allows
the observer to slot MPs into ranked categories. In practice, MPs are often performing
these roles – campaigning, representing and scrutinising have been the focus on the last
three chapters – simultaneously; speaking in a debate, for example, about hospitals to
influence policy in a shared cause with other MPs, while both opposing the govern-
ment and pleasing some of their constituents (and displeasing others) all in the same
moment. There are other strands of political work that I know less about: governing,
lobbying and working with the media. Like anyone else, politicians also do other kinds
of work beyond the political realm: earning money at other jobs, caring for dependents,
even love involves a kind of work. These all deserve urgent anthropological scrutiny
from the viewpoint of both politicians and those they affect.
I have argued that underlying all political work is sociality in various forms, whether
social relationships or socially produced knowledge shared by social groups. To show
how profoundly politics is entangled in sociality, remember the Marshallese politician
who dispenses marriage guidance counselling, therapy and loans (Corbett 2015: 75). Or
theUKMPwho does a pub quiz with local party activists or listens to constituents talking
about mental health problems in their surgeries and then talks about that in a debate. A
politician needs to respond to endless requests from constituents, whips, interest groups
and local supporters without having enough time to do justice to any of these demands;
these interests are unknowable, dynamic and open to endless contestation.
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We all do this adaptive shapeshifting to some extent as humans, just as we all mind
about status and absorb praise easily. For example, academics change their language,
style and emotional sensibilities between talking to students, university committees
and attending seminars with fellow scholars. But politicians do this more often, more
quickly and with more exposure than academics because they are in the public realm
almost constantly. Even when recklessly having an affair with a stranger, a politician
risks courting media interest and therefore public censure. The consequences of
successful or disastrous shapeshifting are more serious for a politician than for most of
us, so the torture is more intense. Adapt to your different audiences too little and
you will be seen as remote and failing in your role as a representative. At the same
time, the more inclusively you listen, the more directions you will be pulled in and
the more you sink under the weight of many voices and demands. Some improvised
shapeshifting may be a universal pattern of human relating, but the extent to which
politicians have to do it, and the rapidity of their reactions, means that they are a
concentrated form of socially shifting being.
How do MPs deal with this confusing array of strands of political and social
work? Across the world the work of politicians entails endless shapeshifting but
continuities are created by meeting spaces, rhythms and ideological riffs. The per-
formance of politics requires rituals, mediated communication and a claim of
representation. In Part II I elaborate on these cultural processes in parliaments.
FIGURE 4.2 The shapeshifting work of politicians.
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PART II
The cultures of parliaments
To fathom the contradictions and entanglements in MPs’ work the spotlight needs
to be turned onto culture. I can only write about culture on the back of under-
standing sociality (or vice versa), rather than jumping entirely from one to the
other. The sociality/culture entanglement becomes clear only when you look at
innovation: ‘the mark of distinctly human sociality is not the possession of one
culture or another as such but the capacity to change and create new cultures’
(Carrithers 2005: 57). Anthropologists have been making the argument for decades
that culture is something you do, create, reproduce and contest, not something you
have or live in (Carrithers 1992, Street 1993). But culture often remains a more
static concept in political science as well as among those working in parliaments,
whether MPs or officials. Whether seen as a variable or a black box into which to
put the unexplainable, culture is often conflated with tradition. So, for the next
three chapters I will try and describe with brush-strokes, and sometimes minute
detail, how culture gets made, remade and displaced through the everyday inter-
action between people. People thinking, walking and talking in private and public
parliamentary spaces create and are created by cultures.
I’m interested in what social interaction and cultural processes by MPs reveal
about their work. MPs are not just individuals, any more than the rest of us; their
belonging to different groups with diverse interests and huge webs of relationships
with others demands complex social and political navigation. In that navigation
they are moved by dynamic and often contradictory motives, constrained by cul-
tural habits but also enabled by imaginative possibilities. They face continual shifts
as they encounter different configurations of people, requiring them in turn to
respond to the endlessly changing demands thrown at them (but also created by them)
as they move from relationship to relationship: at times antagonistic, at other points as
allies, sometimes both and often moving between the two. Politics involves processes
of (a) seeking support for oneself, one’s cause or party or nation, (b) backing the causes
of one’s allies and/or (c) undermining opponents (and opponents’ allies).
How do MPs cope with this changeability? In the UK, many don’t. Alcohol
consumption and divorce among MPs seems to be relatively high and reports of
bullying of their staff are troubling.1 In Portugal drinking alcohol is part of a ‘cult
of masculinity’ among politicians (Mineiro pers. comm), so caution in universalis-
ing causal connections is always wise. Divorce may be partly associated with the
unique pressures of work but also with separation – many MPs live in the political
capital while their partners are at home in the constituency – with MPs finding
new socio-political networks, friends and even lovers in London. So, alcohol and
divorce may not necessarily be symptoms of a failure to cope. On the whole, most
UK MPs do cope, enough to keep trying to return to Parliament multiple times.
But stability of the self matters, not only for the MPs’ well-being but their capacity
too. Ricoeur wrote about how self-constancy is vital to be recognisable, counted
on and accountability – to act and perceive MPs as moral beings we need to see
some constancy in their identities (as cited by Larsen 2020).
Many politicians do cope with changeability, judging by the skill with which
they adapt their performances to multiple sites, audiences and demands. Learning
the skill of adapting to individuals (and groups) through endless daily practice
reveals something about how they do this work. But we are still left with the
problem of how they retain any sense of stable self that travels across all these
relationships. I suggest that there three processes that provide some continuity for
MPs between and across this chaotic dynamism. These processes enable MPs to
maintain or rupture relationships, sustaining or breaking either alliances or enmities.
1. The first are the rhythms of performance that organise the work of MPs by
creating repetition in time and space but allowing for variation at the same time
(Chapter 5). The detail of these depends on the context but most parliamentar-
ians organise their time through repeated patterns as well as departures from fixed
schedules. The meeting spaces around which the bodies of MPs and others
move – whether debating chambers, surgery meeting rooms or TV studios – and
position themselves together do not determine how they behave but they have a
bearing on how they relate.
2. The second continuity is the riffs of meaning that MPs develop to make
sense of ideology and communicate as policies and arguments, each impro-
vised for different audiences (Chapter 6). The communication of these within
many legislatures, and especially in the digital sphere, is becoming more
antagonistic and distrustful.
3. Finally, these rhythms and riffs work in conjunction through rituals and
symbols (Chapter 7). MPs navigate these processes of relating through var-
ious rituals – as examples, debates in parliamentary chambers, press or party
conferences, or more formal meetings – which punctuate the daily routine
with riffs and rhythms of particular political, social and cultural significance
(for details on an earlier version of this, see Crewe 2015a: 225). The more
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events are significant, the more they tend to be ritualised. This usually means
they will be charged with symbolic meaning, regulated by rules and involved
in reproducing or challenging a socio-political hierarchy. The credibility and
plausibility of politicians, and even the parliament as a whole, is constructed
through a variety of performative rituals, artefacts and settings with the aim
that they will be taken seriously by the wider parliamentary community and
the general public.
This may be a more generative way of conceiving of MPs’ work than the reliance
on a typology of roles or functions, because the musicality of riffs and rhythms
emphasises the performative, changeable and relational nature of what they do when
they are doing politics, while the idea of rituals allows us to investigate politics with a
sense of proportion. After all, rituals, and especially well-established ones, reveal which
work is trivial and what is politically, socially or culturally significant.
This approach is a way of encouraging multi-disciplinarity by bringing in history
(what action unfolds between people over time), geography (how bodies move
through space), theology (what people believe or at least what they say they
believe), and culture (how people discipline each other and make or contest
meaning). A focus on these processes invites consideration of politicians’ arguments
and performance of ideology; where bodies go, when, with whom, why and with
what consequences; and how encounters are ritualised, regulated and performed,
revealing what is contested, what is taken for granted, the power hierarchies and
struggles, and what matters socially, culturally and politically in a specific time and
place. If you were researching parliaments during Covid-19 you would have to
analyse what happened to rhythms, riffs and rituals when mediated by the tech-
nology of Zoom and its equivalents. This allows us to study both what individuals
do differently but also how the processes create continuities and cultural patterns,
avoiding both methodological individualism and crude structuralism. Whether
researching a bill, or the relationships between MPs and constituents, or the
workings of a select committee, my contention is that you have to look at the
individual and shared rhythms, riffs and rituals to understand the political work
involved in any depth.
A thorough investigation of these in any parliament might assist in working
towards a rigorous ethnography because rhythms, riffs and rituals can only be
understood if the researcher looks behind the front of stage with its most public
performances, to investigate private and less visible encounters. In the next three
chapters I will explain what I mean in more detail about the continuities in par-
liamentary cultures and inquire into whether this perspective might work in dif-
ferent contexts around the world.
Note
1 Alcohol Concern carried out a survey in 2013 and one quarter of the 150 MPs who
responded believed that there is an unhealthy drinking culture in parliament. According
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to Conservative MP Charles Walker around one sixth of the 2010 intake of Conservative
had divorced, separated or had long-term relationships break down by early 2013 (Hellen
and Grimston 2013). Bullying has been reported in an independent inquiry, https://
www.parliament.uk/documents/Conduct%20in%20Parliament/GWQC%20Inquiry%
20Report%2011%20July%202019_.pdf, accessed 25 April 2020.
106 The cultures of parliaments
5
RHYTHMS OF PERFORMANCE
A good anthropologist (including of parliaments) has to be in part an historian; history
and sociology depend on each other (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 90). But we also
need to have a sense of geography. Without doubt history and geography are enriched
by each other; it is hard to imagine how you could write about time without keeping
place in mind and vice versa. But this goes beyond enrichment and elaboration on
insights into one parliament or many. You can’t understand what it is valid to generalise
about beyond a highly specific moment and space without working out what endures
and what changes through time and across place. The rhythms of parliamentary life
need an inquiry into seasons, diaries and appointments observable in offices, streets and
parliamentary buildings.
Winston Churchill famously said that we shape our buildings and thereafter they
shape us. Buildings matter deeply to those inhabiting them as their affective response
confirms. In an article about the political aesthetics of the nation, Shirin Rai writes
about how the Lutyens-designed Indian parliament was originally created to meet the
needs of the British imperial state and continues to be an expression of power:
social and political relations are reproduced through a variety of modes in
specific spaces – narratives (verbal and written), ceremony and ritual, symbols,
paintings and sculpture. Together, this forms the aesthetics of politics as well as
of power … through these imaginaries we can reflect upon the processes
through which they become hegemonic – how the dominant modes of power
are reproduced and how the marginalized are kept outside the spaces of per-
formance of power (Bourdieu 1984), in the shadows, ‘out of place’.
(2014: 2)
It is hardly surprising that PM Narendra Modi announced that the buildings were
in need of a facelift and that they would be replaced by a new modern building
DOI: 10.4324/9781003084488-5
within a few years.1 But how buildings inspire such emotion, and how culture is
entangled with power in space, can be enigmatic. One of the world’s most famous
buildings, London’s Palace of Westminster, soars in some people’s imagination as a
symbol of Britain’s glorious past:
The past is everywhere: soaring arches, the luxuriance of sculpted dead kings
sprouting from mouldings, painted historical tableaux on the walls, marble
statues of deceased parliamentarians. The ceremonies seem of another era,
binding the everyday to ancient splendour … The Lords presents a seductive
version of the nation’s history, apparently unfolding in perfect continuity from
the place in which one stands. For its devotees, the House is a shrine to this
beloved, majestic, patriotic saga, conjuring endless genial associations, while
still being thoroughly alive in the present.
(Crewe 2005: 9)2
At the same time, for many it doesn’t. It can be a reminder of historical global
vandalism, class privilege or even the UK as a colonising and occupying super-
power creating havoc, displacement and dispossession. The public-school appear-
ance is as alienating for some as it is resonant for others (see Figure 5.1).
The iconic image of the Palace of Westminster may represent clichés of sym-
bolic significance – magnificence or alienation – but the building is falling apart.
The roof is leaking, pipes and cables are in a tangle, mice scurry across its green and
red carpets, and bits of stone regularly crumble and crash to the ground. MPs and
peers are due to move out to allow the Palace to be restored but they have been
procrastinating for years. Despite officials warning that the edifice could collapse
entirely, politicians are reluctant to tear themselves away from this alienating or
FIGURE 5.1 Feeling out of place in the Palace.
‘When I am coming down in the train
from Manchester, I write these revolu-
tionary speeches. I take the tube to West-
minster and as I walk through the portals,
my speech seeps away. Then I rewrite my
speech. When you are away from it, you
have glorious thoughts.’ (Peer interviewed
in 1998)
When a Scottish nationalist first arrived in
the Palace he saw the lion, symbol of
England, and the unicorn, symbol of
Scotland. The unicorn has a chain around
its neck. He loves architecture, and the
building is extraordinary, but he does not
belong. ‘This is someone else’s place. I
just want to get out of the place as soon
as I can.’ (MP interviewed in 2018)
‘I don’t want to get comfortable … You
can see how in this big grand building
people get moulded to serve the institu-
tion. I never forget the people who sent
me here – I am here to serve them not this
place.’ (MP interviewed in 2011)
‘I’m not a real Clerk’, one state-school
educated House of Commons Clerk told
me, ‘and this doesn’t really feel like my
building. I’m only part English so it is not
my history.’ (Clerk interviewed in 2015)
108 The cultures of parliaments
exhilarating political Hogwarts. The officials responsible for restoration despair of
the politicians’ aversion to change and the impossibility of bringing about radical
transformations in the Palace. But this disposition towards the building, with its
occupants clinging to it like limpets, may be more attributable to a craving for
continuity and stability in the face of endless flux and uncertainty than a broader
conservatism. In the endless shapeshifting of parliamentary work maybe the build-
ing offers one of the few stable continuities? In this chapter I will look into the
possibility that space is as significant for people as time, and far more important
than I have acknowledged in the past in my studies of parliaments.
Rhythms organise people in political worlds by creating repetition in time and
space but allowing for variation at the same time (Edensor 2010). Edensor was
influenced by the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre who suggested that to be
serious about the everyday use of time, space and energy, we need to analyse the
rhythms: rhythmanalysis he called it (2013). Lefebvre suggests we look at rhythms
in all their variety – sequential ones where people follow each other (melody);
action in concert when people perform at the same time (harmony); repetitive,
cyclical and life-like patterns (‘birth, growth, peak, then decline and end’, ibid: 25);
as well as eurhythmia (normal and regular), arrhythmia (problematic) and poly-
rhythmia (many rhythms in concert rather than conflict). This offers a way of being
both thorough but also proportionate in our multidisciplinary investigation of how
people in political worlds perform everyday political work, rather than merely fulfil
roles in a mechanical way. One temptation is to pluck some features of a building
or some events in an historical account and make claims that these are more
important than other details simply because the author has that reaction herself.
Another is to listen too hard to those who are easiest to get hold of or have a
position of authority. But we can do more rigorous research if we attempt a more
detailed description of how various inhabitants react – comparing and contrasting
what different individuals and groups say and do. When we study contradictions
between responses and these two types of engagement with informants, then we
can eventually describe the different kinds of significant rhythm more rigorously.
To understand rhythms of political performance in parliament, we need to go
beyond the famous people and publicly famous spaces. These magnificent/dreadful
Barry and Lutyens designed edifices of the world’s nearly oldest parliament and
largest democracy respectively, contain the most famous political spaces globally,
but parliamentary spaces extend far beyond these grand buildings that inspire both
awe and frustration. Politicians navigate government buildings, committee rooms
and constituency offices as well as schools, hospitals or factories; they meet people
in media studios and in the street; they communicate via mediated channels (down
the phone, on their smartphone or in Zoom meetings); and travel to political
spaces in other countries. Politics happens everywhere and anywhere. Rhythm is
created by visiting or revisiting familiar and new spaces, with the same or different
people, at repeated or non-routine times.
People’s everyday routines – where and when they navigate regular and new
spaces and times, that is, the rhythms of their performances – make politics possible
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and reveal part of its specific and generalised character. Researching this character
means asking what bodies are doing when they do politics, because it is impossible
to divorce bodies from minds (at least when they have a healthy relationship).
While the focus in this chapter is on bodies, that is, the embodiment of political
performance, in the next I will shift to thinking about the ideological content of
political communication: riffs and what they mean or do for different people.
Finally, I will consider how rhythms and riffs are performed through ritual in
Chapter 7.
Agendas and diaries of time and space
Politicians’ minds and bodies have to navigate time (parliamentary calendar and
seasons) and space (a parliamentary estate often with many outbuildings, govern-
ment departments and the streets of their constituencies) by following routines and
timetables. These rhythms create continuity and disruption in the work of MPs and
their importance is revealed by the considerable status of diary secretaries: the more
important the politician, the more influential the diary secretary. Although some
do it themselves, MPs often have a secretary who arranges when, where and with
whom they should place themselves, making decisions about who gets access to
private spaces and precious time. Patterns emerge when you look at MPs’ diaries –
both shared and individual. Groups of MPs share rhythms in common – mostly
planned (e.g., attending a select committee), and others spontaneous (like sitting
regularly with your mates in an informal meeting space), while many rhythms are
idiosyncratic (e.g., visiting particular businesses in their constituency annually). In
the everyday work of MPs rhythms provide some continuity in social relations and
form, which makes it possible for MPs to navigate their changeable social world. It
means they can develop and maintain key social relationships and have some con-
tinuous sense of self in relation to the world around them.
The shared rhythms are created by public space and fixed calendars. UK MPs’
shared spaces each have their own history, character and habits. The main formal
debating chamber, and a smaller one-off Westminster Hall, meet at the same time
on a weekly schedule beginning with questions to a minister and followed by
debates and motions, on Monday from 2:30 to 10:30 pm, Tuesday and Wednesday
11:30 am to 7:30 pm, Thursday 9:30 am to 5:30 pm, and Friday (when sitting)
9:30 am to 3 pm. Hours have moved around; Commons’ sittings used to start in
the afternoon and go into the evenings until they were changed in 2002 and 2012.
But before 1570 they met from 8 to 11 am or 12 noon and even at 6 am in 1604
(Rogers 2012: 122). These days one of the few events that all MPs try and attend is
Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) on Wednesdays at 12 noon. Committees tend
to meet weekly at a set time (often on Tuesday or Wednesday mornings), and then
on an ad hoc basis in addition, either in a room on the committee corridor of the
Palace or in the far newer Portcullis House. These fix some of the shared rhythms
for all MPs, in the case of PMQs and important votes, or more often a significant
number of them according to their interests or instructions from the whips. Whips
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demand the presence of their members (or flocks as they are sometimes called) to
ensure that the session is quorate, their frontbench get support in debates or, most
importantly, they are ready to vote with their party. Whips are both people but
also instructions; so, the whips issue a ‘whip’, an instruction stating how their
members should vote, indicating how serious it is by the number of lines.
Political parties have a huge influence on the rhythms of MPs, whether through
whipping, electioneering (see Chapter 2) or party conferences (as well as politicians
in local government, Spencer 1971). In the French anthropologist Florence Fau-
cher-King’s fascinating work on party conferences, she explains how the organisa-
tion of these regular rituals reveals both continuities and shifts in UK politics. Party
conferences emerged 100 years ago in a time when political parties inspired life-
times of loyalty and dominated UK politics. As loyalty to party is seeping away,
and conferences have been professionalised, the audience is becoming sceptical
about their spontaneity and authenticity (2005: 10). She tells us what they are for
in contemporary times:
conferences are an integral element of British democracy: for a month every
year, the main political organisations hold their national gatherings by the
seaside. Thanks to the considerable attention that they receive, conferences act
as reminders of the existence of political parties, whilst at the same time, taking
them temporarily outside of Westminster. They are an opportunity for parties
to address the electorate outside an electoral campaign and for politicians to be
seen meeting ‘real people’. The conference city, be it Brighton, Blackpool or
Bournemouth, becomes for a few days a microcosm of the nation and a
symbol of the ‘accessibility’ and representative function of politicians in a
democracy. Photo opportunities are organised for instance at local schools or
at the racetrack. Thus, politicians are presented as ‘in touch’ with the common
citizen, mixing with ‘ordinary’ people. The ‘conference season’ marks the end
of the summer recess and the beginning of the new parliamentary year. It
draws attention to the inner workings of political parties and also restores the
political structure after the interruptions of the ‘silly season’.
(Faucher-King 2005: 11)
‘Silly season’ is the period between parliamentary terms during the summer when
the media suddenly have to cope with a dearth of political news. Newspapers are
filled with human interest stories while they wait for the politicians to return. The
party conference returns us to the seriousness of politics, a rare chance for parties to
distinguish their groups from each other for the public and to create some sense of
communitas internally.
So, some rhythms are partly controlled by the ‘usual channels’, the political party
managers, but others are in the hands of individual MPs or their factions. Usually
factions are within parties but after the 2016 referendum was won by those want-
ing the UK to leave the European Union (or ‘Brexit’), factions – and therefore
rhythms of participation in the chamber – were utterly disrupted. Backbenchers
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had been getting progressively more rebellious but Brexit precipitated disobedience
to new levels. Semi-private plotting between politicians often takes place away
from the public gaze behind the Speaker’s chair in the corridor off the main
debating chamber or in the Tea Room where parties sit on different tables.
Rebellion against Brexit required deep secrecy. When private plotting across parties
requires space undetected by other politicians (as it did to defy May’s and then John-
son’s attempts to get Parliament’s agreement to do a deal with the EU), then closed
meeting rooms, MPs’ offices and, increasingly, social media channels are employed.
WhatsApp is transforming politics in ways we are only beginning to understand. It
means politicians and their allies can communicate instantaneously to a huge number
of differently configured groups to share knowledge and agree tactics. While the UK
government planned how to Brexit, backbench MPs from across the political parties
(Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrat, other small parties) joined a ‘Rebel Alli-
ance’, as they called themselves, but when they communicated by WhatsApp they did
not want to give their group that name in case it was spotted by a Brexiteer looking
over one of their shoulders. So, the profile of their WhatsApp group was: ‘Buses and
Trains’. Digital transformation also means that the processes of inclusion and exclusion
shift around even faster, partly beyond our gaze, than they did pre-digital media,
obscuring even more of the alliances in our political worlds from view.
While it is relatively easy to observe MPs’ shared patterns by watching them in
public spaces and checking their websites,3 tracking the secret movements of factions
and compiling individual patterns is far more complex. Some rhythms are idiosyncratic
to individual MPs. But if you investigate one, you don’t know what they share with
another, so you have to consult many people and sources: the research task becomes
extremely time-consuming. Politicians’ published diaries reveal that rhythms are
wildly different depending on party, personality and where their constituency is. The
most amusing political diaries I have read are by former MPs and Ministers Alan Clark
(Conservative) and Chris Mullin (Labour) – humorous because they are written with
honesty and a sense of the absurd. Mullin’s diaries contain endless references to the
places he occupied – whether meeting in the library corridor or committee room 10,
having lunch in the House of Commons Tea Room, getting on the phone to Gordon
Brown or dealing with asylum cases in his Sunderland constituency – and it is a
repeated theme on routines that he argued that Parliament should sit in September
otherwise it would look as if MPs are shirking (e.g., Mullin 2010: 132). Clark, writing
15 years earlier, moves from the Commons’ despatch box, to the smoking room, to
his gentlemen’s club (Brooks), his castle in Kent and only occasionally to his con-
stituency of Plymouth by sleeper train for meetings rather than surgeries (2003). The
portraits of the rhythms they conjure are starkly different – products of their time, their
class and their political party – only explicable if you contrast across contexts and tease
out contingent factors.
There is no shortcutting the painstaking business of charting individual rhythms,
comparing them and finding the patterns. In my writings on parliament so far I
have tried to outline some of these patterns, including some typical days in the life
of different types of MP (Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.4).
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This MP’s constituency is in London and she is a junior minister in the Health and Social Care
department
8:30–10:00 Constituency Opening of a new school with both the Leader of the Council and the
Mayor of the Borough. Short speech (off-the-cuff) during ceremony then discus-
sion of school-related issues. Must leave at 10 a.m. sharp.
10:00–10:30 Travel to Ministerial Office, Health Department, Richmond House, Whitehall.
10:30–11:00 Minister’s Office Go through the diary for the coming week with all her Private Office.
Decide on communications strategies with Private Secretary and Special Advisers
(SPADs).
11:00–11:30 Minister’s Office Preparation for BBC World at One interview
11:30–12:00 Minister of State’s Office Weekly forward look at speeches, events and issues over the
next month and relevant political/communication strategies with ministerial team.
12:00–1:00 Secretary of State’s Office Review of the forthcoming week including Weekly Commu-
nications Grid, allocation of Commons Health Questions for regular four-weekly slot
on Tuesdays at 11.30 and tour de table so each minister and SPAD can update team on
major issues of concern. (First half of meeting with officials, second half is ‘political’ i.e.,
no civil servants). Secretary of State knows that minister has leave for studio at Millbank
at 12:45.
12:45–13:00 Whitehall/Millbank Walk to BBC studio, 4 Millbank, briefing on the way by Press
Secretary and SPAD.
13:00–13:20 4 Millbank Interview on the World at One with the BBC.
13:20–14:15 Commons Meeting Room Sandwich lunch with backbench MPs and peers in her
party to discuss the upcoming health legislation to win their support.
14:15–15:00 Commons Ministerial Office Meeting with Chair and some cross-party Members of the
Health Select Committee to seek their views on the upcoming legislation.
15:00–15:45 Minister’s Departmental Office Box Time – chance for Minister to do some of her
box work – policy submissions for decision, correspondence with public or MPs/
Lords, answer queries from the office or any other issues that arise.
15:45–16:00 Minister’s Departmental Office Quick review of speech for event tonight.
16:00–16:30 Minister’s Departmental Office Meeting on questions allocated for Health Questions –
officials will have prepared initial response to each question and briefing on follow-
up questions by either the MP asking initial question or others.
16:30–18:00 Minister’s Departmental Office Back-to-back meetings with interest groups and
professional groups affected by the forthcoming legislation.
18:00–18:30 Minister’s Departmental Office Policy development meeting on mental health in the
North East with officials and SPAD.
18:30–19:30 Minister’s Departmental Office Deferred policy development meeting about prior-
itising and budget planning for next year.
19:30–20:00 Commons Catch up and cup of tea with MP colleague – vote if votes come early.
20:00–20:15 Travel to Association of Community Pharmacists annual dinner at the British
Medical Association.
20:15–10:30 BMA, Tavistock Square Attend dinner, give speech at around 9:30 – in between courses.
11:00–12:30 Minister’s Home Do ‘Red Boxes’ – especially anything time sensitive. Each submis-
sion will have covering or ‘box’ note from the relevant private secretary explaining
what the minister needs to do. Normal routine – at least 30–40 submissions marked
for information or decision, correspondence, Commons Questions briefing to
review following earlier meeting, drafts of forthcoming speeches, copies of other
ministerial diaries, invites to make decisions on, request for future. She will also have
constituency matters, urgent and routine, to deal with.
FIGURE 5.2 A Monday in the life of a junior minister.
Note: Adapted from Committee on Standards. MPs’Outside Interests, Chair Lord Bew, July 2018,
pp. 24–7, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm
ent_data/file/721697/CSPL_MPs__outside_interests_-_full_report.PDF, accessed 14 June 2020.
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These patterns are mere tendencies. Since MPs spend increasingly sizeable
chunks of the week in their constituency, especially if their majority is slender and
they don’t have a frontbench position, their rhythms are hugely affected by the
distance from Westminster to their constituency (until Covid-19 interrupted all
patterns). If outside London, most MPs have two homes or at least two regular
places to stay – one in Westminster and one in the constituency. If they have
dependents, then decisions about where and when to travel will be influenced by
their responsibilities to those children or elderly relatives. Some leave their children
in the constituency while they visit Westminster during the week; others put them
in nursery or school in London during the week and travel all together to the
constituency at weekends. Whatever their pattern, ‘it is a constant juggling act on a
giant scale for those with childcare responsibilities’ (McDougall 1998: 135) and it
remains the case that women in UK society still bear a greater responsibility for
household care than men. In any parliament, if an MP has dependents and no
partner or care-giver to share the work (e.g., grandparent), then the complexity of
dealing with workloads is inevitably immense.
The organisation of political space in the UK has rendered it more difficult for those
with dependents to find a bearable rhythm to their work. It is not just that increasingly
FIGURE 5.3 A Friday in the life of an MP in her constituency.
This government MP’s Scottish constituency is 4 hours travel from Westminster. Her con-
stituency is a mix of rural and urban. She stays there from Thursday afternoon until Monday
morning, returning to London to attend Parliament from Monday pm until Thursday am.
9.00–10.00 Meeting in a local hospital to discuss possible closure of one department.
10.00–12:00 Surgery in MP’s office:
six meetings with individual constituents facing severe and multiple pro-
blems and challenges when accessing local services;
one meeting with a group of environmental campaigners;
one meeting with a group of parents complaining about a local school.
12:00–12.30 Meeting with MP’s staff to make decisions about follow-up on individual
constituents’ cases and phone calls to council for the most urgent case.
12.30–13:45 Walk to meet local party officials to review tactics for campaigning for
local elections and eat a sandwich along the way.
13:45–15:30 Canvass for local government elections (also reconnecting with con-
stituents by knocking on doors), meeting up with neighbouring MPs
from the same party, and giving a speech to party workers.
15:30–16:30 Interview with local journalist about the possible hospital closure.
16:30–17:00 Meeting with staff in MP’s office to discuss latest developments in a
campaign to raise funds for a local charity.
17:00–18:30 Walk to and then visit a housing association to discuss complaints received
from tenants.
18:30–19:30 Opening a new social enterprise, creating jobs for adults with learning
difficulties; giving speech and meeting those involved.
19:30–20:45 Back to office to go through emails, postbag and Twitter and respond to
requests from constituents, journalists, other MPs and party workers.
21:00 Home to catch up with family who live in the constituency.
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politicians are expected to live in two places, which makes it difficult if they have
school-going children, but the very architecture of Parliament can be excluding.
Nirmal Puwar takes us on a feminist walking tour of the Westminster Parliament, a
Palace built for specific sorts of masculinity (2014: 234). Women and racialised MPs
are bodies out of place – even ‘space invaders’ – while the norm of an MP is assumed
to be male and white (see also Chapter 3). This has been mostly reproduced by the
design of the place and its rhythms of communication but occasionally disrupted, most
notably by the suffragettes. In 1908–9 suffragettes padlocked themselves to the grille of
the Commons’ ladies gallery,4 handcuffed themselves to statues in St Stephen’s Hall
and hid in a cupboard on census night (so that Emily Davison could claim her address
as the House of Commons). Puwar draws our attention to how their invasion into a
masculine space underlines the profound exclusion of women (ibid: 237–9). Women
His constituency is in the North of England, too far from London to visit during the week.
9:30–10:00 Spoke in a debate in Westminster Hall about ‘Children Missing from
Care Homes’.
10.00–10:30 Interviewed by a journalist about why children go missing from care
homes.
10:30–11:00 Discussed with staff in his constituency office about various urgent
constituency issues on the phone.
11.00–12.00 Spoke at a meeting of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Children
about children accessing social care services.
12:00–13:00 Met with other backbench MPs to discuss abuse on social media.
13:00–13:15 Grabbed a sandwich.
13:15–14:15 Met with a group of representatives from children’s charities to discuss
improving the educational prospects of children in care and strategies
for responding to upcoming legislation.
14.30–15.30 Attended as a member of the International Development Select Com-
mittee an oral evidence session on sexual abuse and exploitation in the
aid sector.
15.40–16.30 Participated in the Urgent Debate: Learning Disabilities Mortality
Review in the Main Chamber of the House of Commons asking the
Minister a question.
16:30–17:00 Met with his whip to explain why he plans to vote against the party in
an important vote next week.
17:00–17:15 Went to his office in Portcullis House and discussed commitments for
the week with his Westminster office staff.
17.30–18:30 Opened a charity function in one of the House of Commons function
rooms for raising funds for a children’s charity with a brief speech
about their work.
18.30–19:30 Went to the House of Commons to collect some research findings
they had compiled for him and wrote his speech for an important
debate the next day.
19:30–21:00 Dinner with colleagues in the party; discussion of campaigning tactics
for the local elections in their region (and how the leadership is doing).
After dinner caught up with emails
1:00 am Home to his rented flat.
FIGURE 5.4 A Tuesday in the life of a backbench MP in Westminster.
Rhythms of performance 115
may have fought their way into Parliament as both voters and representatives but as
MPs they remain a minority and are still a challenge to our idea of a ‘normal’ parlia-
mentarian. Unsurprisingly, Labour women MPs, and increasingly those from other
parties too, console and support each other in both Houses. I was often told that when
women are seen sitting and talking in a group without men, they are assumed to be
plotting. Again, the rhythm of meetings, conversations and communication, and
whether they happen in public, semi-public or private, tells us much about differences
and relationships between politicians, including how they are gendered.
If you watch MPs’ navigation of time+space, and see who is investing more
time in travelling, juggling and fighting their way into spaces, you learn about
political work and inequalities between politicians. But we haven’t really analysed
what the navigation consists of in depth – I will unravel a few more layers to see
what goes on in both routines and breaks in rhythm.
The emotional gestures of minds and bodies
Two aspects that have been neglected in many existing studies of parliament,
including in my ethnographies of the House of Lords (Crewe 2005) and Commons
(Crewe 2015a), are emotions and the sense of self. To find out about these you have
to shift attention away from activities and outputs and into the minds and bodies of
the participants. As the anthropologist Andrew Beatty points out, emotion isn’t just
important as an extra dimension; if the researcher can’t read emotion (his own as
well as those of the people around him) then how can he relate to his informants
and do research at all (2019: 3)? In the early twentieth century anthropologists
assumed that it was only in so-called ‘primitive’ societies that mind and body are
inseparable and that supernatural and mystical beliefs take precedence over rationality
and logic. But most would now argue that despite the vital importance of under-
standing local cultural specificity, mental, emotional and bodily processes are entan-
gled, just as rationalities and magic are, in every culture around the globe. Let’s get up
close to find out how politicians navigate time and place socially, politically and
emotionally in more detail in a specific place. Lefebvre points out that ‘Everyone
knows from having seen or appreciated this that familiar gestures and everyday
manners are not the same in the West (chez nous) as in Japan, or in Arab countries.
These gestures, these manners, are acquired, are learned’ (2013: 47). But it is easy to
take for granted familiarity with the gestures of our ‘own’ culture – in my case cul-
tural habits found in London. Once I had a closer look, and realised parliamentary
culture has habits all of its own, I was as mystified as I might be in foreign country. I
did not realise what was going on until I looked with a greater intensity than usual
and with the assistance of a psychotherapist colleague, Nicholas Sarra.
In January 2019 the then Clerk of the Committees in the UK’s House of
Commons, Paul Evans, asked me to do research about chairs of select committees.
At the time, I was working with Sarra, a psychotherapist / group analyst from
Exeter University, in a Scottish constituency (see Chapter 3), so we agreed to jump
sideways, observing and interviewing chairs and their clerks during the first half of
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2019. We wrote an article on the basis of this collaborative mini-ethnography
about how committee work is embodied:
Committee chairs, members and staff are constrained by the architecture, rules
and rituals in their bid to achieve plausibility, but at the same time find the
room to express individuality in the ways that they manage emotions and
communicate with others through words, silence, bodily movements, or facial
expressions. By embodying the committee, and mediating between those
involved, the work of chair involves walking between friends and enemies –
forming alliances, dealing with disagreements and disciplining the unruly – to
create the impression that select committees are above party politics.
(Crewe and Sarra 2019: 841)
First, to give a sense of the constraining political sociology of committees, we
described their hierarchies. Within each committee mini-kingdom you find a flat
formal hierarchy – chair and members, clerk, committee specialists and other staff –
but a more pronounced one between the members and staff. Second, departmental
select committees have limited powers and are confined by specific spaces and
allocations of time (ibid: 845). They can call, but not compel, any witnesses to
come before them and give evidence by answering their questions; when Dominic
Cummings refused to attend, there was no serious punishment available for the
committees to impose. In 2018 he was invited to give evidence to the Digital,
Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, as campaign director of Vote Leave
(arguing for the UK to withdraw its membership of the European Union), but
refused. Even when ordered by the House of Commons, he did not comply. The
Committee of Privileges concluded that he was in contempt, adding that they
regretted his tone – ‘this attitude did not serve the interests of civilised debate’5 –
and recommended the House should admonish him. However, this did not stop
Prime Minister Boris Johnson appointing him as a senior adviser three months later
in July 2019.
Committees might expect government to consider and respond to their recom-
mendations, but they can’t demand that they are implemented and they can’t
freeze a contract, hold up a budget or stop a bill. When committees sit their room
is set up in a rigid way – usually with the members’ chairs arranged around a
horseshoe-shaped table, the witness table forming a line to close the horseshoe and
(a few) chairs for the public behind the witnesses. MPs’ schedules are so full that it
is not usually realistic for them to meet more than once or twice a week during
parliamentary sessions. Thus, the scene is set for committees to perform.
Politicians sitting on select committees are both constrained (by hierarchies,
limits to power, rules, routines …) but also, and simultaneously, find ways to create
room for manoeuvre or, to put it another way, breaks in the rhythm. These
openings provide the leeway within which creativity becomes possible, and the
driver for creativity is emotion. This is not necessarily how politicians themselves
view political work. When one of us asked whether emotion features in the life of
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select committees a former chair replied, ‘It doesn’t. Not relevant.’ But he was not
a typical participant – an older man who seemed intent on conveying a tough,
manly kind of leadership. How could political work be possible without emotion,
if it matters to people? The vast majority of staff working on committees told us
that emotional experiences are always present – both unavoidable but potentially
and necessarily performative, often requiring discipline to avoid expression of them
through bodily gestures such as frowning or laughing. When in the gaze of poli-
ticians and the public, for example if the committee is taking evidence in public, its
staff in particular have to perform competence but also the appearance of political
and emotional neutrality:
staff experienced a tiring relentless pressure to perform required emotions (‘If
you don’t smile when everybody’s smiling, there’s a problem.’ – clerk) or not
(‘When to speak, when to not to. When to stop admiring.’ – clerk) … In
particular feelings of potential shame and humiliation frequently arise through
the vigilance around mistakes, blunders and various faux pas which through
the emergent politics may also be constructed to advantage, disadvantage,
scapegoat or displace various positionings. There is, therefore, a perpetual
excited feeling of insecurity which evokes a hyper vigilance about one’s own
and others’ status movements within the wider community. There is a ‘fear of
looking like a dick’, as one participant put it.
(Crewe and Sarra 2019: 852–3)
Emotions require bodies to experience and ‘perform’ them, and yet parliamentary
scholars rarely take bodily communication seriously. Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey is
rare in arguing that facial expressions showing anger and contempt are more
common in exchanges between politicians than between politicians (acting as
committee members) and others in society (2017). We found that bodies often
communicated in order to discipline each other. The late Quentin Hogg reputedly
held back a proposal by Norman St. John Stevas (that the Lord Chancellor’s
Department should be scrutinised by a departmental select committee) with a
single and pointed cough. Committee members, and especially the chair, often
watch the clerk to see whether his/her face is expressing disapproval. The select
committee in action constitutes an embodied affectual display of impression man-
agement in which the poker face, the smirk, the ‘look’, the frown, the appearance
of engagement or disengagement, all play their part in managing the emergent
situation (Crewe and Sarra 2019: 854).
Individual bodies and minds are not equally constrained or free; it is the rhythms
of performance that reveal how the hierarchies affect the chair/members differ-
ently. Formally, the chair presides over the meetings by sitting in the middle of the
table with the clerk on her/his left, representing the committee to the outside
world and embodying it so that one MP who has been chair for many years
claimed, ‘I am the committee.’ The clerk is responsible for the administration of
the committee and is the manager of its staff, making their relationship with the
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chair key to how the committee operates. The rhythm of authority – who is
leading the committee in practice – is revealed by what the bodies of clerk and
chair do, especially at the beginning and end of meetings. During the formal ‘sit-
tings’ of the committee, the chair is the authority, but in between meetings the
clerk symbolically holds the committee in a parliamentary outbuilding in Tothill
Street (pre-Covid), about 10 minutes’ walk away from the Palace of Westminster.
The Committee might symbolically pop into the public domain in the guise of
the chair giving an interview to journalists or talking to stakeholders, but mostly
the intensive work is carried out by the clerks, committee specialists and other
staff – speaking to the chair as and when necessary, so resides in Tothill Street. Just
before every meeting of the committee, and after it has been concluded, the chair
and the clerk confer – checking arrangements, discussing members or whatever is
needed – as the committee is symbolically handed over from one to the other.
When the clerk then takes it to or from Tothill Street, with the staff and often
huge piles of paperwork, the Committee has a nomadic quality to it as it is moved
around the parliamentary estate and even, very occasionally, on evidence-gath-
ering trips to others parts of the UK or the world.
(ibid: 847)
Politicians in general, and select committee chairs and members in particular, face a
continual psychological pressure to perform political competency. This vigilance is
expressed not just by what they say, but what their bodies do. It means that during a
session the chair especially can’t do anything other than focus on their job – looking
and listening to the witnesses, deciding when to move on, checking with the clerk,
disciplining members who are not paying attention. Other members can look at their
iPhones/iPads or even leave the room. Clerks and committee specialists remain silent
during the session – only communicating with gestures or notes (one passes a post-it
with the word ‘time’ on it when members talk for too long), and whispering to the
chair if unavoidable and when they can see the cameras are off them.
What does this tell us about the work of performing on select committees? The
chair embodies the committee and mediates between all those involved through
gestures/responses of her/his mind and body: walking between friends and ene-
mies, reforming alliances, healing divisions and negotiating the tensions between
difference and contradiction. The credibility of the committee is constructed
through the rhythms of performance created by the staff and members through
documents, disciplined enactments and rituals, hoping that they will be taken ser-
iously by the wider parliamentary community, the media and the general public.
The chair and members must be memorable and convincingly authentic in their
public gestures, as if their personalities have the quality of being amplified through
a loud speaker. They must appear to be pursuing the needs of the committee in a
unified way, heart-felt but not too emotional – fierce with ministers but patient
with experts – as embodied through the chair, in order to come across as moral and
politically significant.
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Emotional communities are created by those who share ideas about feelings and
values (Rosenwein as cited by Beatty 2019: 29). Part of the process of relating to
each other emotionally is that we speculate about what others are feeling and don’t
always get it right, because feelings are partly interior to the body but also because
they are entangled with values and always contested. Beatty’s point is that ‘emo-
tions are often performative – intended to influence, persuade or repel. We learn
how to feel anger by observing its behavioural contexts, how it is manifested and
pragmatically used’ (ibid: 54). So, emotions are part of rhetoric even more than the
pervasive Western view of them implies, as if they are inner states that are beyond
our control. For example, in the New Hebrides among the A’ara if you get anger
reclassified as sadness or regret then you are closer to achieving reconciliation (ibid:
55). In fact, as Beatty suggests, there isn’t a right interpretation of feelings because
emotions are better conceived of as episodes rather than entities (ibid: 45), that can
only be probed within their specific cultural context, which is why narratives
rather than typologies are so good for conveying emotional experiences and
interactions. So, we have emotions but they have us at the same time; we perform
emotions rather than merely being in their grip. It is not so much that some
emotions can be controlled while others can’t but more that the intensity varies, so
that it feels as if nothing else becomes possible if overtaken by, say, fury. This
performance, or series of ‘gestures’, as George Herbert Mead puts it, isn’t feigned
or inauthentic just because it is performative but it is influenced by anticipating
how others might react. Communicating is not so much a process of sending
messages but making gestures that arouse responses in others that involve both
mind and body. So, when people respond to each other – with each response to a
gesture becoming a new gesture – we take account of our audience (a point I will
return to in Chapter 7). The audience is both made up of individuals but also
generalised in our minds:
The organized community or social group which gives to the individual his
unity of self may be called ‘the generalized other’. The attitudes of the gen-
eralized other is the attitude of the whole community. Thus, for example, in
the case of such a social group as a ball team, the team is the generalized other
in so far as it enters – as an organized process or social activity – into the
experience of any one of the individual members of it. If the given human
individual is to develop a self in the fullest sense, it is not sufficient for him
merely to take the attitudes of other human individuals toward himself and
toward one another within the human social process, and to bring that social
process as a whole into his individual experience merely in these terms: he
must also, in the same way that he takes the attitudes of other individuals
toward himself and toward one another, take their attitudes towards the var-
ious phases or aspects of the common social activity or set of social under-
taking in which, as members of an organized society or social group, they are
all engaged.
(Mead 1934:154–5)
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A narrative about performing in a select committee in 2014 will illustrate how
Mead’s way of understanding communication – as a social process rather than an
individual activity or event – means taking account not only of one’s individual
interlocutor but the attitudes of the generalised others, in this case a complex
configuration of different social groups in parliament. It will also substantiate
Beatty’s point that it is difficult to write about performativity; about how speech,
thought, bodily movement and emotion emerge simultaneously and often in con-
tradictory ways. In telling this narrative about giving evidence I need to convey
this changeability. Katherine Ewing found in Pakistan that someone’s idea of
themselves can shift (e.g., from a good daughter to a devious politician), but that
they have a sense of wholeness by selecting only those memories that relate to the
prominent sense of themselves at any one moment. A selective memory and
rhetorical devices help people in general deal with the simultaneous experience of
consistency and contradiction (1990: 269–71). So here is a challenge to myself: can
I write about performance (in this case to a select committee) in a way that conveys
these entanglements – both consistencies and contradictions in simultaneous sha-
peshifting – without smoothing them over as we have to in everyday life?
I will try my best. In 2014 I noticed that an ad hoc governance committee was
asking for evidence about running the UK House of Commons. I drafted written
evidence in the expected format – numbered paragraphs so it is easy for staff and
MPs to refer to extracts they may use in debate or reports – and submitted it via
the parliamentary online site. This committee was set up to deal with a row about
who should replace Robert Rogers (now Lord Lisvane) when he announced his
retirement as Clerk of the House and Chief Executive Officer of the Commons. A
recruitment panel chaired by the then Speaker Bercow, announced that they
planned to offer the job to a parliamentary officer in the Australian Senate.
Rumour had it that Speaker Bercow and his allies wanted to redress the elitism and
male dominance of the clerks by appointing a woman; plus, they thought she
might reform management practice in the House. Others were horrified by her
lack of knowledge of parliamentary procedure (she wasn’t a clerk). The con-
sternation of clerks was leaked to the media, directly and indirectly by politicians
who were allies, so the PM held back from recommending the panel’s choice to
the Queen, paused the recruitment process and set up a Select Committee to
decide what to do.
After I gave my written evidence, I was called to speak at one of the commit-
tee’s meetings (i.e., to give ‘oral evidence’), so in preparation I watched or read all
the words of the other witnesses. Clerks were often characterised by non-clerks as
poor managers: backward looking, tradition-bound and opposed to innovation.
Frank Doran MP argued:
I think one of the perennial problems of people who reach the top in this
institution – and I say that advisedly – is that there is a lack of outside
experience. That has been shown over the decades. We are very slow to move
things forward and custom and deference are a big part of the problem as well.
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Meanwhile, Peter Hain complained about the clerks’ culture of aloofness.6 Clerks
had been a vital source of information, humour, reflection and friendship during
my research; I recoiled at this attack on my colleagues. Like MPs, or perhaps even
more so, they are often misunderstood. The idea of these procedural experts being
no more than that, a view perhaps egged on by their seventeenth century legal
garb (bob wig and court dress), was many decades out of date. They had been
managing all aspects of the House of Commons for many years, albeit with an
impressive anti-managerialist flexibility that was becoming unusual in modern
British workplaces. I noted some of my allies. Sir Kevin Tebbit, who conducted a
review of the management of the House of Commons in 2007, gave a soothing
warning: ‘there is an alchemy here – a curious combination of effects which pro-
duces a unique result – and you tamper with it, to some extent, at your peril.’7
I braced myself, increasingly alarmed at the complexity of the issue and the
debt I owed the House staff, including clerks, which I did not want to betray.
My sense of injustice at their situation was fuelled by the knowledge that staff are
not at liberty to criticise MPs or their decision-making publicly. I studied the
reports and evidence, took advice from trusted colleagues and imagined my way
into a mood of calm defiance. When I speak publicly, I play a trick on myself – ‘I
will now be the person others think I am, not the more hesitant and unreliable
person I think I am.’ When I took my seat to begin responding to the MPs’
interrogation, nerves had me in their grip but I sat alongside them in an emo-
tional place of steely focus and gave my evidence (see Figure 5.5).
After the session I stood in the corridor debriefing with other witnesses, bitterly
regretting what I failed to say but relieved that I made no chronic errors. Valerie Vaz
passed by and, to my amazement, thanked me for giving evidence. I was touched and
suspicious in equal measure, thinking she clearly doesn’t want to make unnecessary ene-
mies longer term after our tense exchange. I could imagine how easy it would be for us to
move into a different relationship, now that we were away from the public arena, making
emotional adjustments just as all those who do political work have to do every day.
After deliberating on all the evidence, the Committee decided to keep the Clerk
of the House as the most senior position but created a Director-General with a
contradictory place in the hierarchy: below the Clerk but chairing the Manage-
ment Committee. This resulted in the most senior clerk getting the top job and the
new DG focusing on non-political management. So, the Speaker won in the sense
that a non-clerk was recruited but lost because it was a clerk who was appointed as
CEO. After giving evidence, I was afflicted by a dose of vanity, at the possibility
that I might have had some influence on the decision, but also worry about losing
access to my research site. I had just irritated the most important gate-keeper in the
House of Commons – the Speaker, John Bercow. But if he was infuriated by my
evidence at that point, he was magnanimous later, even assisting in a project that
involved looking at the sensitive question of why MPs became embroiled in an
expenses scandal in 2009 (see Chapter 4). Political work always involves risks when
you alienate people but like politicians, any of us can weather chilly periods of
exclusion if you have allies, patience and the readiness for making reparations.
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pdf, accessed 28 April 2016, Q648.
2 There is a brilliant scene in Annie Hall when a man and a woman talk to each other
while their neurotic inner conversations appear as subtitles. I have re-imagined my
thoughts here – some I do recall but I have also filled in the gaps – to convey a
recognisable pattern rather than factual history.
23 Parliament Office of Science and Technology.
Extracts of the transcript of oral evidence1 A Woody-Allen2 style explanation of what was
going on in my head
Emma: ‘Thank you very much, to begin
with, for inviting me. I am absolutely
delighted to have an opportunity to talk
about Parliament. Why? Because I am a
specialist in organisations, and I do
research, particularly on voluntary orga-
nisations and Parliament. I have been
doing research on the UK Parliament
since about 1998, starting on the Lords
and looking more recently at the House
of Commons. I am also looking at Par-
liaments in South Asia and eastern Africa.
I have just completed a three-year project
looking at the House of Commons. My
main focus was understanding the work
of MPs, which I think is undervalued. I
do not think the complexity of the work
that MPs do is sufficiently recognised.
People are extraordinarily cynical about
politics, and I think that spills over on to
politicians and Parliament. So, I am a
huge champion of Parliament, but also of
the officials in Parliament. My experience
of observing them is that the institution is
extremely well run, so in a way, I am a
bit puzzled by some of the evidence,
which seems to claim that it is not.’
‘Eeeeek, I’m so nervous I feel nauseous – how
am I going to think straight. If I get this
wrong, if I freeze with stage-fright, I’ll really
screw this up for parliamentary staff. Everyone
else in this room knows more than I do. I’d
better establish my credibility first by mention-
ing my research not only in the UK but else-
where. I’ll flatter the MPs – my audience – to
soften them, but I must sound like I mean it
otherwise they’ll think I’m being phoney. I’ll
make it plain that I’m on the side of Parlia-
ment and its staff. OK I’m feeling a bit more
confident now. I’ll come out strong in defence
of staff – thwack, hit them with a slightly
passive aggressive attack on anti-staff evidence.
I can feel my anger and indignation rising.’
Valerie Vaz: Okay. Perhaps you are talk-
ing to the wrong people – I don’t know.
When are you publishing your report?
‘A verbal assault! Am I blushing? She’s hitting
back – trying to undermine my research, imply-
ing I spoke to the wrong people or am out of date.
Hardly surprising. She’s Keith Vaz’s sister who
is a close ally of the Speaker, John Bercow, who
wants to appoint someone from outside who
doesn’t know about UK politics. So, clarify I’m
up to date and ready to substantiate my claim.’
Emma: ‘My book comes out in April
2015. I could give a little more substance
to the claim that I think Parliament is well
run, if that is useful. Is that appropriate?’
Chair: Yes. You could also write to us. ‘Phew, he smiled at me – I think he is on my
side. Anger abates.’
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Emma: ‘In a way, it relates to why I think you
need to have one clear person at the top who
has experience of parliamentary business,
which I define very broadly – not just as very
narrow and fusty procedural work but as
something much broader than that. I would
include what people in the Library do, what
people in Committees do, dealing with the
media – we have not talked about the media
very much. It is an incredibly complex orga-
nisation. What is puzzling is that the kind of
complaints I have read have been about mice
or about building projects going over budget,
but they are not the core business of Parlia-
ment. Who claims that the Committee work
is not absolutely outstanding? I have watched a
particular Committee for two years. I could
not do what those Clerks and specialist advisers
do. It is not just the Clerks; the specialist advi-
sers produce reports incredibly fast, in a way
that, frankly, most academics would not be
able to. How many mistakes are made in all
the mass of documents that come out and
relate to the Chamber? As far as I am con-
cerned, the deftness with which the officials
deal with the core business is very under-
appreciated. It is partly because they do not
really blow their own trumpet. They are not
really here to do that – they are here because
they are serving Parliament, and, in a way,
they are so busy defendingMPs and defending
Parliament that they sell themselves a bit
short.’
‘Feeling calmer now and Andrew Kennon, the
clerk beside me, will definitely like what I’m
saying. Be brave. I have less to lose than the staff.
Right, sound decisive and get to the point. The
person running Parliament needs to continue being
an expert in politics. Establish your evidence for the
idea that they are already doing a good job. Do
they look like they are listening? Yes, my nerves
are under control; keep going. Make the critics
sound as if they have lost their sense of proportion.
Put my case and undermine my opponents; sound
quietly confident but not nasty.’
Valerie Vaz: ‘We have not heard evidence
of that – in fact, we have heard evidence to
the contrary, that Parliament is run quite well,
and the Clerks and Committee section in
particular. We think they are outstanding and
we have heard evidence that they are abso-
lutely outstanding. We could not do the jobs
that they do. I do not know whether you are
just looking at something slightly different or
have heard something slightly different. The
basic running of Parliament we think is good;
the decision-making process and how that
filters down to the rest of the organisation is
the issue that we are looking at. Obviously we
had certain terms of reference for that. We
have heard from staff – we had a staff event,
which obviously was not public. It is right
that we should listen to the people at the
bottom. It is at the top management layer that
things seem to be going slightly wrong. I
don’t think we have ever suggested otherwise
– I suggest you look at the evidence that has
come out of previous sittings.’
‘Ouch, she’s saying I’m on my own – I’m
unreliable, panic … heart beat rises as I reel from
her oh-so-subtle dismissal, implying I’m
“slightly” but fatally off the mark. I don’t
believe it! She’s implying that I’ve only listened
to the people at the top, while they’ve been
paying attention to people “at the bottom”. How
dare she call people “at the bottom”? How rude!
She’s had one event – I’ve been talking to staff
at all levels since 1998. My blood’s up again –
resentment swirling – but I’ll focus on keeping
my mind sharp, unfazed by emotion otherwise
she’ll win the argument.’
FIGURE 5.5 (Cont.)
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Emma: ‘I have. I have talked to a lot of staff
and I have talked to a lot of MPs’ staff, as well,
about how things are run. My experience is
that there is some dissatisfaction. For example,
as David was saying, people who are not
Clerks should – this has already improved
massively, but there is still room for improve-
ment to open things up – be able to become
Clerks if they choose to, and not necessarily
permanently. It is about that interchange that
David was talking about, and I think that there
could be a lot of improvements with that.’
‘Quick – defend my credibility and undermine evi-
dence against my arguments. (God this is exhaust-
ing, how do MPs do this all the time?)
Acknowledge discontent but twist it away from her
superficial claims about problems to my more impor-
tant agenda, i.e., that all staff should have equal
opportunities for promotion. What a relief – I think
I’ve swung back onto the higher moral ground.’
Valerie Vaz: ‘You actually said in your writ-
ten evidence that “any staff should be encour-
aged to develop expertise in the core of the
House of Commons business”. I was just a bit
troubled by your next phrase, which was “if
they demonstrate the capacity.” Are you
saying that it is only a few people – the
anointed few?’
‘Another blow – she’s saying I think some
people are too stupid to be clerks. She’s taken it
out of context. I’m so riled I’m getting hotter;
now my reputation is really at stake. Now I’m
really cross again, but need to keep calm.’
Emma: ‘I am partly influenced by the fact
that I come from the international develop-
ment sector, where civil society organisations
have appointed people to the top – to the
chief executive role – who do not really
understand the core of the business. If they
have an opportunity to learn about it, great;
but if they get parachuted in without neces-
sarily understanding that business, then in my
experience they have not done a good job.
Not everyone is going to have the capacity to
work, for example, as a Committee Clerk – I
would not be able to do that job. Clearly you
have to have the capacity and the particular
skill set to be able to do that kind of job.’
‘Annoyance at my interlocutor is now mixed up
with memories of fury at charities I love being taken
over by CEOs from the corporate sector who intro-
duce pernicious managerialist processes – taking the
soul out of the work. I’m fuming equally at the
arrogance of CEOs and MPs who think they know
best. But I need to make sure everyone knows I’m
not the snob as portrayed in her latest accusation.’
Valerie Vaz: ‘I do not know whether you
have seen this, but they are developed quite
well. It depends on the teams. The senior
Clerk develops people within those teams.
They do get there at the end. I am not sure
whether you have looked at that. I will move
on to allowing people to go across depart-
ments, as you say. It is not necessarily about
giving people an extra qualification, but
sometimes when you get into the civil service
you have a course at Sunningdale. Do you
think it would be useful, when people come
into this organisation, to have an induction
day – whoever they are, whether they go
through the Clerks’ section or anywhere else
– or some kind of certificate or qualification? I
am reluctant to go down that route, but, as
you say, do you think everybody should
know the core business?’
‘Another hint at my deficient knowledge, eh?
But I’m calm and steady now – I can see the
other MPs are looking at me in a reassuring
way. I refuse to be knocked down by her passive
aggressive digs. Or misrepresented by her – I
never said everyone has to know the core busi-
ness. I can feel I’m entrenching a steely determi-
nation for myself. I’m calm now.’
FIGURE 5.5 (Cont.)
(Continued)
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The point of this story is to highlight the complexity of researching emotions
in politics and how they are always partially concealed and entangled in social
relationships. Even explaining my own during one encounter is hard given the
tangled circumstances, a huge cast of characters, different processes happening in
public versus private, and the simultaneity of speech, movement, thought and
emotion. Add to the mix that all those characters have their own contradictory
interests and emotions, and you can see how much work is involved in telling
narratives. Including emotion in the story has to be more than a list and less than
the whole truth and nothing but the truth; it means revealing how and why
people are relating to each other as they are. Rather than getting fixated on
defining emotion in politics, let’s look at how people relate to each other in a
given emotional world. We have to be careful not to reify cultures – as if all
participants in a place conform to ways of being – in fact, I’d argue that the
emotional performance of MPs, clerks and witnesses in select committees is at
odds, responding as they are to different relational pressures.
Emma: ‘I would not say that necessarily
absolutely everybody should. I think that
anybody who is interested should certainly
have that opportunity, absolutely. There are
hugely talented people working in the
Library, for example, or in POST or what-
ever, who I think should be helped to get
the qualifications to apply, for example, for
a Clerk job. I think that would be brilliant.
It would be more than being inducted.
There might even be a course in procedure,
say, available to them. That kind of opening
up of opportunities would be fantastic.’
‘I’ll underline the importance of equal opps,
while reaffirming that I know different corners
of Parliament like POST – using acronyms
shows familiarity.3 I’m rising above her antag-
onism. Maybe if I let my enthusiasm shine
through, it will expose her miserablism.’
Later, in response to Jacob Rees Mogg,
Emma: ‘ … appreciation of what is already
going on that is good is very important, and
recognition of the complexity of Parliament
would be useful, because there is a lot that
officials cannot say publicly. They cannot be
rude about MPs. They cannot talk about
the inevitable conflicts that go on within
organisations. They cannot take credit for
things, because they are always giving credit
to MPs. They cannot explain the delays that
happen, which I know happen particularly
between the House of Lords and the House
of Commons. Also, when MPs get
involved, they cannot blame the MPs for
those delays; they have to take the blame
themselves. So I think some recognition of
all that would be helpful for morale.’
‘Still smarting at how rude MPs have been to
and about staff, I’ll emphasise that staff are
constrained so it is reasonable for me to speak
on their behalf. I’ll try and make it politically
difficult for them to put negative things about
staff in their report – it will make them look
mean. I think we must be coming towards the
end. I don’t think I have majorly messed up
but what have I missed I wonder? … ’
FIGURE 5.5 (Cont.)
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Beatty contrasts emotions he studied in two places (Niha histrionics with Java-
nese discipline) (2019: 79), and we might do the same with different groups in
parliaments, but we need to do this in a way that recognises that emotions are both
an individual and social experience. Reading emotions, as difficult as that is, is a
good way to study political worlds because emotions are a ‘social commentary, a
mode of politics’ (ibid: 133) and politics always stirs the emotions. Maybe the really
skilled politicians develop a capacity to withstand ambivalence and a dynamic sense
of self – the paradoxical experience of being an individual with agency, but part of
a wider constrained social group at the same time – as part of the identity shape-
shifting that is essential in political work?
Breaking rhythms: moving on or staying put
I have written mostly about continuities: how rhythms create routines and well-
trodden paths, thereby maintaining the status quo in people’s relationships with
each other. But anthropologists have become equally interested in disruption,
resistance and breakdowns, grappling with questions about how change happens.
Michael Carrithers has written about how rhetoric can bring about change. He tells
us about an extraordinary moment in history when Willy Brandt visited Warsaw to
lay a wreath to commemorate the Holocaust in 1970:
As is routine on such state visits, a wreath-laying was arranged according to the
meticulous code of an internationally recognized diplomatic culture. The
monument with its honour guard was approached by a motorcade of Polish
and German dignitaries. In due, careful, and slow procession, the dignitaries
stepped out of their cars and arranged themselves while the press crowded
about to record the routine event. An elaborate wreath was produced for
Brandt to place before the monument. He stepped forward to lay the wreath,
arranged its ribbons carefully, then stepped back and, facing the monument,
bowed his head solemnly for a while, obeying the tempo and code of such
affairs. Then, suddenly, he fell gracefully to his knees and, still obeying the
guiding tempo, remained there silently for perhaps a minute. As the present
German Chancellor said (on a recent visit to Warsaw to join in naming a
square after Brandt), ‘we held our breath’. Brandt then rose gracefully and
turned away toward the cars. It was done. A year later he was to be given the
Nobel Prize for peace, not least because of what he did before the monument
in Warsaw. He had achieved a masterstroke of political rhetoric and with it
had created a new item of German, indeed international, culture … So it
became, to echo Goodenough’s famous definition of culture, something that
every German must know to count as a competent member of society.
(2005: 580–1)
Here we have the familiar routine of wreath-laying disrupted by an apparently
small gesture; he added to the familiar style and tempo of a state visit and wreath-
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laying with another familiar move – one of kneeling to express remorse and
repentance. Interestingly a poll in Germany at the time found that 41% deemed it
appropriate, while 48% thought it inappropriate but later it became seen as a heroic
act, paving the way for a new culture (or set of rhythms) of regret for Germany’s
crimes during the Second World War. It was an act of leadership, improvised he
tells us in his memoirs because, ‘As I stood on the edge of the Germany’s historical
abyss, feeling the burden of millions of murders, I did what people do when words
fail.’8 It turned into a huge gesture. Now let’s try a thought experiment about this
improvised leadership. Imagine if it was someone else who fell to their knees –
imagine if it was a woman, a young woman in the Green Party. Would she not
have been seen as disrespectful to tradition, overcome by emotion and illustrative
that women don’t really know how to behave with dignity? She might have been
accused of doing a stunt. Think again, what if it had been Angela Merkel (current
Chancellor) in the present? She has such a reputation for calm, rational, leadership I
think it might be applauded. So, to understand the act, you have to consider the
historical time as well as the person’s reputation, their age and gender, and what’s
at stake for them, because disruption is both an individual and a social act.
Spray et al. have compared disruption in the Indian, South African and UK
parliaments and found that protests provoked by backbenchers, and the opposition,
expressed rebellion at the dominance of the executive (e.g., grabbing the Chair-
man’s microphone, a walkout and filling the well of the House respectively). This
can lead to ‘adjournments’ where the Speaker stops the session so that MPs can
‘cool off’. But when you survey the three sites in detail, it becomes clear there is
huge variety in form, severity, frequency and response (Spray et al. 2014: 202).
Disruption is found in all parliaments but to different extents; the mass violence
that has erupted in parliaments in Japan, Ukraine and Taiwan is extreme relative to
the norm elsewhere (ibid: 204). Disruption is always interesting but to discern its
meaning you have to study the rhythms over time – the more serious the disrup-
tion, the longer the time.
The need for a longer historical view becomes plain when you try to fathom the
causes and impacts of political coups. British anthropologist Jas Kaur has written
about the rhythm of coups in Fiji:
It is not as if history implodes into the moment of the coup and emerges as
something else on the other side; neither is it the case that history and identity
politics simply remained the same. Rather, the coup changes some things,
while other things remain the same. In essence, a coup offers an empirical and
heuristic rupture to narratives which allow life and ethnic difference to make
sense. At the same time, the momentum and the structures of that conjuncture
allow the past to continue into the future.
(2017: 19)
And if you consider the build-up to coups you realise that what appears to be
sudden might actually be very gradual: the plotting entailed in a coup might go on
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for weeks, months or even years beyond public view, but the pressures and ten-
sions between groups is likely to have constituted a conflict that was busy brewing
beneath the apparent peace. You can always find moments of peace in a feud and
tensions underlying periods of relative harmony.
The juxtaposition of contradictions in sociality is a theme that Mead took up
nearly 100 years ago, but still seems to have been overlooked by those in search of
reductionist explanations. Reducing theory to one primary cause is useful if you
are aiming to predict simple cause and effect patterns, but not if you are trying to
understand and anticipate human thought and action. As Mead explains, the social
character of the universe means that an emergent event arises out of history but
also how the future is being imagined, thereby creating contraditions; so ‘Sociality
is the capacity of being several things at once’ (1934: 75). The adjustment from
routines to breaks in rhythm is what leads to the emergence of novelty. When
Speaker Bercow allowed far more Urgent Questions – a process whereby the
Opposition can ask government to make debatable statements on topical issues –
this brought about a significant change in the relationship between executive and
parliament (see Chapter 2). When constituents became more demanding, changes
in the rules of allowances meant that MPs could afford to spend far more time with
them (see Chapter 3). When digital technologies enabled people in political
worlds – politicians, journalists, activists – to communicate instantaneously, 24/7
and via smartphones in our pockets, the rhythms of lives, and how we engage with
each other, was accelerated. When Covid-19 forced everyone to meet virtually,
our rhythms were transformed: we lost face-to-face and, therefore, embodied
opportunities for informal alliance-building and strategising. The emotional impact
of the digital revolution and disruption by Covid-19 on our established and new
relationships will be a vital area for future research for many years to come.
Herein lies the movement in the rhythms of life, including in politics: ‘we are not
just located in the world symbolically; nor do we experience reality purely through
the text: instead, we are located in relations that transform the natural and social
worlds in which we live’ (Burkitt 1999: 2). Both changing the world, and being
changed by it, whether as a result of a shift in people’s values or habits, rules, or
technology, new rhythms are continually emerging and that emergence is accelerat-
ing. It is hardly surprising then that UK MPs are not only procrastinating about
when to move out of the Palace of Westminster to allow restoration but fighting to
retain their private spaces rather than give them up to officials. A venerable back-
bencher, Conservative Edward Leigh, wrote to the House of Commons Speaker on
23 December 2019, complaining about a proposal to hand part of the MPs’ library
over to office space. He referred to it as ‘a space specifically dedicated to MPs’
needs’, ‘part of our rich cultural heritage’, and one of the ‘very few quiet places for
MPs to work’. He was perhaps fighting to protect MPs’ space because an attack on
one’s space, if you feel a sense of belonging to it, can feel like an attack on one’s
identity. But what is novel in contemporary parliaments is the increasingly public
nature of power struggles over space, as this letter was posted online.9
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What I have proposed in this chapter is a systematic (but not comprehensive)
and comparative approach to the study of politicians’ routines and rhythms. My
contention is that rhythms should be taken seriously partly because they offer some
stability and continuity for politicians, and even for the rest of us in a less pro-
nounced way, in their chaotic, contradictory and shapeshifting work. It is impor-
tant to point out that anthropologists have been writing about the complexity of
change for a long time; there is nothing new in this. I am rejecting various either/
or theories – as if choosing between the idea that change is only internal to a
society or imposed from outside; that it is only materially driven or culturally
infused; that it is controlled from above or below. Anthropologists are interested in
entangled explanations and would be in agreement that routines, and breaks in
routine, have to be researched empirically.
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6
RIFFS OF MEANING
Politicians create ‘riffs’ to communicate their ideas, perhaps seven or eight at any
one time, according to Chris Bryant, a British Labour MP. In music riffs are a
repeated chord or melody. It is in jazz that the word is used most commonly,
usually meaning that although there is repetition, there is also the scope for
improvisation. Riffs are a good way to think about not just the continuities and
breaks in ideology, but also the performance as well as the meaning of acts of
communication. When Chris Bryant was Shadow Social Security Spokesperson1
he had to mug up on pensions and so he developed a 90-second speech (or riff),
which could be adapted or extended to several different lengths: two minutes, five
minutes, 20 minutes, one hour. It is acceptable if your audience hear the same
arguments in different contexts, but he adds, ‘If you have a reputation for using
formulas, then you are going nowhere.’2 Riffs will be used on various occasions,
whether in the chamber, in a media interview or in your constituency, so your
style and tempo need to change completely in the different sites because different
relationships are being formed or renewed. You need to have an awareness of
specificity – the audience, the mood, the relationship – and to express a coherence
of self and ideology that glosses over the fact that all human beings have ups and
downs, changes of heart, a range of influences and so on. What makes the politi-
cians’ job especially demanding is that they deal with multiple audiences having
different levels of interest and knowledge, not only shapeshifting between audi-
ences but communicating to several simultaneously.
Riffs are part of the content of politics that has to be adapted to different rela-
tionships. It is full of risks – if you change your riffs too much, you will be seen as
changeable and unreliable; if you don’t change them enough, you will be deemed
inauthentic and robotic. So the content and performance of riffs demand both
authenticity as an individual but also a process of improvised shapeshifting to allow
for loyalty to party and to the diverse preferences and demands of diverse
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constituents. In this, politicians are like everyone else. Anyone with a job that
involves communication, and definitely academics who teach and talk about their
research, develop riffs to convey what they are thinking about or arguing for. But
politicians’ riffs are more changeable and audible in the public realm; there is usually
more at stake when an MP articulates a policy position than when a university tea-
cher gives a talk. So politicians are also different: they are more exposed to censure.
This chapter is about these riffs – what they consist of, how they are created and
contested, what impact they have in different contexts – and which aspects of them
are idiosyncratic to politicians as a group as opposed to generalisable to all humans.
Ideology and knowledge
Although the content of ideology – in the sense of your understanding of the
world, your knowledge, how you attribute meaning to events, what you value,
your judgements about what is good or bad and so on – is wildly different in (and
within) different locations, the processes of creating and being created by it can be
observed across the world. An individualistic view would mean you conceive of
ideology as contained in people’s minds as if separated pieces of information. The
assumption would probably be that if they belong to the same culture, they ingest
the same information, more or less, and transmit it from one generation to the
next. Members of a political party are indoctrinated with an ideology to different
extents, in this view, and it is shared ideology that keeps them in that group. In
contrast to such individualism, anthropologists take a relational view, focusing on
the social relations and group processes entailed in creating (and being created by)
ideology, which become sedimented and disciplinary, but not fixed, as an impor-
tant part of their culture. Anthropologists see ideology and culture as entangled,
rather than deterministic in what people do and how they remake the world
around them, but we may disagree about how to think about individual agency
and cultural change. As examples, Bourdieu stresses the disciplinary processes and
endurability of ideology and power structures while Ingold sees learning as a crea-
tive process that entails formation, reformation and transformation. But anthro-
pology’s starting point on ideology, knowledge and culture is that these are
relational, changing, and are processes rather than commodities or positions.
For the benefit of non-anthropologists, I will briefly mention how we got from
an individualised to a relational way of understanding the world and from dividing
people into two categories (primitive versus modern) to seeing us as either one or a
multitude of groups. Early anthropologists used to deem it possible to find out about
the content of other people’s worldview by collecting and classifying their beliefs as if
they were a collection of mental artefacts. Non-Western beliefs were portrayed as
irrational and primitive until Malinowski did fieldwork. He was the first anthro-
pologist to immerse himself in another community (calling it participant-observation),
in his case in the Trobriand Islands in the 1920s. He portrayed Trobriand Islanders as
rational beings who used social institutions and technologies to maintain a stable
society (Alaszewski 2015: 207). The need for social stability was a human universal
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in his view. Evans-Pritchard took this one step further, pointing out explicitly that
what we might see as an irrational ‘belief’ is experienced by the believers as
knowledge. When he looked in detail at ideas about witchcraft, for example, he
found the Azande of South Sudan rational in the sense that they were logical
within their own terms of reference, seeking to predict and control the future
(ibid: 209–11). What was the significance of this? Logical thinking is another uni-
versal feature of societies that can only be understood if you take account of local
context. The assumptions underlying Azande investigations about how witches
create misfortune are not so different from those of auditors in urban centres
around the world – accounting for past deficiencies in bureaucratic procedures and
projecting remedies into the future. When either the Azande diviners or auditors
find their predictions don’t come true, they both attribute blame to the process –
claiming that the way the divination or forecasting was conducted was flawed.
Perhaps the client was not competent or someone interfered with the various steps
required. So, all cultures operate with a mix of magical and other kinds of thinking
even if the basis of logic or rationality varies, with some believing in the super-
natural power of witches (to inflict injury), accountants (to predict financial health)
or engineers (to solve the climate crisis).
The most famous French anthropologist of the twentieth century, Lévi-Strauss,
put it like this:
magic still exists and all of us are magical in one way or another … my
objective in The Savage Mind [1966] was … to place the thought of people
without writing and that of so-called civilized people in some sort of equality,
on the same plane.
(as quoted by Alaszewski 2015: 212)
Since this early anthropology, we have broken out of both functionalist and
structuralist straitjackets but also shaken up crude classifications of the world (pri-
mitive versus modern) by acknowledging diversity in the way knowledge emerges
in different places or, in the world of academia, disciplines, but also between
dynamic factions and individuals. Fredrik Barth was influential by bringing back
individual agency into our understanding of knowledge production, warning:
As academics, we have been marinated in Western philosophical discourse to
the point where we might too readily accept its current parochialisms as uni-
versal premises. We want to be able to discover and be surprised by other lives
and exercise the relativism whereby all of the traditions, bodies of knowledge,
and ways of knowing practiced by people are recognized for our comparative
and analytic purposes as coeval and sustainable, each on its own premises.
(2002: 3)
Barth distinguishes between three spheres of knowledge: ideas about the world;
partial communication of those ideas in words, gestures and actions; and
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transmission of ideas through social relations. These distinctions are important
because they make it possible for us to acknowledge some stability in ideology,
while creating the space to discern erratic local innovation by individuals and,
therefore, recognise people’s agency.
That is enough of a detour into epistemology and, more specifically, anthro-
pological developments in thinking about knowledge and classifying people and
nations. It was necessary because one of the foundations of anthropology is that we
assume processes of culture-making can be generalised while the substance might
always be looked at afresh in specific contexts. So, to understand political com-
munication in parliaments you have to look at ideas, rhetorical styles and what goes
on between people as they relate to each other through conversation, ritual and
various kinds of media in ways that account for generalisable processes and specific
substance. To make use of Barth’s useful distinctions, I will focus on ideas and
knowledge (ideology) in this section, move onto communication and rhetoric in
the next, and finally write about advocacy in the final section of this chapter.
Let’s return to ideology and think about the kind of taken-for-granted think-
ing – or silent traditions in Bourdieu’s words – that are implicit, and so only appear
in riffs as assumption rather than rhetoric, and that are shared by all (or almost all).
The idea of pollution is taken for granted in places where caste distinctions are
made and this is a good example of how ideology is transferred to the young:
I was sitting on the veranda of a house near Elpitiya in Sri Lanka. It had just
rained, and a boy of 2 or 3 years began playing intently in a mud puddle in the
red laterite soil in front of the house. After a short while his mother shot from
the back of the house and yelled, ‘Stop that! You’ll be as filthy as an outcaste!’ He
stopped, began to cry, but grew distracted and wandered off to the back of the
house … this is quite an extraordinary and highly concentrated slice of rhetoric-
cum-culture, for it conveys to the child, in one short hot virtuoso burst, at once a
desired aesthetic of comportment (cleanliness), a classification of the social world
(us vs. outcastes), and a negative evaluation of the others (dirty in nature, even if
not in actual appearance). If one were to ask how people in caste societies come
by the idea that humans are naturally and obviously divided into different and
unequal kinds, then this would be a splendid illustration.
(Carrithers 2005: 578–9)
So, what is the equivalent to these South Asian ideas of caste and pollution? What
ideas are shared by all politicians? Most obviously all UK MPs assume the need for
‘modernisation’ when trying to win support from the public. In the UK although
traditionally Conservative philosophy tends towards conservatism and the protec-
tion of national institutions, since Thatcher’s reforming zeal they have championed
change almost as much as Labour. Now none praise British traditions or spurn
modernity; it has become a taken-for-granted dominant riff for all politicians. Even
Jacob Rees Mogg, reputedly the last MP who champions British traditions, con-
veyed his approval of change when he wrote this in his first tweet in July 2017:
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‘Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis’ (‘the times change, and we change
with them’).3
Even globally it is hard to find a politician who champions the protection of
tradition without some pledge of renewal or change of some kind; their promises
are about reform and transformation and possibly a return to past glory, but always
with an innovative twist. (Of course this may change post-Covid-19 into a lan-
guage of recovery, but as I write this book during and after a period of lockdown
and then isolation, we are in a transitional phase.) In countries deemed to have
emerging rather than advanced economies, the aspiration of modernity is translated
into the language of development. For politicians in the world’s 141 ‘Low and
Middle Income Countries’ (so-called by the World Bank),4 development, and the
eradication of poverty and conflict, are the discourses they have to engage with
when negotiating with aid-giving countries. The ambitions to reshape the world
get more grandiose and encompassing, while the struggle to raise funds and navi-
gate economic and political complexity intensify for governments and non-state
actors alike. Whether by governments or NGOs, development is packaged as
fundable ‘programmes’ and ‘projects’, and represented in policies, plans and eva-
luations, as if it is about achieving tangible outputs and impacts on beneficiaries
(what it is really about is summarised by Crewe and Axelby 2013). The amount of
time taken up with this representation of development in documents and speeches
has become greater and greater as those investing in programmes bestow less and
less trust on planners and implementers and give in to the temptation to claim
credit for themselves. So, the realisation of the impossible ambitions recedes even
further as resources are poured into claiming credit and winning support for
development rather than into achieving results.
To give another example of shared taken-for-granted ideology among politicians
entangled with people in society, but in a specific region of the world, take the
dominant paradigm of Israeli political culture: Zionism. As Aronoff explains in his
book Israeli Visions and Divisions (1989), Zionism emerged in response to the per-
secution of the Jews, on the one hand, and the threat of assimilation by the dia-
spora on the other. As soon as waiting for messianic redemption was seen as too
passive, Zionists conceived the only rational position to be national liberation
through the creation of the state of Israel. The overwhelming majority of Israeli
Jews – politicians and people alike – support Zionism in contemporary times, but
the two most significant groups who oppose it are some Orthodox Jews (who see
it as blasphemy) and the vast majority of Palestinians (whether residing in Israel or
occupied territories) (Aronoff 1989: xvii–xix). Even among Zionists, he explains,
there is a lack of consensus on fundamental values and policy:
These divisions would appear to be linked to profound differences in a relative
sense of individual and collective security, trust/distrust and amity/hostility
toward outsiders, and temporal worldviews between types of Zionists … What
is shared appears to be very meagre.
(1989: 141)
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Aronoff offers us a persuasive history of the fractures in Israeli society, which are, if
anything, more pronounced now – decades after he wrote this book. At the same
time, his narration of arguments between Israelis (politicians and citizens) about
whether/how to make peace (e.g., to give up the settlements in the occupied ter-
ritories), obscures the view from the Palestinian side. For Palestinians inside and
outside Israel the dispossession of their land and rights – the denial of the right of
their return to where they were born and from which they fled during 1948 or
1967, for example – is against international law. In contrast, the dispossession is
taken for granted as the new state of affairs by virtually all Israelis. Ascertaining
public opinion – the riffs that circulate in society at large – is not an easy task.
Framing makes a huge difference: an Israeli and Palestinian researcher found that
when people were asked if they supported a specific solution to the right of return,
Palestinian support dropped by half when the same question was presented as a
compromise rather than a victory. In contrast, Israeli support increased slightly from
30 to 35% (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 321). It can be easy to manipulate questions
to get the answer you want.
In studying ideology there is no shortcutting the painstaking process of writing
about agreement versus disagreement and how political alliances and hostilities
have developed over time, often in fractured and contradictory ways. You can’t
understand politics in Bangladesh unless you consider the competing rivalries
caused by ideological splits informed by Bengali nationalism, relations with India/
Pakistan, Islam, economic liberalisation and kinship. The bitterness between
opponents, partly organised into the main parties of Awami League and Bangladesh
National Party, has been fuelled by blaming each other for violence and assassina-
tions of former leaders (Ahmed 2020). According to British anthropologist David
Lewis, you need to go further back to understand Bangladeshi politics to see how
its economy was shaped during the colonial era (2012). In Ethiopia you might
argue that contemporary conflicts – including the displacement of 2 million people
partly due to ethnic conflicts – can only be understood if you study PM Meles
Zenawi’s establishment of ethnic federalism after the Ethiopian People’s Revolu-
tionary Democratic Front (ERDPF) overthrew the Derg in 1991. Regional
boundaries were drawn based on major ethnic groups and this created permanent
ethnic minorities that are politically excluded in the sense of being inadequately
represented in regional parliaments (Birhanu and Senbeta, forthcoming). If you
take the case of Benishangul Gumuz, for example, the groups seen as ‘non-indi-
genous’ have been poorly represented in parliament, marginalised from the benefits
of mega projects, and even displaced in huge numbers. It is possible to trace how
the ideology of ethnic nationalism has emerged historically within Ethiopian fed-
eralism in ways that have created deep divisions and conflict within the politics of
this region.
In the UK too you have to think historically to understand the strands of political
ideology, but again the question is: how far back should you go given the turbulence
of recent times? The rough headlines of party soundbites over the past 50 years
are confusing: Conservatives once protected national institutions, the memory
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of Empire and a paternalistic version of helping the less fortunate. But during the
2010–15 coalition this shifted to a strong alliance with successful, aspirant, ‘hard-
working’ people – exemplified by Grant Shapps MP (Conservative) saying to the
House in 2012, ‘we are on the side of aspirant people who wish to buy the roof
over their heads.’5 There were hints of this during Thatcher’s time but they were
surely also influenced by Labour Prime Minister (PM) Tony Blair (1997–2007)
who pulled his party towards the right, championing aspiration and sounding
pro-business, arguing that this was necessary for winning over non-Labour voters.
He argued in his memoirs that aspiration was something natural: ‘to help the
individual gain opportunity, to let him or her overcome limitations … That
echoed and captured something deep within human nature: the desire to be free,
to be the best you can be’ (Blair 2010: 90). While it was a Labour PM, Clement
Atlee, who created the Welfare State, and that party is associated with generosity
in public funding, it was the Conservatives who almost nationalised the whole
economy when coping with the Covid-19 pandemic. So classifying the ideology
of the two parties is no longer as simple as it was.
The ideology of the smaller parties in the UK is more straightforward: most
were partly created out of dissatisfaction with the larger parties (Liberal Democrats
with their illiberalism, UK Independence Party [UKIP] with their pro-European
sentiments, and Green Party with destruction of the environment) or nationalism
in Wales (Plaid Cymru), Scotland (the Scottish Nationalist Party) and Ireland (Sein
Fein). But what parties (or their representatives) put in soundbites and messaging
reveals only a fraction of their ideological assumptions. The contradictions and
dynamism in political parties deserves far more research – I have only really done
so in depth in relation to one piece of law-making (see Chapter 4) – and our
network, the Global Research Network on Parliaments and People, is embarking
on such work in six countries.6
A comprehensive analysis of the ideology of UK political parties would require a
book of its own, but it is worth pointing to how politicians themselves have to
continually research their own party’s riffs and how they are shifting. To influence
your colleagues, and thwart your opponents (on your own side as much as in other
parties), MPs need to know what others are thinking and what they are plotting to
achieve. You need to know your own history – as examples, how and why did
ideological minorities in the UK’s two main parties gain such influence between
2010 and 2020, the Conservatives by the anti-Europe faction and Labour by the
Corbyn-led left? Cameron was persuaded to have a referendum about Brexit because
the anti-Europe party – the UK Independence Party – was gaining popularity. But
also the anti-Europe campaigning within the Conservative party gathered steam and
a large minority threatened to withhold their support for other measures unless he
agreed to a referendum. After this was won by those expressing a preference for
the UK to leave the EU in June 2016, until parliament brought this about in Jan-
uary 2020, the party was mired in bitter conflict about how, and even whether, to
leave the union. This conflict can only be understood in the context of how the UK,
and specifically politicians within the Conservative Party, reacted to various EU
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initiatives since the Second World War. In short, the Conservative Party has been
painfully divided on its relationship with its neighbours for many decades. A small fac-
tion took advantage of the Party’s weak position (a coalition and then minority gov-
ernment) and rising public popularity for the idea of more participatory democracy.
How did the left gain control of the Labour Party by electing Jeremy Corbyn as
leader in 2015 despite his tiny number of supporters among MPs in his party? How
did he continue as leader, even when 173 out of 230 Labour MPs passed a no
confidence vote in him the following year? Again, you have to look at history.
First, the former leader Ed Miliband changed the rules so that the membership had
a far bigger say in choosing the leader. Then the membership of the Party increased
from 198,000 in 2015 to 552,000 in 2018, in part encouraged by the socially
media-savvy group Momentum, and Corbyn seemed to bring back members who
had felt alienated by the Blair/Brown government (Whiteley et al. 2019). This
pitted the Parliamentary Labour Party against the membership and consolidated
Corbyn’s position. However, there is some evidence that it was not so much
ideological differences, as the perception that Corbyn was divisive, unelectable and
lacking competence as a leader, that motivated lack of support for him among the
PLP (Scott Crines et al. 2018). Parties are not formed on ideological agreement
alone: before Corbyn became leader, Angela Eagle MP (former shadow leader of
the House of Commons) claimed that it was likely that Labour Party members
probably only agree with about 40% of its manifesto commitments (as quoted by
Crewe 2015a: 56). Electability, and the promise of power, makes disagreement
with a leader far more palatable. When Corbyn did better than expected in 2017,
dissent quietened down, whereas when his party lost so badly in the 2019 election
that he realised his position was untenable and announced that he would resign
almost immediately. It seems to be another example of how minority factions in
political parties in the UK can take advantage of a rising expectation for more
participatory democracy. It looks as if this may be a sign of things to come.
But also, it is clear that loyalty is about more than a cold clinical assessment of
your leader’s policy positions. As French anthropologist Florence Faucher-King
points out:
Values and ideology are often taken as the cement, the raison d’être of political
parties. However, studies of party activism have shown that activists ignore the
details of political and economic theories that form the ideological basis of
their party and only the most sophisticated amongst them can maintain con-
sistency between such an ideology and the needs of their organisation (Barnes,
1968; Faucher, 1999a: 39). Values are the outcome of interactions between
individuals and relate to rituals in so far as these collective and performative
events help connect us with identities larger than ourselves (Elias, 2001).
(2005: 7)
Loyalty to leaders is about far more than values and ideology in other countries as
well. In 2018 a new young and charismatic politician – Dr Abiy Ahmed – became
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the first Oromo to be Prime Minister of Ethiopia. Perhaps Dr Ahmed’s PhD in
peace gave him an understanding and, therefore, powerful riffs about relationships
in leadership. In the early days he talked about mobilising talent, capacity and
creativity to foster collective action and in one of his early speeches he thanked his
mother and then his wife. Apparently, no Ethiopian leader has acknowledged their
family, and specifically the women in their family, in this way before. Women
scholars told me that this speech was significant: they felt a slight edging towards
the idea that women are part of the political world, a world they have been
excluded from. At the end of another early speech he thanked god – not his spe-
cific Protestant one (his mother is Christian, his father Muslim), but god in general
so that Protestants, Orthodox and Muslims could identify. Ethiopian leaders since
former Emperor Haile Selassie have scarcely acknowledged the importance of god’s
role in peace; for decades people in this deeply religious society have had to pre-
tend that god was irrelevant to politics. The possibility of reconciliation without
god was remote, one Ethiopian political scientist colleague told me, so Abiy gave
everyone hope. He recognised what is important to all Ethiopians – family and
god – and spoke as an individual but to all in the nation. It is a good example of
what Carrithers surely means when he writes: ‘Sociality penetrates us through and
through; thought itself is an argument with yourself, like an argument with others,
and the stuff of thinking is also the stuff of persuasion’ (2005: 578). Abiy was saying
out loud what people were thinking, so they were persuaded that he was talking to
them, even if tragically within a few years conflict and displacement plagued the
country because in this case words were not enough. This takes us into the realm
of rhetoric.
Rhetoric: communicating riffs of meaning
Looking at how politicians communicate requires consideration of a dizzying range
of sites, at least before Covid-19: government departments, chamber, select com-
mittees, constituencies, overseas visits, media studios, rallies, party meetings, offices,
streets … ; modes of communication: mail, email, other social media, speeches,
gestures, images, symbols, texts, gossip, lies, slogans, manifestoes … ; and effects:
alliances/divisions, winning/losing seats, violence and policies/laws passed. I can do
no more here than indicate some promising lines of anthropological inquiry. As far
as shared and contested knowledge is concerned, we can assume that a fission/
fusion of agreement and disagreement operates in most political arenas where
rhetoric is concerned. Leach tells us that in highland Burma in 1939–40 there were
endless squabbles over water rights. These were usually settled by the village
headman but when outsiders (equivalent to other political parties) were involved,
‘The Hpalang people dropped their differences and all told the same lies for the
common good’ (1954: 70). The main zone for this fission and fusion in parliaments
is within political parties, as I have mentioned. The content of riffs is both indivi-
dually created but also dictated by your party: politics is partly about getting your
side to back your narrative and undermining the arguments of the other side. But
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factions or thematic groups can be as, or even more important; in Brazil Bolsanaro
won in 2018 thanks to the ‘bull, bullet and bible’ bloc (agricultural, security and
evangelical) lobbies in a Congress with over 30 political parties.
In a fascinating doctoral thesis about political communication in the Green Party
of Aotearoa New Zealand, Jessica Bignell explains how statements are a vital part
of the game for politicians and their parties. Politicians in political parties are not
just aiming to get into government, they are in a power struggle to represent the
world as they see it (2018: 2). She relies on Bourdieu to argue how ‘what creates
the power of words and slogans, a power capable of maintaining or subverting the
social order, is the belief in the legitimacy of words and those who utter them. And
words alone cannot create this belief’ (as quoted by Bignell ibid: 3). It is easier to
study how words are produced than what happens when they are communicated.
She explains the history of political spin and messaging coming out of the US since
the use of propaganda during the 1914–18 world war (ibid: 35). The contemporary
influence of political communication activists / academics, such as George Lakoff,
has encouraged politicians and their spin merchants to speak in metaphors. He
claims that when people hear words it sets off frames of reference in our brain (e.g.,
politics in the US is filtered through two ideas: a conservative strict father versus
progressive nurturing parent) so the task is to ignite the frame that suits your goal
(ibid: 39–45). Take this together with the pervasive idea in political marketing that
you have to appeal to emotions not rationality and you have part of the explana-
tion for why political communication both changed in style over the last 100 years
but also, arguably, returned to the ferocious contestation of earlier times.
The ‘message discipline’ of parties is not just about making sure, as far as possi-
ble, that all members adhere to key content, and self-censor when off message, but
that they follow communication styles as well. When Bignell immersed herself in
the Green Party she found that they all agreed to convey statements that gave the
impression of economic expertise and competence, and the ‘1+3 rule’ where 1 was
the headline statement that would be used by the media in soundbites, and 3 were
the supporting arguments that would grab attention and substantiate their claims
(ibid: 144–53). Members are disciplined by their parties but at the same time
individuals respond differently depending on their values, history and ambition. As
one New Zealand MP explained:
any organization always has a tension between hierarchical control and free-
dom of thought and conscious thinking, I accept what I can accept but there is
a certain line that if it’s crossed, I will not change and I’ll dig in very firmly.
(as quoted by Bignell ibid: 153)
Whether or not to dumb down a message on climate change, to make the Green
Party more palatable to a potential coalition partner and the public, as well as the
timing of declarations, became the focus of a disagreement. What then took place
is what often happens in politics – a compromise with papers being distributed to a
smaller group, having an impact but not the one anticipated by anyone (ibid: 161).
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Bignell’s thesis is unique as an anthropological ethnography for its spotlight on
political communication in parliament, specifically messaging by political parties.
But another anthropologist has also forensically investigated communication by
politicians at a local level. Heikki Wilenius researched how East Javanese regional
councillors authorise their status (2020). His work is important as a warning to
those tempted to sum up the political culture of place as creating singular modes of
communication. Politicians in Malang have to use different linguistic registers,
ossicilate between hierarchical and egalitarian sensitivities, respond to the need to
dispense patronage but appear clean at the same time, and adjust to swopping from
highly ritualised events to encounters with scarcely any ritualisation at all. Different
publics require different kinds of persuasion and rhetoric can be both ambiguous
and misrecognised (ibid: 256). In contrast to research that pathologises Indonesian
politics, this fine grained ethnography reveals what is going on in the kind of rich
complexity that characterises good anthropology: it makes one feel guilty when
attempting to summarise.
Other anthropologists have written about communication by politicians as part
of wider studies; for example, Faucher-King has written about how political party
conferences are changing partly because they have become more visible to the
general public, so are no longer serving merely internal functions (2005). These
days voters can watch politicians’ conference speeches on the TV or online which
is partly why the leadership tightly control what happens in the public perfor-
mances. The focus on the personalities of individuals, especially the leaders,
increases year by year, with soundbites and images being used to boost their
reputation as celebrities while the leader’s speech is an opportunity to show her/his
charisma (ibid: 10). These highly performative shows remain important politically:
‘The conference season actualises the political map, frames ideological debates and
clarifies the positions of the competing teams. It legitimizes political organisations
and the ways in which social and political conflicts are mediated, displaced or
relocated in Westminster’ (ibid: 11–12). So then the differences between parties
become vital so that viewers are able to weigh them up: ‘Comparing these group
styles points to the competing repertoires and ideologies articulated and promoted
by different political parties’ (ibid: 4). One of the areas of variation between parties
is found in the role of the conference in developing its party’s riffs. While the
Conservative conference is an occasion for conveying the party’s policies, the
annual conference acts as the sovereign body of the organisation for the Labour
Party. Kinnock’s attack on the then far left, the Militant Tendency, and the
rebranding of the party in 1995, took place at conference. Policies are developed at
conference by the Liberal Democrats, but not all of them get into the election
manifestoes, while for the Greens these events are the main mechanism for forging
a common culture and a set of policies (ibid: 16–20).
British anthropologist Amy Busby writes about Members of the European Par-
liament and points out how central their management of information has become
when playing the game (in Bourdieu’s sense) of political work. All politicians
receive huge quantities of information, including 100s of emails a day, so their staff
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have to act as a filter to decide what is important and what can be ignored (2013:
170–3). The invisible staff act as their eyes and ears, reply on behalf of MEPs and
even attend meetings on their behalf, speaking for them: ‘my member says this,
that’. Those that get involved in policy wade through 100s of amendments and
even draft amendments, reports or draft resolutions for their politicians. Some
assistants end up knowing more about the policies or parliamentary procedures
than the MEPs (ibid: 176), becoming the experts that act as intermediaries or
brokers of knowledge. The more substantial the demands on politicians, the more
their staff shift from communication into creating and using riffs to do political
work on behalf of their employers. MEPs get their information from a range of
places (party, NGOs, library, academics etc.) but it is revealing that the one they
most trust is unofficial, informal contacts, and other MEPs’ assistants are the most
common source (ibid: 184, 188).
Gossip is a mechanism for communicating information that is as old as politics itself.
Rhodes writes about this in his study of everyday government (2011), an innovative
piece of ethnographic research by a political scientist interested in the ‘interpretive
approach’. Politicians, officials and journalists gossip about conflict, affairs and who
might get onto/off the frontbench. Ethnographers achieve much of their research by
gossiping with informants about what is being gossiped about between them. Pro-
motion is a regular topic of gossip between officials, as confirmed by this conversation
between a Permanent Secretary and Rod Rhodes (2011: 193):
RAWR: And are you looking forward to whatever the next promotion might be?
PERMANENT SECRETARY: Yes and you are wondering what it is going to be.
RAWR: You’re discussing it furiously with all your peers?
PERMANENT SECRETARY: Yeah, yeah, it happens all the time. And you know, by
now I know a lot of people around the departments and there is a lot of gossip
isn’t there, it’s like a big family.
Gossip is a continual theme in my book on the House of Commons (Crewe 2015a).
Gossip is an essential part of building alliances and outwitting opponents not only
between politicians but with Special Advisers, party apparatchiks and journalists too.
The habits of gossiping between UK politicians and the media used to involve
expensive lunches, or a drink in one of the many bars in the Palace or nearby, but post
the digital revolution the news is more likely to whizz around via Twitter (publicly or
privately through direct messages) or WhatsApp. Journalists are becoming cut out of
this process as politicians leak news straight to the public, but they remain especially
useful when MPs seek anonymity as the source of information. The Chair of the
influential Tory backbenchers group (nicknamed the 1922 Committee) wrote to his
members to complain about leaking. It was immediately leaked as follows:
Dear colleagues, Earlier this year you elected me to serve on the Executive of
the 1922 Committee. One of the reasons I decided to stand was my frustra-
tion, shared by a large number of colleagues, about the frequent leaks from
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1922 Committee meetings. These leaks, once unheard of, have now appeared
to become the norm. However, I have been prompted to send this email after
last night’s meeting which was addressed by the Prime Minister. Details of this
meeting weren’t just leaked. It is clear that somebody was live leaking a
minute by minute account of proceedings as they happened to journalists who
then posted on Twitter whilst the meeting was still taking place … These leaks
are not just undermining the 1922 Committee. They threaten to make it
completely redundant … Kind regards, Graham Evans MP.7
Gossip, and now leaks, are constant: so what is new? Foret (borrowing from
Balandier) makes an argument that political communication has changed not
only because of the digital revolution but because society has transformed as
well (2010). As sociality is becoming weaker, and social relations more fragile,
so we are getting cut off from traditions, and symbols are losing their sig-
nificance except in very specific arenas. Where once political leaders could
dramatise their power by mobilising embodied symbols, they now have to
express their mastery in other ways with new symbols expressed in a continual
virtual performance:
public authorities cannot rely on traditional symbolic resources on a day-to-
day basis to maintain their social control. They have to demonstrate constantly
their ability to master change and deliver efficiently the results expected by
citizens. Symbols still matter, but the construction of the political drama is
radically altered (Balandier 1992). The purpose of symbols for political power
is the same: to show strength and to express legitimacy. Technological means
and cultural conditions are incongruent. Leaders and institutions have the
potential to reach anyone at any time. They are under a continuous obligation
to communicate, as silence would mean indifference or helplessness. Power is
permanently on stage (Schwartzenberg 1979). It is no longer a distant center
that appears at leisure in a carefully controlled ceremonial setting, like the tri-
umphant arrival of a king in a loyal city. It must be an interlocutor, listening to
citizens and responding to them. Mass media forbid the segmentation of the
public a priori (even if new media tend increasingly to do so in practice). It
creates the obligation to have a catch-all message with a neutral content that
makes sense to the majority of the audience without alienating any minority
groups. In short, technology is not only means of communication but also a
communicative constraint.
(ibid: 59)
I will return to the question of which symbols are losing their significance in the
next chapter, as Foret seems too sweeping on that point, but for the moment it is
plausible that communication modes are shifting and legitimacy has become even
more dependent on claiming results and dodging blame. Politicians have always
done this: Caesar wrote The Gallic War to make claims about being a military giant.
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But being judged by results as an individual politician, or leader of any kind, has
become even more complex in two ways. First, it is easier for detractors to dis-
prove false claims, make counter claims and generally sow confusion. Second,
ministers have little control of the impact of their departments and even if they did,
change often takes place long after they have gone – whether positive or negative.
The journalist Isabel Hardman reminds us that the Teenage Pregnancy Strategy
introduced to the UK in 1999 took 15 years to have an effect. By the time the
number of teenage girls falling pregnant halved not only had the minister left but
the government had changed as well (2018: 135).
The pressure to seem in control, to claim results and to evade allegations of
harm, is partly why politicians are drawn to both spin and secrecy like moths to a
flame. Writing during the 2019 general election Robert Crampton (journalist and
son of an MEP) asked why politicians shapeshift in their promises versus delivery of
policy:
Consider the fate of an aspiring politician who made a speech incorporating
the following inconvenient truths. You, the voters, simultaneously demand a
low level of tax and a high level of public services. You don’t want personally
to look after your elderly relatives, as people do in Spain and Italy, but you’ll
be damned if you’re going to pass up inheriting the parental home in order to
fund state provision… We want more houses, wind farms, prisons and rail-
ways – only not where we live. We want unlimited free healthcare while
greedily eating and drinking quantities of food and booze that will make us ill.
And so on.
(2019)
In contemporary politics in democratic states some hypocrisy is inevitable, but it is
worth being discerning about the kind of deceptions that politicians get involved
in. A ‘mask of virtue’ is inevitable in politicians, as Runciman points out, and those
who think they are immune from it are deceiving themselves (2008). ‘Knowing-
ness about political hypocrisy is no more an escape from it than any other kind of
inside knowledge, because it too can be deployed as a mask’ (ibid: 71). The most
dangerous forms of hypocrisy are in the hands of those politicians who pretend
they are above politics, that their hypocrisy doesn’t matter, that they never lie or
that the game of politics is easy (ibid: 72–3). This means that the real choice in
political communication is not between sincerity and hypocrisy, but how you
handle – and how honest you are about – the inescapable temptation towards
hypocrisy.
I have written about ideology shared, for example within political parties, and
how this is turned into rhetoric and communicated in ways that allow people and
politicians to rise above the contestation and dissent. This is changing faster than
anyone can keep pace with. I need to address the huge shifts in political commu-
nication as a result of globalisation and to do this it is important to think about
networks.
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Networked advocacy
The handling of ideological conflict by politicians is powerfully influenced by how
riffs are communicated. Communication has been revolutionised by globalisation,
succinctly defined by Ted Lewellen as:
the increasing flow of trade, finance, culture, ideas, and people brought about
by the sophisticated technology of communications and travel and by the
worldwide spread of capitalism, and … the local and regional adaptations to
and resistances against these flows.
(2002: 7–8)
Two elements of globalisation – the digital revolution and action on climate
change – happened to coalesce recently in a campaign I joined in my home area of
North Somerset in the South West of England, within the UK. This narrative is
about local politicians in a District Council deciding whether or not to allow
Bristol airport to expand. Residents, civil society organisations and groups, politi-
cians and the airport tried to control their own version of the narrative, developing
riffs about technical materiality and community interests while conjuring fellow
feeling across overlapping groups. What unfolded revealed much about how poli-
tics is both a continuing form of engagement but also changing into something
new.
In August 2016 an email pinged in from the Parish Council of the Somerset
village in which I live with my family about an application for a nearby pub to
convert itself to a hotel. I knew from village gossip that this was a cover for illegal
airport car parking. The owners of the pub had a reputation for intimidating local
residents to let them use their fields to fill them with holiday-makers’ cars at a
cheaper rate than the airport’s official car parks. So I went to the council’s planning
meeting to speak against the application. My neighbour and friend, a chartered
surveyor, advised me that I must give them ‘material grounds’ to refuse the appli-
cation that relate to council or national policy and planning regulations. A council
officer strongly hinted on the phone that the public do well in these situations if
they allow themselves to express emotion too. The meeting began in the pompous
but mundane way that council meetings proceed and I spoke when invited, saying
that it would clog up our single track lanes and that the design of the hotel was like
an urban factory in a beautiful corner of Somerset. This was ‘inappropriate devel-
opment on the green belt’ (the technical bit) and ‘more residents would have
spoken but did not for fear of intimidation’ (the emotional bit). That sent a frisson
around the room. The lawyers and agents for the applicant were at a dis-
advantage – they sounded dispassionate, as if they were just doing their job, and
the councillors were clearly bored by their speeches. The councillors poured over
PowerPoint slides of the design. ‘Hmmmm, I agree with the public speaker rather
than our own officer; it does look rather industrial’, said one. Even though the
council officers were recommending approval, their comment about how the
Riffs of meaning 145
applicants were being investigated for running illegal airport car parks, perhaps
conjoined with the mention of the word intimidation, combined to put some off
the whole idea. They voted and the applicant lost by 8 to 11 votes. My own local
councillor and I glanced at each other from across the room and gave each other
the smallest but most heart-felt smile. It was shockingly exciting for a mix of selfish
and altruistic reasons. In political stories it is easy to overstate your own role, in a
longing to be the hero of the story and in the ‘struggle for recognition’, as Hon-
neth puts it (1996), and I can’t pretend this was politically important to anyone
outside our village. What was more significant from my viewpoint was that it
pulled me into a network that became far more important to this region and aler-
ted me to the potential for influencing planning decisions.
From that moment I met a few neighbours regularly to drink a glass of wine and
complain about illegal car parking, occasionally haranguing the council to take
action (which they mostly did not have the resources to respond to) and talking
about how we might gain more influence. I met with our local MP and we agreed
that the inadequacy of transport infrastructure to the airport (no rail or motorway),
and monopoly on legal parking, were creating serious problems. We gave our then
tiny community group a name – Bristol Airport Parking Community Action
Group (BAPCAG) – and teamed up with the North Somerset Parish Councils
Airport Association (chaired by Hilary Burn), experts about the damage caused by
the airport with years of experience of campaigning against it. The need for
advocacy abruptly stepped up in December 2018 when the airport put in a huge
application to expand by 50% – from their then level of 8 million passengers a year
to 12 million. Our airport parking group morphed into a major campaign ‘Stop
Bristol Airport Expansion’ with a website, Facebook page and Twitter account.8
Our first meeting had already taken place in a village hall near the airport before
the application was put in, because we had heard rumours about it, and nearly 100
people came ready to pledge support. This new group encouraged people to
submit written objections on the council site and plotted a media campaign to
make the arguments against expansion. We met with Liam Fox MP to discuss the
argument that there wasn’t the infrastructure to support an expansion. We wrote
to our councillors to express our dissent to this expansion on grounds of noise,
destruction of the green belt, traffic and climate change. Several of us wanted to be
noisier about the climate crisis, but the majority said that the public would be
turned off by such riffs.
On 20 August 2018 Greta Thunberg had decided not to attend school but to
stage a protest outside the Swedish Parliament demanding action on the climate
emergency. Within a few months schools in and around Bristol had joined her
Friday climate strikes, including my own daughter Scarlett Vester, and Extinction
Rebellion groups were springing up across the UK. In February 2019 North
Somerset Council had declared a climate emergency and a goal to be carbon
neutral by 2030.9 Then the man leading Stop Bristol Airport Expansion (SBAE), a
Professor of Film John Adams, had a genius idea – a way of communicating our
key riff. He and his film-maker wife, Cassie Farrell, made a film with four 17 year
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olds, including Scarlett, about the damage that airport expansion would cause.
Entitled ‘An Open letter to Ontario Teachers’, because the airport was owned by
the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Fund, they uploaded it to Facebook on 12 April
2019, paying for ads to make sure that it was seen.10 It had over 60,000 views and
100s of comments flooding in from teachers, horrified at what their pension plan
was doing to schoolchildren in rural Somerset. It featured on several TV news
programmes and Scarlett and one of her fellow students, Libby Scott, were inter-
viewed on BBC radio. It was even reported on by the Chair of the Environment
Agency, Emma Howard Boyd, in the Financial Times:
The North Somerset Times reported that 17-year-old Scarlett Vester got
involved because of the consequences the expansion could have on the
environment. The students did not just design placards, they followed the
money. On discovering that the airport is owned by the Ontario Teachers’
Pension Plan they contacted teachers in Canada asking if they really knew
how their retirement savings were being invested.11
The airport executives were given their chance to reply and invited Scarlett and
Libby to talk. So, Scarlett wrote to the airport and took up their invitation to
meet, informing the BBC so that they could film it. I wrote a two page briefing
for them with four riffs for objecting:
1. Contribution to climate emergency
2. Fields filled with cars and terrible traffic on small lanes and on A38
3. Noise pollution
4. Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty ruined forever
When Scarlett and Libby sat down with two executives, they brought out their
phones to record the meeting but were told that was strictly not allowed. They
remember clearly, however, that whatever they asked seemed to elicit a pre-pre-
pared answer to a slightly different and less embarrassing question. For example,
they asked, ‘Why do you claim that you will be carbon neutral when you are not
taking in account plane and car use and just referring to your site and building?’
and were told that the airport is not responsible for that. The BBC were not
allowed into the meeting by the airport executives but they interviewed Scarlett
and Libby on a nearby field afterwards. Both sounded incredulous at the dissim-
ulation of the airport representatives. Viewers were impressed by the students’
poise, understanding of the issues, and ability to voice their anger with calm and
journalists reported it widely.12 Now 100,000s of people in the South West knew
about the campaign against airport expansion.
The endless objections residents submitted to the council’s planning website,13
and the concerns of the council officials, led to a huge amount of work for the
council to assess the merits of the case. They spent the whole of 2019 assessing and
negotiating with the airport to improve the application, uploading 100s of
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additional documents. This meant endless delays to the planning meeting that
would approve, reject or delay the application. During the early part of 2019 it is
puzzling that residents were bothering to campaign, as it was clear that the over-
whelming majority of councillors were pro-airport expansion. As one of them, I
can say that my motivation was partly irritation at the complacency of the airport
and the council. Rumours circulated that they were developing the site already on
the assumption of approval. The council had a reputation for allowing the airport
every application it put to the planning committee and even reneging on condi-
tions that it attached to approvals.
However, the council elections in May 2019 changed the council’s composition
dramatically. After 12 years of holding a majority, the Conservatives lost 23 seats
while Greens gained 2, Labour 2, Lib Dems 7 and Independents 11, with the latter
taking control of the council. The new councillor in our ward, Steve Hogg, a
former manager at British Telecommunications, was an Independent. Since the
airport was in our ward, he was the local politician most affected by the applica-
tion. We had absolutely no idea what the new Councillors thought about airport
expansion and they were instructed early on by council officers to avoid ‘pre-
determination’ (that is, making their mind up before they had all the evidence).
Open-mindedness was essential or they could give the airport (or its opponents)
grounds to contest the process if they did not like the result.
In the second half of 2019 it was hard to keep track of the hyper-dynamic level
of activity on the campaign side. Stop Bristol Airport Expansion, and various allies
including Extinction Rebellion, co-ordinated by a joint WhatsApp group called
Bristol Airport Action Network, held meetings,14 rallies and protests to get the
media’s attention. During one protest one rebel spent the whole night sitting on
the top of a sculpture just outside the airport.15 Campaigning was not necessarily
always perfectly harmonious: some found Extinction Rebellion cult-like, some
disagreed within their various groups about how disruptive to be, others felt their
contribution was not being adequately appreciated. Despite this, campaigners
recruited more objectors who in turn wrote to their councillors and submitted
further objections on the council site, all to get the local politicians’ attention. And
a core team kept marshalling the arguments against expansion, led by Hilary Burn
and the Wrington Parish Council (the area most affected by the airport), knowing
that the application could only be turned down if there were ‘material’ grounds.
On 29 January 2020 the council released a 175 page report (with another 75 pages
of appendices) stating that they were advising the planning committee to accept the
proposal. Of critical importance, two days later Liam Fox (MP) wrote to the
council’s CEO (and posted it on his website) advising that problems of poor
transport infrastructure, noise and parking should be addressed before a decision
was made about expansion.
The Parish Councils Airport Association and Bristol Airport Action Network
had already crowd funded to get legal advice, hiring a planning lawyer to form an
opinion about the material grounds. She brought out her report on 4 February
2020, six days before the planning meeting, and it was sent to all the councillors.
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She explained the meaning of a ‘material consideration’ (i.e., grounds for refusal): it
was a breach of council policy or regulations that when put on the decision-
makers’ scales should tip the balance one way or the other. She found four ways in
which the application failed to comply with ‘the Development Plan’ – all envir-
onmental impacts – and pointed to the airport’s over-statement of economic ben-
efit. Knowing that pro-airport councillors were likely to warn that refusal could
lead to an expensive appeal, she pointed out that approval could equally precipitate
a costly judicial review.
Once it was known that the planning meeting was set for 10 February 2020, the
council received a flood of applications from the public to speak. They proposed
that Hilary Burn, Chair of the Parish Councils Airport Association, should pick 10.
Scarlett and I were included and asked to dwell on representation of youth and
democratic engagement respectively. We had both been less involved than others
during the second half of 2019, distracted by other study/work, but had kept in
touch through rallies and odd meetings. We wrote speeches with a mix of tech-
nical and emotional riffs. As we tried out our speeches on each other the weekend
before, knowing that we had a part to play in shaping the narratives that could
influence the decision, nerves jangled our bodies. We discussed what was driving
us: for Scarlett it was climate change; for me it had become about solidarity with
Scarlett. The annoyance at local disturbance (cars in our lanes and fields, the noise
of planes and traffic jams on the road to Bristol) was entangled with alarm at cli-
mate change, but also the campaign had the kind of emotional heat needed for me
to pour time and energy into it because my daughter felt so strongly. For me, it
was politics entangled with kinship.
In the wood panelled council chamber the speakers, councillors and observers
drifted in to take their places. We tested our microphones and asked fellow
speakers anxiously about procedure and technicalities, Scarlett and I smiling at each
other tentatively to exude reassurance but sitting apart to disguise our relationship.
The objectors spoke in turn for three minutes, each cheered by the public audience
behind us, followed by pro-airport speakers, in their turn cheered by their sup-
porters in the upper public gallery. I began with emotion: ‘In the last year we have
witnessed an incredible and diverse movement of volunteers – young and old –
spring up across the South West making arguments against airport expansion.’ In
the middle I focused on politics: surveying the objections from 8800 submissions to
the website. I ended with technical materiality, drawing their attention to the
independent barrister’s report that gave them the material grounds to reject. Scar-
lett created a similar mix in her narrative but her riffs were about saving lives,
representation of youth voices and asking the council to be consistent with their
policy on climate change. Others made more emotional speeches (e.g., an Extinc-
tion rebel) or more technical ones focusing on familiar riffs – tackling incon-
sistencies with policies, illegal car parking, climate, noise and public transport
problems.
We listened to the councillors debate for 3.5 hours without any idea about their
positions until they spoke. Gradually we began to realise that many were doubtful
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about expansion. We knew for sure that our own councillor Steve Hogg was
against it because he had campaigned to win his seat in May on that platform.
When he spoke, he made the case against expansion, sounding authoritative and
determined, stressing that approval would drive a wedge between the council and
its residents. He warned that the council officers’ report ignored the views of the
communities and he detailed the material grounds for rejection. Despite the dry-
ness of the topic, he held the rapt attention of his audience. Some councillors then
reflected on the momentous decision before them. Councillor Westwood (Labour)
said:
we need to be looking for the necessary materiality to turn this down, speak-
ing bluntly … the last briefing was from a barrister on some legal aspects of
our decision today. One point he made to us, which I found very interesting,
was that we were the politicians in this mix, we were here to – by some
alchemy – reflect the interests of our constituents, whilst at the same time
deliver a decision based soundly on the material issues of the application. He
also said we should take no heed of what other locally based politicians might
say.16
The council officers replied, defending their 250-page report and warning that the
councillors should not be swayed by ‘untested’ claims and assertions. If information
had not been filtered through the impartial and independent process of council
officers ‘testing it’, then they should be wary, the officers warned. And yet the
impartiality of the council officers was assumed. They had been locked into
assessment and negotiation with the airport – close collaboration no less – for over
a year but since planning decision-making has a bias towards approval, this wasn’t
seen as a compromise of impartiality. Just after 10:30 pm they voted in turn: 18
against expansion, 7 for and 1 abstention. We had won.
An airport executive was heard saying into his phone bitterly some minutes later,
‘that’s politics for you.’ I suspect he may have meant something like: good sense
and evidence was pushed out of the way in favour of residents being self-interested
and emotional, while councillors responded by trying to please them. Some weeks
later the airport’s solicitor sent out a letter warning the councillors that their rea-
sons for turning down the application were not proper or rational, threatening that
they were likely to lose on appeal:
the reasons for refusal raise wholly artificial issues which are unsupported by
the relevant policies cited or by any evidential basis on which to make such a
decision, or raise issues which have been fully addressed by proposed condi-
tions or planning obligations. Accordingly, the reasons for refusal do not con-
stitute proper reasons for refusal … we would remind the Council that
examples, as set out in National Planning Guidance, where an award of costs
may be made against local planning authorities, include failure to produce
evidence to substantiate each reason for refusal on appeal and vague,
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generalised or inaccurate assertions about a proposal’s impact, which are
unsupported by any objective analysis.
Clearly the airport didn’t recognise the politics – the claim that ‘evidence’ was
entirely on their side, for example – involved in their threat.
The political tactic of denying that you are being political can be dangerous for
democracy. The French anthropologist Bruno Latour challenges us to think about
politics as one of the ways that we create society, so when people refer to a crisis of
representation in democratic politics, they are undervaluing and perhaps taking for
granted a process that is easy to misunderstand. When riffs are portrayed as false,
fickle and corrupt in a political debate, we judge the conditions of one regime of
talk by the standards of another; after all, he explains, ‘political discourse appears to
be untruthful only in contrast with other forms of truth’ (2003: 147). For example,
if you are conducting a scientific experiment about what subjects said in relation to
a given question, truth depends on faithfully recording and reproducing what they
said. If you are doing politics, the representative (whether elected politician, trade
union representative or child rights protector) can’t faithfully produce all her
group’s views; she has no option at times but to betray them in the sense of con-
verting multiple views into one or two riffs, filtered through the lens of her own
causes or those of her organisation or party. It is not possible to faithfully reproduce
everything that has been said. In that process of conversion her interpretation of
what is right, good and true is inevitably filtered through her own way of under-
standing the issues. Political representation, in contrast to science, always involves
mediating individual difference and social commonality.
So to pretend that political talk can be guided by reason, straight talk and the
literal representation of a multitude of interests is dark and dangerous. Latour ends
with this warning:
By replacing distorted representation by faithful representation, impossible
obedience by pedagogy, composition of new groups by rectilinear transfer of
‘relations of domination’, we may well finish off politics for good or, in any
case, cool it down to the point of it dying of numbness, without even noti-
cing, like a careless pedestrian lost in a blizzard.
(ibid: 162)
Let’s take an example from the battle over the ‘material’ grounds to approve or
reject expansion. The airport claimed, with council officers’ backing, that in the
calculation of environmental impact they did not have to take account of emissions
caused by the planes or passengers’ cars arriving because policies state that these
can’t be controlled by the airport. But as our councillor Steve Hogg pointed out, the
airport could have some control over this by choosing to agree or disagree with the
plans. He was stretching interpretation of policy to its limits but in doing so
making the council more consistent in its policy about climate change. This poli-
tician was stretching but he wasn’t twisting because he was taking advantage of a
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contradiction to recommend an environmentally ethical course of action. So con-
trary to widespread assumption stretching an interpretation can be ethical while the
disparagement of politics itself can be politically manipulative.
This narrative reveals the complexity of ethics in politics but also how campaigning
has changed in recent years. Digital media was a central ingredient in this story.
Alerting 1000s of people to the campaign, raising funds and persuading them to join
rallies and submit objections would have been impossible without Facebook, Twitter
and WhatsApp. Herbert Richmond is quoted as saying about another form of tech-
nology: ‘Sea power did not win the war itself: it enabled the war to be won’
(Mawdsley 2019: 477). In a similar fashion, digital communication did not stop Bristol
Airport expansion, but the use of digital media by the anti-airport movement played a
crucial role in the rejection of a planning application. The key co-ordinators in that
movement caught people’s attention by marshalling technical riffs and inspiring a shift
in emotion. Although members of the movement were diverse, and the methods, riffs
and relationships used by them varied and kept changing, they all shared a common
narrative about stopping airport expansion. The movement was more of a process than
an organisation, as Latour clarifies:
politics as neither a type of procedure nor a domain of life. Politics is not some
essence, it is something that moves, it is something that has a trajectory …
The radical departure pragmatism is proposing is that ‘political’ is not an
adjective that defines a profession, a sphere, an activity, a calling, a site, or a
procedure, but it is what qualifies a type of situation.
(2007: 4)
I have written in this chapter about how political communication has a role to play
in that trajectory; it works in at least three ways – through culture, rhetoric and
advocacy. To move towards a fuller understanding of the trajectory of politics, I
need to explain how the communication of riffs relates to how people navigate
time and place through rhythms, which brings me to rituals and symbols: the
subject of the next chapter.
Notes
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RITUALS AND SYMBOLS IN POLITICS
Ritual is conceived of as indispensable to religious and royal occasions but tan-
gential to politics by scholars and participants alike. In the 1930s Hocart told us that
scholars misunderstand ritual as hocus-pocus, whereas they tend to view the state as
founded on economic interests (1970 [1936]: 35). The situation has scarcely chan-
ged in political science. A few scholars have looked at ritual in parliaments but
nearly all from a functionalist perspective, searching for its instrumental value in a
narrow sense. Patzelt considers the value of symbols from within a new institu-
tionalist paradigm. The guiding idea of a parliament, or ‘value-oriented principles’,
need to be symbolically represented to create the necessary emotion for participants
to feel committed to the institution, he argues (as cited by Crewe and Müller 2006:
164). He evaluates examples of parliaments symbolising ‘guiding ideas’: it works
well in the French National Assembly where the liberties of citizens are symbolised
effectively, but badly in both Canada and East Germany because their values are
internally contradictory, so do not impress their publics. The problem with this
theorising is that the foundations of the argument are divorced from people’s
everyday (or at least routine) practices and meaning-making. The theory that when
values are aligned with symbols then a parliament is more likely to be effective begs
too many questions about both alignment and who defines success. If you consider
Patzelt’s least contradictory example (France), even there the Assembly sometimes
lived up to its ideals and sometimes failed to (ibid: 167). The work of under-
standing symbols can’t evade inquiry into what people actually say and do (or
avoid) and when you do this research, you find that the entanglements defy tidy
conclusions and universal recipes for improving democracy, even if some common
ingredients can be found.
Rituals tend to reveal what is of particular importance to participants as collec-
tives. Some social encounters are significant to politicians even when not ritualised,
for example, informal plotting in the corridors. And rituals and symbols of less
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political significance may persist even when less seems to be at stake. However, it is
telling that participants start to question them if they find them trivial (or disturb-
ing) and the continual adjustments to rules and rituals occur precisely because they
matter so much. Former MP and Foreign Secretary, the late Lord Howe of Aber-
avon, told the House of Lords how he felt about ritual, mentioning in passing an
anthropologist who had interviewed him some years earlier:
I can well understand the concern of people – I have felt it myself some-
times – at the over-elaboration of ritual and dress. On the other hand, I con-
fess to having been attracted by it on some occasions. I designed a uniform for
the Chancellor of the Exchequer in which to go to the Trial of the Pyx
because I did not see why everybody else should be dressed up and not me.
However, we ought to remember that, although we are rightly critical of
particular aspects of these things, tradition, history and ritual can serve a real
purpose. Emma Crewe, who is after all an anthropologist, goes a little far
when she says: ‘The rituals are the real stuff that politics are made of’. That is
an overstatement, but surely our language – the noble Lord, the right hon-
ourable gentleman in the other place, my noble friend – is a courteous way of
reminding us to respect each other, instead of saying, ‘You’ve got it wrong
mate’. It is odd, but important. I do not stand up for every aspect of ritual, but
dress is also important. People wear various degrees of strange dress from
Annabel’s to Butlin’s, from the Quai d’Orsay to the Kremlin, for recognition
purposes and to tell the staff from the visitors.1
Did I go too far when I claimed democratic politics can’t happen without ritual?
To see how much politics relies on ritual, Engelke suggests we consider what
happens when it goes wrong (2018: 207–8). During President Barack Obama’s
swearing-in ceremony in 2009 the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court read out
the words in the wrong order, causing Obama to stumble. His advisors worried
that opponents may suggest he wasn’t really president. So they re-ran the oath-
taking the next day in the White House and significantly, the Chief Justice put on
his black robes to signal that he had the authority to perform this less showy ver-
sion of the ritual. In the competitive world of politics, where the undermining of
rival people and causes is rampant, of course the marking of status through ritual
matters. Whether signalling the authority of a new president, that a new law has
been passed, or a parliament is sitting as a sovereign ‘house’, rituals communicate
important messages to us in ways that are hard to argue with.
Shirin Rai is the only politics scholar to have taken rituals seriously enough to
run a substantial research programme on what they mean and how they are gen-
dered (in the Indian, South African and UK parliaments). With an exceptional
capacity for interdisciplinarity, she combined a theoretical interest in gendered
performativity, disruption and symbolic space with a commitment to rich specifi-
city and broad comparison, to inspire her coalition of researchers to produce
unique political science (Rai and Johnson 2014). Rituals show us the institutional
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claim-making, operation of hierarchies and the disciplining of members that is
necessary to reproduce norms. But by examining the disruptions, the challenges to
hierarchies and norms are revealed as well as the inevitable conflicts inherent in
politics (Spray et al. 2014). For more about Rai’s work, see Chapter 3.
Meantime, until the 1990s anthropologists sidestepped Hocart’s plea for them to
look at ritual, caught up in a scientific-like study of politics that impelled them to
create taxonomies and systems. At the end of the last century Jonathan Spencer
summed up the plight of political anthropology in a seminal article ‘Post-coloni-
alism and the Political Imagination’, describing the sub-discipline as in a decline
offering ‘social facts at their most thing-like’, the hard currency of anthropological
comparison (1997: 3). In neither African Political Systems (1940), edited by Fortes
and Evans-Pritchard, nor Leach’s Political Systems of Highland Burma (1954), do we
find much about rituals or even the relationship between politics, culture and his-
tory. Similarly, in research that relied on methodological individualism (e.g., Bai-
ley’s Stratagems and Spoils, 1969), the political was opposed to the cultural or
symbolic. Few looked at how politics is entangled with culture – with Clifford
Geertz (1973) as a rare exception – Spencer points out, doing so in a way that
considers our specific historical moment as one of postcolonial dislocation.
Partly as a result of his article, British political anthropology’s entanglement with
culture has had a resurgence. As Spencer recommends, anthropologists have been
writing since the 1980s about how the state is not only created by political insti-
tutions like parliaments but by political action within the polity. Taking the
uncertainties in claims of representation – one of which is that elected representa-
tives stand for or symbolise their area – means that symbolism can’t be brushed
aside as peripheral (1997: 11–12). The French anthropologist Marc Abélès points
out that:
an elected representative is simultaneously a person and a symbol. Politicians
are not only men and women of action; they have the power of evocation.
Many rituals are intended to express in material form the continuing identifi-
cation of elected representatives with their communities.
(2006: 21)
If you consider how the death of Tamil politician and former film star, M.G.
Ramachandram provoked riots and even suicides in 1987, with over a million
people attending his funeral, then the splitting of politics and culture becomes
thoroughly unconvincing (Spencer 2007: 19–20). Spencer’s embrace of uncertainty
and connections in all directions doesn’t take us into a chaotic mess because
anthropology offers a rigorous way to study entanglements. We do so by focusing
on Malinowski’s obsessive empiricism – the study of what people actually get up to
in everyday practices – and working out what seems to be significant (Spencer
1997: 15).
Following in Spencer’s footsteps, this chapter will consider these neglected pro-
cesses of huge significance – rituals and symbols. Kertzer argues, ‘far from being
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window dressing on the reality that is the nation, symbolism is the stuff of which
nations are made’ (1988: 6). All political and legal institutions require rituals
because all face the problem of securing the consent of those who lose out. The
more that is at stake, the more danger there is that the decision might be contested.
So, one of the reasons that ritual is politically so significant is that it:
helps societies deal with many kinds of interpersonal conflicts that threaten to
poison social life and tear the community apart. Indeed judicial procedures,
from the simplest societies to modern nation-states, are highly ritualised. Rites
of the law court are not that different from rites of the royal court. In both
cases the image of sacrality, of legitimacy, is fostered through ritual, while
aggressive behaviour is sharply contained and lines of authority bolstered.
(ibid: 132)
How is this achieved? Kertzer writes about how the process is emotional and cul-
tural; ritual creates an emotional state that renders the substance – the riffs of
meaning that I wrote about in the last chapter – beyond contestation, ‘framed in
such a way as to be seen as inherent in the way things are’ (ibid: 101). But this
legitimising process, or what Stephen Lukes called mobilising consent (1975), is
only one aspect of political ritual. We have to take a look at what happens in
practice before concluding what rituals and symbols mean for participants.
Five distinct kinds of ritual tend be required to make politics work: elections, con-
ferences, informal meetings, decision-making and ceremonies of state. I have already
written about elections and conferences, and informal meetings are not particular to
parliaments (see Brown et al. 2017 for a special issue on the anthropology of meetings),
so in this chapter I will focus on parliamentary decision-making and ceremonies of
state, before returning to broader questions about political ritual.
Ritualised decision-making
Ritual can only be studied properly by watching and, even better, participating, to
get a sense of how the political, cultural and emotional co-exist. Plenty of
anthropologists have done this and written about the rituals of parliamentary or
council decision-making in varied cultural contexts – including parliaments in
Ethiopia, Europe, France, India, Myanmar, Norway, South Africa, the UK and the
US. I have observed ritualised debates in person in the House of Commons, House
of Lords, Dutch Senate, both chambers in the Indian Parliament, and the North
Somerset Council. I have watched many more via the internet but it is much
harder to discern what is going on without being able to look where you wish
(rather than just where the camera points), use all your senses and, more sig-
nificantly, if denied the chance to discuss the significance of events with a range of
participants before and after.
Developing the skill of performing in rituals is important for establishing cred-
ibility. Abram (2017) takes us into planning committees in Norway and some
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aspects echo my experience of the North Somerset Planning and Regulatory
Committee (see the last chapter). In Norway the institution of the council was
being produced with reference to an imagined internal and external world beyond
the confines of its wood-panelled council chamber. In North Somerset too all the
speakers made constant reference to how the councillors were bound by the rules
of the council but also its obligations to the county. The Norwegian councils
showed maps, charts and statistics, while the politicians invoked various trends,
patterns and policies about the area – a constant reminder that ‘their legitimacy lies
in the notion that they relate not only to their own procedure, but that meetings
are primarily about something else, somewhere else’; this is all part of bringing ‘into
being the council as authoritative agent, and as corporate body’, as Abram puts it
(ibid: 40–1). They had to learn how to navigate the meetings but also how to read
the documents, which are significant for the internal political processes but also for
how to relate those in the external world that they are trying to act on (ibid: 34).
The riffs in their planning decision-making rituals were partly to create the very
institution that needed the legitimacy to ensure that its authority was seen as
legitimate. This process also depended on the position of the officials in both
places, as described by Abram:
The requirement to remain calm and appear disinterested is an essential quality
for administrative staff, at least in this municipality (and, by all accounts, also
elsewhere), and takes on the quality of a psychological trait required for the
work … Public servants must embody a quality of obedience to the council
that is temporally marked … The administration is seen to speak with one
voice (formally the Chief Executive’s) in relation to the municipality outside,
rather than being an assemblage of individuals engaged in internal power
struggles or debates. Appearing to be impersonal is thus crucial to the effec-
tiveness of administrators’ roles in council meetings, an essential performance
of the Weberian separation of powers that helps to uphold the legitimacy of
the political process.
(ibid: 38–9)
Like Norway, the officials in the North Somerset case had to speak as if in one
voice and in prescribed ways and once either the public or politicians were engaged,
they remained outside the discussion. They set themselves apart as impartial judges
but intervened in the liminal space between public and politicians, and between
debate and decision, to remind the decision-makers to discount information that had
not been ‘tested’ by them. Whether leaflets distributed by activists, or speeches by
residents, these were unreliable riffs, unfiltered by the impartiality of officials in
North Somerset. Of course, the officials couldn’t say the same about politicians
publicly, even though many of the points made in councillors’ speeches were
identical to those made by the public, but those working for councils will con-
tinually complain privately about how politicians ignore their impartially produced
evidence. It is as if in the power struggle between politicians and officials, an
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alliance between representatives and their constituents contaminates the rational
process of planning being made orderly by regulations. It is no coincidence that
the North Somerset committee is called the Planning and Regulatory Committee, as
if to remind potentially wayward politicians to be mindful of the rules.
The rhythms of this planning committee meeting were tightly organised by rules
about where different groups sit. This is always the case in parliamentary decision-
making rituals. The seating reveals the status of the different groups so that politi-
cians sit on opposing sides and the public are usually separated into a spectator area.
During this ritualised political decision-making moment the public are excluded
spatially by the impenetrability of the documents and assumptions about the
unreliability and partially of their views. Officials in the council were elevated on a
podium, to indicate their considerable authority during this specific ritual, whereas
in the Westminster Parliament they are always tucked away into a box in the
background and never allowed to speak. The more politically significant an event,
the more officials tend to recede into the background but when it comes to plan-
ning sub-committees, they depoliticise it as much as possible in a bid to avoid
losing control.
When politicians disagree, then the drama in a planning committee will be
found in the performance of their speeches and in the final vote. Any representa-
tive politician is likely to mention their constituents in an important speech, partly
to establish their authority as a symbol – standing for a specific group of people in a
place of supreme value – but also to speak to those they are representing, to signal
they are on their side, to apologise to those who disagree, and win further support.
In the case of the airport vote, one councillor asked that the vote be taken by
name, rather than a show of hands, given the importance of the occasion. This
heightened the sense of drama, prolonging the vote by many minutes so that rising
excitement (or presumably dread on the part of the airport) gave the final
announcement far more theatrical punch. Tactically the councillor leading the
debate asked for this knowing that it would be harder to raise their hands on their
own in defiance of public opinion than it would if the show of hands was collec-
tive. And as individual votes were expressed in support of this motion in sequence,
it might encourage the undecideds to follow the herd. It was not only the case that
this planning decision could not have been made without ritual; the ritualisation of
the decision reveals the moments of greatest political significance.
The main decisions that parliaments, rather than councils, make are to pass laws
and this relies on rituals on every occasion. The way the process is ritualised sheds
light on how that particular house of parliament functions. Usually the government
and opposition parties disagree, at least in democracies where you have a vibrant
opposition, so law is always a contest and a negotiation over the meaning and
moral value of ideas expressed in a text. As Riles explains, such documents are not
just ethnographic objects but in their turn reveal much about processes (in this case
of law-making) as well as how ethnographers analyse what is going on in their
fieldwork site (2006: 7). Rituals of debate ensure that in the endless series of col-
lisions between different moral outlooks (or potential conflicts where they are not
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given expression) each skirmish has an outcome, usually a victory for the govern-
ment that is accepted by the losers. The outcomes are usually determined by the
party managers through whipping its members to accept both the message and the
approval/rejection of the motion.
The performance of riffs and the rhythms of ritualising law-making vary hugely
from place to place. The first to look at these events as rituals was Jack Weath-
erford who wrote about the US Congress as long ago as the 1980s. He portrays
these appearances as empty of substance, merely a way of signifying that they are
powerful legislators rather than an opportunity for debate:
The normal work day of a member of Congress is spent making series of
cameo appearances in the various ritual arenas … . The politician enters one
scene, is coached by a waiting assistant for a few moments, and then performs
the role. His particular performance may have no relation to that of the actors
who appeared just before or after him, but the pieces will be edited together
afterwards by the staff. The important point is simply that he should get his
appearance on record. He voted, he came for the quorum call, he asked the
question of the witness, he introduced the bill, he co-sponsored the amend-
ment, he spoke the sentence. The staff can issue all the press releases and
printed speeches to show that this made him a prime mover.
(1985: 206–8)
So, the rhythms of US politicians’ participation indicate the highly individualistic
way that they intervene. The point is merely to show up and convey their own
words so that they can claim to have represented a position, but not to take part in
a discussion. Weatherford concludes that it is the ritual that prevents substantive
interaction: ‘Congress preserves the format of legislative procedure – the appear-
ance of debate and decision without any of the substance … The greatest delib-
erative body in the world has become the greatest ceremonial body in the world’
(ibid: 177, 266). Senators are merely aggrandising their position and consolidating
their power, so that when they are given an account of their speech afterwards,
they can correct it for the Congressional Record into what they should have said
rather than what they actually said (ibid: 200–1).
Putting aside for one moment that ceremony is a misleading term in Weath-
erford’s account, because it is usually seen as interrupting the everyday rather than
constituting it, the rhythm of parliaments’ performances seem to stretch along
several continuums:
 from individualistic to intensely social;
 from highly scripted to spontaneous and improvised;
 from dull and cautious to dramatic and theatrical debate.
On individualism, both France and the UK are up the other end from the US.
Abélès writes that in the French National Assembly words, acts and objects are
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manipulated in ritual to symbolise the relations between political power and civil
society (1988: 393). I argued something similar in Chapter 4 when politicians and
civil society activists were scrutinising a bill about shared parenting. Even if the
individual peer, Baroness Butler-Sloss, was the hero of the hour as she led the final
campaign to amend a clause, the reality behind the scenes was a substantial net-
work of politicians, professionals and activists at work. The social processes of alli-
ance-building and establishing obligations of reciprocity go on before, after and
even during rituals. UK politicians in both Houses talk about reciprocity, the
political advantage of supporting a colleague on their cause because it will increase
the likelihood that they will support you later. Many resist electronic voting in the
House of Commons because appearing in person is an opportunity to lobby col-
leagues and ministers, whether about the vote in question or another matter.
Labour MPs were so keen on this process during the Blair/Brown government that
they would place endless post-it notes on the lapel of the minister they wished to
influence. At all-night sessions ministers looked like they were attending a Greek
wedding – jackets fluttering with yellow messages with the exception of David
Blunkett whose incredible memory needed no jogging (Crewe 2015a: 44).
In Samoa too politics requires a process of softening those who might oppose or
delay:
One of the things that I used to do, because in the budget debate the oppo-
sition have their fun, so tactics and everything. I used to take the matters that
they have raised and then I would discuss it with them in the lounge during
morning tea, afternoon tea, and supper at night. When I would reply, there
were very few interruptions because I had already discussed it with them. But
some of the more senior politicians will say ‘Okay, well thank you for that but
just touch on it in your speech so that my district, my constituency who are
hearing’ (laughter). So, that was a tactic that I used. Samoan politician.
(Corbett 2015: 90)
Improvised spontaneity is unusual in most parliaments much of the time. But it is a
feature of some almost all of the time (e.g., House of Lords) and in most parlia-
ments at least a little improvisation is expected when the public are watching. In
the House of Commons and the French National Assembly it is the most con-
troversial issues that pressurise politicians into a performance that is especially
unpredictable. Abélès tells us about how conservatives clashed with liberals in 1999
when members proposed a law to give legal status to homosexual couples (2006).
They battled over the text in highly improvised ways – especially when it got
heated, for example, about whether the new status should be an ‘agreement’ or a
‘contract’ – and shouted, insulted each other, even burst into tears and had to be
restrained from hitting the Prime Minister. So ritual does not necessarily close
down the possibility of improvisation; in fact you could argue it provides a struc-
tured process within which improvisation and dispute are possible without losing
the element required to secure an outcome that is recognised by all participants as
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legitimate. I have tried to comment on the rhythms of parliamentary ritualisation
but the riffs deserve just as much attention before I consider how these interweave.
In both the UK House of Commons and Lords politicians make moral argu-
ments in ritualised parliamentary debates ‘about how society should be ordered and
governed, how resources are controlled and divided up, and what is deemed
normal, natural and morally desirable’ (Crewe 2006: 94). What they are commu-
nicating – their riffs of meaning – are cosmological, in the sense of how people,
animals, objects, money and even gods should relate to each other. Again, it is
when these become more controversial that both spontaneity, and with it heigh-
tened drama and emotion, enter into the arena. Unpredictability in politics is
exciting, so the more closely stage managed the rituals are, the less gripping they
become. While I was studying the House of Lords, it was the topics that were most
connected to their identity that inflamed their passion, and made peers difficult to
control for the whips (that is, secure their obedience in voting for their party).
Identity was called into question when discussing homosexuality, animal rights and
reform of their own house. It was as if traditionalists experienced (a) liberal atti-
tudes to gay sex as an onslaught on Christian family values, (b) protecting animals
as anti-countryside and (c) reform of their House as a rejection of their own worth;
while modernisers were aspiring for a secular, urban, socially liberal, animal-loving
and democratic nation. In recent years in the Commons, it has been nationalism
and our borders – whether to let people through them and whether to split from
the rest of Europe – that drove politicians into a frenzy. The votes on Brexit
highlighted with clarity why these processes of decision-making have to be ritua-
lised. But before I explain what I mean by that, I need to be more specific about
the details of UK parliamentary ritualised decision-making.
When the Westminster Parliament sits, everyone in the debating chamber has to
comply with a vast catalogue of rules about where to sit, how to move, speak or
remain silent, and how proposals (or motions) can be approved or rejected. It is the
routinised repetition of rules, the defined hierarchies between participants and the
symbolic significance of its substance that make this a ritual. Describing the rules,
and symbols within them, of just the Westminster Parliament could consume
volumes; in fact the formal ‘rules’ of the House of Commons can be found online
in its ‘standing orders’.2 In 1832 there were only eight, but since then the ideolo-
gical clashes engendered by universal franchise and the growth of national parties
have led to over 200, mostly invented to clarify who wins and who loses in cir-
cumstances where attempts at consensus fail to contain the heat of politics (Crewe
and Evans 2018). The bible of procedure, known as Erskine May after a former
clerk, is guarded by his priestly descendants. It runs to over a thousand pages of
close text, explaining the precedents for when rules are ambiguous. I wrote this
with one of senior Clerks of the House, Paul Evans:
Erskine May … sits on the ‘Table’ of the House as the Bible sits on the lectern
in a church – a powerful presence, even when unconsulted. But the ultimate
judge of what happens in the Commons is the Speaker, who is the high priest
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whose presence is essential to validate its rituals. As a presiding officer, the
Speaker of the House of Commons is generally acknowledged to be an outlier
in international comparisons in the degree of discretion and authority they
have in interpreting the unwritten – and indeed the written – rules of the
House; choosing who speaks (within the conventional ritual), what is debated
(within the limits of other agenda-setters) and what is in or out of order. That
is in part why so much ritual surrounds the office of the Speaker, from the
ceremony surrounding his or her election at the beginning of a Parliament,
their role in State Openings, the way in which MPs are required to bow to
them whenever they enter or leave the Chamber, to the sometimes insincere
politeness with which they are addressed by MPs in the heat of debate. MPs
recognise the need to venerate the office of the Speaker, however much they
may love or loathe the individual who holds it, because that position is a
lynchpin on which the business of the House hangs.
(ibid: 45)
So that gives you an introduction to how proceedings are ritualised. Now I will
turn to a narrative that I hope will demonstrate how rhythms and riffs are entan-
gled within rituals.
It can be through the breakdowns in normal interaction that the habitual pat-
terns become clearer. The politics of Brexit (leaving the EU) was one such
breakdown for Westminster and the role of the pro-Europe Speaker – as the high
priest of the rules of parliamentary ritual – was strained to its limit. When Boris
Johnson took over as Prime Minister he did not have a majority to approve his
Withdrawal Agreement to pave the way for our exit from Europe. So an anti-
Brexit alliance formed in the House across his own party as well as opposition
parties, to thwart the whole plan or insist that it only happened with Parliament’s
approval (depending on your viewpoint). The PM tried to duck the need for
Parliament to approve the plan by proroguing Parliament. The Supreme Court
later ruled this unlawful and the Speaker was determined to protect Parliament’s
authority in decision-making on Brexit, even if it meant twisting procedural
rules. On 12 September 2019 Speaker Bercow said in a lecture outside parlia-
ment, ‘Not obeying the law must surely be a non-starter. Period.’3 To make sure
that the government abided by the motions passed by the anti-Brexit alliance (i.e.,
the law), he added:
if that demands additional procedural creativity in order to come to pass, it is a
racing certainty that this will happen, and that neither the limitations of the
existing rule book nor the ticking of the clock will stop it doing so.
He ignored the advice of the clerks both before and after this lecture (e.g., in his
choices about allowing amendments) but the Brexiteers won in any case after
Conservatives secured a majority in an election a few months later and voted
Johnson’s Withdrawal Agreement through Parliament.
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Contrast Bercow’s ‘twisting’ of procedural rules with my narrative about the
airport where my own councillor, Steve Hogg, merely ‘stretched’ them from my
viewpoint. In both cases politicians were dealing with highly controversial political
riffs – in one case leaving the EU and in the other expanding an airport – and a
breakdown in the normal rhythms in part created by new political divisions. The
perspective of the winners often shines through in historical accounts so am I being
influenced by Hogg’s victory versus the failure of Bercow’s cause to remain in the
EU? Or by my past relationship with these politicians (see Chapter 5 and 6)? Pos-
sibly another strand has more influence on my judgement. Bercow was the referee
not a player. When politicians make arguments for change, they surely have to be
allowed to question assumptions and take their interpretations into new directions.
Hogg was testing out whether the airport could be held more accountable for its
environmental impact. It might have been a rhetorical tactic, using the art of per-
suasion rather than a cold clinical statement of policy facts, but that is what political
riffing consists of. Bercow needed to perform neutrality as Speaker of the House,
to be showing no favour as he policed the rules. Even as an anti-Brexiteer it
seemed to me and others that he favoured my side. The emotional problem with
this is that my passion for remaining in the European Union was so intense, that if
asked to acknowledge this at the time, I fear that I might have stayed quiet. So
when a referee takes sides, we can all get implicated in a breakdown in the
impartiality of the ritualisation of decision-making.
But it is not just rules that matter in rituals, and render the Speaker, as arbiter of
the rules, the most important person in the process of decision-making (including
how it is ritualised), but it is symbols that create meaning. Symbols are powerful
partly because they combine clear messages but also ambiguity in meaning. The
most important symbol in a democracy is the Member of Parliament as the repre-
sentative of an area. In the UK this is indicated by their name – the Honourable
Member for Hammersmith, for example – which has to be used when another
member is addressing them in debate. The name of that individual (presently Andy
Slaughter) is less important than the area that they geo-politically symbolise: ‘a
single person is entrusted with the powers of a whole crowd of people, that person
can be invested with a power which transcends each of the individuals who dele-
gate him’ (Bourdieu 1991: 203). She or he can be an incarnation of the transcen-
dence of the social, Bourdieu suggests, as if an act of magic transforms a collection
of people into one body (ibid: 208). That move to speaking on behalf of a col-
lective entails an act of violence upon individuals within the group because it
means eliding differences. So, while the claim of representation sounds clear – the
Member of Parliament (or Council) will speak for a specific group – what that
means in practice is ambiguous. ‘Speaking’ can be a mode of vocal communication
but it can also entail far more – using your voice to push for the interests of a
group, a form of advocacy, on the pretence that they can be singular. Politicians
are symbolic representatives who can claim that their voice (in the bodily sense) is
an act of voice (in a political sense) when they engage in the ritualised decision-
making and scrutiny within parliament. The Speaker symbolises the House of
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Commons, which makes her/him the most important figure in our parliamentary
rituals, but their job is not so much to speak (ironically) as to ensure that others
have fair opportunities to do so.
Ceremonies of state
The ritualisation of decision-making is the process for the alchemical transforma-
tion of an idea via a text into a policy, a regulation or a law. This is only possible
because we, the public, consent to the authority of the decision-makers. This
consent also requires ceremonies – interruptions in the decision-making – to confer
legitimacy on different kinds of decision-maker. A leadership election, an intro-
duction to parliament, a State Opening of Parliament: these ceremonies mark the
transition of a person, or an institution, to move from one state to another – from
citizen to politician for example, or from ordinary building into a sitting parlia-
ment. At the same time, ceremonies achieve many other effects too, so the search
for a singular meaning is pointless. Some of the symbols and their effects are fresh,
some long-standing, so ceremonies not only transport people in the present but
they reunite them with cultural or political ghosts. To understand many cere-
monies you have to consider their past. Maurice Bloch explains that rituals in
Madagascar clearly demonstrate royal power as an important element in the cosmic
social and emotional order but this alone does not explain the ritual (1987: 294).
To do this you have to consider the specific logic of that particular ritual and how
it constructs authority; in this case, the king is a violent conqueror, so the ritual is
partly about how violence by the king is justified (ibid: 296).
Bloch is dissatisfied with Geertz’s famous conclusion in his book Negara on
nineteenth-century Bali that although culture and power were inseparable, ritual
did not serve power, rather ceremony and symbolic action constituted the politics
of Bali (Geertz 1980). Given that kings (or sovereignty) can use violence with
impunity (Graeber 2017: 73) then surely Bloch has a point; if ritual as a perfor-
mance of culture can’t be separated from power, then we need to explain the
relationship between them. Giesen argues in response to Geertz that the Balinese
king and court are performing a ritual in which the hierarchical structure of the
cosmos is recreated (2011: 168). In general, the king’s power to do violence with
impunity is communicated through ritual, as Bloch points out when writing about
Madagascar. But kings can’t inspire loyalty through violence towards enemies
alone; they also give gifts. Burghart writes about how ritual gift-giving, including
to gods, by Nepali kings was a way of constituting their authority until the late
nineteenth century (1987: 267–8). That Nepal became more concerned with its
citizens than gods, and the kings gave land to the public by endowing schools and
hospitals, indicates shifts in power. For our purposes here I’m interested in why the
gift-giving was ritualised, rather than a merely technical and practical process, and
in his answer Burghart makes it plain how gifts connect to violence through ritual.
The ritual representation was emotionally important, inspiring soldiers to bravery
for example, in a way that a mere material transaction never could.
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So, let’s turn from kings to democratic governments and parliaments. In various
explanations of state ceremonies there has been a shift from singular functionalist
accounts to more complex, entangled perspectives. Beginning with functionalism,
Shils and Young follow Durkheim in seeing the social purpose of the coronation
of the UK Monarch as creating social solidarity and an ordered society through an
act of communion (1953: 67). The philosopher Stephen Lukes recoiled from their
assumption of consensus and the idea that moral values are shared nationally when
there is so much contestation about what is good or desirable (1977). For Lukes
rituals make social relationships intelligible; they tell the participants and observers
how society was, is and will be organised, enabling our capacity to imagine the
future. The connection to power is critical in his view because rituals ensure
acquiescence and mobilise consent. He even writes about parliamentarians that this
is helped by their occasional rebellions: ‘The occasional success of back-benchers in
checking or even reversing government policies greatly enhances the symbolic
effectiveness of Parliament as a mobiliser of consent’ (ibid: 209, ftn. 75 and for
more see Crewe 2005: 231).
So how do rituals mobilise consent? Rituals have this effect in the House of
Lords, whether intended or not, because the party managers face a specific con-
tradiction between the ethos of the place and the disciplinary processes that are
needed to get the results they need. Peers are less ambitious than most politicians;
most are ennobled after a long career in the House of Commons or elsewhere.
They are difficult to discipline (to support the party when they speak or vote) at
least in theory, because they are there for life, tend to lack political ambition and
learn fast that the House thrives on an idea of itself as independent-minded. Party
tribalism is a feature of the ‘other place’ (as they call the House of Commons) not
the Lords, so they claim. And yet peers overwhelmingly vote with their own par-
ties and seem reluctant to betray their colleagues with whom they have usually sat
for years. Furthermore, as Lukes argues, the occasional success of the backbenchers
in the ritualised political struggles, and the rules stressing the equality between peers
as performers, give the impression that they have more power and control than
they actually do. Add to the rituals of decision-making, the ceremonies – notably
the State Opening of Parliament – and the combination becomes significant. State
Opening is an embodied reminder of peers’ ownership of their symbolic property
(noble titles and ceremonial prominence indicated by their key roles in processions
and ermine robes). For some this can be converted into objective power in the
nation’s board-rooms, media and charities and for others it is a form of cultural
compensation for their secondary status as a lower house of parliament, playing
second fiddle to the primary house (Crewe 2005). The state ceremonies and the
rituals of debate, taken together, provide backbench peers with a powerful disin-
centive to challenge the status quo.
The specific relationship between status or rank and power within rituals can
only be understood by tracing the historical development of that particular place
(Bloch 1989: 47). So rather than rushing to reduce rituals to a conspiratorial func-
tion, it is vital to understand how and why they capture the popular imagination.
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Or not. When Jimmy Carter, imbued with a modernising zeal, dispensed with the
presidential cavalcade and gold braid he was seen as ‘lacking charisma, the sacred
aura, that presidents should have’ (Kertzer 1988: 183). The importance of history
to understanding symbols of status can be clearly seen in Myanmar. Language,
buildings and even dress are important political symbols in many places because
they communicate with incredible immediacy much about allegiances and habi-
tus – whether people’s class, ethnicity or place of origin. Renand Egreteau explains
that when Myanmar was aspiring towards becoming a decolonised society in the
1950s English was prohibited and non-indigenous designs for the Parliament were
rejected. He also writes about dress. Just as the Indian National Congress politicians
were encouraged to wear khadi (home-woven cloth symbolic of anti-colonialism),
so in Myanmar a similar pattern prevailed:
discarding unicolour suit jackets and ties, male MPs all opted for silk longyis,
pinni jackets and gaung baungs on their head, while the very few women elec-
ted lawmakers entered parliament coiffed in traditional hairstyle (sadon),
wearing colourful eingyi and htamein. The Speakers of the two chambers had
also specially designed gowns: a pink velvet robe for the speaker of the upper
house, and a black and white one for the speaker of the lower house (New
Times of Burma, 1956).
(2019: 691)
However, while successful in stressing distance from the colonisers, Myanmar’s
postcolonial story becomes one of a different form of colonialism over its own
borderlands. The multi-ethnic conference in the Shan city of Panglong in 1947
raised expectations that Myanmar would respect ethnic diversity and equality in a
federal system, under a slogan of ‘unity in diversity’. Over decades ethnic mino-
rities – the non-Bamar – have felt betrayed. The Bamar majority has dominated,
expanding its grip on power through postcolonial state building and military con-
trol of politics and land, with civil wars highlighting these inequalities for decades.
Until the 2021 coup, the parliamentary rules stipulated that MPs should not wear
informal or Western, Indian or Chinese attire – their high status and their indi-
geneity should have been expressed symbolically (ibid: 685). But when the Bamar
MPs wore dress that emphasised their nationalism, it was no longer symbolic of
anti-Britishness, it signified their superiority over the Kachin, Shan, Karen, Mon,
Rohingya and so on. Meantime, others were encouraged to wear items to indicate
which group they belonged to and when you visited the national parliament you
were presented with 48 mannequins (24 men, 24 women) dressed in the traditional
costumes of the groups represented in the legislature. The result was that ethnicity
was essentialised at the expense of commonality, portrayed as if it was about tra-
ditions and folklore rather than power, land, resources and inequality (ibid: 694).
It is easy to discern that dress is symbolically important in Myanmar because it
communicates difference in gender, class and ethnicity, but amongst those possible
differences it is ethnicity that has a contemporary pre-eminence in the sense of
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creating habitus in the political domain. So, sometimes symbols will shout in a
particular direction. But in other cases you find far more contradictions. To return
for a moment to the Westminster Parliament, the meaning of the symbols in the
State Opening of Parliament will illustrate this multiplicity of meaning from dif-
ferent perspectives. The event is described as follows on the Queen’s website:
The Queen officially opens Parliament with an event steeped in tradition. The
State Opening is the only regular event to unite the three elements of legis-
lature – the House of Lords, the House of Commons and The Queen –
together as the Crown in Parliament.4
I spent many months searching for the meaning of the State Opening of Parliament
in the late 1990s, asking various people why it was important: peers, MPs, those
with ceremonial roles (e.g., people called Silver Stick, Black Rod, the Sword of
State, the Cap of Maintenance and the Duke of Norfolk as chief choreographer)
and observers. I watched it during rehearsals, from the Royal Gallery, the House of
Commons, the House of Lords, in the street, in the backyard where they feed the
Queen’s horses, from officials’ offices and on the TV. It all looked completely
different from various vantage points and, unsurprisingly, participants talked about
the multiple aspects as if it were many ceremonies.
After months of confusion I finally embraced the multiplicity, ambivalence and
uncertainty and abandoned any fake search for singularity. The State Opening of
Parliament contains different rituals for different groups of participant (MPs, peers,
Royals) as well for staff who are entertained, citizens who are awe-inspired or
alienated, and journalists who have to report it. Within these groups you find
diverse reactions. The peers who hate it, stay away. Those peers who do attend
love the centrality of their House of Lords in the ceremony; they surround the
Monarch as she reads the speech announcing the government’s political agenda,
explicitly underlining that they are just one rung below the semi-divine Queen in
the UK social pyramid (Crewe 2005: 208–14). It may be partly a reminder of the
cultural compensation for their limited political power, dressed as they are in long
velvet robes that speak loudly of their status and ancient association with the land
(the ermine fur).
The MPs stand at the bar of the House when the Queen reads her speech, as if
inferior beings (in the minds of peers), in a position so demeaning that one told me
he was worried that the Commons may abolish it in a fit of indignation. But MPs
are busy with their own feelings of superiority during the State Opening. They
begin by mocking the Monarch’s representative – the Gentleman Usher of the
Black Rod – who knocks on their door three times to demand their presence in
the Lords. The door is slammed in his face. Once let in, for decades former Labour
MP Denis Skinner reliably made an acerbic remark, like ‘here comes Puss in
Boots’. MPs then amble from the Commons to the Lords in a relaxed fashion and
stand at the bar while the Queen reads her speech. They look on with disdain at
the peers (and by implication the Monarch), the parts of the constitution with only
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residual political power in practice, as if they were indulging their elderly par-
ents. The public look on in awe, loathing or indifference from a distance,
watching the procession in person from Pall Mall or the various ceremonies in
the Palace on the TV, perhaps amused by the drama of the basement being
checked for gunpowder and a government whip being abducted and kept in
Buckingham Palace for the duration. A sizeable global audience watch it on
BBC news or Facebook.5 It is clear that the State Opening is a different ritual
for different groups – perhaps even for individuals depending on where they
are sitting that year – and even the rituals within rituals themselves are involved
in shapeshifting.
Kertzer points out that symbols can be multivocal – their ambiguity is part of
their power (1988: 11). This, along with their non-verbal quality, makes it possible
for rituals to produce quite different experiences, meanings and emotions for those
involved. Our mistaken expectation of language is that we will easily understand
the sense intended, whereas the reality of human interaction is that mis-
understanding is common. Symbolism tends towards the opposite. We don’t
expect to receive clear messages through symbolic communication whereas in
practice we hear and see powerful messages conveyed that have an effect, even
though we don’t necessarily take much overt notice. Political ritual is far from an
unimportant relic from the past – it reveals power, emotion, meaning and political
significance. As a tool of research scrutiny, it is incredibly useful for showing us
where to look.
Rituals, solidarity and violence
It is rituals that organise the riffs and rhythms of political work into processes that
create meaning and power. Rituals are social processes with relationships at the
heart that are politically, emotionally, socially and culturally significant – the more
significant, the more they seem to be regulated. Rituals can’t operate without rules
(especially to regulate the rhythms, that is, what the bodies and voices do) and
symbols (to convey significant riffs of meaning through words, objects, gestures,
dress or people transformed into, for example, a ‘Black Rod’ in the case of the
UK). This usually means rituals will be charged with symbolic meaning, regulated
by rigid rules – with severe consequences for breaking them – and involved in
reproducing, challenging or creating new socio-political hierarchies. So, if you
want to know how important an event is, then measure the extent to which it is
rule-bound, disciplines participants’ and tells them through symbols what to say, do
and think. Without symbols we can’t think:
Only in terms of gestures as significant symbols is the existence of mind or
intelligence possible; for only in terms of gestures which are significant sym-
bols can thinking – which is simply an internalized or implicit conversation of
the individual with himself by means of such gestures – take place.
(Mead 1934: 47)
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So even in everyday interactions, our gestures are symbolic – charged with more
than their literal meaning.
Communication is never merely an exchange of nuggets of preference or
ideology as if these could be a perfect reading of the world. As Bloch puts it: ‘the
message of ideology cannot be maintained simply as a statement … because it is by
its very nature in contradiction with human experience in the world’ (1986: 195).
So, communicating ideology needs ritual to deal with these contradictions because
the performance provides an opportunity for these symbols to become gestures.
However, I am not making a functionalist argument here about the whole. Ritual
is not resolving a contradiction so that the system works, it is embodying the
paradox of being both an individual self and socially connected, and shapeshifting
between identities, that all actors share. This paradox sounds like magic, the con-
juring trick of kings, politicians or any people for that matter, experiencing their
world as both individuals and members of different groups at the same time. But
prestidigitation is a conceit, human action merely looks like a conjuring trick but it
is not. The emotion of being both individual and social does not feel like magic
because humans are more capable of living in paradoxes than they are of describing
them in language. Ritual is an expression of this paradox.
My portrayal of ritual may remind us of Leach, as it ‘serves to express the indi-
vidual’s status as a social person in the structural system in which he finds himself
for the time being’ (1954: 11). But systems theory, structuralism and post-struc-
turalism have long been deconstructed by anthropologists (e.g., Olivier de Sardan
2005) despite their persistence in other social sciences that are trying to avoid
individualism. How to think about individual freedom and structural constraint
remains unfinished business for anthropologists. If we bring ritual back into the
study of politics, there is still more work to be done in understanding two aspects
of this individual versus structural paradox. It begs the question: for individuals,
what is happening emotionally – both consciously and unconsciously – as they
perform political rituals and how does this vary within and between different
groups? Florence Faucher-King addresses this in UK party conferences (2005: 6–7),
(and for that matter Andrew Beatty does so more broadly in everyday life in
Indonesia, 2019), so there are plenty of fruitful directions for inquiry. Plus, they
don’t abandon the need to analyse constraints at the same time, both subtle and
forceful. For example, on conferences Faucher-King suggests:
It offers a stage for a public but pacific expression of competing ideologies. It
reminds citizens of what constitutes a ‘proper’ way to behave in politics. It
celebrates political commitment and political activity. For parties it is an annual
rite of renewal. In its ritualised conferment of legitimacy on political elites, it
highlights the sacred dimension of politics.
(2005: 11)
The ‘“proper” way to behave’ sounds like a form of light discipline. It can be when
the conflicts are expressed with relative calm, as was the case when Faucher-King
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was observing UK politics. But more ferocious conflicts within both main parties in
the UK have been starkly exposed during all political rituals – debating and voting in
the House, party conferences and elections – so that insisting on ‘proper’ behaviour
can also entail not just symbolic violence, but actual violence. It was after the chal-
lenge to Corbyn as leader (through a no confidence vote and leadership election)
that the Labour Party witnessed a surge in violence between its members (mostly not
physical but verbal or digital, and always emotional) not seen since the years of
Militant Tendency. Corbynistas were accused of bullying and anti-Semitism and
they counter-charged their critics with allegations of politically motivated tactics to
bring down Corbyn. Both sides were fighting for control of the party but lashing out
in retaliatory ways as both their party and their sense of self were attacked.
This kind of polarised party conflict is even more lethal in Bangladesh and no
amount of ritual has created enough cohesion to fix it. In fact, the rituals of elections,
and parliamentary debate, law-making and scrutiny, have entrenched or even
inflamed rather than reduced conflict. Since 1971, when the former East Pakistan won
independence from West Pakistan, the two main parties – Awami League and the
Bangladesh National Party – have been locked into bitter power struggles. The point
of ritualising elections is to ensure that all sides accept the result. However, in many
countries, including Bangladesh (and the US in November 2020), they don’t because
they allege that their opponents rigged the election, thereby casting doubt on the
legitimacy of the other side when it has claimed to win and assumed government. For
this reason, politicians in Bangladesh developed a unique way to reduce this risk,
introducing caretaker governments from 1990 to administer elections. However, in
2011 the Awami League-run government abolished this recent tradition on the
grounds that it was out of step with modern democracy (Ahmed 2020: 188). This led
to a boycott of the 2014 election, which has transformed Bangladesh into a one-party
state since then (in 2018 the opposition won only seven seats).
We can’t do without rituals in politics, any more than we can dispense with
language, but you can’t make them do what you want either. They can, but do
not necessarily, resolve contradictions, create consensus, mobilise consent, shore up
existing hierarchies or include/exclude groups. Rituals are not tools to be
employed to do your bidding because they emerge out of the interaction between
people – their riffs and rhythms – and in politics it is usually extremely difficult to
marshal everyone into the new directions you want them to take. Different iden-
tities, interests and aspirations mean that people inevitably want to go in different
directions, leading to power struggles within and between groups, so the results of
politics are usually unpredictable. In the next chapter I will attempt to pull all the
threads together to speculate about why parliamentary history unfolds as it does.
Notes
1 Lord Howe of Aberavon, HL Debates, 3 November 2005, col. 317.
2 https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/commons/standing-orders-public11/,
accessed 15 February 2020.
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3 Bingham lecture: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vMv69cNgUes, accessed 15 Feb-
ruary 2020.
4 https://www.royal.uk/state-opening-parliament, accessed 19 February 2020.
5 BBC News Facebook page got 1.5m views of the 19 December 2019 state opening (https://
www.facebook.com/BBCPolitics/videos/484756375507331/) and BBC News in general
reaches 394m, according to 2019 figures: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/
2019/bbc-international-audience-record-high, accessed 19 February 2020.
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PART III
Politics with the dial turned up
We all do politics but politicians do it with the dial turned up. Parliament is a place
where you find a magnification of politics, awash with crowds, contradictions, rituals,
symbols and significant decisions. The complexity of the work of politicians means
that they face overlapping and often conflicting pressures, demands and audiences to a
far greater intensity than the rest of us do. The more politicians in democracies try to
consult and engage, the more diversity and pressure they experience.
Part I was about the social life of politics. I described the complexity of politicians’
work and how this politics is entangled with social relations, both inside and outside
parliament. Elections are the starting point. In democratic political worlds they are the
process for creating relationships between politicians and voters. So, in Chapter 2 I
explained what anthropologists have discovered about elections from the viewpoint of
both politicians and voters. Once in parliament, voting is used to determine agreement
and disagreement between members of parliament. I concluded that voting is fetish-
ised as if it is a form of magic that can make democracy on its own but it can’t; I argue
that deeper democracy needs other processes to be taken as seriously too. In Chapter 3
I moved onto one of these other processes of socio-political interaction – the repre-
sentation of people by elected politicians. What happens to the claim of representation
in practice for different groups? In Chapter 4 I looked at examples of politicians, and
others, aspiring to scrutinise government – who gets involved, what do they do and
what are the consequences?
In Part II I inquired into the cultural life of politics, the continuities and break-
downs in rhythms and riffs in political work, concluding that it is rituals that signal
which events are of particular significance. In Chapter 5 I offered a systematic way
to research the rhythms of political work – what minds and bodies do in different
configurations across time and in different places. Still looking for ways to be sys-
tematic about studying the entanglement of culture and politics, in Chapter 6 I laid
out what anthropologists have to say about the content of politicians’ ideology,
rhetoric and advocacy – the riffs of meaning that are so vital for achieving change
through politics. As more and more entanglements emerge, a researcher can get
overwhelmed by the volume of data: so then rituals are methodologically useful, as
I explained in Chapter 7, for discerning what is of political importance. Rituals
give us a sense of proportion.
In this final part 3 of the book I want to look at research in politics and the
politics of research – or power and knowledge – pulling the threads together and
considering how you know what to find out about if you are a politician and what
to look at as a researcher. We are all political sometimes, but politicians can rarely
escape walking between friends and foes and navigating power struggles. Looking
at this will help me explain in the final section what, how and why politics
becomes magnified in parliaments so that one way of describing it is that parlia-
mentarians do political work with the dial turned up.
FIGURE III.1 Politicians do politics with the dial turned up.
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A SENSE OF PROPORTION
Politics involves strange processes of alchemy. We need to know what ingredients
are involved but also how they mix, fuse and play together. In democracies the
essentials are elections and winning support, representation of interests, adminis-
tration of the state, and scrutiny of government. To work out how this happens in
everyday culture-making and power struggles, I have suggested that you might
want to consider politics as a form of work, organised by riffs, rhythms and rituals.
When seen as work processes that are endlessly entangled with each other, we can
begin to analyse what is going on between people from their multiple points of
view. The final task is to grapple with making decisions about where to focus our
gaze and how to study the entanglements with a sense of proportion. I need to
disentangle the entanglements.
Everyday political work: walking between friends and foes
If everything is entangled with everything else, what is the starting point? In the
rhythms of politics, we have to understand what acts as triggers or, as Veena Das
puts it, critical events (1995). The same is true of processes. Given that events are
entangled, you have to decide (as a matter of historical inquiry) what to study with
what: what is the unfinished business of earlier processes? You have to begin
somewhere and then account for your starting point. I began my explanation of
parliamentary democracy in this book with voting. Democracy is always more than
voting but without that specific process, it loses its credentials in the eyes of parti-
cipants; without voting, you can’t make a claim to be living within a democracy,
in at least its most skeletal form. You would also lose much of its drama.
The vote is a blunt expression of taking sides on an issue but also declaring
allegiance with one group or another. When it is a citizen voting for a politician,
they are deciding who to be ruled by so the stakes are extremely high. To be seen
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as credible, the rules should be observed, cheating has to be stamped out or con-
cealed, and any inconsistencies regulated or obscured. Technology and ritual in
combination, policed by experts, ensure that the results of the vote in an election
are believed and adhered to. The technology of voting is entangled with the per-
formance of elections as a social and cultural event. The form this entanglement
takes is going to be different across places because political histories create varying
cultural habits. Melnikova describes how in Russian elections a celebratory space
combines with disciplinary processes that are threaded through with specific his-
torical associations of past authoritarianism for participants (2013). So, historical
associations are always found but are different in content between places. You can’t
fathom the reaction of protest to a rigged election in 1983 in Nigeria without
considering longer-standing models of political and ritual power, according to
Apter, with a ‘more indigenous understanding of Nigerian democracy’, as I explain
in more detail in the next section (1987: 490). The violent protests after an election
were seen as irrational mob tribalism by outsiders but from his vantage point as an
ethnographer, Apter realised that they made sense as both symbolic drama and
political action.
Making an argument for taking account of cultural, political and historical spe-
cificity is easy. It is universal theorising that presents a challenge for anthropology.
But it is not an insurmountable one. The focus on specificity was a reaction to the
grand theorising up until the 1970s. It led Kurt Vonnegut to complain about cul-
tural relativism – that everyone was treated as if they were the same by anthro-
pologists teaching him in Chicago University, as if denied both individuality and
the possibility of judgement (2009: 9–10). Since then the challenge for anthro-
pology has been theorising about commonalities but doing so in a way that makes
meaningful allowance for difference and individuality. We need an open mind
about where commonalities might be found. Apter’s point that local traditional
political and symbolic power play a part in the political realm in Nigeria can also
be found in societies perceived as ‘modern’. When the UK held a referendum
about whether or not to exit the European Union (EU), the phrase used to win
support by those wishing to leave the EU – ‘take back control’ – appealed because
it implied echoes of the early days of the welfare state or even further back to times
of imperial power. The return to a past when Britain was in control of itself and of
many foreigners, symbolised a promise about a future (one where we would not be
ruled by foreigners) without saying so directly. When the leavers won the refer-
endum, even though the remainers controlled the government, people behaved as
if it was an election rather than a referendum. The Prime Minister resigned and
eventually the campaign leader, Boris Johnson, took over in what almost felt like a
coup. So, tradition can be used politically in the UK, Nigeria or anywhere else.
To return to voting: it tells us about a fundamental process in democratic poli-
tics – the taking of sides. Votes reveal sides but can also create or change sides in
various ways, so this is a process that can create drama and emotional intensity. The
same referendum on exiting the EU in June 2016 split the country into two new
sides until the UK finally left over three years later. But more often sides are more
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enduring – political parties tend to dominate parliamentary politics although their
fortunes fluctuate, swing or collapse. These groups, and factions within them, have
been extensively studied by political scientists, usually seen as teams of individuals
who come together to control government and form voting coalitions (Saalfeld
and Strøm 2014: 371, 373). However, there is often a gap between empirical
descriptions about party organisation and theoretical models (ibid: 392–3), with the
latter relying heavily on typologies rather than inquiries into why party members
operate as they do. From an anthropological viewpoint, they are stripped of soci-
ality and culture – the very sources of their potential for emotional intensity.
Anthropology can help us to understand how and why people take sides, what
they do about the disagreements that emerge and why politicians get so emotional
about politics. I have written about how party loyalty in the UK House of Lords
defies political scientists’ assumptions (Crewe 2005). Parliamentary scholars have
tended to assume that discipline relies on a mix of self-interest and rule-following.
But I have found that peers are remarkably obedient to the whip – an instruction
to support their party, usually in a vote – not in response to inducements or threats,
but out of loyalty. The late Earl Russell, a Liberal Democrat peer, explained what
loyalty consisted of in practice:
When I think of my loyalty to my party, I think of the people with whom I
ran up steps in Oldham in a heat wave or who held the torch for me when I
looked for numbers in Winchester Cathedral Close in the rain and in the dark.
If I were to vote with this Whip, they would not understand me.1
Another long-standing party member explained in similar terms why she obeys the
whip that it is worth repeating from Chapter 2: ‘It would be very difficult to be
disloyal to party people. I can’t bring myself to go into the division lobby with the
enemy.’2 Peers spoke about voting with those they have worked with (or for) to
avoid the shame of betrayal. They are influenced by the other peers they sit next to
in the chamber or fellow party members they have canvassed with in the streets;
they don’t want to let them down. Ignore the emotions involved in the public
performance of walking into the division lobby with friends, thereby distancing
yourself from your political foes, and you fail to understand party politics in the
Lords. Political sides are created by relationships – including emotions felt towards
others – and not just ideology.
Party loyalty in the UK House of Commons is equally perplexing if you are
wedded to rational choice theory or new institutionalist assumptions that politicians
obey their party when it is in their own self-interest. Backbench government MPs
have voted against ‘the whip’ more often in every parliament since 1945 and yet
the bribes/threats are in theory still available. Despite widespread portrayals of the
Westminster Parliament as weak, Cowley and Russell lay out the evidence of
increased divergence by backbench MPs from the policy standpoints of party lea-
ders (2015: 125–6). This is not just revealed in defeats in the voting lobby, but in
‘retreats’ – when the government withdraws from a position because they
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anticipate that they will lose – and in their amendments to bills or motions in
response to backbench pressures. This increased backbench (and sometimes oppo-
sition) power emerges out of huge shifts within the UK Parliament: less exposure
and deference to their party leaders; local parties flexing their muscles; as well as
more expectations and involvement in constituencies both in person and via social
media (Crewe 2015a: 125–39). The whips in all parties have had to drastically
change their tactics. They no longer use blackmail (much), violence or even angry
rebukes; they are following in the footsteps of their Lords counterparts (Crewe
2005: 160–80), acting not as bullies but as intelligence agents gathering information
about backbench opinion to avoid defeats or HR managers coaxing their flock to
stay in pens with no fences. Whips are not bullies; they are now closer to spies in
both Houses. Far from reducing the drama in voting within the Westminster Par-
liament, its unpredictability makes it even more exciting.
Voting causes or throws into relief society’s divisions in a democracy. More
profound mechanisms of inclusion versus exclusion are found in definitions of
citizenship and voting rights, for example, when people are kept off the ballot
paper in the first place. In the UK those typically deemed unfit for voting, and so
excluded from the electoral roll, are those who have committed election-related
crimes, children (usually under 18), prisoners, the ‘mentally incompetent’, homeless
people and non-citizens. Obviously different countries define citizenship, or
belonging to a nation, in their own way, with profound consequences on the
claims and rights on specific groups, including the right to vote. With the rise of
nationalism, citizenship is being used to exclude huge swathes of many populations:
in Myanmar Burmanisation gives Bamar people automatic rights, while the citi-
zenship of non-Bamar people has to be fought for and of the Rohingya has been
systematically denied for decades. If you can’t vote, you know you are not a full
citizen in the eyes of the state.
So, voting reveals much about the sides in politics – who is in agreement versus
disagreement; included, excluded; and supported or opposed. But it is not the only
process. Sides are also created by the claim of politicians to represent sections of the
population. I have written about how individual parliamentarians represent sections
of the population in Chapter 3 but it is not only individual politicians who claim to
represent others. Political parties represent the interests of groups – they stand for
the working class, a specific ethnic group, an independence movement or an
ideological position. As Bourdieu points out, to understand how political parties
represent sides you have to consider them alongside each other – you can only be
left wing if there is a right wing: ‘Political parties, like tendencies within these
partners, have only a relational existence and it would be futile to try and define
what they are and what they profess independently of what their competitors in
the same field are and profess’ (1991: 184).
In another sense parliaments represent all these sides – they are a ‘kind of spatial
projection of the political field’ (ibid: 186) – which is depicted in debating cham-
bers as political parties are always grouped together. It was in the Constituent
Assembly set up during the French Revolution that the Monarchist supporters sat
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on the right of the President while the Revolutionaries sat on the left. So, although
this section is about how politics involves walking between sides (friends and foes),
it is also about sitting and standing with them and talking against the other side.
Once one party is in government, the other sides oppose in part by scrutinising
what the government does through critique, complaint and subversion. The fantasy
that ‘evidence-based’ policy-making means politicians can rise above ‘tribal poli-
tics’, or the taking of sides, has become commonplace (Sanderson offers a UK
history of this, 2002). But I have argued in Chapter 4 that the consideration of
‘evidence’ in political processes, whether making policy and law, going to war or
administering departments, offers no relief from the taking of sides and amplifica-
tion of emotion in work when it gets political. Evidence is always open to con-
testation so political and legal processes are needed to enable judgements to be
made.
What has changed in the last few decades, since Bourdieu remarked on the
inter- and intragenerational loyalty that made parties relatively stable (1991: 199), is
that political parties have become extraordinarily unstable. After many years of
contest between various right or left parties in France (the Socialist Party, the
Republicans, the National Front), the shock victory of Macron’s La République
En Marche party in 2017 with half of its candidates coming from civil society, is an
illustration of volatility. Half of the representatives elected to Bolsanaro’s political
party in 2018 in Brazil had never stood for election before. The rise of nationalist
parties across the world – either mainstream ones with the Bharatiya Janata Party
governing India or smaller ones looking for independence such as the Scottish
National Party – is challenging the establishment of political sides in profound
ways. Not only does democracy require organising ideas, parties, resources and
narratives into sides, and factions within sides, but the pace of shifts in these divi-
sions is accelerating.
Maybe we can find some respite from this division in the areas of parliament that
are seen as most collaborative? In the UK the obvious candidate would be select
committees (Crewe and Sarra 2019). Is the dial turned down when the aspiration
of House of Commons select committees is to present a united front? Here both
politicians and officials claim that members of select committees put aside political
differences, despite belonging to different parties and pursuing individual agendas
to promote their own career, to publish unanimous reports as a group based on the
consideration of evidence. However, the practice departs from the claim; members
often infringe rules or norms by grandstanding, speaking for too long, giving
speeches rather than asking questions, leaking reports to the press, turning up late
or leaving early without giving notice, demanding to ask a question without
warning, asking someone else’s question, or claiming attention at the cost of other
members. As in all political work, committee members have to recognise each
other’s multiple purposes for taking part in committees rather than assuming that
these infringements are merely bad behaviour. MPs might attend that committee
out of interest in a specialist topic, to scrutinise and influence (most often govern-
ment), to represent issues that are important in their constituency, to feel busy and
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important, or at their party’s bidding. The chair has to allow MPs the time to speak
for any combination of these motives and sometimes will not necessarily know
which audience is uppermost in an MP’s mind. If one member gets too much air
time, then others may become resentful. So, norm-breaking will elicit a reprimand
from the chair or, more unusually, the clerk. Their political party membership
influences these disciplinary processes because the chair can admonish more easily if
the wayward member is in their own party, especially if close to that member, and
so will do so directly. But if the offender comes from another party they might ask
one of the wayward member’s allies to do it. So even in select committees the
multiplicity of goals, motives and pressures means that conflict management is an
inevitable aspect of the work. The rhetoric of select committees is collaborative but
the reality can be conflictual, just as tribal politics, often assumed to be highly
conflictual, turns out to have plenty of alliance building across parties behind the
scenes. Politics is about walking between friends and foes whether the arena is
habitually conflictual or aspires to be collaborative.
What about alliance and enmity between politicians and the public? The position of
parliamentarians is profoundly affected by the low esteem in which they are held by
the public. People beyond the bubbles created by national political worlds – especially
those in and around parliaments, whether politicians, journalists or lobbyists – perceive
politics as conflictual, nasty and immoral. When they see or think about politicians,
they discern, or assume, that they are hypocritical, double-dealing and corrupt. Whe-
ther residing in rural Ethiopia or urban Houston, politics is seen as having hostility at
its heart and politicians are bad people, allegedly. People within the bubble experience
it, in contrast, as intoxicating, addictive and galvanising – full of possibility, power and
excitement, heroes and villains, and friends and foes.
Commentators once had a more favourable view. In democracy the assumption
is that we are offered choices and it is the taking of sides with one group of poli-
ticians against the others that surely creates a restless activity that can, famously in
the words of Tocqueville, accomplish miracles. But once the election is over it is as
if we take sides against all politicians in our cynicism towards the whole lot of
them. This partly happens as a reaction to how politics is portrayed by MPs and
journalists alike. Political parties and their members make claims about their own
brilliance and the failure of their opponents at every opportunity. Politicians mag-
nify these claims, beyond the subtler versions many convey in private, trying to
impress the public that they should support their side with votes, money or other
kinds of support, and distrust the other side. Then journalists focus on this antag-
onistic side of politics – it is good copy at a time when newspapers are struggling to
survive – or even join in to promote those politicians they admire and bring down
those they disdain. In the UK, as examples, John Rentoul’s reporting on politics is
filtered by admiration for former PM Tony Blair, Michael Crick rated former PM
Teresa May highly, while Owen Jones portrayed former Labour Leader Jeremy
Corbyn as the most honourable leader in Parliament. These journalists are honest
about their dispositions but others feign neutrality, as if reporting politics without
the filter of their own views. Those pretending to be impartial confuse the public
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with their apparently neutral damning critiques. How are readers supposed to dis-
tinguish between critical scrutiny of politics by the media as opposed to journalists
doing political work on their own account? It is partly as a result of misreading the
way politics in parliament and in the media is entangled that we – the citizens –
take sides against all politicians and even politics itself.
Taking against politics would mean taking against ourselves. Politicians become
an exaggerated version of the rest of us. We all do politics in this sense of taking
sides but politicians contend with larger networks of friends and foes, more public
censure and exposure 24/7, more expectations from a dizzying array of groups, and
more serious competitive power struggles. Politicians deal with faster rate of change
and a public realm that is becoming increasingly turbulent and unstable. Dealing
with this magnification of politics is emotionally demanding but addictive, both
ego-boosting and ego-destroying – sometimes alternately and sometimes simulta-
neously. Central to these changeable struggles is the force that creates what Toc-
queville wrote about as the restless energy in democracies: power.
Disentangling power
In theory anyone can become a political queen/king in a democracy. As soon as
the leaders close the space for powerful scrutiny, critique and opposition, then the
struggle for power, and therefore democracy, weakens or even dies. But power is
difficult to write about because everyone – different academic disciplines, politi-
cians, activists – has a different view about what it is and how it operates. The way
you define power is a political strategy in itself.
While thinking about power in popular discourse, people tend to oscillate
between individuals and systems. If focusing on individuals – kings, chiefs, politi-
cians – the popular idea is of power as a quantifiable force or a commodity that can
be acquired by individuals, welded, used and abused, especially by leaders of
groups, organisations or countries. When a systemic or institutional view is offered,
in contrast, it is the structure and disciplinary power of rules that tends to be at the
core of theories on power. Anthropology used to be confined by what Gledhill has
called these two straitjackets of methodological individualism versus structuralism
(or systems thinking) and both are relevant but have problems if employed exclu-
sively. We need to understand both the autonomy of individuals to pursue political
strategies and how these relate to social and cultural frameworks (Gledhill 1994:
134). He cites Bourdieu to argue that social actors are like ‘musicians whose
improvisations are neither predictable in advance, a product of conscious intent,
nor simply a “realization” of a structure which already exists in the unconscious-
ness’ (ibid: 135). We need to be able to explain why and how particular individuals
(prophets or party leaders) are persuasive at specific moments. Gledhill argues
convincingly that we have to understand popular political imaginary in specific
places if we want to get to the bottom of power and powerful rhetoric.
Those politicians who realise that their riffs and narratives must marshal and
create the right associations out of people’s political imaginary are the ones who do
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well. To return to Apter’s example, he writes about how a politician in Nigeria
won support in part by criticising the record of the other party (summoning bad
memories of their failure); making promises about benefit (creating visionary
images of better futures); and inviting others to make claims about his power
(using traditional symbols of power) (1987). The performative political success of
this candidate, Ajasin, was partly attributable to a speech he made near the town’s
shrine when standing for election in 1983. He did not just make a powerful
argument for rejecting a bad government, he introduced local women leaders
who marshalled powerful symbolic offerings that are used in other contexts. The
chairperson of his party’s women’s group offered him kola nut for long life and
alligator pepper to make his speech more efficacious. Her actions implied that he
not only had the support of the King but that in making these offerings to the
candidate, benefits would flow if he was voted in and he would become a pow-
erful patron (ibid: 498). When he lost the election – to everyone’s disbelief – a
riot ensued, with Ajasin’s supporters accusing the winning side of rigging the
election and destroying their property. The winners were rounded up and made
to swear allegiance to the party that lost, not just to its local candidates but to its
national ones, and subsequently the judiciary reversed the vote in favour of
Ajasin. How did he get this result? The speech was a critical event and, as
Bourdieu puts it, in politics saying is a form of doing (1991: 190). And in the
rhythms, riffs and ritualisation of this event he drew on various ghosts of past and
future. These ghosts and symbols play important roles in the magnification of
politics.
The importance of ghosts, as in associations or traces of the past, are found in the
rhythms, riffs and ritualisation of politics in any part of the world. But it is only
through specific examples that we can explain and fully understand the significance
of these ghosts. Bloch has written about how royal rituals in Madagascar gain sig-
nificance through adapting non-royal symbols because the construction of author-
ity needs to transcend normal life without losing a connection to it (1989: 187–8).
So too political rituals rely on non-political symbolism to have rhetorical power.
To put it another way, you can’t have power struggles without culture. I have
written about two examples of this interdependence between power and culture in
the Westminster Parliament. Law-making in any legislature is created through the
performance of riffs, rhythms and rituals and rituals are vital for ensuring that the
results stick:
Legislation is re-formed on the anvil of debate, and each debate is not only a
(modestly) creative workshop, it is also a contest and negotiation over the
meaning and moral value of a text. While there is a theatrical quality to rituals
of debate, more importantly they constitute a web of cautionary principles
conceived to ensure that in the endless series of collisions between different
outlooks, each skirmish has an outcome (usually a victory for the government)
that is accepted by the losers.
(Crewe 2005: 183–4)
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Law could not be made without moral communities (usually political parties)
aligning themselves to the acceptance or modification/rejection of the rules and
values encoded in a document. So it is not just traces from the past but images of
the future that create law and politics. The words in a bill, or proposal for law,
symbolise action in the future to reorganise society or reflect existing economic,
political or cultural change. To make law, law-makers need to arrange their bodies
in a sanctified chamber at set times, ready to speak in prescribed ways, and take part
in these rituals of debate, before the law can be approved (or not). So far this is true
of any legislature but the second example of the intertwining of culture and
power – implied by the claim that the government usually wins – is only true of
some political systems.
In the UK, but not necessarily elsewhere, the relative powerlessness of some
parliamentarians is compensated by symbolic capital. The House of Lords is grand
and awe-inspiring, with its luxurious cathedral-like chamber, its regal public rooms
and the deference shown to peers. Those impressed by their own titles of nobility,
which they are awarded on joining the upper house, and being at the centre of
dignified state ceremonies with close proximity to the Monarch, feel humility
towards the institution, and the lowliness of their position within its corporate
grandeur. They express their humility in their courtesy toward one another and
their submission to the collective ‘will of the House’. This elevated social rank is a
contrast to their extremely limited power as a house of parliament. They can only
revise legislation, asking the government to think again, and have positions as
junior ministers in government. The elected House of Commons is the primary
chamber, to which they must always defer, even if individual backbench peers can
gain considerable influence and even persuade the government to revise the text of
bills.
The experience of disjunction between status and power, whereby social rank
compensates for lack of political clout, is shared by backbench MPs. Matthew
Parris reports that as a new MP ‘only slowly does it sink in that though the world
will doff its cap to you … and though the local newspaper will print your thoughts
on any subject … , nobody is actually taking any notice’ (2003: 241). I am not
arguing that the status of most parliamentarians is created with this intention, as if
anyone could do such a thing, but merely that the effect of politicians’ status is to
encourage acquiescence. However, MPs’ reputation is in a decline and so too is
their obedience to the whip and while this could be a coincidence, that seems
highly unlikely. So, some MPs are more powerful than others and none are pow-
erful all the time. The UK politicians in powerful positions – the ministers – have a
grip over their government departments but to different extents as there are hier-
archies between departments and within them. UK journalist Isabel Hardman
relates a junior minister’s frustration with being surveilled and treated as inferior to
the most senior one, the Secretary of State:
‘I feel as though I’ve been tagged by the Probation Service,’ she joked,
explaining that her time wasn’t her own, and that no one really wanted to
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hear about the whizzy policy ideas she’d brought into the department. A few
minutes later, a departmental press officer appeared at her elbow to ‘help’ us
with the coffee we were having. Naturally, the whole meeting become
somewhat pointless, as the minister felt as though she was being monitored
and was careful about what she said. Over the next few months, little was seen
of this minister, buried deep within the bowels of her ministry by an over-
bearing secretary of state who clearly didn’t trust her.
(2018: 126)
Meantime party leaders are losing the loyalty of the backbenchers in their party.
The UK Commons Speaker who presided from 2009 to 2019, John Bercow,
accentuated the enhancement of backbench power by giving them more oppor-
tunities to speak. He granted time for the opposition to ask 100s of ‘urgent ques-
tions’ every year, in contrast to the occasional one allowed by previous speakers. In
the complex power shifts that can be observed in Westminster, status and power
are going in opposite directions.
The power of politicians relative to each other in other countries is so various it
is difficult to generalise but we can be sure that the political and cultural are
entangled. The entanglement of power and culture is illuminated by thinking
about what happens when power hierarchies are ruptured. For Jastinder Kaur
making sense of coups in Fiji requires a look at how power struggles can’t be freed
from ethnic conflict but shouldn’t be reduced to this either (2017: 31, see also
Chapter 5). Both the 1987 and 2000 Fiji coups were a refusal to accept the result
of general elections. At first glance, the undercurrent of tension in Fiji before the
first coup was about different populations – indigenous Fijians and Indian Fijians –
sharing power, heightened by the formation of a coalition government. Although
the 1987 coup in Fiji involved no violence against the politicians, and the military
did not call for mayhem, Suva was overrun with ethnic violence with the result
that 12,000 Indians left the country (ibid: 90). The main coup instigator, Colonel
Rebuke, used the slogan ‘Fiji for Fijians’ but gave several reasons in the months to
follow for this action – a measure against disorder, the will of God – but finally
came back to the nationalist impulse: Fijians must be ruled by Fijians. Through
affirmative action, the civil service, police, military, universities and various eco-
nomic sectors were indigenised. However, after the constitution was reformed, and
non-ethnic seats were given more emphasis than ethnic ones, the Fiji Labour Party
(FLP) won a majority in the 1999 general election which brought Indians back
into Parliament with an Indian, Mahendra Chaudire, as their leader and then PM.
A year later a part-Fijian businessman, George Speight, led a coup, holding the
government hostage for 56 days, which became talked about as the ‘unfinished
business’ of the previous coup (ibid: 91–8).
Kaur points out that to call this ‘ethnic conflict’ would be a simplification, col-
luding with the way it is portrayed by the politicians for political reasons. It is
telling that when one coup supporter was challenged after the 1987 coup to
account for their support, they said: ‘Oh, the Alliance Party will give us everything
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we need, we just have to ask for it, and they’ll give it us’ (ibid: 115). The coup was
about restoring the power of the Fijian chiefs, against a different power base (partly
created by trade unions), as much as (or even more than) ethnic nationalism. But
the relationship between the politicians and people was complex. On the one
hand, ethnicity inflamed a political rhetoric used within a power struggle between
elites rather than drove the coup from the bottom up. On the other hand, when
Indian and Fijian political leaders discussed the possibility of a government of
national unity, Fijians in the capital went on a rampage targeting any Indian they
could find (ibid: 121). The coup and its aftermath put a considerable strain on
Indians as a people, but that human story was lost in the midst of the bigger poli-
tically useful story of Fijian–Indian conflict (ibid: 128). The people faced suffering,
but it was the politicians (or those with the scope to do so) who skewed events
towards a specific form of difference (ethnic, racial, gender).
Different theories of power in parliamentary studies tend to emphasise either
agency or constraint – the possibility of a barrier to action – often without a sense
of the simultaneity, contradictions, or paradoxes. Explanations about gendered
power are a good example. Few social scientists would deny that female politicians
around the world experience barriers to get into parliament and misogyny when
they get there. Political scientists Lazarus and Steigerwalt have written about this in
the US. Donald Trump ran a campaign against Hilary Clinton in 2016 labelling
her ‘a nasty woman’ and in the 2020 Democratic primary elections Elizabeth
Warren was deemed ‘unelectable’ (2018). The position of women politicians in the
US may have improved since House member Coya Knutson received a letter from
her husband in 1954 (encouraged by party leaders) asking her to give up politics
and return home. But Lazarus and Steigerwalt provide ample evidence that women
continue to be subjected to harassment and even death threats, negative stereo-
types, endless comments about their appearance, and assumptions about their
weakness and lower qualifications (ibid). Women are perceived to be less electable
and face more primary and general election challenges. Everyone assumes that
voters might discriminate against them, so even when they don’t, women have to
compensate by working harder and more collaboratively. As a consequence,
women communicate more intensively with constituents than their male counter-
parts, procure more ‘earmarks’ for their constituencies (spending bills that designate
money for specific projects) and introduce more legislative measures, even if they
are less likely to get them through Congress (ibid). But is it ‘as a consequence’?
Why then did Representative Maloney (New York) focus on her constituency,
mostly by trying to legislate to its benefit, even though she was ‘safe’, that is, had a
large majority so was likely to win at the next election?
In another context UK women MPs’ narratives about why constituency work is
socially and emotionally important to them point to their sense of identity –
wanting the fulfilment of esteem within their community not just votes for the
next election (see Chapter 3). It is as if the power struggle dial is turned up even
higher for women politicians and not necessarily in a good way. A more complex
feminist analysis of women’s higher commitment to constituency work might look
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at how they are socialised into an ethos of hard work, constrained by gender
inequalities and determined to challenge them at every turn, but also impelled by
emotions and interests that are not only gendered but shaped by other aspects of
their identity. It could be argued that emphasising women’s vulnerability (as
Lazarus and Steigerwalt do, 2018), without the corollary of their strength, as if they
can be reduced as social actors to mere women, is an expression of the very
inequality that they are observing without naming it in relational terms. Women’s
experience of power is not only gendered but a navigation of class, race, age,
sexuality and ability. A feminist theory of power needs to go beyond this oscilla-
tion between domination and resistance and listing intersecting structured
inequalities. Again, it needs to deal with simultaneity, contradiction or paradox –
whichever is relevant to the specific example – and the only logical way to do this
is historically.
To analyse how gendered power operates in a specific context we need to know
what is going on with whom, where, why, how and when. To generalise we need
to compare different cases and account for similarities and differences. Consider the
difference between women members’ experience of the UK House of Commons
and House of Lords. In contrast to my expectations, if you trace what happens
between people in the two Houses in an everyday sense, you will find clear patterns
(with exceptions) that women thrive in the Lords but face continual misogyny in the
Commons, even though the ratio of women to men is not very different (Crewe
2014a). In the Lords women thrive in a culture that discourages heightened aggres-
sion while in the Commons MPs reproduce a highly competitive culture where
many women feel alienated in the more macho events and excel when the less
rewarded work of collaboration or the caring of constituents is expected:
Surgery meetings often involve discussion of intensely personal, emotional and
painful matters and the women MPs seemed more at ease in this role than
male MPs. But this work, like much women’s labour in the domestic domain,
is under-valued. Furthermore, as Judith Butler puts it, ‘performing one’s
gender wrong initiates a set of punishments both obvious and indirect, and
performing it well provides the reassurance that there is an essentialism of
gender identity after all’ (1988: 528). So gender inequality and difference in
the UK Parliament are found in culturally constructed ideas about what it
means to be feminine and masculine, the way gender is performed by both
women and men, and power relations between and within the House of Lords
and House of Commons and the outside world.
(ibid: 677–8)
My explanation remains plausible in 2020 as far as it goes but it privileges a gen-
dered pattern and misses out other vital aspects of the power struggles which
politicians have to navigate. Let’s mention how younger women MPs are subjected
to sexual taunts, working class women face snobbery, and black women MPs deal
with far higher levels of rape and death threats on social media. Hardman found:
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‘not only was it well known in Westminster that there were sex pests in the cor-
ridors of power; it was also acknowledged that there was a culture in which
women, particularly younger women, were treated as lesser beings, sex objects
who deserved comments ranging from the smutty to the obscene’ (2018: 147).
The challenge is to describe a multitude of concurrent processes, each one
operating as traces and possibilities in the others, as well as the relationships
between these elements. In the end this becomes partly a methodological question,
so I will return to this in the final chapter, where my response to this challenge is
found in the role of imagination in learning with others. But before I discuss
learning, I have one more suggestion for analysing the relationship between the
elements and that is to use the analogy of dials. Dials are useful for writing about
democratic politics with a sense of proportion.
The democracy dials
This book is about entanglements – between identities and different aspects of
political work; between sociality and culture; and between traces of past power and
visions for the future. To navigate these entanglements MPs have to shapeshift
between audiences, demands and places. To find a way of understanding the con-
tinuities between these shifts, I have suggested that we investigate rhythms, riffs and
rituals in our detective work within parliaments. But we still have to make choices
about what to prioritise in our inquiries, not in the sense of finding causes and
effects but creating theory that helps us understand the specific and general human
condition and experience. As Julia Paley argues, we need to get beyond both the
typologies and narrow cause-and-effect theories of political science, but also
anthropology’s focus on people’s imagination without accounting for our choices,
to see how democracy is both practical and imagined with a sense of proportion
(2002: 471). Her definition of democracy is highly political:
the discourses labelling regimes as democracies are strategically deployed by
groups with strong interests in particular definitions and contested by others
differently situated in relations of power. Noting the constitutive nature of
those struggles, rather than establishing an a priori definition of democracy, is
one of the central contributions of an anthropological approach.
(ibid)
Rather than spending too long on defining, listing and testing how variables relate in
cause and effect patterns, I am more concerned to think about the links and intensity
of related elements and what they mean and do for different people. So how can we
do this? Introducing the idea of ‘dials’ might force us to explain more systematically
why specific relationships, processes or events are more significant than others. To put
it another way: how, when and why is the intensity dial turned up?
Politicians do politics with the dial turned up because they walk with even more
friends and foes, and engage in more bitter power struggles, with more at stake,
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than the rest of us. The dial of intensity – of emotion, pleasure, pain, cultural sig-
nificance, political impact … – is higher for politicians meaning that what they do
tends to be magnified compared to ordinary people. Politicians doing politics is
magnified beyond others doing politics, rather like mental illness is an amplification
of the kinds of disturbance that everyone feels for short periods of time. Their
relationship with the world is like a multi-dimensional hourglass with the politician
placed in the narrow neck, squeezed by people from every direction. They are
involved in decisions that affect whole nations and even beyond. It is always the
case, irrespective of time or place, that when a great deal is at stake political events
organised by the state are highly ritualised. When a parliament is being opened, law
is being fought over, or the Prime Minister questioned, then the importance is
conveyed by ritual – with its symbols, hierarchies and rules – because ritualisation is
a way of dealing with intensity. In research terms, ritual is a good indicator for the
potential of the intensity dial being turned up high.
In other ways, you find variability. While the demands on elected representa-
tives to solve problems faced by 1000s in constituencies has been growing in recent
decades in most countries, at the same time the gaze of the media and citizens on
them has intensified. What politicians do, or fail to do, is under a microscope –
magnified and then chewed over before an audience of millions. Digital media is
transforming political relationships in ways we are only just beginning to under-
stand. In countries with a free press, the public used to rely on print, radio and
broadcast journalists to inform them about what was going on in parliament through
interviews, commentary and debates. As journalists developed a more critical and less
deferential approach (to put it politely), political parties increasingly employed press
officers and special advisers to defend politicians (or, to put it impolitely, ‘spin doc-
tors’). The digital revolution has enabled bloggers and politicians to communicate en
masse to the public directly. In countries with no free press, some people are getting
access to information about politics for the first time. Politicians seem increasingly
tempted to use social media to disclose secrets, win favour with potential supporters
and to attack their opponents. (With the Covid-19 pandemic, and severe restrictions
on face-to-face interaction, most had no choice about turning to digital online
communication.) They receive savage attacks in return that may be no worse than
the poisonous letters they once found in their postbag in substance, but the volume
has increased exponentially. In most countries women politicians are even more
disparagingly treated than men by journalists and on social media, and especially
women belonging to minority groups. Twitter and Facebook have accelerated the
cycle of news so that while a week was a long time in politics in the 1960s
(according to British PM Harold Wilson), a few hours is now the equivalent. ‘MPs
are just ordinary people, and if they don’t come in here with the skin of a rhino,
they’ll find a way to self-medicate,’ MP Liam Bryne told a journalist (Hardman
2018: 161). The more politicians use social media, the higher the dial goes up.
The context for this intensity dial explains why it is higher for some MPs than
others, for those engaging more on social media but also those representing
populations in urban centres where social interaction is accelerating, for example.
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The German sociologist Rosa argues in his tour de force Resonance that the impact
of social acceleration means the pace of change has increased and we are under
pressure to do everything faster. It is not just human desire that impels this accel-
eration, but also the way society is developing; to keep the prevailing economic
system going, it is assumed we need innovation, growth and acceleration (2019:
409). We fear we might be left behind, and we get addicted to competition, so we
collude with the acceleration: ‘we must run ever faster in order to maintain our place in
the world’ (ibid: 415). This is true for all of us, but whatever affects society in gen-
eral is amplified in parliament. Politicians increase their reach but democratic poli-
tics takes time, so politicians can’t keep up – they become fire-fighters not leaders.
What is the significance of magnification and acceleration? Graeber and Sahlins
suggest that ‘it is the ghost of divine kingship still hanging over us’ and ‘apparently
exotic tribulations of bygone monarchs still find their echoes in forms of ultimately
arbitrary power that still surround us, like so many bruised and indignant deities, in
national politics to this day’ (2017: 458, 464). This is so familiar to us because kings
don’t only exist on the national stage; we recognise them in our own homes.
Kings, or modern day politicians, are a mix of human and superhuman – magnified
versions of the rest of us – and we hate (or sometimes adore) them for it. As John
Dunn puts it, the idea of democracy implies that ‘in human political communities
it ought to be ordinary people (the adult citizens) and not extra-ordinary people
who rule’ (1992: v). Giles Brandreth (former MP in the UK) told the BBC that
fellow Conservative Ann Widdecombe (another former MP) marched him out of
first class to second class when travelling by train, advising him that it was better if
MPs did not set themselves apart.3 And yet, once citizens become MPs they can
only survive by adapting to extraordinary work and so becoming different, and that
difference so far has mostly consisted of more frequent and visible engagement.
Even when politicians have turned the intensity dial up, the public remain dis-
appointed or even resentful towards them. People react to the dissatisfaction with
democracy by calling for one of two options. They either want their political lea-
ders to be sacked or political institutions to be reformed, mirroring both popular
and political science obsessions with individuals and systems in political worlds
alongside a neglect of relationships. The unfinished business of developing
democracy across the world – shifting from a shallow dissatisfying form of demo-
cratic politics to a more sophisticated deeper form – will surely be found in new
relationships and processes, not new leaders and structures? The skill and under-
standing of leaders are all important but not in the sense of accomplishing change
as superhero individuals, rather in their capacity to deepen relationships within and
between groups in political world. Accountability is not achieved by individuals
but in relationships. So this is the second sense of my democracy dial. While poli-
ticians might long for the dial to be turned down on expectations, exposure and
censure, citizens want democracy to address their demands – the democracy dial
needs to go higher in the sense of accountability.
This assumption about the need for deeper democracy was the contention of a
programme I created with colleagues in the UK, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and
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Ethiopia.4 Taking Appadurai’s idea of ‘deep democracy’, we noted his point that
grassroots movements are finding new ways to combine local activism with global
networking (2001: 25). Since he wrote that two decades ago, both Extinction
Rebellion and Black Lives Matter, social movements demanding action against
global warming and the murder of black people respectively, have emerged as
powerful examples. States need to find ways to respond to these demands of civil
society without insisting on their co-option by government. Rather than assuming
that democratising is about changing individual politicians, reforming parliaments
or insisting that civil society serves governments, we assumed in this new pro-
gramme that change was needed in the relationship between parliament and society
(Diamond 1999: 18). What this means will vary from place to place. We were
interested to hear what citizens expected out of democracy and this relationship
between politicians and people in different countries. Mandy Sadan, one of our
Co-Investigators, explains, ‘It is difficult to conceive of a flourishing democracy
without more concerted attempts to listen to and address the profound distrust,
social stresses and political marginalization experience by many of Myanmar’s
ethnic and religious minority groups’ (2016: 2).
What did we assume about the relationship between democracy, development
and conflict? Democracy in a shallow sense – merely electing representatives
through the ritual of voting so with the accountability dial turned down – is no
guarantee that citizens’ rights will be fulfilled. Many governments within democ-
racies have a history of using violence against those who may be in part expressing
demands for inclusion. Democracy can even deepen social divisions and exclusion
(Spencer 2007) and bring risks of intimidation and violence, for example when
women’s participation increases (Crewe 2014a). We did not assume deeper
democracy would necessarily lead to peace or faster economic development either.
As DFID (now FCDO) points out, a strong democracy can decrease or increase the
risk of ethnic conflict, by allowing the legitimate expression of grievances: elections
can often provoke violence, particularly in newly established democracies. Citizen
engagement too is no guarantee for deepening democracy: it can lead to more
responsive states but equally it can exacerbate elite capture, clientelism and
patronage (DFID 2010: 51, 56).
We were determined not to idealise democracy but to respond to the urgent
need for a detailed understanding of the politics of a country when recommending
or implementing reform – or even re-imagining politics with a new sense of his-
tory – so that solutions respond to fast changing contexts and do not neglect pro-
cess in the rush for results. We chose to work mainly in two countries that are
important to the UK government’s aid portfolio: Ethiopia and Myanmar. We
wanted to create opportunities for national scholars in those two countries to
undertake their own historical and cultural research on parliaments within
democracy. Research has an important role in the scrutiny of democracy and the
promotion of citizen engagement. We hoped that research on the relationships
between elected representatives and the people they represent would generate ideas
for combining representative and participatory democracy in more imaginative,
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Who is an MP for the Kunama?
Mitiku Gabrehiwot, Mekelle University
The Kunama are a minority ethnic group with special protection under the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’s constitution. Since 1992, the Kunama established
their self-governance with elected representatives from local to national levels. At the
moment, there are 202 representatives at sub-district level, seven at the district level,
two at the regional level and two at the federal level (one in each house of parlia-
ment). From observation of their interaction, we found that the level and intensity of
participation of the representatives at the sub-district and district level are both high.
The way that representatives are scrutinised reveals a specific form of edgy intimacy;
it is a form of social criticism in a cultural setting because they all live together. Since
the representatives live and socialise with the people in the same area and eat what
they eat and joke about what they joke, the people use jokes, sarcasm and at times
ridicule of representatives as a way of scrutinising them in their own way. They tease
their big bellies, a common reference to corrupt city-dwelling MPs.
Given the location of the Kunama (in a remote area of Western Tigray where the Tigray
Liberation Front established a stronghold in the 1970s), they adopted the Bayto, a local
constituency, the function of which is the same as parliament. Bayto is a space in the
neighbourhood – a common space – and is even called the local parliament. Accessible
by all, the physical space of Bayto is the most common space next to church compounds.
This created a sense of belongingness among the people which makes discussion ‘nat-
ural’. The success and acceptance of representation differs from local to the national
levels. The physical space at the regional and national parliament level tend to intimidate
MPs from disadvantaged regions or marginalised ethnic groups. Representatives at sub-
district and district level, on the other hand, are familiar with, and comfortable in, the
setting (physical and social) and so perform better in people’s eyes, for example, engaging
in discussion from a position of knowledge. Local representatives are well versed in the
language and ritual of the Bayto since it is cemented in the culture, while the regional
and federal MPs are required to behave according to the designed protocols, making
representation questionable. It makes people ask whether the culture and discipline of
the parliaments is inclusive at all. On the other hand, representatives at Bayto are closely
watched, supervised and at times, corrected by the council of elders, a social unit
responsible for most socio-cultural matters at the village level.
From an agro-pastoralist perspective, representative democracy is a new arrival. Tradi-
tionally, the Kunama are less stratified, even classless, and membership of a given class /
elite is less attractive. According to the elderly, unlike the Highland Ethiopians, the
Kunama had no titles attached to individuals, no matter how accomplished an individual
may be. The idea of representation in democracy in general, and parliament in particular,
is a new phenomenon. Representation demands education and other skills that are not
equally or fairly distributed. For the older generation, the education given to the youth
makes them qualified for political roles but at the same time it means that the older, wiser
people who know what is best for the Kunama are being sidelined. For the Kunama,
representation should be more about ‘wisdom’ than political consciousness.
Given the rough history of the Kunama in their dealings with the state, representa-
tion is a sign of a healing process. If not part of it, they know they will be left behind.
The Kunama see representatives as a sign of belongingness in the state but not as
people who listen to them and address their issues on a regular basis. The values and
mission of the general public are defined, drawn and re-drawn by elders who are
more charismatic than elected representatives.
FIGURE 8.1 Who is an MP for the Kunama? Mitiku Gabrehiwot, Mekelle University.
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creative and systematic ways with a better sense of their specific historical and
cultural significance. Just as Stacy Pigg found in Nepal that vernacular ideas about
what ‘development’ means emerged out of people’s relationships with each other
(1992) – so that city-dwellers and elites within villages are equated with moder-
nity – we assumed that the meaning of democracy shapeshifts across the world.
We created opportunities for scholars and artists in Ethiopia and Myanmar to
probe vernacular ideas about democracy and parliament’s role within it by giving
grants for them to inquire into politics. Figure 8.1 shows an example of what one
these scholars, the anthropologist Mitiku Gabrehiwot, found about the way the
Kunama view their politicians.
Colleagues across Bangladesh (Ahmed 2019 and Ahmed 2020), Ethiopia
(Ayenew et al 2019) and Myanmar are beginning to reveal a spectacular range of
cultures in their local and national political worlds, further enriching the scholar-
ship on politicians and parliaments that I have inquired into within this book. I will
not steal the thunder of those who are yet to publish their work; Mitiku Gabre-
hiwot is the exception because we are working in a new coalition together on a
comparative ethnography of parliaments in six countries and I could not resist
giving you a tiny glimpse into his research (with his permission, of course).
This cultural and political diversity does not preclude comparison. There are three
processes that are worthy of inquiry in all democratic parliaments: (a) the sociality of
parliaments – as found in the work of elections, representation and scrutiny, as exam-
ples – that I outlined in Part I, (b) the culture of parliaments – with its riffs, rhythms
and rituals – as I explained in Part II, and finally (c) the democracy dial. The democ-
racy dial can be seen from two contradictory viewpoints whichever country you are
in, so is really two dials. From the viewpoint of politicians in democracies, they do
political work with the intensity dial turned up high by exposure to multitudes,
competitive demands, power struggles, contradictions, antagonism and emotions. We
Representatives are more about the fulfilment of state ‘obligations’ than adhering to
democracy, more ceremonial than substantive and fashionable rather than of neces-
sity. For the Kunama, the parliamentarians are go-betweens between the state and
the collective identity of the people, but only superficially. However, representation
serves two basic unintended purposes: that the healing process of the people is being
expedited through belongingness to the state’s democratic institutions and that
inclusion in the federal structure is granted. For the Kunama, while the physical
representation is welcomed and fulfils the structure, what it means and what impact
representatives bring, with or without the watchful scrutiny of the council of elders,
is less significant. Overall, the concept of representation is, therefore viewed from a
collective angle rather than an individual MP’s perspective; more symbolic than
substantive and more structural than functional.
* This research was funded by the Global Research Network on Parliaments and
People in SOAS as part of the AHRC and GCRF Network Plus Programme AH/
R005435/1
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all do politics when we engage in the public realm, but politicians do it with the dial
turned up. They might benefit, and therefore so might those they represent, from
turning it down. Indeed, turning the intensity dial down might leave more room for
reflection, depth and focusing on the more urgent priorities.
From the viewpoint of citizens, I have argued, we might view the democracy
dial rather differently. We might want more engagement with parliaments and
politicians – turning the dial up to work towards more consultation, discussion and
accountability. From our viewpoint, the democracy dial is currently too low
because engagement is superficial, infrequent or partial. We might want more
thoughtful, reflective engagement with our own MPs and between politicians and
people more generally. The challenge for all of us, whether in Ethiopia, Myanmar
or the UK, is working out how we can turn these dials in opposite directions at the
same time when we have yet to learn how to navigate entanglements and contra-
dictions with equanimity. Rather than measuring democracy by its appearance,
perhaps we could judge it by the quality of its relationships between politicians and
the people. Let’s have less aggressive noise and more compassionate resonance.
Notes
1 Earl Russell, HL Debates, 13 October 1998, col. 1324.
2 Interview with Emma Crewe, spring 2000.
3 Today Programme, BBC Radio 4, 20 October 2012.
4 For details see https://grnpp.org/partners-research/, accessed 13 February 2021.
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IMPROVISING TOGETHER
I realised how much improvisation was required in both politics and research when
chatting to Tom Goldsmith, presently Clerk of the Committees, in Portcullis
House café. This café is the main meeting place for politicians, officials and visitors
within the estate of the UK Parliament. Tom is one of the officials with a ringside
seat on Parliament, astute powers of observation and an ethos of discretion, which
makes them the perfect informants about MPs. A prominent MP walked up to us
and seeing my grey pass (which should have meant I was a member of parliamen-
tary staff) started joking with Tom, warning me that he was unstable. They had
been on a committee work trip together so knew each other well. Tom kept
trying to intervene to halt this banter and finally managed to say, ‘this is Dr Crewe
from London University, she is doing an academic study of MPs.’ The MP hardly
paused. In a fraction of a second he was transformed from jovial, chatty mate
leaning over us into upright back-straight, highly dignified important person,
showing respect to an academic with formality, politeness and reserve. He offered
his hand and announced with solemnity, ‘Dr Crewe, it is delightful to meet you, if
I can help in any way please do get in touch,’ handing me his business card and
disappearing fast.
I looked at Tom in astonishment. He patiently pointed out the obvious: all day long
MPs are making judgements about how it is appropriate to behave with those in front
of them – one minute being chummy with a clerk he knew well assuming from my
pass I was an official too, the next showing respect to an academic who was planning to
write a book. But as Bourdieu points out, such an encounter is suffused with history:
‘human action is not an instantaneous reaction to immediate stimuli, and the slightest
“reaction” of an individual to another is pregnant with the whole history of these
persons and of their relationship’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 124). Generally
even the reaction of strangers to each other, in this case an MP and an academic, emerge
out of their taken-for-granted dispositions informed by their experience of other
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politicians and academics. It is always both an individualised and social encounter. The
skill required to act is not merely to size up another individual; you have to read that
individual in that specific encounter as a representative of a social group with a history,
purpose and network. You have to react in the moment but with a sense of history and
anticipation of likely impact on each other at the same time.
Why is this story about Tom, an MP and me significant? It was at this seemingly
trivial moment that I realised what I was studying – the shapeshifting work of
politicians: how they not only improvise from one relationship to another in a
moment but respond to various pressures at the same time. But it also revealed
much to me about how anthropology research unfolds: unevenly, through
improvisation and by learning with people. I could identify with the MP’s shape-
shifting because I too make endless tiny adjustments as I navigate my relationships
with others. That brief encounter changed my research because it helped me realise
what both politicians and researchers are doing.
Researching as learning and (in the fullness of time) advocacy
Anthropologists don’t so much study people as if they are objects as learn with
them. Ingold explains, ‘we observe not by objectifying others but by paying
FIGURE 9.1 The improvised learning of researchers and politicians.
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attention to them, watching what they do and listening to what they say. We study
with people, rather than making studies of them’ (2018: 11). I argued in Chapter 1
that this collaborative way of doing research requires interdisciplinarity, reflexivity
and taking account of plural perspectives, but also being frequently critical. So even
if intending collaboration, at times it can become conflictual. The devil is in the
detail with these processes: hard graft is needed to achieve this kind of learning
across disciplines, across self and other, and across conflicting viewpoints. But it is
also necessary to develop a sense of proportion about what is significant. You need to
look at many small things in order to develop an understanding of the big things.
So, this work of learning with people (research) deserves a whole chapter of its
own. Improvised research is not only obligatory for anthropologists, but is what
politicians are doing in their work continually: it is a vital part of effective leader-
ship. If politicians were better researchers (and researchers more savvy about poli-
tics), perhaps the administration of states might improve.
My starting point is to take one’s own ignorance very seriously and assume that
knowledge is found everywhere. People tend to be expert about their own lives;
that is why anthropology has a participatory sensibility. Abélès clarifies: ‘Anthro-
pology proceeds in a different way than philosophers in their critique of sover-
eignty, not least because it dives into daily lives and inverts the focal point by
privileging a bottom-up perspective’ (2014: 92). Anthropologists aspire to chal-
lenge hierarchies of knowledge and the assumption that superior expertise resides
in the Global North, urban elites or centres of learning, or that people far from
those controlling capital remain in ignorance. We try to avoid stamping our own
assumptions on others without noticing that we are doing so: ‘In striving to trans-
cend a view of the world based on the premises of European culture and history,
anthropologists are also encouraged to look beneath the world of appearances and
taken-for-granted assumptions in social life in general’ (Gledhill 1994: 7). In any
country you find different types of knowledge and everywhere, Olivier de Sardan
points out, you get technical and scientific knowledge co-habiting with social,
magical knowledge – in Europe as much as in Africa (2005: 160). You can become
more even-handed in valuing knowledge by taking expertise in the Global South
seriously but also by treating those in the Global North as people to learn with as
well. Abélès had a seminal influence on the anthropology of parliaments by taking
politician informants at home as seriously as those in foreign places, finding the
exotic in the familiar, and injecting history into comparisons between different
political worlds (2000). Just because his native France, for example, seemed well-
known to him, he did not shortcut the process of intense observation across dif-
ferent sites in a political space. When doing fieldwork in one department of
France, it was only by travelling around extensively that he realised how some
candidates became eligible, in the eyes of voters, as a result of their places in net-
works of kinship relations (Abélès 1991: 263).
My next assumption is that interdisciplinarity leads to more interesting theory
than a narrow attachment to one discipline. Interdisciplinarity works better if we
begin with an intense respect – a curiosity and an assumption of value – towards
196 Politics with the dial turned up
other disciplines. So sweeping assumptions that science produces more rigorous
findings than humanities is an unhelpful comparison, for example. Physicist turned
philosopher Thomas Kuhn taught us long ago that shifts in paradigms occur when
there are too many contradictions in the established scientific way of thinking, and
both old and new paradigms can be complementary and logical within their own
terms (1962). The history of science doesn’t invalidate science, but all current
theories will eventually require revision or refinement (Bernstein 2010: 37) and
some scientific theories are better for explaining certain phenomena or questions
than others. Science, social science and humanities shift as culture does, after all
they are embedded in culture – as Jewett explains in US history, from the civil war
to the cold war (2012) – so all knowledge is both embedded and provisional.
Social anthropology has variously described itself as a science, a social science and
a humanity over the years, emerging with a different way of describing itself in the
US and Europe. But there appears to be a general agreement in contemporary
debates that anthropology is found at the intersection of all three, even if my per-
sonal inclination is towards the humanities. Anthropology has the advantage of
being in conversation with many disciplines so can gain from the capacities of each.
Arendt wrote that sciences easily prove their substantive worth, but it is history and
humanities that ‘find out, stand guard over, and interpret factual truth’ (1977: 257).
What Ehrenzweig wrote about art can be extended to politics: good relationships
can transform when creativeness entails giving away parts of our self, and then
taking back into ourselves the accretions stemming from interacting with others
(1967: 105). Through arts and humanities, we can understand the cultural pro-
cesses, emotions and aesthetics in everyday politics and their role in transforming
relationships. Although anthropology often resides in social science faculties, I’m
with Ingold in thinking of writing ethnography as more art than science:
In thickening our descriptions, and allowing a real historical agency to the
people who figure in them, we might want to qualify the sense in which these
accounts could be considered to be scientific. Ethnographic description, we
might well say, is more an art than a science, but no less accurate or truthful
for that. Like the Dutch painters of the seventeenth century, the European and
American ethnographers of the twentieth could be said to have practiced an
‘art of describing’ (Alpers, 1983), albeit predominantly in words rather than in
line and color. Theirs is still a standard against which we measure con-
temporary work.
(2014: 385)
The describing of what we see and hear is taken seriously in anthropology, not just the
theorising in the sense of explaining how and why, and in any case one spills into the
other. You can’t explain what is going on without a strong sense of its meaning and
impact, which leads you quickly into serious theoretical questions and puzzles.
All social sciences are concerned with the basis of generalisation. Induction is
about observing data to test a hypothesis and building the best theories out of it
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while deduction involves inferring the only possible theory in an inquiry. Deduc-
tion begins with a rule and reaches a specific conclusion, while induction begins
with the observation of specific instances from which to then generalise. However,
of course any approach begins with theoretical assumptions and anthropologists
prefer to be far more participatory than most social scientists, aspiring to follow
puzzles that bubble up because they matter to their informants. So it might be
more accurate to conceive of the anthropological research approach as abduction in
the sense that the pragmatist philosopher Charles Peirce proposed (1931, 1958). An
abductive inference is also about coming to the best available explanation (like
induction) but can be conceived as an ongoing, iterative and emergent process
throughout the research rather than an event that takes place towards the end. The
process of an inquiry begins with a puzzle – or an incomplete set of observations
and conclusions, both specific and generalisable – and ends with the most plausible
explanation at that point, which then generates more puzzles. The assumption is
that knowledge is always incomplete, some doubt remains, and so research is never
finished. The philosopher Richard Bernstein writes about this kind of approach as
‘engaged fallibilistic pluralism’. It is founded on the same pragmatic principles:
such a pluralistic ethos places new responsibilities upon each of us. For it
means taking our fallibility seriously – resolving that however much we are
committed to our own styles of thinking, we are willing to listen to others
without denying or suppressing the otherness of the other.
(1991: 335–6)
While induction and deduction (at least in the hands of social scientists) tend to
demand a research plan, in practice the experience of abduction puts the emphasis
on listening to multiple views and improvising according to need as an inquiry
proceeds.
The process of anthropological research is iterative and emergent because the
researcher learns on the job with informants and not at a distance from them.
There are different kinds of learning because there are different types of knowledge
and Bloch points out that language-based knowledge has been over-emphasised by
anthropology (or had been up until then, i.e., 1991). Much knowledge is non-
linguistic: children can conceive of a ‘house’ before they can say the word (Bloch
1991: 186). We learn how to weave, farm, drive and play the piano by doing
them. I’d add, you learn to play the piano in your fingers as much as your brain;
your body is as involved as your mind. It would be impossible to become skilled in
these activities – or in doing anthropological research – if instructed through the
medium of language alone and we are only truly expert in farming or doing
research when we no longer think about what we are doing in words exclusively.
However, thinking is a vital part of skill and this is true for anthropologists as much
as anyone else doing complex work.
How does this ‘thinking’ work? Bloch tells us that cognitively developing a skill
is not just about using your memory to summon the endless examples of
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configurations you have met in the past, but is about learning how to learn so that
you can cope with subtly new situations. In short, dealing with the familiar and the
new in situations requires improvisation and the less you are distracted by the
familiar, the more scope you have for navigating novelty. Bloch’s argument about
how we process information is extremely helpful for our understanding about how
we think, and therefore learn. Rather than following single sequential trains of
thought, which would be unbelievably slow, human minds engage in multiple
parallel processing to analyse information (ibid: 191). Finally, he warns against
adopting the first approach ourselves as anthropologists; that is, we should avoid
over simplified single sequential trains of thought to explain puzzles, including
when suggested by our informants:
Thus, when our informants honestly say ‘this is why we do such things’, or
‘this is what this means’, or ‘this is how we do such things’, instead of being
pleased we should be suspicious and ask what kind of peculiar knowledge is
this which can take such an explicit, linguistic form? Indeed, we should treat
all explicit knowledge as problematic, as a type of knowledge probably remote
from that employed in practical activities under normal circumstances.
(ibid: 193–4)
So we need to learn with informants but at the same time with a critical form of
collaboration. For this reason, we learn as researchers more efficiently by doing
what they do with them, rather than merely asking them to explain their culture
or motives. That is also why it has been by engaging in politics myself that I begin
to glimpse what being a politician might be like. This takes time; you can’t learn
about institutions as complex as parliaments in a rush. When I told the Gentleman
Usher of the Black Rod in 1998 that I planned to learn about the House of Lords
in a year, he told me it would take ten. I’m still learning 20 years later, not least
because new peers keep getting made and the entangled culture and politics of the
place keeps changing.
If research is about learning from others, and learning inevitably means that you
are doing so actively, not merely absorbing information in a machine-like way but
interacting with others with an open mind (and body), then what is the impact on
the researcher? The line between self and other, researcher and researched,
becomes in part blurred. Mead put it like this:
Selves can only exist in definite relationships to other selves. No hard-and-fast
line can be drawn between our own selves and the selves of others, since our
own selves exist and enter as such into our experience only in so far as the
selves of others exist and enter as such into our experience also.
(1934: 164)
We become part of the research and research must be seen as a social process that
inevitably leads to change. As researchers we have to pay attention to this and take
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account of Bloch’s argument, and Mead before him, that for novelty to emerge
you have to have the capacity to be several things at the same time: ‘The social
character of the universe we find in the situation in which the novel event is in
both the old order and the new which its advent heralds. Sociality is the capacity of
being several things at once’ (Mead 1932/2002: 75). So, research requires multiple
parallel processing, improvisation and attention to old and new. I know from
teaching that you can’t get someone to understand something new unless they can
relate it to something already existing in their mind. To convey the substance of a
new idea, you have to conjure the ghosts of old ideas that you share. Since you
often don’t know what their old ideas are until you work together, the processes of
working with the substance and the ghosts requires improvisation with students (or
those you wish to influence) rather than planning. Writing books is even more
difficult because you can’t converse with your reader in real time and this is why
I’m still learning how to make more intelligible my observations of the Westmin-
ster Parliament. This book is merely my latest attempt to keep a disjointed con-
versation going with strangers whose thinking I’m continually trying to understand.
The old order with its old ideas is described by another pragmatist, John Dewey,
as the accretion of habits. Habits change and we need to recognise these shifts but
to act ethically we should also acknowledge the possibility that we can take part in
changing them. He recommends in this process of influencing that we ‘foster
impulses and habits which experience has shown to make us sensitive, generous,
imaginative, impartial in perceiving the tendency of our inchoate dawning activ-
ities’ (1922: 207). I find that more inspiring as advice for how to do research
ethically than the guidelines that emanate from some university ethics committees.
Anthropology can usefully recognise the habits of those who have dominated the
study of parliament – critiquing the past with sensitivity and generosity – and use
imagination with impartiality to suggest new habits for how to approach research.
It is wise not to rush. So before engaging in advocacy, an ethical researcher needs a
thorough understanding of the past, the present and possibilities and even then,
should continue to assume that the next steps are also a learning process.
Curiosity is vital to advocacy but also to leadership and so I’ll make a final point
in this section for politicians. Mead wrote that leaders try to change their com-
munity, enlarging and enriching it. Great religious leaders like Jesus, Mohammed
and Buddha have increased the size of their communities by appealing to them
about cosmological relationships in ways that are distinctive to that group (old
ideas) but relevant to the future (new substance), and persuasive for existing and
potential new members too (respectively: ‘love your neighbour’, ‘justice will come
to all if we submit to the will of the one god’, ‘reach enlightenment’). Then those
leaders stand out as symbolic, ‘representative of the community as it might exist if it
were fully developed along the lines that they had started. New conceptions have
brought with them, through great individuals, attitudes which enormously enlarge
the environment within which these individuals live’ (Mead 1934: 217).1 To
change others, that is, to teach them, you have to have first learned what is their
generalised attitude, which is why great leadership always entails both learning and
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teaching. The pressure on politicians to teach, and the taboo on admitting that they
have to learn, does neither them nor those they serve and represent any good at all.
Entangled, reflexive anthropology: how and why?
Entanglements have been a thread throughout this book. Anthropology can only
be done with a sense of other disciplines – geography, history, cultural studies,
feminism, political science, psychology and so on. But we also need to have a sense
of what makes us unique as a discipline, otherwise we may as well merge with
sociology. One of the most important contributions of anthropology to the study
of parliaments is to show how the separation of the political from the social or
cultural is artificial in all societies including those in Europe. The political work of
parliamentarians in democracies is organised around elections, representation and
scrutiny; each of these processes entails alliance-building and dealing with conflicts.
Politics is a process of walking and talking between friends and foes. It means
creating and communicating riffs, navigating space and time with familiar and new
rhythms, and getting things done through rituals. In the inevitable power struggles
that ensue within parliament (and in any social group, for that matter), people
develop skill in summoning ghosts, accumulating symbolic capital and creating
irresistible new riffs, rhythms and rituals. But they are constrained, and especially so
in the competitive environments of politics, by hierarchies of power, knowledge
and value. Globally women face greater constraints than men when doing politics
in the public realm. This doesn’t stop them becoming leaders necessarily, and
older, richer, well-connected women have more room for manoeuvre than
younger, poorer and isolated ones, but they have to work harder than men. Other
inequalities based on difference, whether structured by class, age, race, ethnicity,
ability or sexuality, are too complex to summarise here. But their relevance to the
study of parliament is obvious when you consider how deeply these structuring
processes affect friendship and enmity. It is harder to build an alliance with some-
one who hates or despises you or assumes you hate them.
To research politics, power and political institutions, you have to look at the
uneven, complex social relations between politicians, between the governing and
the governed, and also between researcher and researched. Part of the reason that
we need to study our own relationships with the politicians we want to know
about is to deal with the tricky problem of getting access to them. Comparing the
way parliamentary and council debates and decision-making are ritualised across
the world is skewed by the difficulty of gaining access to some institutions. While
some nations welcome visitors into political chambers, many remain inaccessible
and hostile. Simone Abram found Norway much easier to study than the UK:
In the Norwegian case, elements such as the public access to council meetings,
public broadcast of those meetings, and availability of contact with participants
reveal an entirely different set of assumptions about whom government is for
than that found in the United Kingdom. Sitting in the segregated public
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gallery of a local authority in England recently, I was threatened with eviction
for taking out a camera, accused of being a threat to security rather than being
seen as a citizen with intense interest in the means by which I was governed.
(2017: 42)
MPs tend to ignore letters from researchers begging for an interview. Why
wouldn’t you? They have more important tasks like running the country, scruti-
nising government and answering constituents’ inquiries. I’m impressed more than
hurt if I get a response from an MP saying that an interview it is not a priority for
their constituents, such as this one when I asked for permission to shadow:
Dear Emma
It is good to hear from you, and thank you for getting in touch. I’m flat-
tered, especially as your blog is so humorous. And it was great to meet you
recently. I have thought seriously about your kind offer but I am afraid I’ve
decided that it doesn’t make sense for my constituents or for myself to go
ahead with such a project at the moment. Many apologies and I hope you find
a good opportunity somewhere else in the country.
Best wishes
xxxx MP
The vast majority of letters and emails I’ve written to MPs get no reply. That
seems reasonable given that they are dealing with so many other pressures. But
there are risks for them in ignoring writers or journalists. Although our ethics
committees constrain us in peculiar ways (obsessing about obtaining consent to
research, as if we were conducting a medical trial, rather than avoiding other forms
of harm), a researcher might get it into their head that whistleblowing on an MP
was justifiable in the public interest. People already in the public eye are constantly
exposed to risks of further exposure and can explain neither this (it sounds as if
they are worrying about being found out) nor their reasons for avoidance and
unreliability (it sounds as if they are moaning). It is difficult to get in the room with
well-known people because there are so many claims on their time and their
reputation is both precious and fragile.
The way I got close to politicians involved flattery. A former MP told me: ‘a
politician has, by and large, an infinite capacity to absorb flattery … They can be
persuaded of virtually anything if it’s skilful enough’ (Crewe 2015a: 3). This works
well on everyone as a persuasive technique but you have to mean it. Since flattery
implies insincerity, in practice I tried to offer MPs genuine praise. I would watch
MPs in a debate, or in a committee meeting, and look them up on Wikipedia and
their own website on my iPhone. Then I would catch them after the meeting
broke up as they moved towards the door and ask:
Would you mind if I asked a quick question? I’m a researcher from London
University. My word you put the minister on the spot! When you argued for
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that change in social care policy it sounded slightly different from your line last
month. Have you seen new evidence or … ?
Whether they were pleased to be recognised for the specific expertise, or delighted
to talk about their political obsession, it usually worked as a strategy for securing an
interview.
I have only managed to secure occasional access to the other parliaments that my
close colleagues have studied – in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Ethiopia – which all
operate with fortress-like impenetrability. I wasn’t long enough in any of these
countries to develop the necessary contacts and alliances. It was easier for me in the
UK than it might be for some because my private school education gave me a
feeling of ease with some, while my career in the voluntary and public sector gave
me much in common with others. How did my background then influence what I
discovered? Trained in the post-structuralist sociology of Bourdieu and Foucault, it
is many decades since I abandoned an individualistic conceptualisation of power in
favour of a relational view. Since then I have become more dissatisfied with the
cruder post-structuralist accounts that imply that power is found in deterministic
structuring processes. To get beyond oscillating between individual and structure in
this theory of power, I will now reflect on what happens in between – in processes
of relating – which means not only getting into my own history, but into how to
think about memory, history and imagination more generally.
My views on gendered leadership are influenced by old family memories, hark-
ing back to a remote father from a privileged white English family who in his turn
rarely saw his own parents and was traumatised by fighting in the Second World
War. During his life he struggled to find a professional sense of purpose but rarely
spoke about it. It was not his male authority I resented, it was his lack of it. It was
my failing in turn not to understand him until after he had died. However, when
people die your relationship with them obviously persists in your memory and
thoughts, affecting not just that relationship but the other ones in your life. Family
relationships still influence how I experience authority and leadership. In my family
it is my mother who was good at politics, which in turn shaped how I viewed
leadership – she knows how to make collaborative alliances inside and outside the
family with those close to her like no one I have ever met – and my daughters
follow in her footsteps. This gendered experience of my parents meant that fem-
inist theories of power that failed to accommodate divergent patterns grated (and
continue to grate) on me. Of course, I am a feminist – in the sense that I recognise
sedimented patterns of women’s subordination in every time and place and feel
committed to challenging them – but I need a theory of gendered power that
allows for divergent relationships and individual freedom as well as sedimented
hierarchy and constraint.
I have learned about politics through childcare: take the example of the politics
of blankets. When my husband, Nicholas, and I became parents we were clear that
the responsibility for our daughters’ care was shared between us. The only issue we
intractably argued about was the number of blankets that small babies need on a
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cold winter’s night. Nicholas was influenced by knowing a baby who died of cot
death (overheating is one of the possible explanations). I hate the cold and despite
our shared value (believing we were equally responsible for protecting our chil-
dren), I was the main carer in terms of time and work when they were tiny babies,
so I felt I knew best that cold would be more likely to bring suffering. We dis-
cussed the evidence but in comparing likely discomfort against the unlikely possi-
bility of death (as I saw it), it felt impossible to be cool, calm and rational. We got
heated – the dial was turned up – at least internally in our heads, doubting each
other’s expertise and throwing evidence at each other in a bid to persuade the
other; in short, we got political. The conflict was not expressed with vehemence.
We somehow resolved this disagreement each evening peacefully, sometimes by
sneaking into the child’s bedroom and taking on/off blankets, and it never became
difficult, even verbally, but the point here is that the number of blankets, as part of
the social and emotional work of protecting our children, became political. At
which point did this social work turn political? When a difference of opinion over
the issue of blankets became fraught – it mattered and we couldn’t find a con-
sensus – creating a form of concentrated, emotional and charged sociality that
couldn’t be easily resolved, it was at that moment that it became political.
One way of understanding politics is to see it as an intense form of sociality:
turbo-charged social, where everything is magnified with the dial turned up. And
‘everything’ is not just conflictual as there is as much co-operation, resonance and
potential harmony in politics as hostility and alienation. It wasn’t just the expres-
sion of conflict I remember in our politics of blankets, we found an everyday way
of dealing with difference by improvising with a mix of concession, compromise
and subterfuge, until the babies grew up enough to decide on their own number
of blankets. Gradually parenting requires a shift of responsibility from adult to child
and as the dependents get less dependent, the social relationships expressed in
decision-making (e.g., about what is safe and allowed) can become more political
too. As long as politics is possible – debate, compromise and subterfuge between
parents and children – then the relationship tends to keep moving along even
when disagreements persist. So, good political work is about moving along in the
face of difference despite a concentration and intensity of emotion – a magnifica-
tion of the social.
I have allowed myself this tangent into my own family politics to give an
example of how the social can get political. Whether navigating social relationships
or family politics, my identity is influenced by age, class, race and gender, by
working at SOAS, being a Londoner, and so on. It is embarrassing to write about
oneself; but if we shrink from it – for example, by resorting to a shallow reflexivity
that implies that one’s account is determined by a few facets of one’s social identity,
or worse only one – how can we write with honesty and rigour? If the rigour of
anthropology depends on explaining our own partiality, then we must do this with
some sense of proportion. The alternative is to bore you with endless detail that
appears disconnected from the research. So, although I have only revealed a little –
and there is so much you (and I) don’t know about my six decades of life so far,
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partly because most of it has been forgotten – what I tell you should be pertinent.
This is what Faucher-King does when she writes:
My aim is to ‘exoticise’ modern western polities and denaturalise the world
that we would otherwise take for granted. I have turned my attention to
Britain because as a native of France its political culture is both familiar and
unfamiliar to me.
(2005: 5)
I share her aim but suggest that diversity within countries is so great, that the
unfamiliar is easily found just beyond one’s own doorstep.
To be honest about past influences, I still need to explain how I am studying
these entanglements of disciplines, past, present and future, researcher and resear-
ched, when it involves holding in mind many processes at the same time. Stacey
and Mowles propose a helpful analogy from complexity sciences in their explora-
tion of change that gets to the heart of this entanglement. They point out that
patterns in the natural world (or in simulated computer models) display paradoxes
of stability and instability, predictability and unpredictability, at the same time (2016).
Rather than Kant’s dualistic ‘both … and’ type explanations, we need to hold the
idea of human experience as paradoxical in the same moment and space, they
propose (ibid: 298), in order to theorise about how processes and actions relate to
each other. Paradox here is not meant in the casual conversational sense of an irony
or a contradiction; it is a particular kind of irresolvable contradiction. Mowles, with
whom I teach at the University of Hertfordshire,2 clarifies that it is a form of
contradictory thinking and doing where one idea defines and negates the other but
neither can be banished. It creates ‘an absurdity, “para doxa” – or against common
sense – because the two ideas are mutually exclusive’ (2015: 5, 13). For our pur-
poses, the most significant example of this is the I/me dialectic of Mead. His idea
of self intersubjectivity means that we ‘are capable of seeing ourselves as others see
us, a peculiar property of our central nervous system, we are able to take ourselves
as objects to ourselves … we are social even in our private thought processes’, as
Mowles explains (ibid: 22–3). At last, we have a way of understanding the con-
tradiction between individual and social experience, of freedom and constraint, of
agency and structure as paradoxical – each is defined and negated by each other, so
never resolved.
The problem with many existing theories about parliament is that they fail to
take a hard look at these entangled paradoxes of social life. Rational choice theories
that assume MPs act on the basis of an assessment of individual self-interest ignore
the way MPs are embedded in social relations. The other main strand of scholarly
theory usually aimed at parliament – institutionalism with its assumptions about
how people are governed by rules – fails to explain individual variation, why
people ignore norms, and how institutions change. MPs experience paradoxes as
socially embedded individuals like but also unlike other human beings. The I/me
dialectic for politicians is amplified by their claim to represent 10,000s of people
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and their daily interaction with endless overlapping audiences that present con-
flicting, complex and confusing demands. The paradox for them is the same in its
logic as it is for other humans, but magnified by exposure to an enlarged audience
representing even more complex differences and expectations than the rest of us.
MPs are ordinary in experiencing the paradox of being individual and social, but
extraordinary in dealing with a far greater intensity; they operate in a higher key.
The discipline of anthropology has something unique to offer but only if we are
in conversation with other disciplines: critiquing, debating and borrowing from
each other. We are not alone in arguing that developing a methodology for
studying parliament requires a theory as part of your approach. Our focus on
interdisciplinarity, but also reflexivity, a plurality of views and entanglements, is
shared with strands of sociology and philosophy. It is combining these with a
continual return to everyday practices and social relationships, and comparing with
other communities, that enables anthropology to provide unique and rigorous
perspectives. That does not mean that what we find is holistic, in the sense of
comprehensively describing the whole, as the job is never finished. Which is why
it makes sense to end on pointing to what we don’t know.
What we don’t know
There are several types of ignorance about parliaments. First, there is what we
don’t know because we have ignored it, we are yet to research or make sense of it.
Second, there is what we don’t know because understanding people is never
complete. Third, there is what we don’t know we don’t know – or unknown
unknowns, as popularised by US politician Donald Rumsfeld. So, I will end on
some remarks about these various unknowns.
Beginning with the kind of ignorance born of ignoring, the study of parliaments
by the dominant disciplines – political science, history, gender studies, public
administration and legal studies – give us a focus on powers, functions, rules, roles
and outputs. These tend be studied in documents – laws, rules, standing orders,
reports – by watching parliamentary debates or committee meetings, and by
deriving knowledge from interviews. In most countries we know a huge amount
about individual politicians and their identity by gender and background; in the
UK this is detailed in Dod’s Parliamentary Companion and all MPs appear in
media interviews, have websites, Twitter accounts and much besides, although
what we ‘know’ is more about their claims and performative representation of
themselves than their thoughts, values and relationships. Traditional scholars of
parliament rarely tell us about the areas that are more complex to study: processes,
relationships and rituals.
Strangely parliaments have been mostly ignored by disciplines that you might
think would be extremely interested in them – organisational and management
studies. If you do a search on ‘parliament’ and ‘legislature’ in the journals Organi-
sation and the Journal of Management you do not get one article with either in its
title. Research on parliaments is often published in specialist journals (Parliamentary
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Affairs, the Journal of Legislative Studies), or broader ones about politics, so organi-
sational studies scholars may have published there. But in the UK parliament I have
only rarely heard of them venturing into these political institutions.3 So we have
yet to find out what management scholars make of parliaments.
In this book I have drawn together the research undertaken by anthropologists
in recent decades. What have we anthropologists ignored in terms of themes? Now
that I have worked with a psychotherapist in the House of Commons, and read
Andrew Beatty’s book on emotions (2019), I would argue that the psychology of
politicians around the world and the group dynamics they create around them is a
serious gap in our knowledge. The affectual states created in and for politics, why
shared and divergent emotions emerge and their impact on political work – these
are all fruitful lines of inquiry.
There is much more to be studied within political parties. Bignell (2018) has
researched the Green Party in New Zealand, William Schumann (2009) the Liberal
Democrats in Wales and Faucher-King (2005) party conferences in the UK. But
what happens within and between political parties deserves anthropological atten-
tion across time and space, as they are changeable in both their internal dynamics
and relations with others.
The political economy of parliamentarians deserves attention by anthropologists
in every country. How are different individuals and groups of politicians entangled
with lobbyists, journalists and civil/corporate interests, and how and why is this
changing? What are the everyday patterns of patronage between politicians, and
between politicians and other people they encounter, from the beginning to the
end of their careers? How does this relate to inequalities that politicians are
embedded in, challenging and contributing to, whether based on gender, age, class,
ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, ability and so on?
We need to know more about the digital revolution and its impact on political
communication, made even more urgent by the response to and impact of the
Covid-19 pandemic, climate breakdown, the decline in mental health and other
emergencies. Finally, while I have been biased towards researching parliament’s
(i.e., backbenchers and opposition parties) scrutiny role, the far more difficult task
of doing anthropological research on government has become urgent. Govern-
ments have been scrutinised by anthropologists in the Global South (for examples,
see Crewe and Axelby 2013), but far less in Europe, the US and other countries in
the Global North and very rarely from the viewpoint of different groups of poli-
ticians and civil servants.
The second area of ignorance – what we don’t know because research is
always incomplete – is endlessly demanding. Diversity across time and space,
and within communities, means our job is never done. Finding out what is
specific to a culture, or even to an individual, as opposed to generalisable is
never finished, and made more complex still by the inevitability of change.
Anna Tsing in her beautifully written The Mushroom at the End of the World tells
us about forests: destroyed in specific ways but also connected in a chain of
destruction:
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It is impossible to explain the situation though the actions of a single hammer
striking every nail with the same stroke. The difference between disappearing
forests, forests plagued by overcrowding and pests, and forests left to grow when
conversions to plantations prove uneconomic, matter. Intersecting historical
processes produced forest ruins in Oregon and Japan, but it would be
preposterous to argue that forest-making forces and reactions are therefore
everywhere the same. The singularity of interspecies gatherings matters; that’s why
the world remains ecologically heterogeneous despite globe-spanning powers.
(2015: 213)
My equivalent to forests is parliaments. I have tried to bring out the differences in
parliaments and the relationships politicians have with each other and others. There
is so much we don’t know about relationships and everyday interactions between
MPs and those they claim to represent across the world in parliaments and con-
stituencies; between politicians and those in the private sector, civil society and
government; and between politicians within their various political parties and fac-
tions. Like Tsing’s forests, it would be absurd to argue they were either all the same
or unconnected; after all, democracy has become a global idea, even if the effects
vary. Tsing continues:
The intricacies of global coordination also matter; not all connections have the
same effects. To write a history of ruin, we need to follow broken bits of
many stories and to move in and out of many patches. In the play of global
power, indeterminate encounters are still important.
(ibid)
These broken bits require careful selection. How do we know which bits are vital
to the story? Where should we start? Bourdieu counsels:
The difficulty in sociology, is to manage to think in a completely astonished
and disconcerted way about things you thought you had always understood.
That is why you sometimes have to begin with the most difficult things in
order to understand easier things properly.
(1991: 207)
So, we take nothing for granted (or as little as possible) and begin with what is
difficult in the sense that it looks obvious but isn’t. In my own study of parliament
I have spent most of my research trying to find out what peers and MPs actually do
(rather than what they say they do) and it is been surprisingly difficult because I
realised as I went along that it is not clear what politics means – it means different
things to different people. Once I decided it was a form of work with friends and
foes (or at least this is a good definition for thinking with), then it became easier.
When choosing which bits to watch, think with and write about we have to
improvise and experiment, creating narratives that are as persuasive as possible for
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that moment, warranted assertions, as John Dewey called them. Like historians
maybe we need to keep revising important old stories to update them in the light
of the present; after all, since history changes as we get further away from it, so an
anthropology entangled with history and geography surely has to keep iterating its
empirical and theoretical narratives? Indeed I have re-written a story about law-
making (in a book on the Commons [Crewe 2015a], an article [2017] and now in
Chapter 4) and although the skeleton is recognisable, I have added more flesh on
the bones – improvising on a narrative riff. In thickening descriptions Geertz-style
we need to get away from the idea of splitting context and substance. If the poli-
tical and social are entangled, then they do not serve as ‘context’ – both are part of
the substance of what is going on.
Jastinder Kaur writing about political coups points to various forms of entan-
glement. Gluckman’s idea of the peace in the feud is central to what she found.
Even during the violence supposed foes offered each other hospitality and even at
times of peace ethnic tensions erupted into quarrels (Kaur 2017: 21–2). One pro-
tagonist told her, ‘They’re fine drinking grog with each other, partying together,
working together, and helping each other out in times of need. But we have to
fight the bigger conflict that government and history keep forcing on everyone’
(ibid: 26). This is far from unique to Fiji. History is not as abrupt as it appears, even
when there are coups. Some have a long, gradual build-up and surprise no one
whereas others are abrupt and shocking, except obviously to those involved in the
planning. The same is true of any event. When we are shocked by critical events, it
is often because we haven’t been paying enough attention – there are warning
signs that go unnoticed because we are busy looking elsewhere. The spread of
Covid-19 was both a shock but also exposed existing and rising inequalities. In
India it was Tablighi Jamaat, a Muslim missionary movement, who were told by
the government not to hold an event and subsequently blamed for a spike in
Covid-19 cases, while Hindu religious events were unnoticed and unblamed.4
When India’s PM Nahendra Modi announced a lockdown to prevent the virus
spreading, 100,000s of daily labourers left the cities to make their way home, often
by walking, knowing that being unable to work was more dangerous to them than
Covid-19. When politicians ignore the warning signs, it can cause terrible
suffering.
Finally, we have a third area of ignorance – the unknown unknowns. By defi-
nition I don’t know what I don’t know; but that doesn’t mean I have nothing to
say about this state of unknowing. It can be broken by fresh perspectives, new
scholars (with different points of view, histories and identities from the established
ones) taking a look at parliaments. Understanding the impact of the digital revo-
lution and artificial intelligence on parliaments, and how they relate to various
emergencies (democracy, mental health, climate change, Covid-19, poverty), con-
tains plenty of unknown unknowns. If I am allowed only one wish for this book, it
is that it might encourage other anthropologists to study parliaments around the
world or better still, to work in governments and stand for election. Perhaps we
anthropologists will only be able to provide properly thick descriptions and theories
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of parliaments once we work for and with them or are even members of them
ourselves, genuine parliamentary participant-observers. Those anthropologists that
are doing this already deserve our respect and support.
I hope to continue learning about parliaments. To discover the unknown
unknowns, I try to keep my mind open and avoid the rush to moral judgement.
That is especially difficult with politicians; we think we know them and we know
we are disappointed, but it is when we have a sense of certainty before we have
begun that anthropology fails to delight. Let’s begin with uncertainty.
Notes
1 Thank you to my colleague Kiran Chauhan for alerting me to this passage in Mead,
which we will write about in a new book we are editing together about leadership.
2 Chris Mowles is the Director of a multi-disciplinary postgraduate course on management,
which I teach on with five others: https://www.herts.ac.uk/courses/dmanma-by-research
3 André Spicer and Jo Silvester from CASS Business School are rare exceptions (https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/09/house-commons-less-toxic-workplace-mps-
hr-procedures, accessed 10 April 2020) and Weinberg’s 2011 edited volume The Psychology of
Politicians is extremely unusual for the UK. These contributions are largely normative, advis-
ing on sexual harassment, induction and training for MPs, as examples.
4 See https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/tablighi-jamaat-event-india-worst-corona
virus-vector-200407052957511.html and https://www.soas.ac.uk/news/newsitem146991.
html, accessed 12 April 2020.
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